1620681 (Refugee)
[2017] AATA 2208
•16 October 2017
1620681 (Refugee) [2017] AATA 2208 (16 October 2017)
DECISION RECORD
DIVISION:Migration & Refugee Division
CASE NUMBER: 1620681
COUNTRY OF REFERENCE: Sri Lanka
MEMBER:Luke Hardy
DATE:16 October 2017
PLACE OF DECISION: Sydney
DECISION:The Tribunal affirms the decision not to grant the applicant a Protection visa.
Statement made on 16 October 2017 at 3:05pm
CATCHWORDS
Refugee – Protection Visa – Sri Lanka – Political opinion – Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam – Civil war – Forced recruitment – Particular social group – Failed asylum seeker – Perceived wealth – Fear of violence – Fear of torture – State persecution – Lack of state protection
LEGISLATION
Migration Act 1958, ss 5(1), 36, 65, 91R, 424A, 499
Migration Regulations 1994, Schedule 2CASES
MIAC v SZQRB [2013] FCAFC 33
WZARV v MIBP [2015] HCA 22Any references appearing in square brackets indicate that information has been omitted from this decision pursuant to section 431 of the Migration Act 1958 and replaced with generic information which does not allow the identification of an applicant, or their relative or other dependant.
STATEMENT OF DECISION AND REASONS
APPLICATION FOR REVIEW
This is an application for review of a decision made by a delegate of the Minister for Immigration to refuse to grant the applicant a Protection visa under s.65 of the Migration Act 1958 (the Act).
The applicant, [Mr A], is an ethnic Tamil Hindu citizen of Sri Lanka. He entered Australia as an irregular maritime arrival (IMA) [in] June 2012 and was detained under the Act. He underwent an entry interview [in] July 2012 and the content of the interview engaged Australia’s protection obligations. [Mr A] was permitted to lodge a protection visa application, which he did [in] November 2012. He was interviewed by a delegate of the minister [in] February 2013. The delegate refused to grant the visa [in] August 2013. [Mr A] subsequently sought review of that decision in the Refugee Review Tribunal, which affirmed the delegate’s decision 13 April 2015.
[Mr A] sought judicial review of the Refugee Review Tribunal’s decision and, [in] November 2016, the Federal Circuit Court issued consent orders for the matter to be reconsidered according to law. The matter is now remitted to the MRD of the AAT, into which the Refugee Review Tribunal merged on 1 July 2015.
[Mr A] appeared before the Tribunal by video link on 25 May 2017 to give evidence and present arguments. He was accompanied at the hearing by his adviser, a registered migration agent. The Tribunal hearing was conducted with the assistance of an interpreter in the Tamil (Sri Lankan) and English languages.
CONSIDERATION OF CLAIMS AND EVIDENCE
The issues
The main issue in this case is whether [Mr A] is entitled to protection in Australia as a refugee or, if not, on complementary protection grounds.
For the following reasons, I have concluded that the decision under review should be affirmed.
Claims to the Department and to the previously-constituted Tribunal
Whereas no previous findings in relation to this matter have any standing in law, I am entitled to have regard to all of the evidence in [Mr A]’s files.
An accurate summary of [Mr A]’s original claims appears in the previously-constituted Tribunal’s decision record:
2. The applicant essentially claims that in 2006 he was kidnapped by the Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal (TMVP), a paramilitary group also known as the Karuna Group (Karuna), and was extorted by the same group from April 2011. He was threatened and assaulted for refusing to meet the group’s demands. He fears harm by this group. He also fears harm for his opposition to Karuna, his family’s support for The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (the LTTE), his brother’s involvement with the Tamil National Alliance (TNA) his Tamil ethnicity, his Hindu religion and having sought asylum in Australia…
Evidence to the Department
Entry Interview
4. Following his arrival by boat, the applicant was interviewed (entry interview) by the department [in] July 2012. The information the applicant provided in connection with the interview is contained in a form (the entry form) signed by the applicant. The interview was conducted with the assistance of an interpreter.
5. At the interview the applicant claimed that he was involved in ‘paddy farming’. He claimed that in March 2012, after the harvest, when he had sold the paddy and was on his way home, unknown individuals from Karuna approached him and other farmers to extort money. They grabbed him by the throat and demanded a share of the proceeds of sale. He had heard that the person responsible was caught by the Special Task Force (STF), taken to the forest and beaten... Other than this incident, if there were bomb blasts, the army or the STF rounded up Tamils for questioning. He was detained for two or three hours following these round ups. He was rounded up three or four times two or three years ago. There was a bomb blast three years ago and the STF came and took a number of people for questioning because they suspected Tamils being behind the bombing. On that occasion he went to ‘class’ and escaped because he feared being beaten. There were no other reasons behind his departure from Sri Lanka.
Application for a Protection visa
6. In a statement of claims (the statement) attached to his application for a protection visa the applicant claimed that he was born and resided in [Town 1], [City 1]. His father, who is now retired, worked as a [occupation]. His family supported the LTTE but none of his family members was involved in ‘fighting’ for the LTTE. His [relative], who came to Australia [number] years ago, occasionally gave money to the LTTE.
7. In around September 2006, when he was [age] years old, he was kidnapped by Karuna on his way to school and kept hostage for about two months. He was blindfolded and assaulted. He was taken to a camp in the forest along with 40-45 other Tamil boys and men. The group wanted to forcefully recruit their captives. Although the camp was for military training, due to his young age he was assigned to cooking and building duties. He was treated badly and beaten with sticks and guns. He refused to partake because he was too young and he did not want to help the group to eradicate the LTTE. He was released in November 2006 after elders in his town negotiated his release due to his young age and a payment was made to Karuna.
8. After attending school for a few years, the applicant started working on a farm. From around 2011, when he obtained his tractor, soldiers from a nearby army base would come and take his tractor or motorbike for their own needs. Sometimes they damaged the vehicles but did not compensate him.
9. One day around April 2011 when he was coming from the farm members of Karuna stopped him and asked him to pay 25% of his profits to their cause. When he refused they beat him and threatened to shoot him. He was harassed ‘many more times’ and asked for money, but he refused to pay. He was beaten on ‘most occasions’. Since his departure from Sri Lanka members of Karuna have visited his parents to threaten and ask them for money. They also threatened to kill his [brother], [Mr B]. His parents were scared and gave the group money. As the applicant and his brother, [Mr C], are in Australia and [Mr B] is [occupation], the group thinks that the applicant’s family has money. Before the applicant left Sri Lanka he ‘laid all of the crops’ and his parents cultivated them. Karuna wanted a share of these as well.
10. The applicant fears further extortion by Karuna. There is nowhere safe for him to go as the group are everywhere in Sri Lanka. They are influential within the Sri Lankan government and the police are often involved in the extortion activities carried out by the group. Recently a person in his town was killed by some from Karuna because he had a land dispute with them and another person was killed by them for helping the LTTE during the war.
Protection Visa Interview
11. The applicant was interviewed by a delegate of the Minister [in] February 2013. He provided additional evidence to the department in relation to his claims. Where relevant the applicant’s oral evidence to the delegate is discussed below.
Submissions and additional documents
12. In a submission, dated [in] February 2013, the applicant’s’ representative provided a summary of the applicant’s claims and responded to a number of issues raised by the delegate at the interview.
13. The applicant’s representative also submitted that the applicant [was] a victim of a human rights violation in 2006 when he was kidnapped by Karuna. The submission referred to the 2012 UNHCR Eligibility Guidelines stating that ‘complainants of human rights violations’ and family members or other dependants are likely to be in need of protection. The relevant section of the Guidelines referred to in the submission specifically states that ‘person[s] seeking justice after mistreatment by the police have reportedly been harassed and received threats, in an attempt to make them withdraw their cases’.
14. It was further submitted that he is at risk of harm as Tamil failed asylum seeker. The submission referred to 2012 Human Rights Watch (HRW) report relating to thirteen cases whereby failed Tamil asylum seekers had been subjected to arbitrary arrest and ill-treatment, including torture and sexual assault on their return to Sri Lanka. In several cases returnees were detained at the airport by CID officials. The submission also referred to the 2012 UNHCR Guidelines referring to, in turn, to HRW, Freedom from Torture and the Asian Human Rights Commission reporting ‘recent’ cases of Sri Lankan asylum seekers who were detained and ill-treated or tortured after being forcibly returned Sri Lanka. It was submitted that the 2012 UK Operational Guidance Note for Sri Lanka, citing an English case, identifies Tamil ethnicity, previous record as a suspected or actual LTTE member or supporter and having made an asylum claim abroad as factors that would increase a person’s chance of being detained at the airport. The submission also referred to a May 2010 Edmund Rice Centre report, a September 2010 Amnesty International report and a July 2011 group submission by Law and Society Trust referring to the detention and mistreatment of asylumseekers forcibly returned to Sri Lanka.
