2212393 (Refugee)

[2023] AATA 3248

2212393 (Refugee) [2023] AATA 3248 (4 July 2023)

DECISION RECORD

DIVISION:Migration & Refugee Division

CASE NUMBER:  2212393

COUNTRY OF REFERENCE:                   Lebanon

MEMBER:Peter Vlahos

DATE:4 July 2023

PLACE OF DECISION:  Melbourne

DECISION:The Tribunal remits the matter for reconsideration with the direction that the applicant satisfies s 36(2)(a) of the Migration Act.

This Statement was made on 4^th July 2023 at 7.30AM.

CATCHWORDS  

REFUGEE – protection visa – Lebanon – religion – beaten and stabbed by militia group after refusing attempted recruitment – fear of harm from that group and others because of criminal record and former drug use – mental health and inability to access treatment – returnee from western country after long absence and general political, economic, security and social conditions – no family or social networks – application made after spouse visa cancelled – imprisonment and immigration detention, rehabilitation courses, mental health diagnosis and ongoing treatment – country information – forced recruitment not used at the time – claims on religious grounds not accepted – claims on economic, security, social and mental health grounds accepted – decision under review remitted

LEGISLATION

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 5H(1)(a), 5J(1), 36(2)(a), 65, 424A

Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), Schedule 2

CASES

Guo v MIMA (1996) 64 FCR 151

Kopalapillai v MIMA (1998) 86 FCR 547

MIMA v Rajalingam (1999) 93 FCR 220

Randhawa v MILGEA (1994) 52 FCR 437

Selvadurai v MIEA (1994) 34 ALD 347

Any references appearing in square brackets indicate that information has been omitted from this decision pursuant to section 431 of the Migration Act 1958 and replaced with generic information which does not allow the identification of an applicant, or their relative or other dependants.

STATEMENT OF DECISION AND REASONS

APPLICATION FOR REVIEW

1. This is an application for review of a decision made by a delegate of the Minister for Home Affairs on 22 August 2022 to refuse to grant the applicant a protection visa under s 65 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act).

2. The applicant who claims to be a citizen of Lebanon, applied for the visa on 5 August 2022. The delegate refused to grant the visa on the basis that the applicant did not satisfy sub-section 36(2) of the Act.

   Procedural history

3. Following the applicant’s review application being lodged on 24 August 2022, the Tribunal dispatched a hearing invitation (first) on 21 September 2022 for a hearing scheduled for 3 October 2022. This hearing was postponed as requested by the applicant on 23 September 2022. The applicant requested an ‘extension of time to prepare his case’ of one month duration. The hearing was adjourned as requested, and the applicant was notified by the Tribunal on 26 September 2022 that no new date had been set.

4. On 26 September 2022, the Tribunal invited (second) the applicant to a hearing scheduled for 3 November 2022. On 1 October 2022, the Tribunal received an email from the applicant with a completed hearing response form, which indicated that the applicant would be attending the hearing which had been scheduled for 3 November 2022. The email also included (‘attached thereto’) documents in support of the applicant’s review which included the following:

   §Department of Justice and Community Safety letter which stated that the applicant was identified as falling into the low-risk category for violent recidivism, dated 25 July 2019.

   §Education certificates including drug treatment programs.

   §Letter from [Company] regarding his involvement in drug and alcohol programs he had completed in [Correctional Centre], dated 5 February 2020.

   §Psychological Report by [Mr A] (psychologist) dated 7 June 2022.

   §County Court of Victoria ‘Reasons for Sentence’ for sentence hearing made [in] April 2019.

5. On 20 October 2022, the applicant emailed the Tribunal to advise that he was unable to attend the hearing scheduled for 3 November 2022 because his mental health was very poor at that time and he was undertaking medical treatment with doctors belonging to IHMS. The email stated that the doctors would assess his medical condition every two weeks, and he would be able to provide a report in 14 days. The email requested that the Tribunal adjourn the case, and that the applicant would be “back on track in the next few months.”

6. On 21 October 2022, the Tribunal wrote to the applicant to advise that the hearing scheduled for 3 November 2022 had been postponed as requested, and that no new date had been scheduled.

7. On 23 November 2022, the Tribunal wrote to the applicant requesting the medical report referred to in the applicant’s email of 20 October 2022, which the applicant had indicated he would forward to the Tribunal when it became available. The email also stated that the Tribunal was conscious that that the applicant remained in detention whilst his review was ongoing, and requested an update as to the applicant’s current mental state and his ability to attend a hearing in the future, requesting the applicant provide a timeframe on when he believed he would be ‘fit and well’ to attend a hearing if he did not believe he would be fit to attend a hearing in the near future.

8. On 5 December 2022, the applicant responded to the Tribunal’s email and advised that the IHMS doctors had provided the applicant with wrong medical records, and that he had requested his medical records again and had been told he should received the documents with 10-days and would send it to the Tribunal when he received the records.

9. On 13 December 2022, the Tribunal wrote to the applicant inviting him (third) to attend a hearing scheduled for 25 January 2023.

10. On 13 December 2022, the applicant emailed the Tribunal to request a further hearing postponement. In the email, the applicant stated that he believed he was not yet ready to appear before the Tribunal and believed he was not in a good position with his mental health and was still receiving treatment by the IHMS doctors in detention. ‘Attached’ to the email was the applicant’s IHMS medical records. The applicant requested that the hearing be postponed for another 6 to 8 weeks.

11. On 20 December 2022, the Tribunal wrote to the applicant to advise that the hearing scheduled for the 25 January 2023 had been postponed and that the hearing would be rescheduled for a future date.

12. On 22 December 2022, the applicant emailed the Tribunal and requested that the hearing be adjourned for “at least another 10 to 12 weeks from the last scheduled date which is 25 January 2023’. The applicant stated that he believed that this would give him enough time to ‘overcome my mental health issues’ and to find legal representation.

13. On 13 February 2023, the Tribunal wrote to the applicant advising that the Tribunal wished to progress his review application because it was not proper to allow persons to remain in detention for any period of time other than the time required to have the matter to the Tribunal’s attention, and that the Tribunal proposed to list the matter for a hearing in March 2023. The Tribunal’s letter also stated that if the applicant did not wish to attend a hearing before the Tribunal, the matter could proceed to be determined on the papers and where the Tribunal would direct questions to the applicant under section 424A of Act.

14. The letter stated that given the length of time the matter had been before the Tribunal and the number of postponement requests already granted, the Tribunal was not prepared to postpone the matter for 10 to 12 weeks as requested by the applicant. The Tribunal’s letter requested the applicant to advise the Tribunal on whether he would prefer to attend a hearing before the Tribunal or waive his right to a hearing and proceed with Tribunal asking for information on the papers as proposed. The letter also invited the applicant to provide the Tribunal with any medical evidence or documents in relation to the applicant’s current mental health concerns.

15. On 14 February 2023, the applicant emailed the Tribunal and advised that he had contacted Legal Aid and was inquiring whether they may be able to provide legal representation for his Tribunal matter. The email stated that the applicant had not made any progress on his mental health and this is why he needed a legal team to assist him.

16. On 7 March 2023, the applicant emailed the Tribunal to advise that he had a hearing at the Tribunal  in the General Division on 5 – 6 April 2023 in relation to “permanent residency” and requested the Tribunal to schedule a hearing for his protection visa after April or May.

17. On 2 May 2023, the Tribunal wrote to the applicant to invite him to attend (fourth) hearing before the Tribunal on 23 May 2023.

18. On 12 May 2023, the applicant emailed the Tribunal to request that the hearing scheduled for 23 May be postponed for one or two months because the applicant was not mentally fit enough to present for a hearing before the Tribunal, and because the applicant had another hearing before another division of the Tribunal on 1-2 June 2023 and that he was “very stressed out”.

19. On 22 May 2023, the Tribunal wrote to the applicant to advise that the postponement request had not been granted and that the scheduled hearing would proceed on 23 May 2023. The Tribunal noted in its letter that there had been three previous postponements granted in relation to this review application which were granted on the basis of the applicant needing more time to seek legal representation, time to settle his mental health concerns, and due to his matter in a different division of the Tribunal. The letter also stated that the Tribunal was not prepared to postpone the matter any further but would allow two weeks for any further submissions the applicant may wish to make after the hearing.

20. The hearing proceeded as scheduled on 23 May 2023 but was ultimately adjourned to further date to allow the applicant further time to prepare.

21. On 2 June 2023, the Tribunal sent the applicant an invitation to attend the hearing scheduled for 27 June 2023. The hearing invitation noted that as discussed at the previous hearing, the Tribunal would not consider any further adjournment requests and that if the applicant was not able to proceed with the hearing on the day, the Tribunal would determine the review application on the papers.

22. The applicant appeared before the Tribunal on 27 June 2023 to give evidence and present arguments.

23. The Tribunal hearing was conducted with the assistance of an interpreter in the Arabic (Lebanese) and English languages.

    CRITERIA FOR A PROTECTION VISA

24. The criteria for a protection visa are set out in s 36 of the Act and Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (the Regulations). An applicant for the visa must meet one of the alternative criteria in s 36(2)(a), (aa), (b), or (c). That is, he or she is either a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under the ‘refugee’ criterion, or on other ‘complementary protection’ grounds, or is a member of the same family unit as such a person and that person holds a protection visa of the same class.

25. Section 36(2)(a) provides that a criterion for a protection visa is that the applicant for the visa is a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the person is a refugee.

26. A person is a refugee if, in the case of a person who has a nationality, they are outside the country of their nationality and, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, are unable or unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of that country: s 5H(1)(a). In the case of a person without a nationality, they are a refugee if they are outside the country of their former habitual residence and, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, are unable or unwilling to return to that country: s 5H(1)(b).

27. Under s 5J(1), a person has a well-founded fear of persecution if they fear being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, there is a real chance they would be persecuted for one or more of those reasons, and the real chance of persecution relates to all areas of the relevant country. Additional requirements relating to a ‘well-founded fear of persecution’ and circumstances in which a  person will be taken not to have such a fear are set out in ss 5J(2)-(6) and ss 5K-LA, which are extracted in the attachment to this decision.

28. If a person is found not to meet the refugee criterion in s 36(2)(a), he or she may nevertheless meet the criteria for the grant of the visa if he or she is a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the Minister has substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of being removed from Australia to a receiving country, there is a real risk that he or she will suffer significant harm: s 36(2)(aa) (‘the complementary protection criterion’). The meaning of significant harm, and the circumstances in which a person will be taken not to face a real risk of significant harm, are set out in ss 36(2A) and (2B), which are extracted in the attachment to this decision.

