1906464 (Refugee) - [2023] AATA 4642

1906464 (Refugee) [2023] AATA 4642 (15 December 2023)
OUTCOME OF REVIEW
DIVISION:Migration & Refugee Division
REPRESENTATIVE: Mr Farnam Razzaghipour (MARN: 9789359)
CASE NUMBER: 1906464

COUNTRY OF REFERENCE:            Iran
MEMBER:Senior Member G.A.F. Connolly
DATE OF ORAL DECISION:             15 December 2023
TIME OF ORAL DECISION:             2:30pm
PLACE OF DECISION:  Sydney
DECISION:The Tribunal sets aside the decision of the Department to refuse the grant of a protection visa and remits the matter with the following directions:

[a] that both the first applicant and the second applicant satisfy s 36(2)(aa) of the Migration Act; and
[b] that the other applicants satisfy s 36(2)(c)(i) of the Migration Act, because of their membership of the same family unit as the first named applicants.

Statement made on 15 December 2023 at 2:30pm
CATCHWORDS
REFUGEE – protection visa – Iran – religion – conversion to Christianity – delay in church attendance in Australia – delay in applying for protection – greater risk of harm for evangelical Christians – personal testimonies of Christian faith – decision under review remitted
LEGISLATION
Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975, s 43
Migration Act 1958, ss 5(1), 5AAA, 5H, 5J – 5LA, 36, 65, 104, 423, 499
Migration Regulations 1994, Schedule 2
CASES
Abebe v Commonwealth (1999) 197 CLR 510
ABT16 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 836
Drake v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1979) 24 ALR 577
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Guo (1997) 191 CLR 559
Nagalingam v MILGEA (1992) 38 FCR 191
Prasad v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1985) 6 FCR 155
Any references appearing in square brackets indicate that information has been omitted from this decision pursuant to section 431 of the Migration Act 1958 and replaced with generic information which does not allow the identification of an applicant, or their relative or other dependants.
STATEMENT OF REASONS
[1] The practice of this Tribunal is, overwhelmingly, to hear cases and then reserve them, with the Tribunal’s decision and reasons to be communicated to applicants at a later date.
[2] Owing to the sheer length of this case, its complexities, its evidence, and my preference for it to be resolved sooner rather than later, I have chosen to deliver these reasons orally.

[3] The applicants in this case are Iranian nationals who have made a claim of protection on Australia.

[4]    The applicants and family members in this matter are:
A.[Name]  (first applicant) ([age] year old man)
B.[Name]          (second applicant) ([age] year old woman)
C.[The third applicant]   ([age] year old daughter)
D.[The fourth applicant]                    ([age] year old son)
E.[The fifth applicant]           ([age] year old daughter)

[5] For the purposes of this decision, I will refer to the family of the first applicant and second applicant as ‘the applicant family’.
[6] On 03 February 2012, the first applicant was granted a business visa.[1]
[1] Protection Visa Decision Record of 07 March 2019 at page 3.

[7] [In] September 2012, the first applicant arrived in Australia.[2]
[2] Protection Visa Decision Record of 07 March 2019 at page 3.

[8] Between 2012 and 2015, the first applicant returned to Iran and arrived back in Australia.[3]
[3] Protection Visa Decision Record of 07 March 2019 at page 3.

[9] [In] September 2015, all of the applicant family arrived in Australia.[4]
[4] Protection Visa Decision Record of 07 March 2019 at page 3.

[10] On [date], the applicant’s daughter was born in Australia.[5]
[5] Protection Visa Decision Record of 07 March 2019 at page 3.
[11] On 14 December 2016, the first applicant and second applicant lodged an application for a protection visa. [6]
[6] Protection Visa Decision Record of 07 March 2019 at page 3.

[12] At some point on or about 07 March 2019, the applicants were interview by a Delegate of the Minister for Home Affairs (Minister’s Delegate).[7]
[7] Protection Visa Decision Record of 07 March 2019 at page 1.

[13] On 07 March 2019, the Minister’s Delegate refused the grant of protection visas to the first applicant and the second applicant.[8]
[8] Protection Visa Decision Record of 07 March 2019 at page 8.

