1732753 (Refugee)

1732753 (Refugee) [2022] AATA 3724 (19 August 2022)
DECISION RECORD
DIVISION:Migration & Refugee Division
REPRESENTATIVE: Mr Dongjie Xu (MARN: 0848682)
CASE NUMBER: 1732753

COUNTRY OF REFERENCE: China
MEMBER:Peter Papadopoulos
DATE:19 August 2022
PLACE OF DECISION: Sydney
DECISION:The Tribunal remits the matter for reconsideration with the following directions:
(i)that the first named applicant satisfies s 36(2)(a) of the Migration Act; and
(ii)that the other applicants satisfy s 36(2)(b)(i) of the Migration Act, on the basis of membership of the same family unit as the first named applicant.

Statement made on 19 August 2022 at 11:02am
CATCHWORDS
REFUGEE – protection visa – China – religion – Christian – underground house church – political opinion – opposition to the Chinese Communist Party – political activities in Australia – family planning laws – unregistered child – producing Christian material – social compensation fee – detention – forced sterilisation – education – medical benefits – decision under review remitted
LEGISLATION
Migration Act 1958, ss 5(1), 5AAA, 5H, 5J – 5LA, 36, 65, 499
Migration Regulations 1994, Schedule 2
CASES
Kopalapillai v MIMA (1998) 86 FCR 547
MIEA v Guo (1997) 191 CLR 559
MIMA v Rajalingam (1999) 93 FCR 220
Prasad v MIEA (1985) 6 FCR 155
Randhawa v MILGEA (1994) 52 FCR 437
Selvadurai v MIEA (1994) 34 ALD 347
Sun v MIBP [2016] FCAFC 52
Any references appearing in square brackets indicate that information has been omitted from this decision pursuant to section 431 of the Migration Act 1958 and replaced with generic information which does not allow the identification of an applicant, or their relative or other dependants.
STATEMENT OF DECISION AND REASONS

[The applicant] ([named]) is [an age] year old man born in Fujian Province in The People’s Republic of China (PRC or China). [Mrs A] is [an age] year old woman who was also born in Fujian Province. They are a married couple and have three young children, namely:
·     [Daughter A], their [age] year old daughter;
·     [Daughter B], their [age] year old daughter; and
·     [Daughter C], their [age] year old daughter.
Leaving [Daughter B] behind in China, the couple arrived in Australia with their eldest daughter [Daughter A] [in] July 2016. They each entered Australia as the holder of a visitor visa and they have not departed since. Nine days after arriving in Australia, the couple and [Daughter A] applied for a protection (Class XA) visa (protection visa). As the family awaited an outcome on their protection visa application, [Daughter C] was born in Sydney and later included in that application.
On 7 December 2017, a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection made a decision to refuse to grant a protection visa under s 65 of the Act to each of the four applicants. The delegate refused to grant the visa on the basis that the applicants are neither persons to whom Australia has protection obligations nor members of the family unit of a person to whom Australia has protection obligations.
This is an application for review of the delegate’s decision.
The issue in this case is whether each applicant is either a refugee or a person who meets the criteria for complementary protection. I also need to consider whether any applicant is a member of the same family unit as a person who is a refugee or meets the criteria for complementary protection. A summary of the relevant law, mandatory considerations and an extract of key provisions of the Act is set out in Attachment A.
All four applicants were represented by a registered migration agent, namely Mr Dongjie Xu (MARN 0848682), in connection with their protection visa application and review application.
For the following reasons, I have concluded that [the applicant] is a refugee within the meaning of s 5H of the Act and that the decision under review should be remitted for reconsideration with the direction that he satisfies s 36(2)(a) of the Act and that [Mrs A], [Daughter A] and [Daughter C] satisfy s 36(2)(b)(i) of the Act on the basis that they are members of his family unit.
Claims and evidence
Protection visa application
Protection visa application form
In their protection visa application form, the following claims were made.
[The applicant] left China [in] July 2016 with [Mrs A] and [Daughter A], their eldest daughter. At that time, [Mrs A] was pregnant with their third child and they had left [Daughter B] back in China in the care of [Mrs A’s] parents.
[The applicant] and [Mrs A] were married [in] March 2010. They each hold [specified] qualifications. Between 2001 and 2010, [Mrs A] worked as [an occupation 1] for various [companies] in Fuzhou City in Fujian Province. She then ceased work as [an occupation 1] and established and ran a [business 1], a pursuit that she followed until she left China in July 2016. Between 1995 and 2005, [the applicant] worked as [an occupation 1] and [another occupation] for various [companies] in Fuzhou City. He then ran his own [occupation 1] business from 2005 until June 2013. He then scaled down his business in order to help his wife run her [business 1] until they left China in July 2016.
[Mrs A] experienced fertility problems for many years and had been very upset because she could not conceive a child. In early 2011, [an employee] at one of her [business 1s] introduced her to Christianity and encouraged her to pray for a child. [Mrs A] was open to the suggestion and began to pray for a child. After her “constant prayers”, [Mrs A] became pregnant and was delighted. In recognition of this “miracle”, [Mrs A] began attending a house church and was baptised [in] August 2011. She persuaded [the applicant] to join the house church and he too was baptised [in] December 2011. Their first daughter [Daughter A] was born on [date]. Their second daughter, [Daughter B], was born on [date].
In or around August 2015, [the applicant] began designing “Gospel Pamphlets with colourful pictures and good wordings”. He gave these designs to the pastor at his house church who would print the pamphlets and give them to other church members to hand them out to people in parks and plazas in the hope that it would attract those people to Christianity.
Around 8pm on [a day in] February 2016, three policemen raided [the applicant’s] home and seized a Bible, some gospel pamphlets and [the applicant’s] computer and laptop. When [the applicant] and [Mrs A] attempted to resist the search of their home, [the applicant] was slapped by a policeman and they were both told not to speak without permission. [The applicant] was then taken to [a named] Police Station where he was questioned for about two hours and hit “very hard” because he refused to answer questions. During the interrogation, the police searched the computer and laptop and found the pamphlet design files. [The applicant] was detained for [number] days and was released after his wife had arranged and facilitated the payment of a bribe of [amount] RMB to a senior police officer. On his release, [the applicant] was warned by the police to cease any involvement in “spreading activities” and cease attending the house church. Following his release, [the applicant] became aware that two fellow church members who had been “privately and secretly” handing out the gospel pamphlets in [a named location] had been arrested, interrogated and tortured by the police and revealed his “information” to the police.