    Mandatory considerations

29. In accordance with Ministerial Direction No.84, made under s 499 of the Act, the Tribunal has taken account of the ‘Refugee Law Guidelines’ and ‘Complementary Protection Guidelines’ prepared by the Department of Home Affairs, and country information assessments prepared by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade expressly for protection status determination purposes, to the extent that they are relevant to the decision under consideration.

    CONSIDERATION OF CLAIMS AND EVIDENCE

30. The issue in this case is whether Australia has protection obligations in respect of the applicant. For the following reasons, the Tribunal has concluded that the matter should be remitted for reconsideration.

    Identity and Country of reference

31. The applicant claims that he was born on [Date] in Tripoli, Lebanon. The applicant provided certified copy of his passport.[1] Issued [in] 2016, to the Department of Home Affairs (‘the Department’) that confirms the applicant’s evidence as to his date and place of birth. There is no evidence to suggest that he has a right to enter and reside, whether temporarily or permanently, in any other country.

    [1] Passport [Number] issued [in] 2016 and expiry date [2021] issued by Embassy of Lebanon

32. Accordingly, the Tribunal finds that the applicant is a citizen of Lebanon and that as such his protection claims will be assessed against Lebanon as the country of reference and ‘receiving country’ respectively.

    Applicant’s migration history

33. On 27 August 2007, the applicant applied for an offshore Sponsored Family Visitor visa (UL-679) which was sponsored by his brother. On 11 September 2007 the application for a UL-679 visa was refused by the Department on the basis of the applicant ‘not being a genuine visitor’. On 28 March 2008 another application for a UL-679 visa was undertaken again sponsored by the applicant’s brother. On 17 July the UL-679 visa was granted. [In] August 2008, the applicant arrived in Australia. [In] October 2008 the applicant departed Australia for Lebanon. On 18 March 2009 an application for a Partner visa (UF309/BC100) was submitted offshore. On 12 August 2009 the applicant’s UF-309 visa was granted. [In] July 2010 the applicant departs Australia on his UF-309 visa. [In] August 2010 the applicant arrives in Australia on UF-309 visa. On 10 August 2012 the applicant’s BC-100 visa was granted by the Department.

34. On 1 December 2012 an Apprehended Violence Order (‘AVO’) was made against the applicant ex-wife (applicant claims order was put in place for damaging a wall during an argument, but order allowed him to reside together during order’s duration). On 1 July 2016 an AVO was made against the applicant by his ex-wife (applicant claims this occurred during a contentious child custody case and was put in place for matters she alleged had occurred in the past).

35. On 23 January 2017 an application for Citizenship conferral was made by the applicant. On 1 November 2018 the application for citizenship conferral was refused on the basis of a ‘bar on approval – offences.’ On 14 December 2017 a Family Violence Order was made against the applicant by his current spouse but allowed them to continue to live together during the duration of the order. [In] April 2019 the applicant was convicted of [offence] and sentenced to 3 years 9 months imprisonment.

36. On 17 June 2019 the applicant’s BC-100 visa was cancelled on character grounds (ref: section 501, Migration Act).[2]

    [2] Note: Information in the Department’s File records indicate that the applicant has convictions in Australia for [offences].

37. On 7 April 2022 the decision to cancel was not revoked. On 13 April 2022 the applicant submitted an application for review to the AAT (General Division) re: BC-100 visa cancellation.[3] On 4 July 2022 the AAT review re: cancellation of BC-100 visa is affirmed. On 5 August 2022 the applicant submitted an application for Protection visa (XA-866). On 22 August 2022 the application for Protection visa (XA-866) was refused.

    [3] 2022/3036 AAT 6File (General Division).

38. On 8 August 2022 the applicants makes a judicial review application to the Federal Court challenging the AAT decision to affirm cancellation of the applicant’s BC-100 visa.

39. On 24 August 2022 the applicant’s AAT review re: Protection visa (XA-866) refusal commences.[4]

    [4] AAT (Migration & Refugee Division) File no. 2212393.

40. On 25 October 2022, the applicant’s judicial review (case File no. AAT(GD)2022/3036) – Minister withdraws objection to review, and the matter is returned to the AAT (GD) for review.

    The applicant’s claims for Protection

41. The applicant’s written claims are found on the Department of Home Affairs’ File.[5] The claims can be summarised as follows:

    [5] Department of Home Affairs File [Reference].

    §The applicant left Lebanon because there was hardship, violence, religious and political conflict, and there was tensions between the Sunni and Alawite sects in Tripoli.

    §In February 2009, the applicant was stabbed by an Alawite group, the Arab Democratic Party, and was beaten with rifles and stabbed. This incident occurred after a gang tried to recruit him to work for them and he refused, and this angered them.

    • The applicant is afraid that if he returns to Lebanon he will be targeted and harmed by the Alawites, who have weapons and are powerful and dangerous. They might stab or hurt him if he refuses to work with them, and is afraid they might send him to Syria to fight for them.
    • The applicant is afraid that Daesh/ISIS will target him because they would believe that he goes against the ideals of their interpretation of Islam, because of his criminal history and former drug use.
    • The applicant is afraid of gangs and militants which rob and stand over people in Lebanon. He indicates that when he speaks Arabic people will be able to tell that he has not lived in Lebanon for years, and is afraid they will target him because they will see or hear that he has been living in a Western country.
    • The applicant is afraid that if he needed medical treatment for physical injuries he would not be able to afford the treatment.
    • The applicant is afraid he would be unable to access mental health care and treatment in Lebanon which he needs to continue his rehabilitation. In Lebanon he never heard of anyone accessing mental health treatment, and he hid his mental health from his family, not thinking he could talk about it or get help; now that he has received support and treatment in Australia, he knows it is important to continue his treatment.
    • He has not lived in Lebanon for 12 years, and does not have the networks or connections to set himself up, and would not have accommodation, a job, family support, or access to mental health care or medical treatment, and would have no money to pay for this, or food and other items he needs.
    • The applicant states that It is not part of his faith to lie, and if someone asked him about what has happened, he would have to tell them about his mental health difficulties, his drug use and criminal record. If people in Lebanon knew about these things he would be in danger and be discriminated against, and he will be laughed at, bullied, excluded, and targeted. Because of his mental health he could be called ‘crazy’ and not treated equally, and because of his criminal record he would be considered bad person who could not be trusted, and a thief.

    Supportive documents provided to the Tribunal

1. In support of his application the applicant submitted the following documents:

   §The Department of Home Affairs Protection visa decision record dated 22 August 2022.

   §Statement from his current spouse.[6]

   §Statements by the applicant’s brothers and sister-in-law.[7]

   §Excerpts of various medical referrals (various dates) which make reference to a past diagnosis of Bipolar Affective Disorder.

   §A ‘copy’ of a translated letter from an attorney-at-law (Lebanon), dated 18 July 2022, making reference to an incident in 2009.[8]

   §‘Copy’ Psychologist Report – [Mr A] dated 20.05.2023.[9]

   §Copy (dated 19 March 2019) DFAT (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade) Country Information Report – Lebanon. 

   §Miscellaneous reports concerning the current social, pollical and economic situation in Lebanon.[10]

   [6] see, Department of Home Affairs File no. [Reference]

   [7] see, Department of Home Affairs File no. [Reference]

   [8] Ibid

   [9] see, AAT File – documents.

   [10] Ibid, AAT File – applicant’s documents.

   EVIDENCE AT THE HEARING

   The applicant’s circumstances in Australia since his arrival

2. The applicant told the Tribunal that he arrived in Australia on a ‘tourist visa’ and again, in 2009 on a Partner visa (subclause 309).

3. The applicant said that his first marriage ended in divorce. His first marriage was very traumatic for the applicant as he had lost to children (sons) and this took a heavy toll on his physical and mental health. The applicant told the Tribunal that he would frequently visit his sons’ graves.

4. The applicant said that his first marriage two daughters (one, aged [Age]- years-of-age and the other, [Age]-years-of-age) which he loved and cared for “very much” and would regularly see them before the deterioration of his physical and mental health.

5. The applicant said that after the dissolution of his first marriage (which happened in 2014), the applicant “re-married” to his current spouse but has “no children”.

6. The applicant told the Tribunal that he had criminal charges against him name – after certain criminal acts were committed by him in May 2018. The applicant said that his suffering the “deaths of his sons” made him depressed and began to seek refuge for his heavy grief by taking narcotics which eventually caused him not only to suffer a number of physical and psychological illness but led him to commit a series of crimes using a firearm.

7. The applicant said that he had been charged and convicted and had spent “four years in prison.” The applicant said that he regretted this period of his life. He also told the Tribunal that before his “life went out of control” he had established for himself his “own business” as a [Occupation]. However, his personal depression as a result of not coping with the deaths of his sons, the applicant said he lost his business and turned to crime.

8. The applicant said that before that “difficult time” in his life here, in Australia, he had never been involved in crime and since spending time in prison and ‘in detention’ the applicant had undertaken a series of drug-rehabilitation courses, stayed ‘clean of drugs’ and has engaged with health professionals in attempt to address his physical and mental health.

   Problems in Lebanon – the need to seek protection in Australia

9. The applicant admitted to the Tribunal that he decided “to leave Lebanon” because there was always “hardship, violence, religious tensions and political conflicts” and there was always a “ongoing tension” “between the Sunni and Alawite sects” in Tripoli.

10. The applicant said that he “never cared” or “sought to be involved” in politics or in “religion” movements. He said, he had no interests in that and that he only wanted to live his own life free from tensions, conflict and turmoil.

11. The applicant said that where he lived (in a suburb of Tripoli) the tensions which dominated generally – the Lebanon always intruded on his own life and work. The applicant told the Tribunal that when he “was working at a local [Workplace]” the applicant said a group “of youths” (in February 2009) demanded him to “get involved” in “with them” in “doing things”. The applicant described this group as a ‘Alawite group’ aligned with the ‘Arab Democratic Party’ and when “he refused” their invite, the applicant said that he was “beaten and stabbed”.

12. The applicant said that from that time – having experienced violence, he was determined to leave the Lebanon for Australia where his brothers lived.

13. The applicant told the Tribunal that the authorities “could not provide any protection” to him that was effective and guaranteed.