[14] In the reasons published by the Minister’s Delegate, these were the findings of fact of the Minister’s Delegate and I set them out for ease of reference:
The two applicants were interviewed on the same day and having considered their testimonies along with all the other evidence before me, I am not satisfied that they are genuine and committed Christians. I consider that they have taken up the Christian religion and they attend church for the sole reason of creating an avenue to remain in Australia.
Various reports indicate that the decision for an Iranian Muslim to leave their religion and convert to Christianity is significant and potentially dangerous.1 The information the applicants have provided in relation to making the significant decision to convert religions and to take up Christianity in an active and serious manner in Australia has been inconsistent, unpersuasive and gives reason to doubt the veracity of the applicants’ claims. At interview, both applicants confirmed their written claim that they had attended [Church 1] since April 2016. The applicants also testified that prior to coming to Australia in 2015 they had made up their minds to confirm their Christians beliefs and formally become Christians in Australia. They came to Australia to become Christians. It was put to both applicants that considering they claim to have come to Australia to become Christians then attending [Church 1] in April 2016 was of concern. It was put to them that the 7 or 8 month delay in attending church after arriving in Australia in September 2015 was reason to doubt their claim that they came to Australia for reason of becoming Christians. They both provided reasons for the delay and I note that the female applicant gave birth in [in specified year], however I do not accept that their reasons for not pursuing their plans of becoming Christians for 7 or 8 months is supportive of their claims. Furthermore, since the date of interview both applicants have provided a letter from [Church 1] indicating that they started to attend church on [two dates in] October 2016. That longer, year-long delay, noted in the evidence provided by them gives more reason to doubt their claims are genuine. The applicants have not claimed that the dates provided by [Church 1] are incorrect. The dates provided by [Church 1] are also exact, they are not approximate dates and that reinforces that the dates come from church records and are accurate.
I consider that if the applicants uplifted themselves and their children to come to Australia to become Christians then they would have begun the transition to convert religions soon after arriving in Australia. The lengthy delay is of significance and is of concern and it gives good reason to doubt the applicants’ claims are genuine.
In addition to the above, the female applicant testified that she attended [Church 1] after her hairdresser invited her to go. As put to the applicant at interview, I consider that if she came to Australia with her family for the reason of attending church and becoming Christians then the long delay in attending church and only attending after being invited by her hairdresser is of concern.
The applicants claim that during their trip to Australia in 2013 they went to a church on one occasion. They were able to enter the church and sit down but there was no service being offered at the time. They only visited the one church in 2013. It is claimed that the female applicant was so affected by her visit to that church that she started to cry while sitting in the church. At interview, she was asked if she was so positively affected by attending the church in 2013 then why was it that it took her 8 months (now known to be a year) to attend a church after arriving in 2015 and why she only attended after being invited by her hairdresser. She said that they came to Australia to be Christians. She also said that she had children to look after and she was looking for the right church for them in Australia and they were the reason for the delay in going to church. The applicant also said that she is still affected by the single visit to the church in 2013 and she took the female interpreters hand and placed it on her own arm and said that you can feel that she is still cold and physically affected by the visit to the church in 2013. It was put to the applicant that if she was so affected by the church visit in 2013 then it is hard to understand why she delayed attending church for so long on this current visit to Australia.
In regards to their frequency of attendance at [Church 1], the male applicant testified that because he had to work 7-days a week so he could only attended church about twice a month. He could not go every week. He also said that his wife attends church with him ‘most of the time’ but she never attended without him because they only had one car and he used the car to get to work. The female applicant said that she attends church with her children most Sundays, if not all Sundays. She was asked if she always attended with her husband, she said that she did because they only had the one car. The difference in the testimony was put to her and she said that her husband must have been wrong in what he said. The applicants are not expected to always attend church and the manner in which people practice their religions can be diverse. However, in this circumstance I find the differences in testimony from both applicants when considered with the other concerns noted in this assessment to be a result false non-genuine claims.