In early May 2016, [Mrs A] realised she was pregnant with their third child. The couple then decided that they should go abroad in order to realise their religious freedom. They also wanted to escape punishment that would arise if they were found to have breached China’s family planning laws, specifically their forced sterilisation and the forced abortion of their unborn child. [Mrs A’s] father had been forcibly sterilised in or around 1984 for having breached China’s one child policy, a procedure that had damaged his body and rendered him unable to undertake heavy duties.
[In] July 2016, 11 thugs who had been hired by corrupt local officials, came to [the applicant] and [Mrs A’s] home to confront [the applicant] because he had been involved in petitions made to the Fujian Provincial Letters and Visits Office in relation to not having received compensation following the demolition of his home in a nearby village along with the homes of some of his village neighbours. [The applicant], [Mrs A] and [Daughter A] were not home at the time of this visit but [the applicant’s] parents and younger brother were present and physically hurt by the thugs. On [the following day], [the applicant] and [Mrs A] returned home and the incident was reported to the police but they felt that was “useless because they are the same group of people and protecting each other”.
[Later in] July 2016, [the applicant], [Mrs A] and [Daughter A] left China. They departed from Fuzhou airport and arrived at Sydney airport [in] July 2016.
After [Daughter C] was born on [date], she was included in the application. It was claimed on [Daughter C’s] behalf that she was the third child of her parents and, if she returned to China, she would be unable to obtain hukou registration because her parents had breached China’s family planning laws. This would result in [Daughter C] being unable to access entitlements ordinarily available to Chinese citizens, specifically “public education, medical and social benefits”.
Protection visa application interview
The applicants attended an interview with the Department in connection with their protection visa application on 30 June 2017. The delegate interviewed [the applicant] and [Mrs A]. The interview was conducted with the assistance of an interpreter in the Mandarin and English languages.
The Tribunal has listened to a copy of the recording of the protection visa application interview and refers to it, where relevant, in the findings and reasons below.
Submissions in support of the application
On 13 July 2017, the applicants’ representative provided a letter to the Department in which the following key submissions were made:
·     [The applicant] and [Mrs A] fear persecution for reason of their religion. [The applicant] and [Mrs A] are committed Christians who will not change their beliefs and would continue to practise their Christian faith and worship in an underground church if they return to China. [The applicant’s] adverse experience in China was consistent with what is known of the mistreatment of Chinese Christians by the Chinese authorities.
·     [The applicant] and [Mrs A] fear persecution for reason of their imputed political opinion (family planning related). There was a “reasonable likelihood” that [Mrs A] would be targeted for forced sterilisation and subjected to monetary penalties due to her violation of China’s family planning policy.
·     [Daughter C] would be denied hukou registration in China unless [Mrs A] did not resist undergoing sterilisation. Without a hukou, [Daughter C] would be denied “government allocations and certain public benefits and rights, such as having access to education and health care”. Furthermore, the money penalties imposed on her parents for breaching family planning laws would make it increasingly difficult to raise [Daughter C].
Supporting documents
The following documents were provided in support of the application:
·     Chinese passport biodata pages for each of [the applicant], [Mrs A] and [Daughter A]
·     Certified copy of [Daughter C’s] New South Wales birth certificate
·     Signed letter from [Leader A], [from Church 1] dated 27 June 2017, stating that:
o   [The applicant], [Mrs A] and [Daughter A] joined the Mandarin congregation in September 2016 which they have regularly attended and where they have undertaken Bible study and served in the welcoming team
o   [The applicant] and [Mrs A] are devoted Christians
o   [The applicant] had recently helped design the cover of a [Christian Organisation 1] publication, something he cannot freely do in China
o   [The applicant] could attend an official state church in Fuzhou and avoid persecution but would be denied the opportunity to serve and develop his faith freely
o   [The applicant] is “very depressed of seeing his Christian life suffocated in Fuzhou”
·     Signed letter from [name], [an] Officer, [from Christian Organisation 1] dated 5 July 2017, stating that [the applicant]:
o   helped [Christian Organisation 1] design the cover of a bilingual book entitled “[title]” written by [author name] that is due to be published in October
o   was helping [Christian Organisation 1] design a poster to promote the “[named program]” to be held in October 2017
·     Signed letter from [a named] Pastor dated 11 July 2017 stating that:
o   [The applicant], [Mrs A] and [Daughter A] are part of the Mandarin congregation at [Church 1] and, as far as he knows, [the applicant] joined the congregation in September 2016
o   [The applicant] is a devout Christian and participates in the ministry of the church
·     Unsigned and undated letter from [name deleted], stating that:
o   [The applicant], [Mrs A] and [Daughter A] joined the Mandarin congregation in September 2016 which they have regularly attended and where they have undertaken Bible study and served in the welcoming team
o   [The applicant] and [Mrs A] are devoted Christians and keen to use their gifts to evangelise in the Chinese community
·     Excerpt on “Reproductive Rights” from United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices: China (2016)
·     Excerpt on “Population Control” from United States Congressional Executive Commission on China Report on Human Rights Practices (2016)
·     Various photographs of a [business 1] in China owned by [the applicant] and [Mrs A] and persons at that [business 1] along with untranslated and translated documentation pertaining to that business.
Summary of the delegate’s decision
On 7 December 2017, the delegate refused the protection visa application because credibility issues associated with the applicants’ claims and country information indicated that fear of serious or significant harm was not well-founded.
Based upon [the applicant’s] testimony at interview, the delegate was not satisfied that:
· [the applicant] and [Mrs A] were introduced to Christianity prior to their entry to Australia;
· [The applicant] was ever detained for [number] days for reason that he [produced] a flyer for his unregistered church and consequently that [Mrs A] paid a substantial bribe for her husband’s release from such detention.
Given the lack of documentary evidence relating to [Daughter B’s] existence, and the lack of spontaneous evidence at interview in relation to [Daughter B], the delegate was not satisfied that [Daughter C] was the third child of [the applicant] and [Mrs A]. It followed that there was no basis for the claim that harm would arise out of family planning laws having been breached such as [Daughter C] being denied hukou registration and either or both of her parents being forcibly sterilised.
Notwithstanding the credibility issues, the delegate concluded that country information did not support the applicants’ claim that they would be of adverse interest to the authorities for reason of their Christian belief, nor that [Mrs A] would be targeted for sterilisation and [Daughter C] denied hukou registration. The delegate did note that country information indicated the applicants would be subject to a Social Compensation Fee for which they had demonstrated capacity to pay.