15. The following additional documents were provided with the submission:
An untranslated copy of a Pupil’s Record Sheet;
An untranslated copy of a Grama Niladhari’s Certificate;
Copy of a Certificate of Birth
Letter from [Local Government Body 1], dated [in] 2013, stating that the applicant was ‘unlawfully abducted and detained’ by Karuna during the period of September to November 2006. He was ‘tortured and persecuted… as he refused to join their illegal activities’. The [Local Government Body 1] with Karuna and facilitated his release. The applicant ‘has been facing threats from this group since he was released from their detention’.
Letter from [Club 1], dated [in] February 2013, stating that the applicant has been an active full-time member of the club. He has been playing [sport] for club during tournaments. The club rules are that members of the [team] are not allowed to play for any other teams in the region. In [Town 1] has also formed a [team] for which a person by the name of [Mr D] is in charge. [Mr D] compels the good players from [Club 1] to join his team. On many occasions [Mr D] forced the applicant to play for his team but the applicant refused. He was then asked to go to [Mr D]’s office where he was beaten and threated with death if he failed to play for [Mr D] in future tournaments.
Details of four persons, including names, dates of birth and boat ID numbers, who were allegedly forced to return to Sri Lanka and were persecuted in detention upon returning.
The Delegate’s Decision
16. The delegate refused to grant the visa [in] August 2013. The delegate did not accept that the applicant faces a real chance of persecution for the reason of his race or religion. The delegate did not accept that the applicant was a person of ongoing interest to Karuna or the Sri Lankan authorities or that he there is a real chance that he would face serious harm for the reason of his real or perceived political opinion arising from any real or imputed association with the LTTE, his brother’s activities in support of the TNA or being a victim of a human rights violation. Nor did she accept that there is a real chance of the applicant being persecuted for the reason of his membership of a particular social group, including returned failed Tamil asylum seekers of Tamil ethnicity. The delegate accepted, however, that the applicant’s family may have a profile which makes them vulnerable to criminal extortion and that there is a real chance of the applicant suffering persecution in [Town 1] for reason of his membership of the particular social group of ‘wealthy Tamils in eastern Sri Lanka’. Nevertheless she concluded that it would be reasonable for the applicant to relocate to Colombo or elsewhere within Sri Lanka.
Evidence before the Tribunal…
Pre-Hearing Submissions
18. On 7 January 2015, the applicant’s representative provided the Tribunal with a detailed submission in relation to the facts of the case and the applicable law (see folios 55-59 of the Tribunal file [1311463]). The submission provided a summary of the applicant’s claims and addressed issues raised by the delegate in her decision.
19. The applicant’s representative also referred to reports from the Bar Human Rights Committee (March 2014), the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (February 2013) and Swissinfo and submitted that the applicant would face a ‘real risk of persecutory harm’ on return to Sri Lanka. The applicant’s representative also submitted that the applicant would face ethnic discrimination in Colombo and lacks familial networks. It was submitted that the applicant’s relocation in Sri Lanka could be traced, given the requirements to register a change of address in many parts of Sri Lanka, including the North and East. The applicant would be identified as a Tamil from Eastern Sri Lanka.
The Hearing
20. The applicant appeared before the Tribunal on 14 January 2015 to give evidence and present arguments. The Tribunal hearing was conducted with the assistance of an interpreter in the Tamil (Sri Lankan) and English languages. Where relevant the applicant’s oral evidence to the Tribunal is discussed below.
Notice under s.424A of the Act
21. On 16 January 2015 the Tribunal wrote to the applicant pursuant to s.424A of the Act inviting him to comment on/respond to information that the Tribunal considered would, subject to any comments/response he made, be the reason, or a part of the reason, for affirming the decision under review.
22. On 30 January 2015, the applicant’s representative provided a submission, which included a response to the Tribunal’s s.424A letter. The submission also contained a summary of the applicant’s claims and addressed, more generally, the Tribunal’s concerns in relation to the applicant’s evidence and credibility.
23. It was further submitted that there are a number of reports of failed Tamil asylum seekers who have been subject to detention and torture by the Sri Lankan authorities. It was submitted that Tamil returnees are frequently imputed with pro-LTTE opinion and the authorities are highly suspicious of Tamils returning from abroad. It was submitted that, contrary to advice from DFAT, it is not safe for Tamils to return as failed asylum seekers. The submission referred to a 2014 report by the Bar Human Rights Committee of England and Wales; a February 2013 research response from Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada; a report by Freedom from Torture; UK Home Office’s March 2012 COI report in relation to Sri Lanka and news reports sourced from the internet.
24. The submission also addressed the issue of internal relocation…
32. … in the statement submitted in support of his application for a protection visa, and subsequent evidence to the department and the Tribunal, [the applicant] claimed that in 2006 he was abducted by Karuna and detained for two months. During the course of his detention he was seriously mistreated. The applicant, however, had made no mention of this … incident in his entry interview. When this was put to him at the hearing, he stated that at the entry interview he was told by the interpreter assisting him that everything he discloses at the interview will be shared with the Sri Lankan authorities. At his protection interview, the applicant had offered the same explanation for the omission in his evidence at the entry interview. This explanation was also reflected in the applicant’s representative’s submission [in] February 2013…
33. In his response to the Tribunal’s s.424A letter, a different explanation was offered. It was stated that the applicant did not disclose this incident at his entry interview as he was instructed by the interviewing officer that, if his claims for asylum were not successful, he would be sent to Sri Lanka. Concerned that the information he provided to the Australian authorities would be communicated to the authorities in Sri Lanka, he feared that he would be returned and harmed by the Sri Lankan authorities on account of this information. It was stated that he was also reluctant to disclose this information on account of the fact that he was fearful he would be suspected by the Australian government of terrorist training and carrying arms. At this point in time, he had received no independent legal advice or assurance that the information he disclosed to the Australian authorities is protected and confidential. It was only after he was advised about the relevance and importance of this matter by an independent lawyer that he was encouraged to disclose this information to the authorities. In her submission of 7 January 2015, the applicant’s representative stated that the purpose of the entry interview is to gather generally an applicant’s claims to determine if they have prima facie claims for protection. The protection visa application and the interview are then opportunities for the applicant to provide the necessary details… The applicant had [nevertheless] mentioned at his entry interview a number of other claims, including experiencing extortion and being rounded up for questioning by the authorities after bombing incidents…
34. … at the hearing, the applicant claimed, for the first time, that, during or after his claimed abduction in 2006 [at the age of [age]], he was asked by his abductors to support the then government of Sri Lanka. However, he refused to do so because he supported the TNA. He claimed, for the first time, that the main reason he did not wish to return to Sri Lanka was because he and his family supported the TNA. He also claimed, for the first time, that he engaged in activities in support of the TNA, including putting up posters in support of TNA candidates during elections. While in his evidence to the department he had mentioned that his brother, [Mr C], had problems with Karuna because of his activities in support of the TNA, he had never previously mentioned that he personally supported the TNA, that he engaged in any activities in support of the TNA or that he feared returning to Sri Lanka because of his support for the TNA. At the hearing, the applicant was asked to explain … his evidence. He stated that at the entry interview he was told by the interpreter that everything he discloses at the interview will be shared with the Sri Lankan authorities. When it was put to him that he had never previously mentioned this as an explanation for his failure to disclose his support for, and association with, the TNA, he said he was asked during the interview if his family supported the TNA and he had answered ‘yes’…
35. In his response to the Tribunal’s s.424A letter, it was stated that the applicant was ‘under the impression that he had supplied an adequate amount of information concerning his family’s problems related to their support for the TNA’. It was stated that in his departmental interview he had raised information about his brother [Mr C]’s problems on account of his TNA involvement and the support of his family for the TNA. It was further stated that the applicant had also previously mentioned that he has fears and problems in relation to his profile as a family member of an active supporter of the TNA. It was explained that it was only on one occasion, during the election period of 2010, that he was involved in public activities in support for the TNA. … While it is true that the applicant had referred to his brother’s involvement with TNA, he had never previously mentioned his own involvement with the Alliance…
36. It was also stated in the applicant’s response to the Tribunal’s s.424A letter that being fearful of what might happen as a result of his involvement with, and support for, the TNA is not the primary reason that he does not wish to return to Sri Lanka. It was stated that he previously did not claim this as a specific reason when he was articulating his claims for asylum, because he perceived his main problems in Sri Lanka to be his problems with the Karuna group. These explanations, however, [appeared contradicted by] the applicant’s own evidence at the hearing. When asked at the hearing why he did not wish to return to Sri Lanka, he stated that the main problem is that he supports the TNA and this will cause him problems…
38. … the applicant’s evidence [appeared] inconsistent with his brother’s evidence. The applicant’s brother, [Mr C], was interviewed by the department in connection with his application for a protection visa. At his interview he gave evidence to the effect that the applicant was too young to carry out activities in support of the TNA in Sri Lanka. He stated, however, that the applicant had accompanied him when he went out to canvass for the TNA and put up posters. He further claimed that he worked for a politician by the name of [Politician 1] and he put up posters displaying [Politician 1]’s photographs. At the hearing the applicant claimed that he supported the TNA by putting up posters of TNA candidates during the 2010 elections. When asked who these candidates were, he said he had put up posters for [Politician 2] and another candidate whose name he could not remember. The applicant made no mention of having accompanied his brother when he carried out his claimed activities.
