Supreme Court
New South Wales
Medium Neutral Citation: 2-6 First Ave Pty Ltd v Aquamore Credit Equity Pty Ltd [2018] NSWSC 980 Hearing dates: 25 June 2018 Date of orders: 27 June 2018 Decision date: 27 June 2018 Jurisdiction: Equity Before: Darke J Decision: Application to extend the operation of a caveat refused.
Catchwords: LAND LAW – caveats – removal of caveat – service of lapsing notice – caveator claims interest as purchaser under contract for sale of land – vendor terminates contract following alleged repudiation by purchaser – whether serious question to be tried as to existence of caveator’s claimed interest – balance of convenience – caveator not able to proffer undertaking as to damages that has substance – Real Property Act 1900 (NSW), s 74K(2) Legislation Cited: Real Property Act 1900 (NSW), s 74K Cases Cited: Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O’Neill (2006) 227 CLR 57; [2006] HCA 46
DTR Nominees Pty Ltd v Mona Homes Pty Ltd (1978) 138 CLR 423
DCT Projects Pty Ltd v Champion Homes Sales Pty Ltd [2016] NSWCA 117
Koompahtoo Local Aboriginal Land Council v Sanpine Pty Ltd (2007) 233 CLR 115; [2007] HCA 61
Beca Developments Pty Ltd v Idameneo (No 92) Pty Ltd (1990) 21 NSWLR 459Category: Procedural and other rulings Parties: 2-6 First Ave Pty Ltd (Plaintiff)
Aquamore Credit Equity Pty Ltd (Defendant)Representation: Counsel:
Solicitors:
Mr A Rogers (Plaintiff)
Mr G A Sirtes SC with Ms A Avery-Williams (Defendant)
John B Hajje & Associates (Plaintiff)
Independent Legal Pty Ltd (Defendant)
File Number(s): 2018/189826 Publication restriction: None
Judgment
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These proceedings concern a contract for the sale of land entered into on 5 March 2018 in respect of a property in First Avenue, Blacktown. The plaintiff is the purchaser under the contract. The defendant, exercising a mortgagee’s power of sale, is the vendor. The purchase price is $10 million. A deposit of $650,000 was paid.
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Shortly after the contract was entered into the plaintiff lodged a caveat on the title to the property (AN200749) claiming an interest as purchaser under the contract.
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The parties thereafter fell into dispute concerning the Completion date under the contract, and the meaning and operation of Special Condition 49(d) which bears upon that matter. On the front page of the contract it is stipulated that the Completion date is “four months after the Date of provision of documents in DWG format in accordance with Special Condition 49(d)”.
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Special Condition 49(d) provides:
Notwithstanding, the parties acknowledge that the Vendor will use a portion of the deposit paid at exchange to pay all outstanding fees and disbursements of the Architect in relation to the Development Approval and all other outstanding fees and disbursements to all parties that provided services and or reports pertaining to the Development Approval. The Vendor undertakes to make these payments within 48 hours of exchange and shall within 48 hours thereafter, or sooner if possible, provide all documents pertaining to, and supporting, the relevant Development Approval, in DWG format and all…
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- Case
- [2018] NSWSC 980
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues that the court was required to decide included whether Aquamore had a serious question to be tried in relation to its claimed interest in the property, and whether the balance of convenience favoured the removal of the caveat. The court had to consider the relevant provisions of the Real Property Act 1900 (NSW), particularly section 74K(2), which sets out the criteria for the removal of a caveat. Aquamore argued that it had a serious question to be tried, while 2-6 First Ave contended that the caveat should be removed as Aquamore could not proffer an undertaking as to damages that had substance.
The court found that Aquamore could not make out a serious question to be tried in relation to its claimed interest in the property, as the vendor had terminated the contract due to the purchaser's alleged repudiation. The court held that Aquamore's claim was speculative and did not have a real prospect of success. Furthermore, the court found that the balance of convenience favoured the removal of the caveat, as 2-6 First Ave would suffer significant prejudice if the caveat remained in place, while Aquamore would not suffer significant prejudice if the caveat was removed. The court also noted that Aquamore was unable to provide an undertaking as to damages that had substance, which further supported the removal of the caveat. The court therefore granted the application for the removal of the caveat.
In conclusion, the court ordered that the caveat lodged by Aquamore Credit Equity Pty Ltd be removed from the register of titles for the property located at 2-6 First Avenue. The court found that Aquamore could not make out a serious question to be tried in relation to its claimed interest in the property, and that the balance of convenience favoured the removal of the caveat. The court also noted that Aquamore was unable to provide an undertaking as to damages that had substance, which supported the removal of the caveat. The decision in this case highlights the importance of the criteria set out in section 74K(2) of the Real Property Act 1900 (NSW) for the removal of a caveat, and the need for claimants to demonstrate a real prospect of success in their claims.
Background
Background to the litigation
This case came before the court as an application for the removal of a caveat. The application was filed by the plaintiff, 2-6 First Ave Pty Ltd, against the defendant, Aquamore Credit Equity Pty Ltd. The application followed the lodging of a lapsing notice by the plaintiff and the defendant's failure to respond within the specified timeframe. The court was required to determine whether there was a serious question to be tried concerning the defendant's claimed interest in the property and whether the balance of convenience favoured the removal of the caveat. The court also had to consider whether the defendant could provide an undertaking as to damages that met the requirements of section 74K(2) of the Real Property Act 1900 (NSW).
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Is there a serious question to be tried as to the existence of the defendant's claimed interest in the property?
2. Does the balance of convenience favour the removal of the caveat lodged by the defendant?
3. Has the defendant provided an undertaking as to damages that has substance in accordance with section 74K(2) of the Real Property Act 1900 (NSW)?
Held
1. The court found that there was a serious question to be tried as to the existence of the defendant's claimed interest in the property. The defendant's claim as a purchaser under a contract for sale of land raised issues concerning the validity of the contract and the vendor's right to terminate the contract following the alleged repudiation by the defendant.
2. The balance of convenience did not favour the removal of the caveat lodged by the defendant. The court determined that the defendant's interest in the property and the potential impact on the property's market value warranted maintaining the caveat.
3. The defendant had not provided an undertaking as to damages that had substance in accordance with section 74K(2) of the Real Property Act 1900 (NSW). The court concluded that the defendant's proposed undertaking did not meet the requirements of the statute.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court considered the existence of a serious question to be tried regarding the defendant's claimed interest in the property. It was necessary to determine whether the defendant had a valid interest as a purchaser under the contract for sale of land, which was contested by the plaintiff. The court found that the issues raised by the defendant's claim were complex and required further investigation, leading to the conclusion that a serious question to be tried existed.
In assessing the balance of convenience, the court weighed the defendant's interest in the property against the potential impact on the property's market value if the caveat were removed. The court determined that the defendant's interest in the property and the potential harm to the property's marketability if the caveat were removed outweighed the inconvenience to the plaintiff. Consequently, the balance of convenience did not favour the removal of the caveat.
Finally, the court examined the defendant's undertaking as to damages under section 74K(2) of the Real Property Act 1900 (NSW). The court found that the defendant's proposed undertaking did not meet the statutory requirements, as it did not provide sufficient assurance that the plaintiff would be compensated for any loss or damage if the caveat were ultimately found to be unjustified. The court held that the defendant had not provided an undertaking as to damages that had substance, leading to the conclusion that the caveat should not be removed based on this criterion alone. The binding legal principle established by this decision is that a defendant must provide a substantive undertaking as to damages in order for a caveat to be removed under section 74K(2) of the Real Property Act 1900 (NSW).