Application for review
On 22 December 2017, the applicants lodged an application for review of the delegate’s decision with the Tribunal.
Pre-hearing submissions and supporting documents
On 22 June 2022, the applicants were invited to attend a hearing on 19 July 2022. Between 11 and 19 July 2002, the Tribunal received a large volume of material in support of the review application. The Tribunal notes the following non-compliance with the COVID-19 Special Measures Practice Direction – Migration and Refugee Division (Practice Direction) in relation to the provision of this material:
· contrary to paragraphs 6.11 and 6.13 of the Practice Direction, various documents were provided to the Tribunal less than seven days before the hearing and without written explanation as to why they had not been provided earlier;
· despite the applicants having a representative, namely Mr Dongjie Xu (MARN 0848682), documents were not lodged in a form that complied with paragraph 6.12 of the Practice Direction.
Furthermore, some of the material was provided by the representative to the Tribunal in duplicate. For the sake of brevity, the following is a summary of the supporting documents received by the Tribunal during the fortnight prior to the hearing.
On 11 July 2022, the Tribunal received a statement signed by [the applicant] and dated 9 July 2022. [The applicant] reiterated information in support of claims that had been raised before the Department but also detailed new claims in relation to anti-Chinese Communist Party (anti-CCP) political activities that he and his wife had engaged in since they arrived in Australia. In relation to these new claims, [the applicant] stated that:
·     in 2017, through Twitter and YouTube, he noticed the activities of [Mr A], an exiled Chinese businessman and anti-CCP activist who founded the [Organisation 1]
·     in or after April 2019, he joined [Group 1] on the [Platform 1] social chat platform, an online chat group of individuals who collaborate in support of the [Organisation 1]
·     he assumed the identity [specified] on the [Platform 1] social chat platform and volunteered his services [for] the group in order to create anti-CCP material
·     in June 2020, he joined [Group 2],[1] a Sydney-based organisation associated with the [Organisation 1], and volunteered his services as [an occupation 1]
·     in June 2021, he was appointed to lead [Group 2’s] [named] Team and has been responsible for the organisation’s [specified] requirements including in connection with its [protest material]
·     he produced over 1,000 anti-CCP [works] for [Group 2]
·     he attended the following anti-CCP protests and rallies in Sydney:
o   [rallies and dates specified]
·     in December 2021, his wife became a volunteer [for] [Group 2]
·     he and his wife have financially supported the [Group 3], a non-government organisation associated with the [Organisation 1]
·     he and his wife fear that the Chinese government will discover their anti-CCP activities in Australia and believe that if they return to China they will be persecuted on that basis.
[1] [Deleted.]
In support of these new claims, the following evidence was provided to the Tribunal before the hearing:
·     A portfolio of images of anti-CCP [works] including [brochures]
·     Photographs taken at anti-CCP rallies in Sydney, Canberra, Adelaide and Brisbane [in] 2021
·     Photographs of [the applicant] at the CCP [protests on dates specified]
·     Letter (unsigned) from [name], [Group 2] member dated 2 July 2022, stating that [the applicant]:
o   joined the [Organisation 1] in 2017 and the [Group 2] in June 2020
o   participated in [protests on dates specified] and offline events celebrating the [Group 2] anniversary [in] June 2021
o   is an active volunteer, contributes to [projects] for [Group 2] and became a team leader for [a named team] on 25 January 2021
o   has produced over 1,000 [specified works] in support of [Group 2] activities
o   is being monitored by the Chinese government.
·     Letter (signed) by [Mr C], [Group 2] member dated 3 July 2022, stating that:
o   he has known [the applicant] for 18 months through the [Organisation 1] and that they are members of [Group 2]
o   he has spoken to the applicant over the phone but never face to face
o   there are over 400 CCP operatives embedded in various chapters of the [Organisation 1]
o   Chinese political activists overseas who have family in China, like [the applicant], cover their faces to conceal their identities in order to protect their family in China from government reprisals
o   [The applicant] will be persecuted if he returns to China given his active participation in anti-CCP activities in Australia.
·     Letter (unsigned) from [Mr D], [Group 2] member dated 5 July 2022, stating that:
o   he has known [the applicant] through [Group 2] since June 2020
o   [The applicant] has played a key role in [contributing to] [Group 2] posters, [and other projects]
o   [The applicant] has attended [Group 2] anti-CCP demonstrations on [dates specified]
o   [The applicant] will be in grave danger if he returns to China as his identity is likely known to the Chinese government.
·     Screenshot of payment confirmation of a USD100 donation by [the applicant] to the [Group 3] on 26 May 2022
·     A letter from the [Group 3] dated 17 March 2021 thanking [the applicant] for his donation of USD[amount] in 2019 along with screenshots of associated payment confirmations
·     A letter from [Group 4] dated 7 July 2022 thanking [Mrs A] for her donation of USD50 on 10 December 2021 along with screenshots of payment confirmations connected with this transaction
·     Screenshots of two website page petitions – [specified] – and emails confirming signatures submitted by [the applicant] in support of a petition calling for official recognition of the CCP as a terrorist organisation and another petition in support of human rights and democratic freedom in Hong Kong
·     Online copy and unofficial translation of writ of summons dated 23 June 2021 pertaining to the criminal prosecution of two activists in China with a notation indicating that these activists were engaged in [Organisation 1] activities (the court document)
·     A small [portfolio] highlighting the placement of [Group 2] work in the office of [Official A]
·     A USB key containing four videos:
o   ‘[title]’ – video (duration 40 seconds) of a protest featuring [the applicant]
o   ‘[title]’ – video (duration 1 minute 2 seconds) featuring multiple protests and an interview with [the applicant]
o   ‘[title]’ – video (duration 4 minutes 17 seconds) featuring an interview with [the applicant] at a Sydney protest
o   [title] – video clip (duration 12 seconds) of a [media interview] with an Australian politician, highlighting prominent placement of [the applicant’s] [work].