It is noted at the time of interview the female applicant had not yet received her baptismal certificate. This was discussed with both applicants at interview and it was generally put to them that being baptised seems to be a central and important part of the Christian faith and it was of some concern that she had not taken possession of her certificate some two years after being baptised. Both applicants provided reasons, the male applicant said that they had been busy and the female applicant said that she had ‘insisted’ many times that the church give her the certificate but the church was busy. It is noted that the certificate was quickly obtained after the interview.2 The female applicant was asked if they had baptised their child born in Australia, she said that they had not but it was just a matter of making an appointment. I consider that if the applicants were committed Christians who had given up their lives in Iran to pursue Christianity in Australia then the decision to either baptise their child or not would be significant and more than just making an appointment. While not reasons to refuse the applicant on their own, the baptismal certificate not being pursued and their child not being baptised does not suggest that the applicants are committed and eager adherents and followers of the Christian faith.
The applicants claim that during their trip to Australia in 2012 they were locked out of their motel room in the early hours of the morning and a neighbour let them come inside her room. The neighbour happened to be Christian and on that basis they concluded and realised that Christianity means love and trust and that convinced them that the religion was for them. It was put to the applicants that it was hard to appreciate that that single meeting could have been sufficient to convince them that Christianity was based on good principles. It was further put to them that it was harder to accept the claim considering they have both indicated that the woman who let them into the room did not speak English and they could not really communicate with her. Following the same logic of the applicants claim, the female applicant was asked if she had ever met a kind or loving Muslim, she said that she had not and she had never seen such things in Iran. I have serious doubts that the applicants’ interaction with a Christian woman who could not communicate with them made them have an understanding that Christianity is based on love and trust. Furthermore, the female applicant’s statement that she had never met a kind or loving Muslim is extremely hard to accept as truthful and that indicates to me that the applicants are prepared to say anything in the pursuit of a PV.
At interview, the male applicant testified that when he came to Australia in 2015 he was struggling with his wife’s pregnancy and that was one of the reasons why he could not go to church. He also said that he had was applying for jobs and trying to establish his own business but that failed. He said that money was being sent to him from Iran. It was put to him that if he had time to try and establish his own business then that could indicate that his time was not tied to his wife’s pregnancy and he may have had time to attend church. The applicant said that he had been truthful and he also said that soon after arrival and while looking for work and to establish a business he was attending church but he was not aware that [Church 1] provided interpreters at that time. The applicant suggested that he was attending church soon after arriving in Australia but the evidence before me indicates that is not truthful and the applicant started attending church in November 2016.
At interview, the applicants were asked questions about their claimed former religion of Islam and a number of questions about their claimed religion of Christianity and what being a Christian means to them and why being a Christian is important to them. While the applicants provided responses, I found there responses to be basic and their responses were not sufficient to remove the above concerns. I am not satisfied that the applicants have a deep or intimate personal understanding of the Christian faith or a deep or intimate personal connection to the faith. The applicants also provided a number of documents and some photos both prior to interview and after the interview.3 I have reviewed all the documents and the photos but assessing them in light of all the above, I do not consider that they evidence a genuine commitment to the Christian faith on behalf of the applicants.
While the applicants have physically attended church in Australia, on the basis of all the above I am satisfied that the applicants are not genuine converts to the Christian faith. I find the claims for protection are fabricated, the applicants are not genuine and committed Christians and the claims for protection are not credible.