39. In his response to the Tribunal’s s.424A letter it was stated that it was on one occasion only that the applicant accompanied his [brother] [Mr C] when he went out to canvass support for the TNA. On this occasion, he attended when asked to do so by his [relative]. This [relative] worked on the [Local Government Body 1] and was a well-known member of local community. He passed away about 4 years ago. The applicant, his brother and his [relative] went out to provide support for the TNA. They placed posters in support of [Politician 2] and [Politician 1]. At the time of the hearing the applicant could not remember the name of the other candidate for the TNA ([Politician 1])… The applicant’s brother [meanwhile] made no mention of having put up posters in support of [Politician 2]…
40. … at the Tribunal hearing the applicant claimed, for the first time, that [Mr D] and the Karuna Group threatened and forced him, as well as the other [players] at [Club 1], to put up or distribute pro-government posters. He claimed that, when he initially refused, he was beaten. When asked to explain his failure to raise these claims at an earlier opportunity, the applicant stated that he had not raised this claim before because his family had been functioning well previously and that he had raised the claim in response to the Tribunal’s questions. It was also stated in the applicant’s response to the Tribunal’s s.424A letter that the applicant never volunteered this information before because he was never asked about it directly. It was stated that at earlier stages of the protection visa application process, when asked about the difficulties he faced when playing [sport], he had described them accordingly by giving a general overview of the types of problems he faced. He was not questioned further about it and as such, did not have an opportunity to provide further information…
41. … in his protection interview, the applicant claimed that he played [sport] since he was [age] years old and the last time he played [sport] was at a tournament about two weeks before he came to Australia in June 2012. He claimed that Karuna in his area, headed by [Mr D], had their own team and they wanted him to play for their team, but he refused and his club did not permit him to play for another team. The applicant stated that the last time [Mr D] came to play against his team or his team was forced to play against the Karuna team was two years before he left Sri Lanka.
42. At the Tribunal hearing, however, the applicant claimed that he played his last tournament in January 2012 and that was the last time he encountered [Mr D]. He claimed that until that time [Mr D] threatened to kill him 10 to 15 times a year for refusing to play with the Karuna team. He stated that during the tournament in 2012, [Mr D] came and asked him to play. When the inconsistency in his evidence was put to him, he essentially stated that he has replied to the Tribunal’s questions and that, if the Tribunal were to go to his country, it would understand the situation.
43. In response to the Tribunal’s s.424A letter, it was stated that the applicant played for [Club 1]. Tournaments with other [clubs] were organised through a draw and he would play at minimum 10-15 tournaments a year, depending on when and if his club was drawn to play. He remembers tournaments specifically being held in January and April every year. January 2012 is the last time he can recall playing a tournament, but he may have also played in April 2012. It was stated that, for a number of years, [Mr D] would harass him when he was playing [sport]. When [Mr D]’s Karuna [team] was drawn to play in a tournament, [Mr D] would approach the applicant to play for his team. The applicant never wanted to play for [Mr D]. He was also prohibited from playing for his team, as club rules would not permit a member to play for another team if their own club was drawn in the tournament. When the applicant refused to play for [Mr D]’s [team], he would be harassed. This harassment would take the form of verbal abuse, threats of physical abuse and threats to the applicant’s life. This would occur at every [tournament], on average 10-15 times a year, depending on the draw. The last occasion that the applicant was forced to play for [Mr D]’s team was in 2010. At [tournaments] thereafter, the applicant continued to play for his own club but was still harassed to play for [Mr D]’s team. This continued up until the last time the applicant played [sport] in Sri Lanka. It was further stated that there may have been confusion about when the applicant ‘last experienced harm’ at the hands of [Mr D] when playing [sport]. The applicant interpreted this to mean when he was last forced to play for [Mr D], which is why he gave 2010 as the last date he experienced such harm. However, the harassment and threats continued through to, and during, 2012.
44. … The applicant explicitly stated at his protection interview that the last time [Mr D] came to play against his team was two years before he left Sri Lanka. He also stated that it was at that time that [Mr D] had demanded the applicant play for [Mr D]’s team and that [Mr D]’s team had stopped playing [sport] for the past two years. … it was stated in the applicant’s response to the Tribunal’s s.424A letter that the harassment [Mr D] subjected the applicant to would take the form of verbal abuse, threats of physical abuse and threats to the applicant’s life. This is contrary to the contents of the letter purportedly issued by [Club 1], dated [in] February
2013. In that letter it was stated that, on many occasions, [Mr D] forced the applicant to play for his team, but the applicant refused. The letter did not mention that the applicant was forced to play for [Mr D]’s team in 2010 or at any other time. The letter further stated that the applicant was asked to go to [Mr D]’s office where he was beaten and threated with death if he failed to play for [Mr D] in future tournaments. At the hearing the applicant also claimed that, when he refused to play for [Mr D]’s team, they beat him because they were also aware of the farming issue…
45. … at the Tribunal hearing the applicant claimed, for the first time, that, in 2008 or 2009, he was detained when he refused to lend his tractor to a CID office near [his] house. In the statement accompanying his application for a protection visa the applicant had claimed that, from around 2011, when he obtained his tractor, soldiers from a nearby army base would come and take his tractor or motorbike for their own needs. Sometimes they damaged the vehicles but did not compensate him. At his protection interview, he told the delegate that Karuna and the army used to forcefully borrow his tractor whenever they needed it and when they returned it, they did so with a load of sand. At no point the applicant claimed to have been detained for refusing to lend his tractor to the army, CID office or Karuna. When asked [why he did not] raise these claims at an earlier opportunity, the applicant stated that he disclosed this claim [now] because he was repeatedly questioned by the Tribunal. In his response to the Tribunal’s s.424A letter, it was stated that, throughout the process, he has always raised these incidents of harassment by the CID as one of his fears in Sri Lanka. He knew that it was important to raise the ongoing harm that he suffered at the hands of the CID. However, he was under the impression that information about these incidents was accepted, and he did not understand the importance of detailing further harm that he suffered. He occasionally finds it difficult to discuss these matters and incidents of harm that have occurred against him without prompting…
50. … between April 2011 and March 2012 the applicant was [purportedly] targeted and asked to pay a portion of his income to Karuna. When he refused to pay, he was threatened with death and beaten. The country information before the Tribunal indicates that in the north and the east, pro-government paramilitary groups such as the Eelam People’s Democratic Party (EPDP) and Karuna operate their own criminal enterprises with impunity.[1] The US Department of State report on human rights practices in Sri Lanka for 2013 indicates that, although the number of killings associated with pro-government paramilitary groups had declined from the previous year, there were persistent reports that paramilitary groups ‘engaged in intimidation, extortion, corruption, and violence against civilians in the Tamil dominated northern town of Jaffna’. The report also indicates that pro-government paramilitary groups had increasingly taken on the ‘characteristics of criminal gangs as they sought to solidify their territory and revenue sources in the postwar environment’[2]
51. The applicant stated at the hearing that he was targeted because Karuna wanted a share of his profits to spend on their camp and that other farmers were also been targeted for extortion. He did not claim that he or members of his family were targeted for extortion because his family members supported the TNA …
[1] Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, The Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal (TMVP) and Karuna factions; their relationship with each other; reports concerning their treatment of Sinhalese and Tamil citizens; whether they are still active as paramilitary groups, LKA103950.E, 17 February 2012; ‘SLA, paramilitary, extort money from traders in Batticaloa’ , TamilNet, 13 July 2011, and ‘SLA complicit in assisting Karuna’s extortion ring’, TamilNet, 5 August 2011, US Department of State , Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2013 – Sri Lanka, 27 February 2014
[Mr A] gave his oral evidence to the previously-constituted Tribunal on 14 January 2015 and, as noted, the previously-constituted Tribunal’s decision was made on 13 April 2015.