In support of the claims in relation to religious persecution that were originally raised before the Department, the following evidence was provided to the Tribunal before the hearing:
·     A portfolio of [the applicant’s] work for books “[title]”, “[title]” and various posters
·     Letter signed by [Leader A], [from Church 1] dated 28 June 2022, stating that:
o   [The applicant], [Mrs A] and [Daughter A] began attending Mandarin Sunday services in September 2016. They have joined the Bible study group and are valued members of the Mandarin congregation
o   [Daughter C] and [Daughter A] attend the Kids’ Church
o   [The applicant] and [Mrs A] are devoted Christians, and [the applicant] has used his [skills] to assist the church with [projects]
o   there has been increasing pressure placed on churches in China over the last two years whereby house churches have been forced to close and children’s Sunday services are not permitted even in registered churches
·     Letter signed by Yung M Tang, [an] Officer of [from Christian Organisation 1] dated 28 June 2022, stating that [the applicant] has provided various [services] to [Christian Organisation 1] between 2017 and 2021
·     Letter from [Mr E] of [Employer 1] dated 1 July 2022 stating that [the applicant] has been working for [Employer 1] since June 2019 as [an occupation 1] on an annual salary of AUD65,000.
In support of the claims in relation to family planning law breaches and associated impediments to [Daughter C’s] hukou registration, the Tribunal received a copy of [Daughter B’s] Chinese birth certificate along with a translation of that document (without specification of the translator’s name or qualifications).
The hearing: oral evidence and supporting documents
[The applicant] and [Mrs A] appeared before the Tribunal on 25 and 26 July 2022 to give evidence and present arguments. The Tribunal did not receive any oral evidence from witnesses, despite the Tribunal’s invitation to the applicants to provide witness testimony. The Tribunal hearing was conducted with the assistance of an interpreter in the Mandarin and English languages. Where relevant, the oral evidence of [the applicant] and [Mrs A] is referred to below.
At the commencement of the hearing, [the applicant] and [Mrs A] handed their Chinese passports and the Chinese passport for their [Daughter A] to the Tribunal. The Tribunal made photocopies of the biodata page and pages of each passport containing a visa label, entry stamp and exit stamp. The Tribunal then returned the three passports to [the applicant] and [Mrs A].
Following my request during the hearing, during the evening of 25 July 2022 while the hearing was adjourned, the applicants provided the Tribunal with a pdf document containing various photographs of [Daughter B] with [the applicant], [Mrs A], [Daughter A] and other family members in China. These numerous photographs were inspected by the Tribunal at the hearing earlier that day when [Mrs A] was asked to produce her mobile telephone to provide evidence of [Daughter B’s] existence and her relationship with [Daughter B]. Along with photographs were numerous mobile phone screenshots taken on a web-based communication platform demonstrating video conversations between [Mrs A] and [Daughter B]. [Mrs A], along with [the applicant], freely and openly explained who was in each photograph, where each photograph was taken, whether any photograph was taken on a particular occasion and how old their [Daughter B] was when various photographs were taken. [Mrs A] also emotionally explained that she regularly communicated with her daughter using the video camera function on her mobile phone.
Where relevant to my findings, the evidence given by the applicants at the hearing is detailed in this Decision Record.
Post-hearing submissions and evidence
Neither the applicants nor their representative provided the Tribunal with any submissions or evidence following the hearing.
CONSIDERATION OF Claims and evidence: ANALYSIS (ASSESSMENT, FINDINGS AND REASONS)
Nationality: country of reference/receiving country
[The applicant], [Mrs A], [Daughter A] and [Daughter C] claim to be citizens of China. Copies of the passports of each of [the applicant], [Mrs A] and [Daughter A] were provided to the Department along with a copy of [Daughter C’s] NSW birth certificate. The delegate was satisfied that the applicants were citizens of China. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, I am satisfied that the applicants are citizens of China. I accept that China is the receiving country for the purpose of assessing claims for protection in this matter. There is no evidence before me to suggest that the applicants have the right to enter and reside in any other country for the purposes of the Act.
Credibility
In determining whether a protection visa applicant is entitled to protection in Australia, it is necessary to make findings of fact on relevant matters. In assessing the credibility of the applicant’s claims, the Tribunal accepts that the benefit of the doubt be given to asylum seekers who are generally credible but unable to substantiate all of their claims. The Tribunal is also mindful that if it makes an adverse finding in relation to a material claim made by an applicant, but is unable to make that finding with confidence, it must proceed to assess the claim on the basis that it might possibly be true.[2] However, the Tribunal is not required to accept uncritically any or all of the allegations made by an applicant. Further, the Tribunal is not required to have rebutting evidence available to it before it can find that a particular factual assertion by an applicant has not been made out.[3]
[2] MIMA v Rajalingam (1999) 93 FCR 220
[3] Randhawa v MILGEA (1994) 52 FCR 437 at 451 per Beaumont J; Selvadurai v MIEA (1994) 34 ALD 347 at 348 per Heerey J and Kopalapillai v MIMA (1998) 86 FCR 547
The mere fact that a person claims fear from harm for a particular reason does not establish the genuineness of the fear or that it is ‘well-founded’ or for the reason claimed. Likewise, the fact that an applicant claims to face a real risk of significant harm does not itself substantiate that such a risk exists or that it amounts to ‘significant harm’. It remains for the applicant to satisfy the Tribunal that all of the statutory elements are made out.[4] Section 5AAA of the Act makes clear that it is the applicant’s responsibility to specify all particulars of a claim to be a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations and to provide sufficient evidence to establish that claim. The Tribunal does not have any responsibility or obligation to specify, or assist the applicant in specifying, any particulars of his or her claims. Nor does it have any responsibility or obligation to establish, or assist in establishing, the claim. It remains for the applicant to present evidence and advance arguments adequate to enable the Tribunal to make a favourable decision. There is no burden upon the Tribunal to make out a case that an applicant has failed to adequately advance.[5]
[4] MIEA v Guo (1997) 191 CLR 559 at 596, Prasad v MIEA (1985) 6 FCR 155 at 169–170
[5] Sun v MIBP [2016] FCAFC 52 at [69]
I have taken into account the AAT’s Migration and Refugee Division Guidelines on the Assessment of Credibility both in the conduct of the hearing and evaluating the testimony of [the applicant] and [Mrs A]. I have also taken into account their evident lack of familiarity with the Tribunal setting and lack of English. With this in mind, I asked straightforward questions, and paraphrased and checked their often brief responses where necessary.
I do not consider things like minor changes in dates, minor details omitted from claims in the written application, or minor mistakes and omissions from an applicant’s personal history would, on their own, undermine an applicant’s credibility. However, when the evidence set out here, some of it on critical matters, is considered cumulatively I find that these minor errors, inconsistencies and omissions together take on more significance and so have been given weight.