[15] From this decision to refuse the grant of protection visas by the Minister’s Delegate, the first applicant and second applicant now appeal to this Tribunal.
CRITERIA FOR A PROTECTION VISA
[16] The criteria for a protection visa are set out in s 36 of Migration Act and Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (the Regulations). An applicant for the visa must meet one of the alternative criteria in s 36(2)(a), (aa), (b), or (c). That is, he or she is either a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under the ‘refugee’ criterion, or on other ‘complementary protection’ grounds, or is a member of the same family unit as such a person and that person holds a protection visa of the same class.
[17] Section 36(2)(a) provides that a criterion for a protection visa is that the applicant for the visa is a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the person is a refugee.

[18] A person is a refugee if, in the case of a person who has a nationality, they are outside the country of their nationality and, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, are unable or unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of that country: s 5H(1)(a). In the case of a person without a nationality, they are a refugee if they are outside the country of their former habitual residence and, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, are unable or unwilling to return to that country: s 5H(1)(b).

[19] Under s 5J(1), a person has a well-founded fear of persecution if they fear being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, there is a real chance they would be persecuted for one or more of those reasons, and the real chance of persecution relates to all areas of the relevant country. Additional requirements relating to a ‘well-founded fear of persecution’ and circumstances in which a person will be taken not to have such a fear are set out in ss 5J(2)-(6) and ss 5K-LA, which are extracted in the attachment to this decision.
[20] If a person is found not to meet the refugee criterion in s 36(2)(a), he or she may nevertheless meet the criteria for the grant of the visa if he or she is a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the Minister has substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of being removed from Australia to a receiving country, there is a real risk that he or she will suffer significant harm: s 36(2)(aa) (the complementary protection criterion). The meaning of significant harm, and the circumstances in which a person will be taken not to face a real risk of significant harm, are set out in ss 36(2A) and (2B), which are extracted in the attachment to this decision.
[21] Any application to this Tribunal, even where an applicant has not attended their hearing, is a proceeding de novo and not an appeal, strictly speaking, at least not an appeal to any court. The case before the Tribunal is heard and determined afresh, on the material that is placed before the Tribunal, and the Tribunal is not bound by any previous decision of the executive government.

[22] In this matter, the Tribunal stands, rather, in the place of the original decision maker, with the power to affirm, vary, or set aside, and decide in substitution or remit a decision under review with the Tribunal’s directions or recommendations: s 43(1) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act1975 (Cth) (AAT Act). The Federal Court said this of the Tribunal’s task[9]:
The question for the determination of the Tribunal is not whether the decision which the decision-maker made was the correct or preferable one on the material before him. The question for the determination of the Tribunal is whether the decision was the correct or preferable one on the material before the Tribunal.
[9] Drake v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1979) 24 ALR 577 at 589 per Bowen CJ and Deane J.

[23] It goes without saying that no two cases are the same and that each case must be judged according to its own facts and on its own merits. In view of what was said in Drake, set out above, it is important to repeat that the Tribunal here takes on the role of determining what was the correct or preferable decision on the whole of the material that has been filed with or presented to this Tribunal in this case.
Mandatory considerations
[24] In accordance with Ministerial Direction No.84, made under s 499 of Migration Act, the Tribunal has taken account of the ‘Refugee Law Guidelines’ and ‘Complementary Protection Guidelines’ prepared by the Department of Home Affairs, and country information assessments prepared by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade expressly for protection status determination purposes, to the extent that they are relevant to the decision under consideration.
THE PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THIS TRIBUNAL
[25] It is important at the outset of these reasons to explain the nature of this Tribunal and its task in cases such as this one.

[26] The proceedings before the Tribunal are inquisitorial and the Tribunal is not in the position of a contradictor. It is for an applicant to make their case. It is for an applicant to advance whatever evidence or argument they wish to advance in support of that case. In these particular cases, an applicant’s contention will be that Australia owes them protection obligations. This Tribunal must then decide whether that claim has been made out.[10]
[10] See Abebe v Commonwealth (1999) 197 CLR 510 at 576 [187] per Gummow and Hayne JJ

[27] To emphasise the point, per ss. 5AAA and 423A of the Migration Act, it is for an applicant to make their own case in as much detail as possible – and to do so at their first reasonable opportunity. Otherwise, adverse inferences may be drawn against cases made later and, especially, made after already significant delays. I will now discuss these two sections in more detail.
a.section 5AAA of the Migration Act makes clear that it is the responsibility of an applicant to specify all particulars of their claim to be a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations and to provide sufficient evidence to establish the claim. The Tribunal does not have any responsibility or obligation to specify or assist in specifying particulars of the claim or to in fact establish or assist in establishing the claim. This is consistent with the well-settled proposition that it is for an applicant to make their own case. Further, and critically, applicants are expected to present their case in full before the primary decision-maker and not to wait until after the primary decision has been made. In this respect, two obligations are particularly relevant: the ongoing requirement under s.104 of the Migration Act for an applicant to ensure their relevant details are correct and up to date, and, also, for them to amend any incorrect information at the first reasonable opportunity.
b.section 423A of the Migration Act requires the Tribunal to draw an adverse inference about the credibility of an applicant’s claims or evidence where the applicant raises a claim or presents evidence that was not put forward before the primary decision was made. In such a case, if the Tribunal is satisfied that the applicant does not have a reasonable explanation about why the claim was not first raised or the evidence was not first presented before the primary decision, the Tribunal is required to draw an inference unfavourable to the credibility of the applicant’s claim or evidence. Applicants, therefore, who do not present all of their claims and evidence to the primary decision-maker must have a reasonable explanation for their not doing so.