14. The applicant told the Tribunal that if he returns to Lebanon, he will “again be targeted” and “harmed” by the Alawites in his “local area”. The applicant said that these groups are always armed and do not care about the consequences of their actions nor do they care about the local authorities which have no real authority to provide proper protection to people.

15. The applicant fears, he told the Tribunal, that if these local Alawites again approach him, they may demand of him to “go to Syria to fight for them.” The applicant also expressed a fear that ‘radical political and religious elements’ will target him if he was to return to Lebanon because they “might consider him as having gone against their interpretation of Islam, because of his criminal past” and “drug use”.

16. The applicant said that where he will return (to his suburb) it would be easy for radical elements to “target him” because he will be easily identified by the way and means he goes about his business as “a local that had returned to Lebanon from a western country.”

17. The applicant said if he was forced to return to Lebanon “he will have no where to live”. The applicant admitted that he had his mother still living in Tripoli in a “small family-owned apartment” but she was ill (with cancer) and had “another female living with her” and there was no available space for him to live there.

    Fears of the Applicant concerning his physical and mental health

18. The applicant said that “if he needed medical treatment for his physical injuries” he would “not be able to afford the treatment” in Lebanon.

19. The applicant said that he feared that “he would be unable to access mental health care and treatment in Lebanon” which he requires to “continue his rehabilitation.” The applicant told the Tribunal that he “never heard of anyone accessing mental health treatment” in Lebanon.

20. The applicant also said that while in Lebanon, he had “hid his mental health issues from his family”, “not thinking he could talk about it” or “get help.” The applicant told the Tribunal, “now that he has received support and treatment in Australia” he “understands” “it is important to continue with his treatment.”

21. The applicant also said that he had not lived in the Lebanon for “14 years” and “does not have networks or (any) connections to set himself up” if he was to return to Lebanon. The applicant said that he “had no accommodation, no job, family support, or access to mental health care and medical treatment” and “would have no money to pay for any assistance” he might require. Moreover, the applicant would have “no money” to purchase the necessities of life if he had to return to Lebanon.

22. The applicant said that “in Australia” he had his wife which regardless of what he had done in the past supports him. He also said he has his brothers as a family support network and important of all he does not wish to “be far away from his two daughters.”

23. The applicant ended his evidence telling the Tribunal that “it is not part of his faith to lie” and if “someone asked him about what has happened (in his life) he would have to tell them about his mental difficulties, his drug use and criminal record”. The applicant explained to the Tribunal that “if people in Lebanon (in his local area) knew about these things” he “would be in danger  and would be discriminated against” and he would be “ridiculed” “bullied”, “excluded” socially and even “targeted” with violence. Moreover, because of his “mental health issues” the applicant feared that he “would be called ‘crazy’” and “not treated equally, and because of “his criminal record” he “would be considered a bad person” and would “not be trusted” and considered “a thief”.

24. The applicant was advised by the Tribunal that it would not determine his protection claim application until the Tribunal (in the General Division) had determined the issue of the cancellation of his Partner visa.

25. The applicant was asked if he had any other issues he wished to raise with the Tribunal and the applicant’s response was that he had no other matters he wished the Tribunal to consider.

    COUNTRY INFORMATION – LEBANON – RELIGIOUS – POLITICAL – SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC TENSIONS – THE RULE OF LAW [11]

    [11] see, Department of Home Affairs & Trade (DFAT) Country Information Report – Lebanon 19 March 2019 and further updated report – Country Information Report – Lebanon – 26 June 2023.

    Recent History

26. Following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire after World War One, the League of Nations mandated the provinces that comprise present day Lebanon to the direct control of France. Lebanon’s constitution, drawn up in 1926 and still in use, specified a balance of power between the various religious groups; while a 1932 census was used to justify dividing parliamentary seats according to a ratio that favoured the Christian community. Lebanon became independent in November 1943 and the last French troops left in 1946. Aside from a 1958 political crisis fuelled by regional tensions, Lebanon enjoyed general peace and prosperity during its first decades of independence.

27. Tensions between pro- and anti- Palestinian factions, fuelled by sectarian disputes between the large Christian and Muslim communities, led to a civil war in Lebanon in 1975. After the Arab League brokered the National Reconciliation Document (also called the Taef Accord) in 1989, fighting mostly ceased in 1990. The Taef Accord created new power-sharing agreements between Christian and Muslim communities and called for the disarmament of various militias, with the exception of Hezbollah, which remained armed in its capacity as a ‘resistance force’ against occupying Israeli forces in southern Lebanon. Israel withdrew its forces in 2000, but still occupied some disputed lands along the border.

28. Since the end of the civil war, Lebanon’s recent history has been characterised by instability and economic and political crises, including assassination of political rivals, most notably that of former Prime Minister Rafic Hariri in 2005. Syrian forces, which first entered Lebanon in 1976, remained as an occupying force until 2005, departing following a series of protests surrounding Hariri’s assassination. Other crises included an Israeli invasion and conflict between Israel and Hezbollah in 2006, and a Hezbollah takeover of west Beirut in 2008. Frustration with tax increases, corruption and sectarian rule led to mass protests in 2019. The civil war in neighbouring Syria that commenced in 2011 drove 1.5 million refugees into Lebanon, which Lebanon has struggled to absorb.

29. A large-scale chemical explosion in August 2020 destroyed the Port of Beirut when a fire in an adjacent warehouse ignited nearly 3,000 tons of ammonium nitrate. Two-hundred and twenty people died and more than 6,500 were injured. Many Lebanese blamed the explosion on political dysfunction. Mass protests broke out and then-Prime Minister Hassan Diab and his entire cabinet resigned.

30. Since 2020, Lebanon has experienced a severe economic crisis . On 31 October 2022, President Michael Aoun left office at the end of his presidential term. As at publication, the country’s parliamentarians, divided along sectarian lines, have failed to elect Aoun's successor, despite 10 rounds of voting.

    Demography

31. Lebanon has not conducted a census since 1932. According to the CIA World Factbook, the population of Lebanon is approximately 5.3 million citizens, and up to 6.7 million people in total, including refugees.

32. However, estimates of the population vary considerably, chiefly due to uncertainty around the number of Syrian refugees in Lebanon. The CIA World Fact Book estimates there are 830,000 Syrian refugees in Lebanon, while the Lebanese Government estimates there are two million ‘displaced Syrians’ (a broader category than just refugees). Ninety-five per cent of the population is Arab (noting many Lebanese Christians do not identify as Arab, but as Phoenician). The remaining 5 per cent are mainly Armenian. The majority of people live in and around the Mediterranean coast, especially Beirut, which has a population of 2.4 million people. Ninety per cent of the population is urban.

    Economic situation

33. Lebanon is experiencing severe economic depression. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) peaked in 2019 at USD54.9 billion then fell sharply to USD23.1 billion in 2021, according to World Bank figures. Those using US-dollar denominated accounts have had their savings locked or devalued, alongside a severe devaluation in the Lebanese Pound (LBP). Long-running public debt has become unsustainable.

34. Some analysts have claimed that the cause of the debt is overly generous and unsustainable interest payments from the central bank to foreign investors, which, according to the New York Times, amounted to a form of ‘Ponzi scheme’. The currency has been sharply devalued, inflation is very high (over 150 per cent in 2021) and some people have been unable to access savings or afford basic goods and services.

35. Supply of basic goods including medicines, food and fuel is unpredictable, and they are sometimes rationed. Subsidies that were applied to these goods were mostly lifted as the economic crisis deepened and many Lebanese who relied on subsidies have been left without access to these goods.

36. Poverty rates have doubled since 2019, affecting 82 per cent of the population, according to a UN study, although the World Bank believes this figure is exaggerated and it is now conducting its own study which it believes will show a figure around 50 per cent. There is little in the way of social welfare. The UN has scaled up humanitarian assistance in response to the economic crisis. It is providing limited payments to over 1 million Syrian refugees and 660,000 Lebanese, funded by donor governments and the World Bank. Remittances from the Lebanese diaspora contribute to over 50 per cent of the country’s GDP. However, the great majority of Lebanese living in poverty lack support.

    Employment

37. According to International Labour Organization (ILO) data, the official unemployment rate was 12.5 per cent in 2021 and has been rising sharply each year from a low of 6.3 per cent in 2009. The youth unemployment rate (people aged 15 to 24 years old) followed the same trend and was 25 per cent in 2021, according to the ILO. International media reports estimate that about a third of the labour force is unemployed. In-country sources told DFAT that significant competition between Lebanese and Syrian refugees, even for unskilled jobs, has heightened tensions between the two communities.

38. High levels of unemployment stem from the wider economic crisis. Some firms have stopped trading, and the public sector has been hit by austerity measures which have reduced jobs. Power cuts and a lack of fuel have meant that some businesses cannot operate or have had to scale back operations. State-supplied power is sporadic and often doesn’t exceed two hours per day, leaving much of the population reliant on privately-owned diesel backup generators to make up the shortfall.

    Corruption

39. Lebanon has a comprehensive legislative framework against corruption. Nevertheless, corruption is widespread and often occurs with impunity. Lebanon ranked 150th out of 180 countries in Transparency International’s 2022 Corruption Perceptions Index. Bertelsmann Stiftung, a German thinktank, called corruption in Lebanon ‘endemic’ in its 2022 Country Report, noting widespread corruption in the judiciary, land administration and public services, and a lack of initiative to combat or punish corruption.

40. Entrenched patronage networks monopolise the economy and public service, and municipalities are sometimes unable to enforce regulations due to political interference. Bribes and irregular payments are often exchanged when applying for public utilities, and the use of connections (wasta) is a common way to navigate the public administration. A survey of youth in 2020 found corruption affected nearly ‘every aspect of daily life, including health care,’ with one respondent stating: ‘if I want to go to proper hospital, I need wasta’.

    Heath system

41. The Lebanese health system is a mix of private and public services. The system has been badly affected by the recent economic crisis. International media reported that it was ‘on the brink of collapse’ in January 2022, noting an outflux of doctors and nurses, as well as widespread corruption. Because of the economic crisis, many Lebanese who previously had private health insurance can no longer afford it and are relying on the public system. The economic crisis has affected supply chains for pharmaceuticals and basic medical supplies, which are often unavailable. According to Bertelsmann Stiftung, about half of the Lebanese population cannot access healthcare. Even those who can access healthcare are not always able to access medicines, which are either unavailable or very expensive.