Grounds upon which the applicants seek protection

Based upon the material that was before the Tribunal prior to the hearing, I identified three separate bases upon which the applicants variously sought to engage Australia’s protection obligations:
·     [the applicant] and [Mrs A] fear that they would be harmed by the authorities in China upon their return because of their anti-CCP political activities since arriving in Australia and [the applicant’s] land confiscation petitioning activity in China (“the political opinion claims”);
·     [the applicant] and [Mrs A] fear that, as a result of having breached China’s family planning laws and policies, they would be forcibly sterilised and that their third child [Daughter C] would be denied hukou registration if they resisted sterilisation (“the family planning and hukou registration claims”); and
·     [the applicant] and [Mrs A] fear that they would be harmed by the authorities in China because they are Christians and wish to continue attending an underground church in China (“the religion claims”).
These three bases upon which protection is sought were explored in detail at the hearing. That exploration is canvassed below. However, prior to proceeding to make findings of fact, I make the general observation that the applicants have made claims for protection on numerous grounds which have evolved throughout the history of the application. I understand this occurs in a range of applications and draw no adverse inferences in relation to the staggered presentation of claims in this case. However, the Tribunal is concerned with the representative’s late provision of a large volume of material to the Tribunal relating to an aspect of the political opinion claims concerning the activities of [the applicant] and [Mrs A] since they arrived in Australia. In response to the hearing invitation, the representative had indicated that he would provide the Tribunal with witness statements and written submissions prior to the hearing. None were provided. Instead, the representative provided the Tribunal with a large volume of material containing various documents and video files. As stated above, this material was not provided in a form and manner that complied with the Practice Direction and some of the material was provided in duplicate. Of particular concern was the fact that the material was provided in a piecemeal fashion across three separate days and without any explanation as to the nature, provenance and relevance of the material. This concern was raised with the representative during the hearing. The representative apologised for his failure to comply with the Practice Direction but gave no reason or explanation for that failure.
Political opinion
As stated above, prior to the hearing I identified that the applicants sought to engage Australia’s protection obligations on the basis that [the applicant] and [Mrs A] feared that they would be harmed by the authorities in China upon their return because of:
· their anti-CCP political activities since arriving in Australia (the anti-CCP political activity); and/or
· [the applicant’s] involvement in petitions to the Fujian Letters and Visits Office over the local government’s failure to adequately compensate him and his neighbours for the demolition of his and their village houses in 2015 (the land compensation petition).
Withdrawal of claims relating to the land compensation petition
During the hearing, I sought to verify with [the applicant], [Mrs A] and their representative whether the claims surrounding the land compensation petition remained a basis upon which protection was sought. [The applicant] advised that he no longer feared harm arising out of the land compensation petition because he and his fellow villagers were eventually compensated by the local authorities in China such that new properties were built and returned to them in late 2017 or early 2018. [The applicant] also advised that some of his properties are being rented and his parents are collecting those rents. l then obtained confirmation from [the applicant] that he no longer wished to pursue this aspect of his claim. Following this, I sought confirmation from [Mrs A] whether she still wished to pursue the land compensation petition as part of her claims, to which she replied that she agreed with her husband and no longer wished to pursue the matter as part of her claim for protection. The representative also confirmed that this matter was no longer an issue. Accordingly, I give no further consideration to the issue of the land compensation petition and find that it is not a basis upon which any of the applicants seek a protection visa.
Country information relating to anti-CCP political organisations and activists
Turning to my assessment of the anti-CCP political activities of each of [the applicant] and [Mrs A], I have had regard to the most recent Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) country information report[6] which provides that certain civil society organisations (CSOs), high-profile activists and other individuals who criticise the Chinese government may be targeted by the authorities and individuals involved may be persecuted or face reprisals. This DFAT report provides the following information in relation to activists and civil society:
3.82 Civil society in China is restricted. CSOs and their activities must be registered by the government with local authorities. In practice, some CSOs, particularly large organisations, are required to work closely with the government and are quasi-government bodies. All NGOs must have a government sponsor to be registered. Foreign-linked CSOs (including those based in Hong Kong, Macau or Taiwan) are subject to particular scrutiny and may be unable to register or re-register. Few foreign CSOs exist in practice. If an organisation does have government support and its aims align with government priorities, it can be successful in achieving its aims or raising awareness (for example women’s and environmental NGOs) but it depends on the organisation and its goals, history and relationships.
3.83 People who advocate for human rights and their families are subject to surveillance, threats and detention. DFAT is aware of human rights activists who work in areas such as gender or labour rights who have been detained for their activism. Families of activists have been threatened with the loss of jobs if they speak out. Those who speak out about their treatment by authorities face further detention, limiting the number of available sources and information about the treatment of activists.
3.84 Some private criticism (for example among friends and family) of government is generally tolerated. If the criticism is more widely disseminated, for example on an online platform or deemed too inflammatory or in relation to a particularly sensitive subject, authorities might reprimand the individuals involved.
3.85 High-profile activists and critics are particularly targeted but DFAT is also aware of examples of low-profile but outspoken activists being targeted. Profiles of those who may be affected are difficult to predict accurately. DFAT assesses that high-profile activists are at high risk of official discrimination in the form of detention and imprisonment. The hidden nature of low-profile activists and reluctance to speak out make it difficult to assess the risk to day-to-day critics, but those who criticise the government on sensitive issues can come to the attention of authorities. Any discussion on social media is visible to authorities. A person that has been active in protests outside of mainland China (including Hong Kong) against the Chinese Government is likely to attract the attention of government, especially if they are high-profile, but interest in a lower-level protester is not impossible.
[6] DFAT, Country Information Report – People’s Republic of China, 21 December 2021, paras 3.82–3.85
The Country of Origin Information Services Section (COISS) within the Department of Home Affairs (DHA) provided the following advice on 31 January 2020 in relation to a protection visa applicant involved in anti-CCP political protests in Australia, including a protest outside the Chinese Consulate-General in Sydney on 4 June 2017:
Country information is not definitive about whether the Chinese authorities would be aware of the identities of its nationals who partook in various events in Sydney as outlined in the background section of this report. However, country information does indicate that Chinese authorities are concerned with anti-Chinese sentiment abroad. There is some recent reporting about purported intimidation against some individuals, including Chinese nationals, who expressed dissenting views on politically sensitive topics on Australian university campuses. In the past, high-profile members within Australian society that are associated with the Australian Values Alliance encountered difficulties either entering China as an Australian citizen or being temporarily prevented from returning to Australia as a Chinese citizen departing China.