Relevant country information
The civil war and the LTTE
A practical summary of relevant events appears in the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) DFAT Thematic Report: People with Links to the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, 3 October 2014:
2. Background Information
2.1 Following independence in 1948, Sri Lanka experienced tensions between its majority Sinhalese and Tamil populations, the second-largest ethnic group in Sri Lanka. Sinhalese have traditionally considered that Tamils received preferential treatment under British rule. The growing dominance of Sinhala nationalist politics contributed to a series of policy changes that started with the ‘Sinhala Only’ Official Language Act 1956, which made Sinhala the only official language. These policy changes, designed to assist Sinhalese, particularly in the areas of education and employment, continued into and during the 1970s. This meant that many Tamils faced barriers to education and employment, creating a sense of marginalisation among the Tamil community.
2.2 The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) was formed in 1976 with the main aim of establishing an independent Tamil state, Tamil Eelam, in the north and east of Sri Lanka. From 1983, the LTTE pursued this aim through a military campaign against the Government of Sri Lanka. A serious civil conflict, broken only by an internationally-brokered ceasefire from 2002 until 2006, lasted until May 2009.
2.3 At its peak in 2004, the LTTE exercised effective control of up to 15,000 square kilometres–or approximately three-quarters of the territory in the north and the east of Sri Lanka–with an armed force of approximately 18,000 combatants. The LTTE also maintained an intelligence wing and a political wing, all supported by an extensive administrative structure from its de-facto capital in Kilinochchi in Sri Lanka’s north. This included a police force, law courts, postal services as well as television and radio broadcasting.
2.4 The mostly-Tamil civilian populations of the areas controlled by the LTTE were required to interact with the LTTE’s military and civil administration as a matter of course. This included the payment of personal income taxes, sales taxes, licence fees and customs duties at the border of LTTE-controlled areas. The LTTE also supported its administration through foreign funding and both voluntary and forced recruitment of Tamils.
2.5 During the period of the conflict, the LTTE also actively suppressed alternative Tamil political groups, such as the moderate Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF), including through violent attacks on TULF members throughout Sri Lanka. The LTTE also suppressed other Tamil militant groups.
End of the conflict
2.6 On 18 May 2009, the Government announced its military victory over the LTTE and complete territorial control over Sri Lanka. Hundreds of thousands of people were displaced and tens of thousands of people were killed during the conflict. Most of the LTTE’s military and political leadership were killed during the conflict, particularly during its final months.
2.7 Towards the end of the conflict, a large number of LTTE members were arrested and detained by Government security forces following their surrender or capture. According to a 2010 report by the International Commission of Jurists, any association with the LTTE at that time was grounds for arrest. The large majority of those arrested were sent to Government-run rehabilitation centres. A smaller number were prosecuted through Sri Lanka’s court system. In addition to those arrested, many civilians were also questioned and released towards the end of the conflict.
2.8 DFAT assesses that, as of October 2014, the LTTE does not exist as an organised force and any former LTTE members within Sri Lanka would have only minimal capacity to exert influence on civilians or those returning from abroad.
Tamil ethnicity and imputed LTTE links
The UNHCR Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing the International Protection Needs of Asylum-Seekers from Sri Lanka (21 December 2012, HCR/EG/LKA/12/04, provide non-exhaustive information about potential risk profiles relevant to assessing prospects for Tamils returning to Sri Lanka:
A.1 Persons Suspected of Certain Links with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil
Eelam (LTTE)…
A.2 Certain Opposition Politicians and Political Activists…
A.3 Certain Journalists and Other Media Professionals…
A.4 Certain Human Rights Activists…
A.5 Certain Witnesses of Human Rights Violations and Victims of Human Rights
Violations Seeking Justice…
A.6 Women in certain circumstances…
A.7 Children in certain circumstances…
A.8 Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender and Intersex (LGBTI) Individuals in
certain circumstances…Addressing LTTE links in closer detail, UNHCR draws attention to:
by the LTTE continue to expose individuals to treatment which may give rise to a need for international refugee protection, depending on the specifics of the individual case. The nature of these more elaborate links to the LTTE can vary, but may include people with the following profiles:
1) Persons who held senior positions with considerable authority in the LTTE civilian administration, when the LTTE was in control of large parts of what are now the northern and eastern provinces of Sri Lanka;
2) Former LTTE combatants or “cadres”;
3) Former LTTE combatants or “cadres” who, due to injury or other reason, were employed by the LTTE in functions within the administration, intelligence, “computer branch” or media (newspaper and radio);
4) Former LTTE supporters who may never have undergone military training, but were involved in sheltering or transporting LTTE personnel, or the supply and transport of goods for the LTTE;
5) LTTE fundraisers and propaganda activists and those with, or perceived as having had, links to the Sri Lankan diaspora that provided funding and other support to the LTTE;
6) Persons with family links or who are dependent on or otherwise closely related to persons with the above profiles.
According to UNHCR the mere fact that a person is an adult Tamil male from the north or east, on its own, no longer places that person at risk of persecution: whereas “Tamils Originating from the North or the East of Sri Lanka” constituted a risk group in UNHCR’s April 2009 “UNHCR Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing the International Protection Needs of Asylum-Seekers from Sri Lanka” ( they were not included in the “Risk Profiles” in the updated 2012 Guidelines. UNHCR published a report in 2011 to the effect that most Tamil refugees who had formerly sought asylum abroad (mainly in India) were returning to the East of Sri Lanka in and around “the eastern district of Trincomalee followed by Mannar, Vavuniya and Jaffna in Sri Lanka’s north.[3] Overall, the UNHCR Guidelines have evidently moved on from suggesting that merely being a Tamil male from the north or east of Sri Lanka is sufficient to give rise to a real chance of serious harm.
[3] “UNHCR helps first group of Sri Lankan refugees return by ferry from India” UNHCR News, 12 October 2011, >
That said, UNHCR in 2012 did observe that in dealings with the police, the Tamil-speaking population appeared to be at a disadvantage: despite ongoing efforts to increase the number of Tamil-speaking police staff, particularly in Tamil majority areas. The 2012 UNHCR Guidelines also referred to reports relating to some cases, in the years between 2009 and 202, in which “former Sri Lankan (in particular Tamil) asylum-seekers … were allegedly detained and ill-treated or tortured after having been forcibly returned to Sri Lanka upon rejection of their asylum claims or who voluntarily returned to Sri Lanka.[4]
[4] Human Rights Watch has reported thirteen cases of arbitrary arrest and torture of failed Tamil asylum-seekers, upon their return to Sri Lanka, most recently in February 2012. See: Human Rights Watch, “UK: Halt Deportations of Tamils to Sri Lanka. Credible Allegations of Arrest and Torture upon Return ”, 25 February 2012, and Human Rights Watch, “UK: Suspend Deportations of Tamils to Sri Lanka. Further Reports of Torture of Returnees Highlight Extent of Problem”, 29 May 2012, Freedom from Torture has documented 54 cases of Sri Lankans (predominantly Tamils), who experienced torture in detention in the post-conflict period (i.e. after May 2009), including cases of individuals who were tortured after having voluntarily or forcibly returned from the United Kingdom to Sri Lanka. See: Freedom from Torture (formerly the Medical Foundation for the Care of Victims of Torture), Sri Lankan Tamils tortured on return from the UK, 13 September 2012, The total of 54 cases includes 35 cases of post-conflict torture in Sri Lanka documented earlier, including of 14 individuals who returned to Sri Lanka after a period abroad (in three cases the person was forcibly returned from a European State, upon rejection of the asylum claim). See: Freedom from Torture, Freedom from Torture submission to the Committee against Torture for its examination of Sri Lanka in November 2011, undated, last accessed November 2012, See also Amnesty International, Sri Lanka: Briefing to Committee Against Torture, October 2011, detailing the case of two brothers who were arrested,The following information about risk profiles appears in the DFAT Thematic Report: People with Links to the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, 3 October 2014:
High-profile former LTTE members
2.11 Those at highest risk of monitoring, arrest, detention or prosecution include the LTTE’s former leadership, regardless of whether they performed a combat or civilian role during the conflict. Although most of the LTTE’s military, political and administrative leadership were killed during the conflict, a number of others either surrendered or were captured and sent to rehabilitation centres or prosecuted. Some former leaders may have left Sri Lanka before, during or after the conflict (see also ‘Former LTTE members living outside of Sri Lanka’, below). In addition to the LTTE’s former leadership, a number of other former members were suspected to have committed terrorist or serious criminal acts during the conflict, or to have provided weapons or explosives to the LTTE.