While the Tribunal is conducting a ‘de novo’ review, it also cannot close its eyes to delay and to ‘recent invention’ of old evidence. These are less matters of strict rules of evidence than the application of common sense. This said, there may be good reasons for a failure by an applicant to immediately recall all aspects of an applicant’s experience that may soundly ground a protection claim. It is crucial to always keep an open mind and to be fair and just in all the circumstances of an applicant’s claim. Yet, ultimately, it is the applicant’s case to make.
[28]     In this case, I have considered all of the material afresh and made my own assessment and determination as to whether the applicants meet the criteria for the grant of protection visas. While as noted above, the Tribunal is inquisitorial and can seek out the evidence it requires in order to reach a determination, the Tribunal is not required to actively seek out evidence to support any applicant’s claim.[11] It is, rather, the responsibility of each applicant to specify all the particulars of their claim to be a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations and to provide sufficient evidence to establish such a claim: s 5AAA of the Migration Act.
[11] see ABT16 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 836 (05 June 2019) at [28] per Perram J.
CONSIDERATION OF CLAIMS AND EVIDENCE
[29]     Noting the above, then, the issue in this case is whether the first applicant and the second applicant have made out their claims that Australia owes them protection obligations as Iranians who are converts to Christianity, in particular, evangelical Christianity.
[30]     To reiterate what I have said in other cases: where an applicant makes a claim of a fear of persecution, the mere fact that a person claims this fear of persecution for a particular reason does not establish either the genuineness of the asserted fear, or that the fear is well-founded, or that it is for the reason claimed. A fear of persecution is not well-founded if it is merely assumed, or merely asserted, or if its basis is mere speculation. An assertion, however, passionately and/or repeatedly it is made, is not proof of its truth.

[31] Although the concept of onus of proof is inappropriate to administrative inquiries and decision-making of the kind done by this Tribunal, the relevant facts of the individual case will have to be supplied by the applicant in as much detail as is necessary to enable the decision-maker to establish the relevant facts. A decision-maker is not required to make the applicant's case for them. Nor is this Tribunal required to accept uncritically any and all of the claims and allegations made by an applicant.[12] As a general rule, this Tribunal grants the benefit of the doubt to applicants who are generally credible even if unable to substantiate all of their claims. At the same time, an applicant who is not credible will, almost always, have their case rejected.
[12] Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Guo (1997) 191 CLR 559 at 596, Nagalingam (1992) 38 FCR 191, Prasad v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1985) 6 FCR 155.
[32] I have read all of the evidence in this case, that was filed by all of the applicants, and which I set out here in the written reasons for completeness:
A.Statutory Declaration of Farnam Razzaghipour made 16 August 2023 and its annexures and attachments
B.Statutory Declaration of [the second applicant] made 12 December 2016
C.Statutory Declaration of [the third applicant] made 10 August 2023
D.Statement of [Person A] dated 14 August 2023

E.the bundles of photographs and historic materials relevant to the Christian religious practice of the first applicant and the second applicant that were filed with the Department and this Tribunal.

[33] I have also reviewed my notes of the hearings before me of this case on 23 May 2023 and 21 July 2023.
[34] Further to the questions before the Tribunal in this case: I have recently in the Iranian protection case of 1905907[13] set out the precarious position today of Christians, especially evangelical protestant Christians, in Iran. I will not repeat what I say there in these reasons but do rely on what I say in case 1905907 here as regards why evangelical protestant Christians are in more danger in Shia Iran than may be the case for members of historic Christian churches with orthodox doctrines of belief and salvation, such as the various rites of the Catholic and Orthodox churches that are registered and largely accepted in Shia Iran by its Islamic Republic authorities.[14]
[13] AAT case 1905907 of 01 December 2023
[14] See especially:

[35] It follows from my analysis in case 1905907[15] that an evangelical Christian in Iran is in significantly more danger, and at greater risk of suffering significant harm, than is a nominal Catholic or Orthodox.
[15] AAT case 1905907 of 01 December 2023

[36] Accordingly, the only question before the Tribunal is whether the first applicant and second applicant are evangelical Christians of a kind that would face real risks of suffering significant harm on account of their religious faith.