Generally speaking, country information indicates that the Chinese government is concerned about its nationals who are particularly vocal on issues the government deems politically sensitive. The nature of dissenting discourse or actions occurring offshore may be commensurate with the Chinese government’s level of interest in particular individuals. It is also noted that China has a history of extra-territorial monitoring and surveillance of Chinese nationals, including those of particular concern who have fled abroad. China is reported to engage in a degree of monitoring or surveillance within diaspora communities abroad. Genuine intimidation or harassment of family members in China is an indication that a Chinese national abroad has come to the attention of Chinese authorities.
Country information was not located about consequences for Chinese nationals who return to the mainland after attending events as described within the background section of this report. However, two publically high-profile critics of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and senior members of the Australian Values Alliance are among those who have been either questioned by Chinese authorities or refused entry into China. Additionally, espionage charges laid against an Australian national who is a former Chinese diplomat turned critic of the Chinese government demonstrate that high-profile defectors and critics are detained and sometimes formally charged upon return to China. General information about the treatment of persons expressing dissenting views on politically sensitive issues in China is well documented. Country information indicates that Chinese authorities are concerned with political opinion that has potential to create social unrest or perceived to undermine the legitimacy of the CCP.[7]
[7] Department of Home Affairs, COISS 2020, Q & A Report 20200121103857 – Critics of the Chinese government – Treatment of returnees (31 January 2020), p.2
In relation to monitoring the behaviour of Chinese citizens outside China, the Netherlands government’s Country of origin information report on China (July 2020) (the Dutch country information report) indicates that Chinese authorities monitor their online activities. The report indicates that social media activity is monitored and reprisals have occurred where an individual posts anti-CCP content online, especially where that individual has a large social media following. In some instances, the authorities have pressured family members of the individual concerned. The report relevantly provides the following information:
Chinese users abroad who visit social media sites need to keep in mind that their online behaviour is being monitored by the Chinese government. Fake accounts on the same social media platforms are one method used for surveillance. The Chinese government does not attach consequences to every critical post, but there are examples of Chinese users abroad who encountered problems due to posting content online, especially if these users had a large number of followers. The Washington Post reported on a Chinese internet user in the United States who posted critical messages on WeChat. According to the paper, family members, likely under pressure from the Chinese authorities, subsequently sent him messages urging him to return to China. A Chinese student who posted critical tweets on Twitter during his stay in the United States was arrested upon his return to China. In February 2019, following months in detention, the student was sentenced to six months in prison for allegedly posting denigrating content that had a negative impact on society.[8]
[8] Netherlands government, Country of origin information report China (July 2020), see section 5.15 Chinese users abroad: see

The Dutch country information report also indicated that while there is relatively little verifiable information available regarding how the Chinese authorities deal with asylum seekers returning from abroad, the following groups face a heightened risk of being subjected to interrogation, detention, torture and/or unfair trial at the hands of the Chinese authorities:
·     human rights defenders;
·     members of ethnic minorities (such as Uighurs and Tibetans);
·     members of religious movements designated as xie jiao (such as Falun Gong practitioners and Church of the Almighty God members);
·     members of ‘grey’ religious denominations.[9]
[9] Ibid., section 8.1 Human rights defenders
The Dutch country information report also states that since the coronavirus pandemic broke out in Wuhan in late 2019/early 2020, human rights defenders who were critical of the Chinese government’s policy on coronavirus risked being subjected to prosecution. Persons prosecuted include journalists and medical personnel who criticised the Chinese government’s coronavirus policy.[10]
[10] Ibid.
In a recent Freedom House publication “Out of Sight, Not Out of Reach: The Global Scale and Scope of Transnational Repression” (February 2021), authors Nate Schenkan and Isabel Linzer argue that China conducts the most sophisticated, global and comprehensive campaign of transnational repression in the world. The report provides the following information in relation to recent examples of China’s targeting of human rights defenders, journalists and others who criticise the CCP:
Independent Chinese media in Australia have had advertisers and even local town councils withdraw from sponsorships under Chinese diplomatic pressure, while suffering more overt actions like the theft of newspapers. Chinese political cartoonists, activists, and the teenage son of a detained rights lawyer who have fled China have been threatened or detained in neighboring countries like and Myanmar, and in some cases, forcibly returned to the mainland. In July 2020, a Chinese student in Australia who runs a Twitter account critical of Xi Jinping said she had received video calls in which a Chinese police officer, speaking next to her father, warned her “to remember that you are a citizen of China.”[11]
Risk of harm arising out of [Mrs A’s] anti-CCP political activity in Australia and proposed political activity in China
[11] Schenkan, N. and Linzer, I., “Out of Sight, Not Out of Reach: The Global Scale and Scope of Transnational Repression” (February 2021), Freedom House p. 19 Complete_FH_TransnationalRepressionReport2021_rev020221.pdf (freedomhouse.org)
I accept that [Mrs A] donated USD50 to [Group 4], an organisation associated with [Group 2A] in the United States of America (USA), on 10 December 2021. Taking into account the country information, the Tribunal finds that the Chinese authorities are unlikely to have any interest in [Mrs A] because of this one small donation. The relevant country information does not indicate that persons who make small donations to anti-CCP organisations are likely to come to the attention of, or harmed by, the Chinese authorities. My finding is underscored by the fact that no evidence was provided in relation to how [Mrs A’s] donation would come to the attention of the Chinese authorities particularly since there is no evidence to suggest that this information is in the public domain.
At hearing, [Mrs A] maintained that if she returned to China she would continue to donate to the [Group 3] in the USA and “join [Mr A] in eliminating the CCP”. When asked why it took her much longer than her husband to become involved in any anti-CCP political activity, she explained that she had only recently become involved in [certain] work for the [Group 2] in December 2021 because she was otherwise engaged in caring for her youngest daughter [Daughter C]. [Mrs A] also did not provide any evidence during the hearing in relation to the nature and degree of her recent volunteer [activities] and none of the documentary evidence before the Tribunal details her engagement in such activities. By contrast, a significant amount of material was provided to the Tribunal from a wide range of sources to demonstrate [the applicant’s] work with the [Group 2]. Given the lack of evidence in relation to the detail of [Mrs A’s] recent contribution to the [Group 2], I find that [Mrs A] has not engaged in that work.