2.12 DFAT assesses that these high-profile (‘high risk’ or ‘hardcore’) former members would likely be arrested, detained and prosecuted through Sri Lanka’s criminal courts, often following a period of detention in a rehabilitation centre. Although many high-profile members may have already been released following their detention and prosecution, any other high-profile members who remain at large or return to Sri Lanka would likely be arrested, detained and prosecuted in this way. Following their release from rehabilitation or prison, high-profile former LTTE members are likely to be intensely monitored by Sri Lankan authorities.
Low-profile former LTTE members
2.13 In addition to a relatively small number of high-profile LTTE members, many thousands of LTTE members have been arrested and detained in rehabilitation centres since the end of the conflict. Generally, this would include former combatants, those employed in administrative or other roles and those who may have provided a high level of non-military material support to the LTTE during the conflict.
2.14 DFAT assesses that, although the great majority of these low-profile (‘low-risk’) former members have already been released following their detention, any other low-profile LTTE members who came to the attention of Sri Lankan authorities would be detained and may be sent to rehabilitation centres. Following their release from rehabilitation centres, low-profile former LTTE members may be monitored but generally are not prosecuted.
Former LTTE members living outside of Sri Lanka
2.15 Although Sri Lankan Tamils have emigrated abroad since independence in 1948, the number of Tamils who left Sri Lanka grew quickly after the start of the civil conflict. There are at least one million Sri Lankan Tamils living outside of Sri Lanka, including in Canada, the UK, the Indian State of Tamil Nadu, France, Germany, Switzerland, Australia, Malaysia, the Netherlands, Norway and Denmark. Members of the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora may be citizens of those countries, dual-nationals or will have arrangements to stay legally in their country of residence. Many members of the Tamil diaspora return to Sri Lanka to visit family members, for holidays and for business. Remittances from Tamil diasporas have traditionally been, and continue to be, an important source of income for family and community members in Sri Lanka.
2.16 Some members of the Tamil diaspora played a central role during the conflict, particularly as a source of funding, weapons and other material support for the LTTE, but also as political advocates for a separate Tamil state in Sri Lanka. Many countries’ designation of the LTTE as a terrorist organisation after September 2001 made it more difficult for the organisation to raise funds from Tamil diaspora communities.
2.17 Some Tamil diaspora groups have traditionally held and continue to hold public demonstrations in their countries of residence to support a separate Tamil state in Sri Lanka. High-profile leaders of pro-LTTE diaspora groups may come to the attention of Sri Lankan authorities as a result of their participation in such demonstrations.
2.18 In general, DFAT assesses that Sri Lankan authorities may monitor any member of the Tamil diaspora returning to Sri Lanka, depending on their risk profile...
Family members
2.25 DFAT is aware of but cannot verify cases where close relatives have been arrested and detained because of their family connections with former LTTE members. However, close relatives of the LTTE members who are wanted by Sri Lankan authorities are likely to be subject to monitoring.
Civilians living in areas formerly controlled by the LTTE
2.26 According to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees’ eligibility guidelines released in July 2010, due to the improved human rights and security situation there was ‘no longer a need for group based protection mechanisms or for the presumption of eligibility for Sri Lankans of Tamil ethnicity originating from the north of the country’ (see also ‘Tamils’ in the October 2014 Country Report on Sri Lanka).
2.27 Because of the pervasiveness of LTTE control in the north and east during the civil conflict, most Tamils from these areas are likely to have paid taxes to or provided a low-level of material support to the LTTE. DFAT assesses that those Tamil civilians who were not members of the LTTE, including those who may have provided a low-level of support to the LTTE, may be monitored by Sri Lankan authorities, but are at a low risk of being detained or prosecuted.
Relevant information about the aftermath of the civil war in Sri Lanka’s north and east
As noted, the 26 year-long civil conflict between the Sri Lankan government and the secessionist Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) ended when the government declared victory on 19 May 2009.[5] The final period of conflict, during 2008-2009, was concentrated in the northern Vanni region (which includes Vavuniya, Mullaitivu, other districts and most of the region around Kilinochchi).[6] [7] During the final stages of conflict, the Sri Lankan government set up camps intended specifically to house internally displaced persons (IDPs), who were fleeing the conflict in the north. Camps intended for IDPs were dubbed “welfare centres” by the government, whilst camps and other places of detention intended for holding suspected LTTE members were known as “rehabilitation centres” or “rehabilitation camps”.[8] [9] [10] The International Crisis Group (ICG) reported that over 280,000 Tamil civilians who entered government-controlled areas in the final months of conflict were detained in emergency IDP camps. These camps, were mainly located in Vavuniya. The ICG notes that government forces “also detained more than 10,000 individuals allegedly involved with the LTTE in separate camps with no outside access”.[11] Amnesty International reported that the 10,000 figure was provided by the Sri Lankan government, and that the actual number of detainees suspected of being LTTE members and sympathisers detained could be higher.[12] The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre states that over 11,000 suspected LTTE sympathisers were held at locations separate to the IDP Camps.[13] The whereabouts and conditions of detention for LTTE suspects were in many cases not made public.[14]
[5] UK Home Office, Country of Origin Information Report – Sri Lanka, 11 November 2010, pp.29; 34
[6] UK Home Office, Country of Origin Information Report – Sri Lanka, 11 November 2010, p.29
[7] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, UNHCR Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing the International Protection Needs of Asylum-Seekers from Sri Lanka, April 2009, p. 12
[8] Human Rights Watch, Legal Limbo: The Uncertain Fate of Detained LTTE Suspects in Sri Lanka, February 2010, pp.1-3
[9] Freedom from Torture 2011, Out of the Silence: New Evidence of Ongoing Torture in Sri Lanka 2009-2011, 2011, pp.4; 9 <
[10] Amnesty International, Sri Lanka’s Displaced face uncertain future as government begins to unlock the camps, 11 September 2009, placed-uncertain-future-government-unlock-camps-20090911
[11] International Crisis Group, War Crimes in Sri Lanka, Asia Report No. 191, 17 May 2010, p.6
[12] Amnesty International, Sri Lanka’s Displaced face uncertain future as government begins to unlock the camps, 11 September 2009h ttp:// placed-uncertain-future-government-unlock-camps-20090911
[13] Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, Internal Displacement: Global Overview of Trends and Developments in 2009 – Sri Lanka, UNHCR Refworld, 17 May 2010 Amnesty International, Sri Lanka’s Displaced face uncertain future as government begins to unlock the camps, 11 September 2009, placed-uncertain-future-government-unlock-camps-20090911
According to the US Department of State (USDOS), approximately 2,400 LTTE suspects were thought to be in rehabilitation centres in 2009, while an additional number of detainees were thought to be held in police stations, intelligence facilities, army or paramilitary camps or other informal detention facilities.[15] The USDOS also received credible reports in 2008 and 2009 that the government maintained secret detention centres where LTTE suspects were held, tortured and often killed.[16] [17] Many LTTE suspects were reportedly transferred to a Terrorist Investigation Department (TID) facility within Bossa prison in Galle, and hundreds were eventually transferred to remand prisons, although according to Amnesty International the majority were not charged with an offence.[18]
[15] US Department of State 2010, Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 2009 – Sri Lanka, 11 March, Section 1 (c)
[16] US Department of State 2010, Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2009 – Sri Lanka, 11 March, Section 1 (c)
[17] US Department of State 2009, Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2008 – Sri Lanka, 25 February, Section 1(c)
[18] Amnesty International 2012, Locked away: Sri Lanka’s Security Detainees, UNHCR Refworld, 13 March, p. 17
According to Human Rights Watch, security forces detained almost all ethnic Tamils exiting the Vanni from March 2008 onwards. Exceptions included some local humanitarian workers and clergy, who were allowed to enter and exit the region. Human Rights Watch alleges that no meaningful attempt was made to “distinguish between persons with suspected LTTE links and ordinary civilians”.[19] Human Rights Watch alleges that in a February 2009 interview, Sri Lanka’s Defence Secretary reportedly suggested that those left in the Vanni were legitimate targets. The secretary stated: “[t]here are no independent observers, only LTTE sympathisers. Radio announcements were made and movement of civilians started a month and a half ago.” However, government warnings to leave the Vanni were apparently ineffective because the LTTE prevented civilians from leaving areas under its control.[20]