[37] I have read, closely, what the Minister’s Delegate said in his reasons – set out above – in March of 2019, in refusing the grant of protection to the applicants. However, there are significant problems with what the Minister’s Delegate found in relation to the first applicant and the second applicant, in light of all the evidence in this case, including the evidence given before me at the hearings of this case. In particular, I have these pronlems with the Minister’s Delegate and his findings and reasons:
A.the issue of delay was in the making of the claim by the applicants – delay may cast doubt on an applicant’s claim but that in and of itself is not fatal. An applicant may only lodge a claim for protection when they feel they need to do so, such as when another visa runs out. While this may ordinarily harm an applicant’s credit, this does not of itself cause the refusal of a protection claim, on its own. Each case has to be considered on its own merits. Delay is not fatal where there is evidence that an applicant would, if returned to their country of origin or to another receiving country, face real risks of suffering significant risk. I am inclined on my review to give any delay here little weight in my determination of the applicants’ case, given the other evidentiary matters that give risk to a risk of significant harm.[16]
B.the second applicant’s choice of church – the Minister’s Delegate made much of the fact that the second applicant had a, perhaps, eclectic approach to her church and that she only went to [Church 1] in Sydney because she was invited by her hairdresser. While church fellowship is a critical aspect of Christian belief across Catholic, Orthodox, and Protestant, denominations, the obligation to attend frequently and for what service (praise/prayer or worship or Holy Communion) differs among denominations. The fact that a woman’s hairdresser invited her to attend [Church 1] – which is a church well known in Sydney, and elsewhere, as one that attracts [many worshipers] – is entirely unremarkable.[17] There is no dispute that the second applicant attended [Church 1] nor that she is on her evidence a Christian believer. It is hardly surprising that some new parishioner would be attending [Church 1] because they were invited by a friend or someone they trusted, such as a hairdresser in the case of a mother in the second applicant’s position. I do not think that I need to go into evidence on the issue of the often very close relations that will exist between women and their hairdressers any more than I think I would be required to do so for men of a certain era and their barbers, or, indeed, their bartenders.[18] It is simply a matter of common sense that should never have escaped the Minister’s Delegate’s attention. There was an element in this respect of the trivial, if not the tendentious in how the Minister’s Delegate approached the second applicant’s evidence of her [Church 1] membership. In these respects, I find the Minister’s Delegate made far too much of trivial, if not irrelevant matters, especially in the formerly Islamic context of the second applicant’s life in Iran[19], and I am inclined to disagree, heartily, with any use of these bases by the Minister’s Delegate to support his findings.
C.Criticism of the applicants’ religious knowledge – it should be pointed out here, were there any doubt, that Christianity is a religion of faith and works, and that not all those who are Christians can give the clearest of answers to religious questions. This has been ever so since the life of Jesus on this earth and the importance of faith and works over formal religious knowledge is probably best exemplified for Christians by the differing behaviour of the Saints Peter (the senior apostle) and John (the youngest apostle), at the time of Jesus’ arrest, trial, and crucifixion, where the elder Peter denied knowing Jesus[20] while the young John stood loyally by the Cross[21]. While one hesitates to delve too deeply into Christian theology in a merits review decision, it is critical in this respect, to correct a misreading of the Christian faithful. In practical terms, moreover, the ability for any Christian to convey religious knowledge would be all the more difficult where that Christian is being questioned in English and in Farsi by even the most kind and the most patient government official. Moreover, the first applicant and his son [the fourth applicant] in the hearings before me were able to give me deep and very personal testimonies of their Christian faith and how they came to it. It did not appear to me to be rehearsed or fake. It seemed to me to be entirely natural and sincere. Every Christian will have their own particular of how they came to be a member of the Christian faith - sometimes it was a faith they were simply born into while for others it will be a conversion that causes them to have faith in Christ as their redeemer. In the absence of contradictory witnesses or contradictory information, I cannot see any reason to dispute the testimonials of the father and his son, and their Christian faith, let alone to dismiss them as the Minister’s Delegate did, wrongly.
[16] Protection Visa Decision Record of 07 March 2019 at page 5.
[17] See in particular the scholarly writings as well as investigative journalism of Elle Hardy on Pentecostal Christianity, in particular her book, Beyond Belief: How Pentecostal Christianity Is Taking Over the World (Hurst Publishers, London UK, 2022).
[18] See this informative exploration by the University of Melbourne: Hannah McCann
[19]
[20] Gospel of St Luke, Chapter 22, Verses 54-62.
[21] Gospel of St John, Chapter 19, Verses 25-27.