Furthermore, while the Tribunal accepts [Mrs A] is interested in supporting [Mr A] in eliminating the CCP when she returns to China, she gave no evidence in relation to exactly what she would do in China to support or achieve that goal. Given that [Mrs A’s] evidence on this point was vague and lacked detail, the Tribunal finds that [Mrs A] will not engage in any anti-CCP political activity in China that would bring her to the attention of the Chinese authorities.
Accordingly, I find that there is no real chance of harm arising out of [Mrs A’s] anti-CCP political activity in Australia and proposed political activity in China.
Given the above findings, I will proceed to further consider only [the applicant’s] claims in relation to his political opinion.
Nature and degree of [the applicant’s] anti-CCP political activity in Australia and proposed political activity in China
I accept on the evidence before me that [the applicant] has been actively engaged in anti-CCP political activities in Australia since April 2019 when he joined [Group 1], an online chat group of individuals who support the [Organisation 1]. After initially engaging with other anti-CCP activities in this online forum through [Platform 1], [the applicant] began to create and disseminate [material] critical of the CCP. [The applicant’s] political involvement escalated in June 2020 when he joined [Group 2]. I also accept that [the applicant] provided his [skills] to [Group 2] on a volunteer basis and that this partially enabled the organisation to increase its online presence and political reach through the development of its website and production of anti-CCP pamphlets [and materials]. This material has been used at protests and disseminated online, including through streaming services hosted by [Platform 2][12] and [Platform 3],[13] and in other fora. Recent media reports have monitored the [Group 2’s] rise in Australia and indicate that the spread of its anti-CCP message has been strengthened by the [materials] that the organisation has been delivering to Australian homes.[14] The Tribunal received evidence demonstrating that the [Group 2’s] reach has extended into [one] Parliament whereby one of its posters has been displayed in the office of [Official A] and appeared in the background during a recent [media interview] with that parliamentarian. I find that [the applicant] has been integral to the [Group 2’s] production of this widely distributed anti-CCP material and that his [work] for the organisation has contributed to its success in fostering anti-CCP sentiment in Australia and possibly other parts of the world.
[12] [Deleted.]
[13] [Deleted.]
[14] [Deleted.]
I accept that [the applicant] participated in the following anti-CCP protest activities in Australia:
· [protests and dates specified].
In [material] relating to these protests, a person identified in this material as [the applicant] is wearing a face mask, [and specified clothing]. I accept that a number of protesters, including [the applicant], made an effort to conceal their identity at these events so as to minimise the prospects of the Chinese authorities identifying them and thereafter taking action against them and their families in China. Upon observing [the applicant’s] physical stature at the hearing and listening to his voice and speech pattern during the hearing, I am satisfied that the individual identified in the [material] concerning the protest activities in Sydney was [the applicant].
I accept that [the applicant] has, since 2019, donated up to USD250 to [Group 3], an organisation associated with [Group 2A] in the USA. I also accept that [the applicant] has signed two online petitions on a US [website][specified] – which is now defunct.[15]
[15] [Deleted.]
[The applicant] told the Tribunal that if he returned to China he will continue to engage in [work] for the [Organisation 1] as he supports [Mr A] in his mission to eliminate the CCP. [The applicant] stated that this was the only form of protest activity that he would engage in if returned to [China]. I accept [the applicant’s] evidence in this regard because it was consistent with the majority of his anti-CCP activities to date and aligned with the nature of anti-CCP activities undertaken by [Organisation 1] in China who tend to spread their views in the virtual world rather than protest in public places such as squares and outside government offices and buildings.
Subjective fear, real chance, serious harm
I accept that [the applicant] genuinely fears being returned to China for reason of his anti-CCP political conduct in Australia and his proposed anti-CCP activities in China. Given his credible account of the evolution of his anti-CCP political activity in Australia at hearing, I find that [the applicant] engaged in anti-CCP political conduct in Australia otherwise than for the purpose of strengthening his claim to be a refugee.
The question then arises as to whether the Chinese authorities have noticed or will notice [the applicant’s] anti-CCP conduct in Australia and/or will notice his proposed anti-CCP activity in China. If I find that he has or will come to attention of the Chinese authorities, I must then consider whether there is a real chance of [the applicant] being persecuted by the Chinese authorities as a result of any of those activities.
Taking into account the country information, I find that the Chinese authorities are unlikely to have any interest in [the applicant] because of his small financial donations to two [Group 2A]-related American organisations and his signing of two anti-CCP online petitions [in the US]. As stated above in relation to my findings concerning [Mrs A’s] donation, persons who engage in such incidental activities do not ordinarily come to the attention of the Chinese authorities. My finding is underscored by the fact that no evidence was provided in relation to how [the applicant’s] participation in these activities could come to the attention of the Chinese authorities, particularly since there was no evidence to suggest that such information was available in the public domain.
At hearing, I explored [the applicant’s] understanding of the likelihood of him being persecuted in China for his anti-CCP political activities. [The applicant] conceded that:
· he, his wife, children and family in China have not been persecuted or in any way harmed by the Chinese authorities as a result of his political activities in Australia;
· he had no knowledge of whether any of his fellow members of the [Group 2] had been intimidated, persecuted or harmed by the Chinese authorities as a result of their political activities in Australia.
Despite this concession at hearing, [the applicant] insisted that this did not mean any harm would not arise at some point in the future. In that regard, I note that three of [the applicant’s] fellow [Group 2] members provided letters of support in which they asserted that there is a risk that [the applicant] will face persecution in China. [One named member] stated that [the applicant] is being monitored by the Chinese government. [Mr C] stated that there are over 400 CCP operatives embedded in various chapters of the [Organisation 1] and that [the applicant] will be persecuted if he returns to China given his active participation in anti-CCP activities in Australia. [Mr D] stated that [the applicant] will be in grave danger if he returns to China as his identity is likely known to the Chinese government. No evidence or argument was provided to support these assertions. Taking into account the clandestine nature of the [Group 2’s] operations and the potential for its members to exaggerate the spectre and reach of the Chinese authorities, I regard these assertions as speculative and give no weight to this evidence.