[19] Human Rights Watch, Besieged, displaced and detained: The plight of civilians in Sri Lanka’s Vanni region, December 2008, p. 11
[20] Human Rights Watch, War on the displaced: Sri Lankan army and LTTE abuses against civilians in the Vanni, February 2009, p.20
Specifically, the military and the police Criminal Investigation Department (CID) set up several points where people leaving the Vanni would be initially screened by military personnel, then often transported to one of the hospitals in Kilinochchi for further questioning by security forces where they were encouraged to admit any LTTE association voluntarily. This second stage at Kilinochchi could last for up to 36 hours. The government did not make public any information as to who was arrested during the screening process, or as to how many detainees were sent to IDP camps as opposed to LTTE detention facilities.[21] Aid agencies were denied access to points where the military received and interviewed civilians,[22] and Human Rights Watch suggests that there may have been enforced disappearances and extrajudicial killings of some LTTE suspects during the screening process.[23]
[21] Human Rights Watch, War on the displaced: Sri Lankan army and LTTE abuses against civilians in the Vanni, February 2009, p.29
[22] International Crisis Group, Crisis in Sri Lanka, 30 April 2009
[23] Human Rights Watch, War on the displaced: Sri Lankan army and LTTE abuses against civilians in the Vanni, February 2009, p.29
Additionally, the ICG notes that intelligence agencies and Tamil paramilitaries[24] repeatedly screened civilians for LTTE affiliation once detained in the IDP camps.[25] Amnesty International also reported in September 2009 that the government was continuing to screen IDPs in attempts to “weed out” LTTE members hiding in the camps.[26] Human Rights Watch clarifies that some people first detained in IDP camps were later moved to rehabilitation centres. Security forces arresting people from IDP camps often refused to advise family members, government representatives or the Human Rights Commission on Sri Lanka where those arrested were taken.[27]
Displacement from the Trincomalee area has evidently had more to do with the state attempting to build a power plant in the vicinity of Sampur.[28] Although the previous government told IDPs from the area in 2011 that they would not be allowed to return, the new government has reversed that position in a review of the previously planned development, and allowed them to return.[29]
Change of government
[24] The Sri Lankan government was generally thought to have been aligned with some paramilitary groups during the conflict with the LTTE. See: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Sri Lanka: Paramilitary groups in post-war Sri Lanka, 20 May 2010
[25] International Crisis Group, War Crimes in Sri Lanka, Asia Report No. 191, 17 May 2010, p.6
[26] Amnesty International, Sri Lanka’s Displaced face uncertain future as government begins to unlock the camps, 11 September 2009, placed-uncertain-future-government-unlock-camps-20090911
[27] Human Rights Watch, Legal Limbo: The Uncertain Fate of Detained LTTE Suspects in Sri Lanka, February 2010, pp.1-11
[28] “Trincomalee war displaced 'won't go back'”, BBCSinhala.com, 5 December 2011,
[29] “‘Homecoming’ for 579 displaced families in Sampur by end April”, Sunday Times, 29 March 2015,
Mahinda Rajapaksa had already lost Sri Lanka’s presidency to a moderate rival in January 2015. The new prime minister led the opposition to Rajapaksa’s UPFA-led coalition to a definitive victory in the 2015 general elections. This, I note, occurred several months after [Mr A] gave oral evidence about the Karuna Group and government forces to the previously-constituted Tribunal, and also some months after the previously-constituted Tribunal made a decision in this matter. Essentially, it would appear that the government that [Mr A] claimed to fear, has been sent into opposition. According to BBC News:
Sri Lanka's ruling United National Party has won the most seats in the island's parliamentary elections, blocking former President Mahinda Rajapaksa's attempt to return to power.
The UNP doubled its number of seats in parliament to 106, while Mr Rajapaksa's United People Freedom Alliance took 95.
The result gives the UNP enough seats to form a coalition with its allies.
Turnout in Monday's polls was high, in what was widely seen as a referendum on Mr Rajapaksa.
Prime Minister and UNP leader Ranil Wickremesinghe said: "The majority of this country have voted to consolidate the gains of the 8 January revolution." …
"Now it is no longer necessary to be divided as winners and losers. We need to unite as one family to create a new political culture in this country."
Mr Rajapaksa won his seat as MP - but the results mean he will be staying on the opposition benches.
Mr Rajapaksa lost the presidency in January to his former Health Minister, Maithripala Sirisena.
He ran as a parliamentary candidate for the UPFA in Monday's elections - hoping to secure enough support to force President Sirisena to name him as prime minister.
Although Mr Rajapaksa and Mr Sirisena both belong to the UPFA, the two men are rivals and lead opposing factions in the UPFA.
Mr Sirisena's allies are expected to join the UNP in a national unity government, giving the UNP enough seats for a majority.
Correspondents say the UNP also enjoys a better relationship with two smaller parties - the Tamil National Alliance and the leftist JVP (Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna), which took 16 and six seats respectively.[30]
Addressing and reconciling past wrongs
[30] “Sri Lanka elections: UNP victory as Rajapaksa hopes rebuffed”, BBC News, 18 August 2015, >
Various independent reports indicate that the new government of Maithripala Sirisena has commenced implementing its undertaking to investigate past excesses and illegal behaviour by all parties in the civil war including individuals associated with state parties, paramilitary groups and the LTTE:
In an important turning point, the resolution on Sri Lanka titled ‘Promoting reconciliation, accountability and human rights in Sri Lanka’ presented at the 30th session of the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva, was adopted on October 1. The resolution, which secured the support of 25 countries including the US, was passed after no country sought a vote on the text.
On September 30, Sirisena pledged to follow a process of truth seeking, justice, reparation and non-recurrence. Addressing the 70th session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York, Sirisena said it was imperative that Sri Lanka adopts a new social, economic and political approach to rise up to the challenges of the 21st century.
“In this regard, reconciliation receives priority attention in my country,” he said.
Detailing his vision, Sirisena said Sri Lanka involves wants to achieve the twin objectives of sustainable development and reconciliation.
“A fundamental requirement in this context is dealing with the past honestly and building a modern Sri Lankan Nation. In dealing with the past, we will follow a process of truth seeking, justice, reparation and non-recurrence. Sri Lanka remains committed to fulfil this responsibility. In this respect, we intend implementing a new program and plan of action in Sri Lanka to advance human rights,” he added. [31]
[31] “After dodging war crimes probe, Lanka focuses on truth, reconciliation”, Asia Times, 12 October 2015,
In its Country Report: Sri Lanka, 16 February 2015 report, DFAT observed:
3.10 The new Sirisena government has reportedly asked for a list of all detainees held under the [Prevention of Terrorism Act] for review, and has said it is willing to work with the International Committee of the Red Cross in providing greater access to detainees and establishing a comprehensive database on detainees.
Supporters of the TNA
I have had regard to independent country information to the effect that The Tamil National Alliance (TNA) “swept the Sri Lankan parliamentary elections in the Tamil-speaking Northern and Eastern provinces” in the 2015 elections.[32] On 3 September, the leader of the TNA, Rajavarothiam Sampanthan, was selected to lead the opposition in parliament. Analysts said that Sampanthan’s appointment signalled “significant progress in the efforts at reconciliation between the Tamils and Sri Lanka’s majority Sinhalese population” and would bring the TNA “into the political mainstream, encouraging its members to view issues through a broader, national lens”.[33]
[32] Balachandran, PK, ‘Tamil National Alliance Sweeps Tamil Votes in North, East Lanka’, The New Indian Express, 18 August 2015, Bastians, D, ‘Tamil Lawmaker to Lead Opposition in Sri Lanka’, The New York Times, 3 September 2015, >
The DFAT Country Information Report: Sri Lanka, dated 24 January 2017, includes the following observations:
2.29 The Sirisena Government has prioritised human rights and reconciliation and has made significant progress, including: replacing military governors in the Northern and Eastern Provinces with civilians; returning some of the land held by the military since the conflict-era back to its former owners; releasing some individuals detained under the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) and committing to reform the PTA; and engaging constructively with the United Nations. The Government also established an Office of National Unity and Reconciliation (ONUR) to develop a national policy on reconciliation.