42. In Lebanon, the National Social Security Fund (NSSF) is a form of mandatory insurance which covers formal employees and their dependents and is intended to meet the bulk of health expenses of the roughly 25 per cent of Lebanese who are covered by it. However, the NSSF has come under increasing pressure as Lebanon experiences its economic crisis; from 2020, it is increasingly unable to meet its commitments. In July 2022 local media reported that, on the assumption that the NSSF will never pay, hospitals are refusing to treat NSSF subscribers, unless they are willing to pay out of pocket, at market rates.

    Mental Health treatment

43. Mental illnesses, including anxiety, depression and PTSD, are common in Lebanon, and have reportedly worsened as a result of multiple nationwide crises. Mental health services are scarce, especially outside Beirut. The economic crisis has led to a mass exodus of mental health professionals from Lebanon. In country sources report that people with a mental illness have traditionally been subject to considerable stigma, especially those with more noticeable symptoms, who are perceived as ‘incompetent, aggressive, violent’ and unable to participate in the community. In-country sources told DFAT there is a widespread belief that the mentally ill should simply ‘snap out of it,’ however, also reported that the considerable stresses of the August 2020 port blast had led to an increased openness around mental illness, especially anxiety and depression.

    Drugs abuse

44. Drug abuse is reportedly common in Lebanon and has worsened in recent years. Research in 2021 by the American University of Beirut found that the combination of political and economic crises, and an ‘overloaded, underfunded mental health system’ had led to an increase in Lebanese with mental health support needs self-medicating with alcohol, tobacco, cannabis and psychoactive prescription drugs. Other commonly abused substances include Ketamine, amphetamines and salvia (herbal hallucinogenic).

45. Possession of illegal drugs is usually punished with a jail sentence ranging from 3 months to 3 years. Under Drug Law 673 of 1991, judges are ‘requested’ to offer enrolment in a treatment program as an alternative to imprisonment, however, in reality, very few drug users are enrolled in these programs. There are a number of rehabilitation services in Beirut, however very few elsewhere in the country. Wealthier drug users are reportedly much more likely to be able to access these services than poorer people, who are more likely to go to jail.

    Security situation in the Lebanon

1. Lebanon’s security situation is uncertain due to conflict in neighbouring Syria, tensions between Hezbollah (which is part of the Lebanese Government) and Israel, terrorist threats from internal and external actors, and, occasionally, communal violence.

2. A maritime border dispute with Israel has been a recent source of tensions, with Hezbollah drones shot down by Israeli forces in July 2022, however tensions eased following a United States-brokered maritime border demarcation deal signed separately by Lebanon and Israel on 27 October 2022.

3. Terrorist cells have been uncovered by security forces in Lebanon in recent years, including in September 2021 and February 2022. In February 2022, international media reported that 48 young men left Tripoli to join ISIS in Iraq. The security forces operate checkpoints throughout the country that target security threats and are used to control crime. However, the state’s capacity to control security threats is negatively impacted by the ongoing economic crisis(see State Protection). For example, in June 2021 international media reported that soldiers were ‘suffering and hungry’. Like other members of the public sector, the security forces are paid in Lebanese Pounds which, following that currency’s collapse, no longer provides a living wage. However, LAF wages are currently being supplemented by Qatar (and may be further supplemented by the US).

4. Relatively low-level and localised violence occurs between communal groups (such as between Alawites and Sunnis in Tripoli, or Shi’a Hezbollah and Sunni or Christian groups in Beirut). In October 2021, for example, supporters of Shi’a organisations Hezbollah and Amal protested in a Beirut Christian neighbourhood, sparking a deadly battle with gunmen suspected to be from the (Maronite) Lebanese Forces. In-country sources report regular armed clashes in Tripoli between rival families and crime gangs. However, in-country sources also reported in December 2022 that the situation in Tripoli has improved following a targeted recruitment campaign designed to broaden LAF’s representation and improve local confidence in the LAF; reportedly, 1000 young men have recently been recruited from Tripoli and Akkar which has helped calm the situation in Tripoli.

5. UN Sources report that intercommunal tensions between Lebanese and Syrians are rising as the economic crisis continues. While there are presently few violent clashes between communities, in July 2022 UN sources reported that the situation was worsening, with an increase of vigilantism. In a 2019 survey by the UN, only 4 per cent of Lebanese saw relations with Syrian refugees as negative; in 2022, that number rose to 51 per cent. However, sources expressed the view that the situation would not break into open violence without ‘political instigation’

   Religion

6. Lebanon officially recognises 18 religious groups. These include four Muslim groups (Shi’a, Sunni, Alawites, and Ismailis); 12 Christian groups (Maronites, Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholics, Armenian Orthodox, Armenian Catholics, Syriac Orthodox, Syriac Catholics, Nestorian Assyrians, Chaldeans, Copts, Latin [Roman] Catholics, and Evangelicals); Druze (a religion that combines traditional Islamic teachings with certain philosophical ideas and mystic practices); and Jews. Unrecognised groups include Baha’is, Buddhists, Hindus, Ahmadis, Zoroastrians, Jehovah’s Witnesses and several other Protestant groups, including Mormons. Human rights groups report that unrecognised religious groups can legally own property, and are able to assemble for worship and perform their religious rites freely.

7. Jehovah’s Witnesses have been present in Lebanon since the 1920s though it is difficult to estimate their number, due to the underground nature of their faith. Many Jehovah’s Witnesses reportedly disguise themselves as ‘Protestants’. In-country sources told DFAT that recognised Christian churches tend to be antagonistic towards Jehovah’s Witnesses (and also towards Protestant churches, such as Baptists, Pentecostals, Quakers, and others). Such antagonism has focused on proselytising and conversion, reportedly because it has implications for church revenue generation. In-country sources told DFAT this hostility has reduced in recent years.

8. There are an estimated 10,000 or fewer Baha’is living in the community, unrecognised by law and unknown to most ordinary Lebanese. According to sources, Baha’is face social exclusion but not, in recent years, physical abuse. Such social exclusion might include refusal of accommodation, if a prospective landlord recognises a person as Baha’i, or exclusion from private education.

9. Lebanon has not conducted a census since 1932, therefore no current official statistics are available on the country’s religious communities. In-country sources suggest this lack of data is a deliberate attempt to protect the political status quo from the consequences of demographic change. Unofficial estimates of the size of religious communities vary, but interlocutors agree that the combined Muslim communities now outnumber the combined Christian communities. Estimates endorsed by the US Department of State are that 69.3 per cent of the citizen population is Muslim (31.2 per cent Sunni, 32 per cent Shi’a, and a small percentage are Alawites and Ismailis); 30.7 per cent of the population is Christian; and 5.5 per cent of the population is Druze. The remainder consists of small communities of other faiths. Within the Christian community, Maronite Catholics are the largest group (52.5 per cent), followed by Greek Orthodox (25 per cent), and other smaller Christian groups (including Greek Catholics (Melkites), Armenian Orthodox, Armenian Catholics, Syriac Orthodox, Syriac Catholics, Assyrians, Chaldean Catholics, Copts, Protestants (including Presbyterians, Baptists, and Seventh-day Adventists), Roman (Latin) Catholics, and members of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latterday Saints (Church of Jesus Christ)).

10. With the exception of Beirut, most cities do not contain communities from all major religions. Different religious groups tend to be concentrated in particular areas: - Most Sunnis are concentrated in West Beirut, and the governorates of North Lebanon and South Lebanon. North Lebanon is majority Sunni with a substantial Christian population in the south and east. There is also a small Shi’a population in the north-east of the governorate, contiguous with the northern part of Beka’a governorate. - The Shi’a community is concentrated in southern Lebanon, Beirut’s southern suburbs, and the northern half of the Beka’a governorate. Beka’a governorate is approximately half Shi’a, with a substantial Christian population in the capital, Zahle, and smaller populations of Sunnis in the north-east and Druze in the south. - Maronite Christians are concentrated in Mount Lebanon governorate, and in Beirut and its surrounds. Beirut governorate has substantial Christian, Sunni, and Shi’a populations. The city has both mixed suburbs and religiously based enclaves. - South Lebanon governorate and Nabatiyeh governorate are both majority Shi’a, but have a mixed population that includes Sunnis, Christians, and Druze. - Large Druze communities are concentrated around Mount Hermon in Nabatiyeh governorate, and in the area known as ‘Old Chouf’ at the southern end of the Mount Lebanon ranges. Druze are also concentrated in Baabda and Aley (Mount Lebanon governorate), Hasbaya (Nabatiyeh governorate) and Rashaya (Beka’a governorate). - The majority of Lebanon’s small Alawite population resides in Tripoli and Akkar in the North governorate.

11. Unlike in most other Arab countries, Lebanese can legally change their religious affiliation, converting not only from Christianity to Islam, but also from Islam to Christianity. Conversions also take place between different Christian denominations and (more rarely) between followers of different branches of Islam. To convert to a different religion, a local senior official of the religious group the person wishes to join must approve the change, and the newly joined religious group must issue a document confirming the convert’s new religion. The convert can then register their new religion with the Ministry of Interior and Municipalities (MoIM) Personal Status Directorate. The new religion is included thereafter on government-issued civil registration documents, along with mention of the original religion. Sources report that religious affiliation is no longer printed on National ID cards but is still recorded by the government on a person’s Personal Status Record (PSR) which governs access to a number of important services. ‘Secular’ is not available as a category; in-country sources report that those who have attempted to be listed as secular can have their sect left blank on a print-out of their PSR, but their original sect affiliation will be unchanged in government records.

12. Mixed marriages between Christians and Muslims, or between those from different Christian denominations or schools of Islam, sometimes occur in Lebanon, resulting in some religious pluralism within family life, though not without tension. For example, a mixed couple may be ostracised by some members of the extended family. Children of mixed marriages officially take the father’s religion. DFAT is not aware of any reports to suggest that either converts or those involved in mixed marriages are subject to any official discrimination. In cases where converts or those involved in mixed marriages have experienced societal discrimination in the form of harassment or ostracism, this is most likely to be the result of specific localised factors (such as a family’s socioeconomic standing or level of social/religious conservatism) rather than being systemic in nature.

13. Human rights observers report that relationships between religious groups in Lebanon are generally peaceful. Interreligious dialogue between religious leaders and communities occurs. Religious leaders have regularly condemned extremism and violence perpetrated in the name of religion following terrorist attacks in the region against religious targets. Violent clashes with religious overtones have been less common in Lebanon in recent years. Where violence has occurred between communal groups (such as between Alawites and Sunnis in Tripoli, or Shi’a and Sunni or Christian groups in Beirut), it has generally been relatively low-level and localised in nature, with political rather than religious motivations (see Security Situation). Lebanese authorities are generally committed to preventing violence between religious communities.

