2212059 (Migration) [2024] AATA 615 (4 April 2024)
DECISION RECORD
DIVISION:Migration & Refugee Division
APPLICANTS: [Applicant 1]
[Applicant 2]
[Applicant 3]
REPRESENTATIVE: Mr Nishant Sharma
CASE NUMBER: 2212059
MEMBER:Deputy President J.L Redfern PSM
DATE:4 April 2024
PLACE OF DECISION: Sydney
DECISION:The Tribunal affirms the decision not to grant the applicants Skilled Nominated (Permanent) visas.
Statement made on 4 April 2024 at 9:57am
CATCHWORDS:
MIGRATION – Skilled Nominated (Permanent) (Class SN) visa – Subclass 190 Skilled – Nominated – Requirement for members of the family unit of the primary applicant to meet the health criteria – Where primary applicant’s child does not meet health criteria – adverse Medical Officer of the Commonwealth (MOC) opinion – Public Interest Criterion 4005 – significant cost to the Australian community – MOC opinion invalid – Ministerial Intervention – principles concerning MOC opinion assessments – subsequent MOC opinion - Decision affirmed
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – where an opinion of MOC is required, Tribunal must take it as correct – Tribunal must be satisfied that MOC has applied correct test in forming its opinion
LEGISLATION:
Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 65, 349, 351
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), r 1.03, r 2.25A, Schedule 2, cl 190.216, cl 190.311, Schedule 4, Public Interest Criterion 4005
CASES:
Applicant Y v Minister for Immigration And Citizenship [2008] FCA 367
Dang v Administrative Appeals Tribunal [2019] FCA 220
Drake v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1979) 24 ALR 577
Han v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 331
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Seligman (1999) 85 FCR 115
Nellas v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship And Multicultural Affairs (No 2) [2024] FedCFamC2G 67
Ramlu v MIMIA [2005] FMCA 1735
Re Drake and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (No 2) [1979] AATA 179
Robinsonv MIMIA (2005) 148 FCR 182
SECONDARY MATERIALS:
Committee for Economic Development of Australia (CEDA), Australia's Future Migration System, December 2022
Department of Home Affairs, Notes for Guidance for Disability Services, May 2023
Any references appearing in square brackets indicate that information has been omitted from this decision pursuant to section 378 of the Migration Act 1958 and replaced with generic information which does not allow the identification of an applicant, or their relative or other dependants.
STATEMENT OF DECISION AND REASONS
INTRODUCTION
This is an application for review of decisions made by a delegate of the Minister for Home Affairs on 8 August 2022 to refuse to grant the applicants Skilled Nominated (Permanent) visas under s 65 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act).
The applicants applied for the visas on [date] [month] 2021. The delegate refused to grant the visa on the basis that the first named applicant, [name], did not satisfy cl 190.216(3) of Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (the Regulations) because not every member of her family unit satisfied the…
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CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court was required to determine the validity of the Medical Officer of the Commonwealth (MOC) opinions relied upon by the delegate in assessing the son's eligibility under PIC 4005. Specifically, the applicants contended that the MOC opinions were invalid or improperly formulated, and that the assessment by the MOC of estimated costs for a hypothetical person with the same condition was too general and did not properly apply the statutory criteria. The court also considered whether the MOC had applied the correct test by assessing the condition and then applying the statutory criteria by reference to a hypothetical person suffering from that specific form or level of the condition, rather than a generic form.
The Deputy President noted that while MOC opinions are generally to be taken as correct if properly formulated, they must be based on the correct application of the relevant criteria. The court referred to established case law, including *Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Seligman* and *Robinson*, which held that a MOC opinion is only binding if it is of a kind authorised by the Regulations and if the MOC has applied the proper test. The Deputy President accepted the submission that the MOC must ascertain the specific form or level of the applicant's condition and then apply the statutory criteria by reference to a hypothetical person with that precise condition, not a generic one. Despite finding that the MOC opinions were not demonstrably unlawful or inconsistent with policy, the Deputy President acknowledged the force of the applicants' submission that the estimated costs for a hypothetical person might be an overestimation given the son's existing improvement and the applicant's expertise in disability services.
Ultimately, the Tribunal affirmed the decision not to grant the visas. While acknowledging the potential harshness of the outcome due to the absence of a waiver provision for PIC 4005 and the son's Australian birth and positive response to early intervention, the Deputy President found that the MOC opinions, as formulated, led to the conclusion that the health care and community services required would likely result in a significant cost to the Australian community, thus failing to meet the criterion.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
It is an important issue for the applicants because there is no waiver or discretion if PIC 4005 is not satisfied.CONSIDERATION The application was made on [date] [month] 2021 and the period against which the health requirement must be assessed is from this date. At the time the application was lodged, [the son] was two years old. There is no dispute in this case that a MOC opinion is required. Nor is there dispute that the MOC opinion, and the updated RMOC opinions, are adverse to the applicants because the cost assessed is said to be ‘significant’. The estimated cost exceeds $51,000, which is the amount nominated by the Department in its Procedural Instruction for the health requirement as being the policy threshold for the level of costs regarded as significant.[4][4] Department of Home Affairs, Notes for Guidance for Disability Services, May 2023. Unless government policy is unlawful or there are cogent reasons to depart from the policy, the Tribunal should have regard to relevant government policy. However, policy should not simply be applied without independent scrutiny and to do so would be an error of law: Drake v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1979) 24 ALR 577 and Re Drake and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (No 2) [1979] AATA 179. Having reviewed the Procedural Instruction for the Health Requirement and the Disability Guidance Note, I am of the view that neither of these policy documents are inconsistent with the Act, the Regulations or case law, nor was there a submission to this effect. They are comprehensive, relevant and promote consistency based objective medical and healthcare information. The applicants contend that the first RMOC is not binding on the Tribunal because it is invalid or is not properly formulated. The applicants do not take issue with the revised RMOC but I must nonetheless still consider its validity as it forms the basis for the assessment on whether the health care and community services required for [the son] would likely result in significant cost. Opinions of the Review Medical Officer of the Commonwealth – are they valid? Questions about the impact of Medical Officer opinions on the assessment of the health requirements for certain visas and the validity of those opinions have been judicially considered on numerous occasions by the Federal Court. In Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Seligman (1999) 85 FCR 115, the Full Court held that the delegate is only entitled and obliged to take the Medical Officer’s opinion as correct if it is an opinion of a kind authorised by the Regulations. In Robinson, the Minister accepted that, even though Seligman was decided before the privative clause provisions were introduced to the Act, the nature of the error identified by the Full Court in that case would be a jurisdictional error. Accordingly, Siopis J found, referring to Seligman, that the question of whether there had been jurisdictional error would depend on whether the medical opinion was binding on the Tribunal pursuant to reg 2.25A(3) of the Regulations. This in turn would depend on whether the Medical Officer has applied the proper test by which to assess the matters referred to in PIC 4005. In considering this matter, his Honour accepted the submission of the applicant and found as follows at [43]:A proper construction of Public Interest Criterion 4005 of the Regulations, requires the MOC to ascertain the form or level of condition suffered by the applicant in question and then to apply the statutory criteria by reference to a hypothetical person who suffers from that form or level of the condition. It is not the case that the MOC is to proceed to make the assessment at a higher level of generality by reference to a generic form of the condition.