2.30 Symbolic changes have also contributed to a more positive outlook for reconciliation. The 2015 Independence Day ceremony was attended by Tamil National Alliance (TNA) leaders for the first time since 1972 and President Sirisena delivered a trilingual Declaration for Peace in Sinhala, Tamil and English, paying respect to all victims who had lost their lives during the civil conflict (a significant step toward acknowledging losses on both sides…
3.6 Tamils have a substantial level of political influence and their inclusion in political dialogue has increased since Sirisena came to power in 2015. There are a number of Tamil political parties, with the largest coalition of parties operating under the umbrella of the Tamil National Alliance (TNA). The TNA currently has 16 members of parliament and holds the majority of seats in the Northern Provincial Council. The TNA leader, Rajavarothiam Sampanthan, is leader of the National Opposition.
I have not been able to find evidence to suggest that there has been sustained or systemic harassment of TNA voters, supporters or campaigners in Sri Lanka in recent years, let alone in or since 2015. Given the support the TNA received in the 2015 parliamentary elections, it seems difficult to infer that its voters, supporters or campaigners were facing any potentially relevant substantial or significant intimidation.
As discussed by DFAT, above, following the 2015 elections the electorally-strengthened TNA found itself leading the country’s parliamentary opposition:
After a gap of over three decades, a Tamil lawmaker has become the Leader of the Opposition in the Sri Lankan parliament.
As soon as the House met on Thursday morning, Speaker Karu Jayasuriya announced that Tamil National Alliance leader R. Sampanthan had been made the Leader of the Opposition and said no other name had been proposed.
A. Amirthalingam of the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) was the first Tamil to hold the post between 1977 and 1983.
Mr. Sampanthan, who, in 1956, joined the Ilankai Tamil Arasu Katchi (also known as Federal Party), was first elected to Parliament from Trincomalee in 1977 on the ticket of the TULF when the general elections were held under the 1972 Constitution.
After resigning as MP along with other members of the TULF in 1983, Mr. Sampanthan returned to the Parliament in July 1997. Since 2001, he has been heading the TNA, which now comprises the ITAK, the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation (TELO), the Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF) and the People’s Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE). According to records of the Parliament, Mr. Sampanthan has served as MP for more than 22 years.
Later, speaking on a motion to increase the number of Cabinet Ministers to 48 and that of State Ministers and Deputy Ministers to 45, Mr. Sampanthan told the Parliament that his party would work closely with everyone to resolve the Tamil question while “we are loyal to this country and people of this country”. It was his party’s “primary duty” to ensure that there was a “fair and acceptable” settlement of the Tamil issue[34]…
The Karuna Group
[34] “TNA’s Sampanthan becomes opposition leader in Sri Lankan parliament”, The Hindu, 3 September 2015,
I have had regard to the following information about the Karuna Group:
In a report dated September 2014, Amnesty International stated that members of the Karuna faction within the UPFA were amongst parties accused of still engaging in violence:
Amnesty International continues to receive credible reports of the unlawful use of force and violations of the right to life by state agents and by paramilitary groups under the control of the armed forces, including extrajudicial killings and suspicious deaths in custody. These remain widespread and unpunished…
Parties that have been accused of such abuse include police and army personnel, members of the Eelam People’s Democratic Party (EPDP); the Karuna faction within the ruling United People’s Freedom Alliance (UPFA); and the Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal (TMVP.
The Sri Lankan authorities have taken insufficient measures to prevent violations by government forces and their affiliates by failing to adequately discipline personnel and by failing to ensure that paramilitary agents and political parties aligned with the government are disarmed.[35]
[35] Amnesty International, Ensuring justice: Protecting human rights for Sri Lanka’s future, September 2014, p.15
A November 2014 Colombo Mirror article reported that Karuna Amman had ‘been accused of executing nearly 600 Sri Lanka police officers who had surrendered to LTTE forces in June 1990 when he was the LTTE eastern commander’, and that the opposition United National Party (UNP) had ‘often accused the Rajapaksa government of harbouring a criminal’. The article also indicated that during the budget speech, Karuna ‘warned the UNP saying that he would not hesitate to “reveal many secrets” if the UNP continues to raise allegations against him’.[36] I could find no evidence of anything coming from this 2014 threat.
[36] ‘Karuna goes anti-India wholesale, slams TNA of being extra nice’, Colombo Mirror, 5 November 2014,
In a November 2014 paper on the South Asia Analysis Group website, Colonel R Hariharan, a former military intelligence officer and head of intelligence of the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) in Sri Lanka between 1987 and 1990, referred to Karuna’s ‘dwindling political fortunes’. Hariharan stated that ‘President Rajapaksa had chosen to ignore Karuna’s crimes for the support rendered by him and his cadres in aid of the Sri Lanka forces’, but more recently:
Karuna has been driven to political wilderness, marginalized by Rajapaksa and ignored Tamils. With little or no influence either personally or politically, his future looks bleak as he faces the parliamentary election next year. He runs the risk of being totally sidelined in the run up to the elections unless President Rajapaksa lends a helping hand.[37]
[37] Hariharan, R, Sri Lanka: Karuna’s allegations about IPKF’s human rights violations, South Asia Analysis Group, Paper No. 5819, 10 November 2014, >
In the presidential election held on 8 January 2015, incumbent President Mahinda Rajapaksa was defeated by Maithripala Sirisena, formerly the health minister in the UPFA government.[38] [39] Following the election, Sirisena was sworn in as president and appointed UNP leader, Ranil Wickremesinghe, as the new prime minister.[40] On 11 January 2015, it was reported that Sirisena had ‘secured a parliamentary majority’ after ‘more than 40 parliamentarians… shifted their allegiance from Mr Sirisena’s predecessor, Mahinda Rajapaksa’.[41]
[38] ‘Sri Lanka election: Incumbent president Mahinda Rajapaksa concedes defeat’ , Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 10 January2015 ‘Sri Lanka leader to face health minister in polls’, Associated Press, 21 November 2014, ‘Cloud coup-coup land?’, The Economist, 12 January 2015, ‘Ranil’s third stint as PM’, Sunday Observer, 11 January 2015, ‘Sri Lanka’s newly-elected president Maithripala Sirisena secures parliamentary majority’, Agence France Presse, 11 January 2015, >
Although Karuna supported Rajapaksa before the election,[42] on 11 January 2015 it was reported that ‘SLFP vice President Vinayagamoorthy Muralitharan (alias Karuna Amman)’ had decided to extend his support to President Sirisena. According to the article, ‘several members of the UNP have expressed their displeasure over Karuna’s support, because of his unpopularity, his associations with the LTTE and war crimes allegations’.[43]
[42] Packiyanathan, S, ‘Tamils can depend on President – Muralitharan’, Daily News, 2 December 2014, ‘SLFP Splits: 21MPs Supports President Maithri. Others with Mahinda’, The Republic Square, 11 January 2015, type="1">
In an article dated 12 January 2015, the Colombo Telegraph referred to ‘the notorious… Karuna Amman’ as one of ‘several undesirables from the previous regime’ who had extended their support to Sirisena:
The entry of Karuna into the Sirisena fold is raising major concerns after the opposition campaigned strongly on a platform to hold both KP and Karuna to account.
Wide sections of the UNP are unhappy about the movements but it is learnt that the party leader is explaining that the process is about building a majority in Parliament. Fears are rampant that defeated President Mahinda Rajapaksa may return to Parliament on January 19 and wrest control of the UPFA majority in the House and the new administration is key to secure support ahead of that date.