100.   DFAT assesses that members of recognised religious groups do not face official discrimination on religious grounds. Members of recognised religious groups who reside in areas where they are a minority may face low-level societal discrimination, however this is unlikely to include violence. Members of unrecognised religious groups may also face low- to medium-level societal discrimination and harassment. Such discrimination is unlikely to include violence, as members of unrecognised religious groups are typically protected to some degree by their relative anonymity.

State Protection

101.   The ability of authorities to provide state protection depends to a large degree on geographic area: several areas of Lebanon are not under the complete control of the state. Government forces are less able to enforce the law in areas where Hezbollah operates (southern suburbs of Beirut, parts of the Bekaa Valley and southern Lebanon), and they do not typically enter Palestinian refugee camps (see Palestinians). However, it is not possible to say State security agencies are unable, in all circumstances, to enforce the law in these areas. Civilian authorities maintain effective control over the armed forces and other security forces.

102.   Lebanon’s economic crisis has meant that members of the security forces have suffered the same slump in real income as have other civil servants, affecting their ability to support themselves and their families. Security forces have been ‘struggling to manage the consequences of compounding crises, with LAF officers and soldiers needing to increase and intensify operations across Lebanon since 2019, despite a more limited resource environment and increasing desertions. According to military sources cited in international media, desertions from the LAF since 2019 may be as high as 5,000. In-country sources report that members of the security forces have been among those who attempted irregular migration from Lebanon.

103.   Security forces in Lebanon are factionalised and often fail to coordinate effectively, sometimes competing openly and even clashing within and across units and services. Private security firms are reportedly on the rise in Lebanon, and are typically affiliated with powerful political figures, acting with some level of impunity. Sources suggest that some businesses do not find the police to be reliable in protecting them.

FINDINGS AND REASONS FOR DECISION

The issue of credibility

104.   The Tribunal is aware of the importance of adopting a reasonable approach in finding credibility. In Guo v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs(1996) 64 FCR 151, the Full Federal Court made comments on determining credibility. The Tribunal notes in particular the cautionary note sounded by Foster J at [194]:

His Honour states:

“care must be taken that an over-stringent approach does not result in an unjust   exclusion        from consideration of the totality of some evidence where a portion of it         could be reasonably      have been accepted…”

105.    The Tribunal also accepts that “if the applicant’s account appears credible, he should, unless there are good reasons to the contrary, be given the benefit of the doubt.” (see: United Nations Commissioner for Refugees’ Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status, (Geneva, 1992) at paragraph [196]). However, the Handbook also states at paragraph [203] that:

“The benefit of the doubt should, however, only be given when all available evidence has been obtained and checked and when the examiner is satisfied as to the applicant’s general credibility. The applicant’s statements must be coherent and plausible, and must not run          contrary to generally known facts.”

106.   When assessing claims made by applicants the Tribunal needs to make findings of fact in relation to those claims. This usually involves an assessment of the credibility of the applicants. When doing so, it is important to bear in mind the difficulties often faced by asylum seekers. The benefit of the doubt should be given to asylum seekers who are generally credible but unable to substantiate all of their claims.

107.    The Tribunal must bear in mind that if it makes an adverse finding in relation to a material claim made by the applicant but is unable to make that finding with confidence it must proceed to assess the claim on the basis that it might possibly be true: see, MIMA v Rajalingam (1999) 93 FCR 220.

108.    However, the Tribunal is not required to accept uncritically any, or all of the allegations made by an applicant. Further, the Tribunal is not required to have rebutting evidence available to it before it can find that a particular factual assertion by an applicant has not been made out: see, Randhawa v MILGEA (1994) 52 FCR 437 at [451] per Beaumont J; see: Selvadurai v MIEA(1994) 34 ALD 347 at [348] per Heerey J and also, Kopalapillai v MIMA(1998) 86 FCR 547.

Consideration of the applicant’s claims

(a)The applicant was attacked and stabbed by Alawites from the Arab Democratic Party in 2009 because he refused to work for them

109.   It was the applicant’s evidence that he feared returning to Lebanon because he was afraid of being targeted and harmed by the Alawites. He claimed that in February 2009 he was attacked by a local Alawite group, the Arab Democratic Party, and was severely beaten and stabbed. He claimed that this incident occurred after a gang tried to recruit him to work for them, and he refused, which in turn angered them. The applicant’s evidence was that he is afraid he will be targeted and harmed by the local Alawites if he returns to his local suburb in Tripoli, Lebanon.

110.   At the hearing, the Tribunal asked the applicant whether he had engaged locally in politics, supporting other political groups. The applicant’s response was that at no time while in Lebanon did have an interest in that country’s politics. The applicant was asked to explain, how a person that was not openly known to have any involvement in politics would become the target of local Alawite group associated or a part of the ‘Arab Democratic Party’? The applicant was also asked by the Tribunal to explain, why in 2009 he was being forcibly recruited to join the local Alawites when the then political situation in the Lebanon was politically stable. Indeed, the available county information on the Lebanon indicates that such ‘forceful recruitments’ of Lebanese males occurred several years later in 2012, following the national uprising in Syria in 2011 which escalated into civil war.[12] Accordingly, having taken into account the applicant’s admission that he was not active or had an interest in politics while in Lebanon, the Tribunal is not satisfied that Lebanese citizens were being recruited by Alawites for political purposes in Lebanon or as irregular combatants in the Syrian civil war in 2009 as claimed. In considering the accuracy of this aspect of the applicant’s claims it was further noted by the delegate in his decision[13] and the Tribunal in the country information it consulted concerning recruitment attempts by the Arab Democratic Party (ADP), information indicates that it is an Alawite political party and militia which is based in Jabal Mohsen, an Alawite enclave in Tripoli, Lebanon, and reports indicate the ADP is active in Tripoli and is supported by the vast majority of the Lebanon’s small Alawite minority.[14]

[12] ‘Timeline – Violence in Syria’, Reuters, 9 July 2012, CX290696; ‘Syrian rebels, civilians brace for long civil war’, see: Associated Press (AP), 27 November 2012, CX299831

[13] see, AAT File – delegate’s decision record.

[14] ‘Lebanon’s Alawites at a Crossroads’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 21 May 2014, CX321431; ‘Lebanon’s Alawi A minority struggles in a ‘nation’ of sects’, Al-Akhbar English, 08 November 2011, CX84333; ‘Two Alawites shot in Tripoli’, Daily star, The (Lebanon), 27 February 2014, CX318541; ‘The view from Tripoli’s restive Jabal Mohsen’, Daily Star, May 2009, CX226807; ‘Syrian war intensifies Lebanon’s divisions’, Aljazeera, Doha ( (TV), 17 June 2013, CX309531.

111.   The Tribunal noted that there had been recurring violence in Tripoli’s Alawites in Jabal Mohsen and Sunnis in Bab al-Tabbaneh, but there is no available information to indicate that the ADP seeks recruits from the Sunni sect, which the applicant (has indicated in his interview with the Department) he belongs to. There are reports of political factions buying the support of people in Tripoli, and unemployed young men reported seeking payments from politically backed armed groups,[15] there is no information to indicate that groups attempt to force people to work for them, or reports of violent reprisals for individuals who resit recruitment by groups. In considering the applicant’s claim of ‘being stabbed by Alawites in Tripoli’ prior to coming to Australia in 2009, it is also noted that he returned to Lebanon in 2010 and this raises doubts as to whether the applicant’s claim of being attacked by local Alawites was actually what had occurred.

[15] ‘Sporadic Tripoli Violence evokes memories of Civil War’, Daily Star, The (Lebanon), 28 September 2012, CX296270; ‘Deadly clashes in Lebanon reflect Syrian divisions’, Egypt Independent, 31 August 2012, CX306852.

112.   The Tribunal noted from the documents submitted by the applicant to support his protection claims, he also provided a copy of the ‘Applicant’s Statement of Facts, Issues, And Contentions’ which the applicant had submitted to the General Division explaining to the Tribunal in that instance, his circumstances as to why his Partner visa should not be ‘cancelled’. Indeed, at p.8 of Counsel’s submission it states:

[42] the relevant other considerations concern the current circumstances in Lebanon. The country    information reveals the following….

The applicant fears he would again face physical harm from criminal gangs in Lebanon (at p.10)

113.   The Tribunal is inclined to consider that it is very likely that the applicant’s main concern with regards to being forced to return to Lebanon is his fear (and the Tribunal considers this highly likely) that he would fall victim to criminal gang violence which seems to have significantly increased with the onset of Lebanon’s severest economic recession in years. The Tribunal is of the opinion that the claim of having been targeted by Alawites in his local area was introduced by the applicant as his claim only to act as an embellishment to enhance his claims for protection having in mind the deterioration of the political situation in the Lebanon since the applicant was last there, in 2012. Having considered all of the above matters, the Tribunal is not satisfied that as was claimed Alawites from the Arab Democratic Party attempted to forcibly recruit the applicant, nor that he was attacked and stabbed because he refused to associate and work with them, or that he was or face harm from Alawite elements in his home area if he was to return to Lebanon on the basis of his claimed refusal. However, the Tribunal does accept after having considered the available country information that the applicant if he returns to his home area in Lebanon, he may be the victim of violence and harm caused by local criminal elements which have increased with the deteriorating economic situation targeting Lebanese citizens.

(b)Applicant’s fear to return to Lebanon because of his criminal record

114.   The applicant claimed to fear to return to Lebanon because of his criminal record. He had made reference in his protection application to criminal convictions in Australia, indicating that [in] April 2019 he was convicted of ‘[offence]’, and was sentenced to 3 years and 9 months imprisonment.[16] It was noted by the Tribunal that the applicant’s claims of a criminal is supported by departmental records, which indicate that the applicant’s Spouse visa was cancelled in 2019, and information considered during the process of considering that revocation process indicated that the applicant had convictions in Australia for [offences].[17] Having noted this information on file, the Tribunal accepts the applicant’s claim that he has a criminal record.

[16] Department of Home Affairs File no. [reference] – see copies of applicant’s charge and sentence documents.

[17] Notification of outcome sent to prison 11/4/2022 – [the applicant] – Lebanon – [Reference] page 32-33 (National Criminal History Check).