[38] Overall, on balance, this case – and its many hearings – has revealed vastly different aspects of the applicant family to this Tribunal than I think was the case before the Minister’s Delegate, whose decision I have found to be, in key respects, quite unsatisfactory.
[39] Therefore, this Tribunal must set aside the decision of the Minister’s Delegate.

FINDINGS

[40] It follows then that I have found, on my review, of the whole of the case of the first applicant and the second applicant – after two very long hearings and the filing of considerable documentation – that:
A.I find the first applicant and the second applicant are evaneglical Christians of a kind that would face real risks of suffering significant harm on account of their religious faith.
B.because of (A), I do not need to consider the position of the [third applicant] as a public critic of the Iranian regime, who, on the evidence before me, would very likely satisfy s 36(2)(aa) of the Migration Act in her own right.
C.because of (A), I do not need to consider the position of the applicant daughter [the fifth applicant] who was born in Australia and has only known Australia, and may have her own claims for protection.[22]
[22]

[41] I have found all of these matters on the basis of the evidence before the Tribunal and without any need for the Tribunal to extend any benefit of any doubts to any of the applicants.

DECISION

[42] The Tribunal sets aside the decision of the Department to refuse the grant of a protection visa and remits the matter with the following directions:
[a] that both the first applicant and the second applicant satisfy s 36(2)(aa)
of the Migration Act; and

[b]that the other applicants satisfy s 36(2)(c)(i) of the Migration Act, because of their membership of the same family unit as the first named applicants.

Statement made on 15 December 2023 at 2:30pm

Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Iran Country Information Report, 24 July 2023, at paragraphs 2.79 to 2.88.
US State Department, 2022 Report on International Religious Freedom: Iran, dated 15 May 2023, at section 2.
Danish Immigration Service and the Danish Refugee Council, Iran: House churches and converts, February 2018, pages 27-28

Senior Lecturer in Cultural Studies

The closure by the Taliban of the last women’s beauty salons, as places where women could gather free of male presence, is an example of the larger role played by such interactions in female lives and culture: US National Public Radio, Inside Kabul's beauty salons: One of the last places women can gather now must close, 14 July 2023.
In respect of the facts of the youngest daughter and the obligations owed to her, see my reasons for decision and my discussion of the Crown’s “Parens Patriae” obligations in 1814077 (Refugee) [2023] AATA 729 (10 February 2023)

Details

AGLC: 1906464 (Refugee) [2023] AATA 4642
Case: [2023] AATA 4642
Decision Date: 15 December 2023

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The applicant, an asylum seeker from Iran, sought review of a decision by the Minister to refuse to grant a protection visa. The applicant claimed to have converted to Christianity in Iran and continued to practice their faith in Australia. The primary dispute concerned whether the applicant had a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of religion should they be returned to Iran, and whether they met the criteria for a protection visa. The matter was heard by G.a.f. Connolly SM in the Administrative Appeals Tribunal.

The Tribunal was required to determine whether the applicant's conversion to Christianity was genuine, and if so, whether they would face a real chance of serious harm upon return to Iran due to their religious beliefs. Specifically, the Tribunal had to consider the applicant's delay in attending church services in Australia and the delay in lodging their protection visa application, and assess whether these factors undermined the credibility of their claim. The Tribunal also needed to evaluate the evidence presented regarding the general risk faced by evangelical Christians in Iran.

In reaching its decision, the Tribunal considered the applicant's personal testimonies regarding their Christian faith and the circumstances of their conversion. It acknowledged that while delays in church attendance and application lodgement were noted, these did not necessarily negate the genuineness of the applicant's conversion or their fear of persecution. The Tribunal applied the principles established in refugee law concerning the assessment of credibility and the evaluation of risk, particularly in the context of religious persecution. The Tribunal found that the evidence, including the applicant's personal accounts, suggested a greater risk of harm for evangelical Christians in Iran.

Consequently, the Tribunal remitted the decision under review to the Minister for reconsideration, indicating that the applicant had established a case for the grant of a protection visa.

Orders