Asked at hearing whether he had any knowledge of any individuals being harmed by the Chinese authorities as a result of their participation in activities connected with the [Organisation 1], [the applicant] stated that he did not know anyone personally who had been harmed but believed that many people had been harmed. When asked to explain what information he relied upon to form that belief, [the applicant] stated that:
·     [Mr A’s] videos state that many [supporters] have been arrested in China;
·     a woman by the name of [Ms B] whom he met online in the [Group 1] chat group on the [Platform 1] mentioned that someone had passed on the details of [contributors] in that chat group who were living in China to the Chinese Ministry of State Security; and
·     a court document found by his wife on Twitter, and translated by a member of the [Group 2] in Australia, demonstrated that [Organisation 1] were being punished in China for engaging in activities similar to his anti-CCP conduct in Australia.
I understand and accept that [the applicant] would be influenced by statements made by [Mr A] and [Ms B]. However, I was given no detail in relation to the nature and purpose of those statements along with the context in which they were made. I was therefore unable to examine the credibility of those statements. In the absence of that evidence, and taking into account the high degree of likelihood of [Mr A] and [Ms B] to exaggerate the spectre and reach of the Chinese authorities to their followers in order to increase the fervency of support for their cause, I have serious doubts in relation to the cogency of any information provided by them. Accordingly, I am not persuaded by [the applicant’s] evidence in this regard.
By contrast, I accept that the court document and its translation provided to the Tribunal is reliable as its provenance was properly explained during the hearing and the information contained within this material is consistent with the country information in relation to the nature of offences committed by persons in China who engage in anti-CCP political activity. The court document reveals that:
·     two individuals in China had been placed under residential surveillance in early 2021 on suspicion for financing criminal activities endangering national security;
·     the Zhenjiang Runzhou People’s Court in Jiangsu Province, China found that these two individuals had:
o   disseminated false information over the internet using [Platform 2] and that this information was harmful, untrue and damaging to China’s national image;
o   caused disturbances and serious disorder in a public place in violation of Article 293 of the Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China and were to be sentenced.
While I accept that the two individuals named in the court document were under suspicion of financing criminal activities endangering national security, I reject the assertion made in a footnote in the translation that this is likely because of the two individuals donating to [Group 3] and/or [Group 4], two [Group 2A]-related organisations. There is nothing in the document which allows such an inference to be drawn. That said, I find this court document otherwise indicates that persons disseminating certain types of anti-CCP information in China on [Platform 2], a platform created by [Group 2’s] founders, are of interest to the Chinese authorities and likely to face harm in China.
Taking into account the specific DFAT country information in relation to the nature of civil society organisations that are of interest to the Chinese authorities, and the anti-CCP mission of [Group 2A] and [Group 2], I find that the Chinese authorities have an interest in monitoring the activities of these organisations in Australia. These organisations, while only recently established, have a significant global presence and reach due to the high profile of [Group 2’s] founders and the extensive anti-CCP political activism of [Group 2] in Australia. Accordingly, I find that there is a real chance that the Chinese authorities know or would find out about [the applicant’s] [contributions] to [Group 2’s] operations in Australia given their interest in monitoring anti-CCP elements online, particularly across [Platform 2]. I am satisfied that there is a small but nonetheless real chance that [the applicant] would face persecution from the Chinese authorities upon his return to China for his involvement in [Group 2’s] activities in Australia.
Furthermore, taking into account the specific DHA COISS country information, I also find that there is a real chance that the Chinese authorities know or will find out about [the applicant’s] attendance at three anti-CCP protests given their interest in monitoring the activities of Chinese citizens abroad, particularly those who are critical of the CCP. [The applicant’s] participation in these protests may or will be known to the Chinese authorities either through their own monitoring efforts or through reports being made to them by other Chinese citizens who have knowledge of [the applicant’s] involvement. While efforts were made to conceal [the applicant’s] identity at these protests, the risk remains that his participation may have been reported to the Chinese authorities. The level of risk is heightened given the nature and number of highly visible anti-CCP protests attended by [the applicant]. Therefore, I am satisfied that there is a small but nonetheless real chance that [the applicant] would face persecution from the Chinese authorities upon his return to China for his involvement in [Group 2’s] protest activities in Australia.
Given the above findings in relation to the court document and aspects of the country information in relation to the treatment of political dissidents by the Chinese authorities, I also find that there is a real chance that [the applicant] would be persecuted by the Chinese authorities if he were to undertake the anti-CCP political activity which he proposes to do if he returns to China.
When asked at hearing to articulate the harm he would face if he returned to China, [the applicant] made clear that he expected that he would be arrested by the authorities upon arrival, interrogated and then gaoled because of his anti-CCP political conduct in Australia. Again, given the above findings in relation to the court document and aspects of the DFAT country information in relation to the detention and imprisonment of anti-CCP activists and protestors in China,[16] I accept [the applicant’s] claim in this regard. I find that the harm would be serious as it would involve a threat to [the applicant’s] liberty as well as significant physical harassment and ill-treatment of [the applicant] by the Chinese authorities. I conclude that there is a real chance that [the applicant] would face serious harm if he returned to China.
[16] DFAT, Country Information Report – People’s Republic of China, 21 December 2021, para 3.85
Again, given the above findings in relation to the court document and aspects of the DFAT country information in relation to the detention and imprisonment of anti-CCP activists and protestors in China,[17] I also find that the persecution in this case involves systematic and discriminatory conduct.
Fear of persecution for the reason of political opinion and this is the essential and significant reason for the persecution
[17] Ibid.
I also find that [the applicant] fears persecution for the reason of his political opinion and this reason is the essential and significant reason for the persecution.
Real chance of persecution relates to all areas of China
I also find that relocation within China is not an option for [the applicant] as the real chance of serious harm relates to all areas of China. Given the nature of many of [the applicant’s] anti-CCP political activities in Australia and his proposed anti-CCP political activity in China, I find that he will be of interest to the Chinese authorities throughout China and persecuted accordingly. On that basis, the requirement in s 5J(1)(c) is met.
Effective protection measures

(2B)However, there is taken not to be a real risk that a non‑citizen will suffer significant harm in a country if the Minister is satisfied that:
(a)     it would be reasonable for the non‑citizen to relocate to an area of the country where there would not be a real risk that the non‑citizen will suffer significant harm; or
(b)     the non‑citizen could obtain, from an authority of the country, protection such that there would not be a real risk that the non‑citizen will suffer significant harm; or
(c)     the real risk is one faced by the population of the country generally and is not faced by the non‑citizen personally.
…

[2022] AATA 3724

19 August 2022

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