115.   Having said this, the applicant told the Tribunal that he fears returning to the Lebanon because of his former drug use. In his application he indicated that he had “used” the drug “ice”, and that he claimed that he had stopped using it while in prison and in immigration detention (where he had been held since 2018), and has received a monthly injection of ‘Buprenorphine’ to treat his drug addiction. The applicant claimed of past drug use as being consistent with the evidence on file, as to having committed the [offence] in 2018 because he was ‘drug affected’ and had ‘a methamphetamine habit’ ‘consuming 1 gram per day of the drug known as ‘ice’.[18] Therefore, the Tribunal accepts the applicant’s claim that he was a former drug user.

[18] Ibid.

(c). The applicant’s fear of returning to Lebanon because of his mental health issues

The applicant claimed to fear returning to the Lebanon because of his mental health. The applicant has provided to the Tribunal a ‘current diagnosis’ and treatment from a psychologist [Mr A], and also excepts from a 2018 medical referral form to a 2017 diagnosis of Bipolar affective disorder.[19] There is also in the Department’s records in relation to the cancellation of the applicant’s Spouse visa – a report provided by the applicant from his psychologist, [Mr A] in 2019, who makes reference to the applicant’s past diagnoses of Bipolar Affective Disorder and Social Anxiety, and assessed that the applicant appeared to be suffering from a Psychotic Disorder (PD) and a Depressed Mood Disorder (DMD), and to have overcome a Substance Abuse Disorder.[20] Accordingly, the Tribunal accepts that the applicant has considerable mental health concerns.

[19] Ibid

[20] Ibid and see AAT File – applicant’s submissions – medical records and reports.

(d). The applicant’s fears to return to Lebanon because he has been living in        Australia

116.   The applicant claimed to fear returning to the Lebanon because he had been residing for a considerable period of time in Australia (a ‘Western country’). The applicant told the Tribunal that he had lived in Australia ‘continuously’ since he ‘last returned to the Lebanon in 2010’.[21] The applicant claims to fear returning to the Lebanon because he has not lived in the Lebanon for 13 years, and does not have the ‘networks’ or ‘connections’ to re-establish himself, and would have ‘no accommodation’ and ‘no employment prospects’ and these issues establish substantial challenges for him.

[21] Ibid.

117.   The applicant also claimed that his religious faith did not allow him ‘to lie’ and that ‘if people in Lebanon asked him, he would tell them about his mental health issues, drug use and criminal record.’ He also claimed that if ‘people in Lebanon’ ‘knew about these matters (personal)’ he ‘would be in danger’ and be the subjected ‘to discrimination’. In considering the possibility that the applicant would ‘tell people’ about his ‘personal circumstances’ and issues, the applicant has not in any way attempted to qualify his past criminal activities or his drug use. He has been direct and open about his mistakes and vices and what impressed the Tribunal was his directness in informing the Tribunal that he was the cause of everything he had done. The Tribunal noted that the Department doubted that the applicant would tell others about his difficult and unenviable past but the Tribunal is of the opinion, that despite the delegate’s doubts about the applicant bona fides, the Tribunal does accept as a his faith instructs him, the applicant would not conceal his past and that would in a socially fractured country as Lebanon is, cause for him not only danger to his person but would also cause him to be subjected to societal ridicule, discrimination and ostracism. Furthermore, having suffered the loss of two children, and effect the that had on him and having considered the applicant’s responses to the Tribunal’s questions about his past – ‘religion’ or ‘belief’ weighed heavily on the applicant mind and demeanour. Having considered the above matters the Tribunal accepts that the applicant would tell others in Lebanon about his mental health issues, drug addiction and criminal past, and this would cause him to be harmed and to be discriminated.

Summary of findings

118.   For the reasons detailed by the Tribunal above, the Tribunal accepts the following:

(a)  The applicant has a criminal record;

(b)  The applicant is a former drug user;

(c)   The applicant has physical and mental health issues;

(d)  The applicant will tell people in Lebanon about his mental health, drug use and criminal past;

(e)  The applicant lacks networks and connections, and family support in Lebanon;

(f)    The applicant has been living in a Western country for a significant period of time;

(g)  The applicant has not resided in the Lebanon for more than 13-years, and that he has no accommodation, employment prospects and faces considerable challenges (no family or support network) if he returns to Lebanon.

119.   For the reasons detailed by Tribunal above, the Tribunal does not accept the following:

(a)  That the applicant was attacked and stabbed by Alawites associated or part of the Arab Democratic Party in 2009;

(b)  That the applicant fears being targeted and harmed by Alawites if he is returned to Lebanon;

Analysis of applicant’s claims

120. To satisfy the criterion for a protection visa as provided for in s. 36(2)(a) of the Act, an applicant must be a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom a decision-maker is satisfied that Australia has protection obligations because the person is a refugee. A ‘refugee’, as defined in s. 5H(1) of the Act, is a person who is outside their country of nationality or former habitual residence and is unable or unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of their country of nationality or to return to their country or former habitual residence due to a well;-founded fear of persecution. The meaning of ‘well-founded fear of persecution’ is set out in s.5J of the Act and includes a requirement in s. 5J(1)(a) of the Act that the ‘person fears being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.’

121.   The applicant claimed that he is afraid of criminal gangs and other militants which rob and stand over people in Lebanon. He said in his evidence that if he returned to Lebanon, when he would speak Arabic – people will be able to tell that he had not lived in Lebanon for many years, and he was afraid people will target him because they will see or hear that he had been living in a western country. As the Tribunal noted above, the Tribunal accepted that the applicant would be returning to Lebanon after having lived in a western country. In considering whether he is at risk of persecution on account of him being a returnee from a Western country, it is noted that more Lebanese people live outside Lebanon than in it, with the Lebanese diaspora estimated between four to thirteen million, including large numbers of migrants in Western countries, particularly Canada, USA, France and Australia.[22] Information further suggests that the Lebanese government has encouraged Lebanese living abroad to return regularly to Lebanon[23] and information suggests returning to Lebanon after a time abroad is not unusual,[24] indeed it has been noted that an estimated 20-25,000 Australians normally reside in the Lebanon.[25] Nevertheless, in recent times the Lebanon has become a very different country according to updated reports.[26] By 2022, Lebanon entered the fourth year of a crippling economic crisis that has had disastrous consequences for rights and pushed over 80 percent of the country’s population into poverty. Marginalised communities have been disproportionately impacted. The crisis has had a devastating impact on the provision of public services, and in particular education, security, and health.

[22] ‘Patriotic young Lebanese say the battle to stay is lost.’ Reuters, 28 March 2014, CX319456; ‘Migration Profile – Lebanon’ Migration Policy Centre, 01 May 2017, CISEDB50AD7776. ‘Expats fill suitcases with medicines, cash 2for families in Lebanon’ Aljazeera, 22 July 2021, 20210806122258.

[23] ‘CARIM – Migration Profile’, Consortium for Applied Research on International Migration (CARIM), 01 January 2022; 20220323160304.

[24] Ibid

[25] Ibid

[26] Human Rights Watch Report [2022] Lebanon.

122.   According to the World Bank, the Lebanese crisis ranks among the “most severe crises episodes globally since the mid-nineteenth century,” and is the product of three decades of deliberate, reckless fiscal and monetary policy. The currency has lost more than 95 percent of its pre-crisis value. This rapid devaluation, as well as supply-chain bottlenecks and fuel shortages have caused food prices to increase dramatically by 483 percent in January 2022 compared to the year before, and remaining high at 332 percent as of June 2022. As the Central Bank ran out of foreign reserves and lifted subsidies on the import of most vital goods, prices for electricity, water, and gas skyrocketed, increasing by 595 percent between June 2021 and June 2022. The price hikes turned utilities essential for business, health, and food into a luxury many people can afford only in limited quantities, if at all.[27] In this context, the information before the Tribunal indicates that violent crime is on the rise in Lebanon. Some citizens have resorted to ‘armed robbery to recover their funds from the banks.’[28] Public safety is limited as state institutions weaken; the capacity for security agencies to maintain order has been undermined, further escalating regional tensions and wide social unrest.[29] Violent protests continue to occur due to poverty and food and resource shortages.[30] DFAT now advises the public to reconsider the need to travel to Lebanon due to the security environment, and the threat of terrorism.[31] Moreover, sectarian violence and civil conflict by militants linked to the Islamic State continues to fuel the social instability and high safety risks in Lebanon, with various planned suicide bombings and detonations of explosives occurring, and weapons and munitions being seized throughout the Lebanon.[32] Having considered this information concerning the present situation in the Lebanon, the Tribunal concludes and finds that there is a real chance of the applicant being persecuted and harmed by local gangs and militants because he is a Lebanese citizen returning to Lebanon from a Western country.

[27] Ibid

[28] Martin Chulov Fake pistols, sit-ins, and stand-offs: Lebanon’s banks on frontline of crisis, The Guardian 7 October 2022.

[29] Arab News, Social unrest grips Lebanon after pound plunges, 15 February 2023.

[30] Ibid

[31] DFAT, Smart Traveller, Lebanon: Travel Advice and Safety, 28 February 2023 (DFAT Smart Traveller).

[32] Timour Azhari, ‘Lebanon foils three planned suicide attacks, interior minister says’, Reuters, 23 February 2022.

123.   The applicant claimed that he was afraid he would be unable to access mental healthcare and treatment as he would or might require in Lebanon which he needs to continue his rehabilitation. As the Tribunal indicated above, the Tribunal accepts that the applicant has immediate and on-going mental health concerns. In considering the applicant’s concerns in relation to mental healthcare in Lebanon, the Tribunal considered the ‘updated report’ provided by [Mr A], Consultant Psychologist dated 30 May 2023[33] and noted the country information in relation to healthcare in Lebanon.

[33] DFAT Country Information Report – Lebanon, 19 March 2019

124.   In their most recent “Country Information Report” in relation to Lebanon, released in 2019, DFAT noted:

The standard of public healthcare in Lebanon is widely considered to be very poor. Just under      half of Lebanese citizens (47 per cent) have health insurance. About 23 per cent of those         insured are covered by the National Social Security Fund, 9 per cent by military schemes, 7 per cent by private insurance, 4 per cent by the Civil Servants Cooperative, and 4 per cent by          other schemes. The remaining 53 per cent lack any formal coverage and are covered by the Ministry of Public Health (MoPH), which serves as an ‘insurer of last resort.’

This has given the MoPH a strong role not only in preventive care, public health   leadership,      and regulation, but also in curative care. To provide hospital coverage to      about 250,000   cases per year, the MoPH contracts 26 public and 105 private hospitals. Individual patient co-        payment to the hospital constitutes 5 per cent (public hospital) or 15 per cent (public hospital)   of the hospitalisation costs, with the MoPH directly reimbursing the hospital for the difference.        As such, the MoPH is the main financier of private hospitals, allocating almost two thirds of its      total annual budget for hospitalisation coverage.

The mass influx of Syrian refugees since 2011 has placed considerable strain on the
          Lebanese health system, particularly in the north of the country and in the Beka’a valley.
          Other weak points include a huge under-supply of nurses (2.6 nurses per 1,000 population;        compared to 7.9 for Australia), a lack of emergency specialists, a lack of       elderly care     facilities, and a range in the quality of health care provision between regions.

Mental health care has been an increasing public concern, particularly given     Lebanon’s long and traumatic civil war: individuals exposed to war-related events      are at significantly higher risk of developing a mental disorder. A MoPH study in       2008 found that up to 70 per cent of the Lebanese population had been exposed to one   or more war-related events, and up to 38 per cent had been displaced by conflict. The     study found that 4.6 per cent of the population had experienced a severe mental       disorder (including depression and anxiety) in the year before the study; around 25 per          cent met the criteria for at least one of the classified mental disorders; and 10.5 per cent           had experienced more than one disorder at some point in their lives. Very few individuals   who had experienced any type of mental disorder had ever received any professional       treatment. Those who did seek treatment tended to delay doing so for extended periods           after the onset of the disorder. Many individuals had sought assistance from   religious           healers, spiritual advisors, or fortune-tellers rather than medical professionals. Significant      stigma           continues to attach to those seeking assistance for mental health-related issues.       A number of societal groups are particularly vulnerable in relation to mental health
          issues, including persons with disabilities, children and adolescents, the elderly,        prisoners, torture survivors, families of the disappeared, survivors of sexual and gender-         based violence, LGBTI (lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, or intersex) individuals, and        Palestinian and Syrian refugees.

The latest mental health decree law (72/1983) focuses on the organisation of the care,
          treatment, and rehabilitation of patients with mental health conditions, as well as    protecting the rights of these patients and their families. It regulates guardianship issues     for people with mental conditions and facilitates access to in-hospital care for the most vulnerable groups. The law stipulates the creation of a mental health body, under the           governance of the MoPH, to oversee and implement mental health policies, and to monitor           mental health services and treatment practices in health facilities. The decree law is currently     under revision to address issues such as access to free community-based mental health care,    standards and regulations for involuntary admissions, and the working modalities of the          mental health body, in addition to accreditation of mental health professionals.[34]

[34] Ibid

125.   Subsequent reports indicate that Lebanon’s healthcare system is overwhelmed by the multiple crises facing the country. Lebanon is presently facing the most serious financial crisis in its history, which has crippled the economy, with the country’s banking system paralysed, the currency having crashed, losing more than 95 per cent of its value, a severe fuel shortage, and ongoing increasing shortages in medicines and food.[35] In August 2020 a massive explosion occurred at Beirut Port which killed almost 200 people, left over 6,000 injured, displaced around 300,000 and destroyed a large part of Beirut, with the explosion caused by the stockpile of ammonium nitrate which had been stored without adequate safeguards.[36]

[35] ‘Explainer: How bad is the crisis in Lebanon?’ Reuters, 11 September 2022, 2021094103948; ‘Visit to Lebanon. Report of the Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights, Oliver De Schutter’, United Nations Human Rights Council, 11 April 2022, at p.3, 202205135540.

[36] ‘End of the World’: Countdown to Beirut’s devastating blast’, Associated Press (AP), 25 August 2020, 20200825100104.

126.   Information indicates that hospitals were laying off staff prior to the crisis has put additional strain on the public healthcare system, with many Lebanese unable to afford private healthcare, and many unable to avoid preventative healthcare.[37] Human Rights Watch reports that the state owes large amounts of money to both public and private hospitals, severely restricting hospitals’ ability to maintain sufficient staffing levels and provide personal protective equipment.[38]

[37] ‘The Beirut Blast Left Lebanon’s Health System Badly Shaken’, Direct Relief, 13 October 2020; ‘Abiad Says Patients’ Inability to Afford Treatment is Growing’, Nahamet, 06 May 2021.

[38] ‘Lebanon: Health Workers’ Safety Neglected during Covid-19’, Human Rights Watch (HRW), 10 December 2020.

127.   Human rights reports concur that the crises have devasted the healthcare sector, with shortages leaving hospitals permanently closed or ceasing operations, and declining salary values triggering a mass exodus of doctors and nurses.[39] It is noted that information also indicates that whilst the provision of mental health services in Lebanon was poor prior to 2014 since that time, a concerted effort by the Lebanese government and a number of international non-government agencies improved the situation, though substantial challenges remained.[40]

[39] Amnesty International Report 2021/22: ‘The State of the World’s Human Rights’, 12 April 2021.

[40] ‘Psychological disability in the Middle East’, see, Institute of Developmental Studies – K4D Research Helpdesk, 30 May 2018, at p.5, CIS7B839419534.

128.   However, the multiple recent crises have led to a ‘sharp rise’ in the number of people suffering from severe mental health and a significant lack of resources for treatment.[41] The Tribunal also considered the concerns made by the applicant in his submissions to the Tribunal – where, he stated that mental health treatments are inadequate, and that the health system in Lebanon is collapsing.

[41] ‘Nothing but a pot of mlukhiye’: Trauma, mental health in Lebanon, Aljazeera , 20 September 2021.

129.   The applicant expressed concerns that medication is scarce and expensive, in particular psychotropic drugs.[42] It was the applicant’s concern that there is a lack of affordable opioid replacement – suboxone also known as buprenorphine therapy. The drug is only distributed by the Ministry of Health.

[42] Arab News, Concern as mental health patients in Lebanon struggle to obtain medications, 14 January 2022; see Applicant’s Counsel’s written submission to (GD) at p.9, see AAT File.

130.   According the applicant, there has been a fourfold increase in the price.[43] The applicant also submitted that Lebanese NGOs warn that a lack of services in an increasingly dire economy are harming former users’ drug recovery efforts, with substance abuse on the rise and higher risks of relapse from the lack of affordable medications and limited mental health professionals accessible for treatment.[44]

[43] European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction, Overview of the drug markets in the European Neighbourhood Policy – South Countries: Regional Report , 2022 at p. 11.

[44] Middle East Eye. Lebanon’s recovering drug addicts risk relapse as economic crisis destroys hope, 21 January 2023.

131.   Having considered this information and all the evidence individually and cumulatively the Tribunal concludes and finds that that the applicant will encounter considerable challenges in accessing mental healthcare in present day- Lebanon. Furthermore, having regard to the information concerning the current state of mental healthcare services in Lebanon, and the collapse of the economy which directly impacts on the health system and its ability to provide needed necessary care to the applicant as is needed or might be required, the Tribunal finds that there is evidence to suggest that the applicant might be denied care and accessing the mental health care services because he is a person that has been absent from the Lebanon for a long period of time and without his own personal networks or for any other reason or reasons contained in s.5J(1)(a) of the Act.

132.   The applicant claimed that having not lived in Lebanon for 12 years, he does not have the networks or connections to set himself up, and would not have accommodation, a job, family support, or access to mental health care or medical treatment, and would have no money to pay for this, or food and other items he needs. In considering the environment the applicant would be returning to, it is noted that Lebanon is currently experiencing a severe economic, political and social crisis which was compounded by the August 2020 explosion which destroyed large parts of Beirut.[45] Even prior to the blast, the country was facing its worst crisis since the civil war with analysts warning of a ‘Venezuela-style’ collapse.[46] The state is commonly described in reports as ‘failing’.[47]

[45] ‘Lebanon: Why the country is in crisis’, BBC News, 5 August 2020, 20200820094525; ‘Can Lebanon Fires Be Put Out?’ Carnegie Middle East Centre, 6 August 2020, 20200820121229; ‘Beirut Blast: An Accident in Name Only’ International Crisis Group (ICG), 7 August 2020, 2020081117552; ‘Lebanon: Country in free-fall’ Economist, 11 August 2020, 20200814083858.

[46] ‘Who is to blame for Lebanon’s crisis’, Aljazeera, 23 May 2020, 20200730144349; ‘Lebanon: Moody’s rating cut to the same grade as Venezuela’, Middle East Monitor (MEMO), 28 July 2020, 20200730190305; ‘The lights go out on Lebanon’s economy as financial collapse accelerates’, Washington Post The, 20 July 2020, 2020072113141.

[47] ‘What Political Fallout from the Lebanon Blast?’, Nahamet, 7 August 2020, 20200807164549; ‘Special Report: Lebanon’s power struggle – why a failing state can’t get the lights on’, Reuters, 11 August 2020, 20200881152205; ‘State of collapse: Can Lebanon’s troubled leadership save the country?’ Reuters, 15 August 2020, 2020081821637.

133.   Health and welfare have been severely impacted by these crises.[48]Crime and domestic violence have risen significantly and the general security environment remains potentially volatile.[49]Information suggests that Lebanon is effectively bankrupt,37 with the collapse of the already slowly imploding economy having been accelerated by protests since October 2019, followed by COVID-19 lockdown measures.[50] The local currency has crashed, and in July 2020 Lebanon become the first country in the region to enter hyperinflation.[51]

[48] ‘Beirut blast: WHO warns dozens of health facilities ‘non-functional’’, BBC News, 13 August 2020, 20200813142808.

[49] ‘Lebanon:10 Months of Crisis,’ Nahamet, 11 August 2020, 20200811150712; ‘Lebanon: Rise in Extortion, Harassment Crimes’, Asharq Al Awsat, 6 May 2020, 20200513085627, ‘Beirut blast could lead to another civil war in Lebanon’, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 12 August 2020, 20200813142448

[50] ‘S&P Downgrades Lebanon Bonds to Default after Missed Payments’, Nahamet, 23 August 2020.

[51] ‘After the port blast, rudderless Lebanon drifts towards the rocks’, Reuters, 27 August 2020, 20200825154722; ‘Lebanon:10 Months of Crisis’, Nahamet, 11 August 2020, 20200811150712.

134.   The country defaulted for the first time on its 1.2-billion-dollar debt in March 2020.[52] Negotiations with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for a financial agreement worth up to ten billion dollars have stalled over inaction on long-demanded economic reforms.[53]The country’s banking system is paralysed. Analysts generally agree that Lebanon’s economy is in freefall.[54] A World Bank report assesses that the explosion caused between US$3.8 and US$4.6 billion in damage, while estimated economic activity losses range between US$2.9 billion and US$3.5 billion.[55]

[52] ‘Lebanon Inflation soars above 100% year-on-year in July’, Reuters, 27 August 2020.

[53] Ibid

[54] Ibid

[55] Ibid

135.   According to the UN, the economic crisis had doubled poverty rates before the explosion and extreme poverty had almost tripled.[56] Save the Children had warned in July 2020 that almost one million people did not have money to buy essentials and more than 500,000 children were already struggling to get enough to eat.[57]More recently, ESCWA has said that more than half of Lebanon’s population is at risk of failing to access basic food needs by the end of 2020. The average price of food products had increased by 141 percent in the year to July 2020 and ESCWA expects the explosion to further drive-up basic food prices.[58]

[56] ‘Beirut Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment’ (RDNA) – August 2020.

[57] ‘UN Says Half of Lebanon ‘Trapped in Poverty’ even before Beirut Blast’, Nahamet, 19 August 2020

[58] Ibid

136.   While the applicant has family support in Lebanon, the Tribunal accepts that they are not in a position to support him financially because his mother is elderly, and his siblings have their own families to support. The applicant’s mother has a small two-bedroom home, with a person who assists with her daily tasks living with her and would be unable to provide long-term accommodation and support for the applicant.[59] Whilst the applicant has family in Lebanon, the Tribunal accepts that that family support in light of the general circumstances prevalent in the Lebanon would not be forthcoming and that if the applicant were to return to Lebanon, he would find it extremely difficult – next to impossible to re-establish himself in today’s Lebanon. Indeed, his health issues past and present would become generally known and may subject the applicant to societal discrimination because of his past drug problems and on-going rehabilitation. Therefore, the Tribunal is satisfied that the applicant’s concerns about setting himself up in Lebanon are for a reason contained in s.5J(1)(a) of the Act.

[59] ‘Lebanon ‘fast spiralling out of control’ leaving many destitute and facing starvation, warns Bachelet’ UN News, 10 July 2020, 20200714142526.

137.   For the reasons given above, the Tribunal is satisfied that the applicant is a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under s 36(2)(a).

DECISION

138. The Tribunal remits the matter for reconsideration with the direction that the applicant satisfies s 36(2)(a) of the Migration Act.

Peter Vlahos
Member

ATTACHMENT  -  Extract from Migration Act 1958

5 (1) Interpretation

…

cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment means an act or omission by which:

(a)     severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person; or

(b)     pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person so long as, in all the circumstances, the act or omission could reasonably be regarded as cruel or inhuman in nature;

but does not include an act or omission:

(c)     that is not inconsistent with Article 7 of the Covenant; or

(d)     arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions that are not inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant.

…

degrading treatment or punishment means an act or omission that causes, and is intended to cause, extreme humiliation which is unreasonable, but does not include an act or omission:

(a)     that is not inconsistent with Article 7 of the Covenant; or

(b)     that causes, and is intended to cause, extreme humiliation arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions that are not inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant.

…

torture means an act or omission by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person:

(a)     for the purpose of obtaining from the person or from a third person information or a confession; or

(b)     for the purpose of punishing the person for an act which that person or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed; or

(c)     for the purpose of intimidating or coercing the person or a third person; or

(d)     for a purpose related to a purpose mentioned in paragraph (a), (b) or (c); or

(e)     for any reason based on discrimination that is inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant;

but does not include an act or omission arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions that are not inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant.

…

receiving country,  in relation to a non-citizen, means:

(a)     a country of which the non-citizen is a national, to be determined solely by reference to the law of the relevant country; or

(b)     if the non-citizen has no country of nationality—a country of his or her former habitual residence, regardless of whether it would be possible to return the non-citizen to the country.

…

5H    Meaning of refugee

(1)For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person in Australia, the person is a refugee if the person is:

(a)     in a case where the person has a nationality – is outside the country of his or her nationality and, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country; or

(b)     in a case where the person does not have a nationality – is outside the country of his or her former habitual residence and owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, is unable or unwilling to return to it.

Note:     For the meaning of well-founded fear of persecution, see section 5J.

…

5J     Meaning of well-founded fear of persecution

(1)For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person, the person has a well-founded fear of persecution if:

(a)     the person fears being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion; and

(b)     there is a real chance that, if the person returned to the receiving country, the person would be persecuted for one or more of the reasons mentioned in paragraph (a); and

(c)     the real chance of persecution relates to all areas of a receiving country.

Note:     For membership of a particular social group, see sections 5K and 5L.

(2)A person does not have a well-founded fear of persecution if effective protection measures are available to the person in a receiving country.

Note:     For effective protection measures, see section 5LA.

(3)A person does not have a well-founded fear of persecution if the person could take reasonable steps to modify his or her behaviour so as to avoid a real chance of persecution in a receiving country, other than a modification that would:

(a)     conflict with a characteristic that is fundamental to the person’s identity or conscience; or

(b)     conceal an innate or immutable characteristic of the person; or

(c)     without limiting paragraph (a) or (b), require the person to do any of the following:

(i)alter his or her religious beliefs, including by renouncing a religious conversion, or conceal his or her true religious beliefs, or cease to be involved in the practice of his or her faith;

(ii)conceal his or her true race, ethnicity, nationality or country of origin;

(iii)alter his or her political beliefs or conceal his or her true political beliefs;

(iv)conceal a physical, psychological or intellectual disability;

(v)enter into or remain in a marriage to which that person is opposed, or accept the forced marriage of a child;

(vi)alter his or her sexual orientation or gender identity or conceal his or her true sexual orientation, gender identity or intersex status.

(4)If a person fears persecution for one or more of the reasons mentioned in paragraph (1)(a):

(a)     that reason must be the essential and significant reason, or those reasons must be the essential and significant reasons, for the persecution; and

(b)     the persecution must involve serious harm to the person; and

(c)     the persecution must involve systematic and discriminatory conduct.

(5)Without limiting what is serious harm for the purposes of paragraph (4)(b), the following are instances of serious harm for the purposes of that paragraph:

(a)     a threat to the person’s life or liberty;

(b)     significant physical harassment of the person;

(c)     significant physical ill‑treatment of the person;

(d)     significant economic hardship that threatens the person’s capacity to subsist;

(e)     denial of access to basic services, where the denial threatens the person’s capacity to subsist;

(f)     denial of capacity to earn a livelihood of any kind, where the denial threatens the person’s capacity to subsist.

(6)In determining whether the person has a well‑founded fear of persecution for one or more of the reasons mentioned in paragraph (1)(a), any conduct engaged in by the person in Australia is to be disregarded unless the person satisfies the Minister that the person engaged in the conduct otherwise than for the purpose of strengthening the person’s claim to be a refugee.

5K    Membership of a particular social group consisting of family

For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person (the first person), in determining whether the first person has a well‑founded fear of persecution for the reason of membership of a particular social group that consists of the first person’s family:

(a)     disregard any fear of persecution, or any persecution, that any other member or former member (whether alive or dead) of the family has ever experienced, where the reason for the fear or persecution is not a reason mentioned in paragraph 5J(1)(a); and

(b)     disregard any fear of persecution, or any persecution, that:

(i)the first person has ever experienced; or

(ii)any other member or former member (whether alive or dead) of the family has ever experienced;

where it is reasonable to conclude that the fear or persecution would not exist if it were assumed that the fear or persecution mentioned in paragraph (a) had never existed.

Note:     Section 5G may be relevant for determining family relationships for the purposes of this section.

5L    Membership of a particular social group other than family

For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person, the person is to be treated as a member of a particular social group (other than the person’s family) if:

(a)     a characteristic is shared by each member of the group; and

(b)     the person shares, or is perceived as sharing, the characteristic; and

(c)     any of the following apply:

(i)the characteristic is an innate or immutable characteristic;

(ii)the characteristic is so fundamental to a member’s identity or conscience, the member should not be forced to renounce it;

(iii)the characteristic distinguishes the group from society; and

(d)     the characteristic is not a fear of persecution.

5LA Effective protection measures

(1)For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person, effective protection measures are available to the person in a receiving country if:

(a)     protection against persecution could be provided to the person by:

(i)the relevant State; or

(ii)a party or organisation, including an international organisation, that controls the relevant State or a substantial part of the territory of the relevant State; and

(b)     the relevant State, party or organisation mentioned in paragraph (a) is willing and able to offer such protection.

(2)A relevant State, party or organisation mentioned in paragraph (1)(a) is taken to be able to offer protection against persecution to a person if:

(a)     the person can access the protection; and

(b)     the protection is durable; and

(c)     in the case of protection provided by the relevant State—the protection consists of an appropriate criminal law, a reasonably effective police force and an impartial judicial system.

…

36     Protection visas – criteria provided for by this Act

…

(2)A criterion for a protection visa is that the applicant for the visa is:

(a)     a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the person is a refugee; or

(aa)  a non-citizen in Australia (other than a non-citizen mentioned in paragraph (a)) in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the Minister has substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the non-citizen being removed from Australia to a receiving country, there is a real risk that the non-citizen will suffer significant harm; or

(b)     a non-citizen in Australia who is a member of the same family unit as a non-citizen who:

(i)is mentioned in paragraph (a); and

(ii)holds a protection visa of the same class as that applied for by the applicant; or

(c)     a non-citizen in Australia who is a member of the same family unit as a non-citizen who:

(i)is mentioned in paragraph (aa); and

(ii)holds a protection visa of the same class as that applied for by the applicant.

(2A)A non‑citizen will suffer significant harm if:

(a)     the non‑citizen will be arbitrarily deprived of his or her life; or

(b)     the death penalty will be carried out on the non‑citizen; or

(c)     the non‑citizen will be subjected to torture; or

(d)     the non‑citizen will be subjected to cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment; or

(e)     the non‑citizen will be subjected to degrading treatment or punishment.

(2B)However, there is taken not to be a real risk that a non‑citizen will suffer significant harm in a country if the Minister is satisfied that:

(a)     it would be reasonable for the non‑citizen to relocate to an area of the country where there would not be a real risk that the non‑citizen will suffer significant harm; or

(b)     the non‑citizen could obtain, from an authority of the country, protection such that there would not be a real risk that the non‑citizen will suffer significant harm; or

(c)     the real risk is one faced by the population of the country generally and is not faced by the non‑citizen personally.

…