However, the Government is also being warned that the flood of undesirables sent to President Sirisena’s doorstep are arriving at the behest of President Rajapaksa who is engaged in an attempt to discredit the new administration.[44] That opinion notwithstanding, Vinayagamoorthy Muralitharan was not on the list of new Cabinet Ministers sworn in on 12 January 2015.[45]
[44] ‘Sajin, Karuna And Flood Of ‘Undesirables’ Flock To Maithripala’, Colombo Telegraph, 12 January 2015,
[45] ‘New Cabinet Ministers sworn in’, Onlanka News, 12 January 2015, >
The period in the lead up to the 17 August 2015 parliamentary election was relatively peaceful, compared to previous elections, and although there were reports of violence and malpractice on election day polling was considered largely unhindered.[46] [47] [48] The UNP won the most seats, although not an outright majority.[49]
[46] Campaign for Free and Fair Elections, General Election 2015 CaFFE Report No44: The most closely contested election after 2001 general election?, 16 August 2015,
[47] Centre for Monitoring Election Violence, Parliamentary General Election 2015: Election Day Communiqué 2, 17 August 2015,
[48] ‘Sri Lanka parliamentary elections genuine, ‘well administered’ – European election monitors’, Colombo Page, 19 August 2015,
[49] ‘Sri Lanka ruling party gets majority in parliament with 106 seats’, Colombo Page, 18 August 2015,Ranil Wickremesinghe was sworn in as Prime Minister on 21 August, and on the same day the UNP and the SLFP signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) agreeing to work together in a National Government for a two year period.[50] [51] President Sirisena allowed SLFP members to choose whether or not they wished to join the National Government.[52] Former president Mahinda Rajapaksa, elected in the district of Kurunegala, had already stated that he would be a SLFP member of the opposition in parliament.[53]
[50] Mallawarachi, B, ‘Sri Lanka’s prime minister sworn in as 2 parties sign deal’, Associated Press, 21 August 2015, Balachandran, PK, ‘SLFP To Join National Government For Two Years’, The New Indian Express, 20 August 2015,
[52] ‘President allow SLFP members choice to sit in opposition’, Colombo Page, 24 August 2015, ‘Former President of Sri Lanka to continue in politics within parliament’, Colombo Page, 19 August 2015, >
As noted above, the Tamil National Alliance (TNA) “swept the Sri Lankan parliamentary elections in the Tamil-speaking Northern and Eastern provinces” in the 2015 elections.[54] Also as noted above, on 3 September, the leader of the TNA, Rajavarothiam Sampanthan, was selected to lead the opposition in parliament, with political analysts observing that his appointment would bring the TNA “into the political mainstream”.[55]
[54] Balachandran, PK, ‘Tamil National Alliance Sweeps Tamil Votes in North, East Lanka’, The New Indian Express, 18 August 2015, Bastians, D, ‘Tamil Lawmaker to Lead Opposition in Sri Lanka’, The New York Times, 3 September 2015, >
In this significantly altered political landscape, Vinayagamoorthy Muralitharan reportedly announced on 26 August 2015 that he ‘will never go into national politics’ and ‘would be forming a new political party without any racist agenda and hoped to contest the next local government election’. As reported by the Daily News:
“Even my party asked me to contest for the General Election from the Battcaloa [sic] District but I didn't contest as I didn't want to be a failed politician,” he said.
“I knew that I could never win the election after competing from the Batticaloa district as the political situation of the district had completely changed after the January 8 Presidential Election,” he said.
“I explained to the party that I am ready to contest if they give me a chance to contest from the Kalutara District with the assistance of Kumara Welgama as 14,000 Tamil votes are there. Definitely Sinhala people would have voted for me. Then they promised to give me a National List slot. But I didn't expect such an opportunity from them as I knew the history of the party and my name is not there in the SLFP National List…”, Muralitharan added…
He further stated that the Eastern province needs a strong Tamil leader…
He said: “my people are forcing me come out an give them a voice . I am thinking about forming a new party. I want to have a discussion with president Mithripala Sirisena . I think he will appreciate my decision. I have already discussed with senior members of the party. I will never contest under the UNP or SLFP. My own party will not be based on race or religion.
He also added that Pillayan was rejected by the people in the East. “I asked him to contest alone from the Batticaloa District. But he didn’t accept that. So, he got only 11,000 votes,” he said.[56]
I have had regard to the following independent report[57] about the arrest and charging of Vinayagamoorthy Muralitharan, a.k.a. Karuna:
Sri Lankan investigators on Tuesday arrested Vinayagamoorthy Muralitharan, better known as Karuna Amman, a former LTTE leader who was later a government minister, on charges of corruption during the previous Mahinda Rajapaksa regime.
Colonel Karuna — his nom de guerre — who commanded the LTTE in Sri Lanka’s Eastern Province, defected from the organisation in 2004 to begin his own political outfit, the Tamil Eelam Peoples’ Liberation Tigers. He later joined former President Rajapaksa and served as minister in his government, drawing severe criticism from the LTTE for being “a traitor” who abandoned the movement to join the State whose armed forces they were fighting.
Karuna was Deputy Minister of National Integration in the Rajapaksa administration but has held no political position since January 2015, when Maithripala Sirisena unseated Mr. Rajapaksa in the presidential elections.
On Tuesday, the Financial Crimes Investigations Division of the Sri Lankan government reportedly questioned Karuna for hours, for allegedly misusing a State vehicle. Later, Colombo’s Chief Magistrate remanded him till December 7.
In 2007, Karuna was arrested and remanded in Britain on charges of immigration offences.
Karuna’s name has also figured among those charged of war crimes — including forcefully recruiting children — committed during Sri Lanka’s 30 year-long ethnic conflict.
Once a powerful LTTE leader, he later saw himself as one of the “architects” of the rebel Tigers’ fall, according to an interview he gave to the Washington Post months before the war ended.
[56] Mudugamuwa, I, ‘Karuna to form new party’, Daily News, 27 August 2015, “Former minister and rebel LTTE leader Karuna arrested”, The Hindu, 29 November 2016,
As at 12 February 2017, although apparently still facing court on charges described above[58], Vinayagamoorthy Muralitharan, continued to operate within the democratic process, launching on that day a political party, the Tamil United Freedom Party (TUFP) in Batticaloa. At the party's inauguration, he said TUFP would be based in Batticaloa and would open branches in the north and the east.[59]
[58] “Karuna Amman ordered to appear before Police FCID every month”, News 1st, 1 February 2017,
[59] “Ex-LTTE Leader Forms Political Party To Raise Tamil Concerns”, DNA News, 12 February 2017, >
I could find no evidence of an active, remnant, paramilitary “Karuna group” or of any offshoot in Sri Lanka.
The relationship between the TNA and the current UNP-led government in Sri Lanka
After elections that it considered to be free and fair, and an election campaign that involved evidently very little civil strife, the UNP gained the third largest number of parliamentary seats and sought successfully to be recognised as the main opposition party[60].
[60] “Sri Lanka's Tamil National Alliance party presses for opposition status in Parliament”, DNA India, 30 August 2015,
I have had regard to the following independent reporting[61] of the outcome of Sri Lanka’s August 2015 parliamentary elections:
The Tamil National Alliance (TNA) will support the United National Party (UNP), The Hindu reported, quoting its leader R. Sampanthan.
“In the process, we also expect resolution to the national question in a manner acceptable to all people,” TNA leader R. Sampanthan told The Hindu.
Meanwhile, Sampanthan argued that the verdict of people in the Northern and Eastern Provinces had demonstrated “beyond question” that the TNA was “the true representative of Tamils.”
The UNP emerged as the single largest party in Monday’s Parliament election in Sri Lanka, winning 106 out of the 225 seats. The TNA won 14 seats.
[61] “TNA to back UNP: Sampanthan”, Asian Mirror, 20 August 2015,
Whereas the TNA evidently sits as a leading opposition party in the parliament, I note that the TNA has evidently boasted some influence in the formulation of the UNP-led government’s policies[62]. As at July 2017, the TNA appears not yet to have lost faith in the UNP government’s approach to bringing past human rights abusers in the north and east of Sri Lanka to account[63].
Treatment of returnees
[62] “TNA Forced UNP To Change Stance On Constitutional Reform, Claims Weerawansa”, Asian Mirror, 8 January 2016,
[63] “Constitution-making: Sampanthan urges UNP-SLFP consensus”, Daily Mirror, 19 July 2017,
The report of the UK Home Office fact finding mission to Sri Lanka published in March 2017 contains comments from a wide variety of individuals and organisations.[64] The International Organization for Migration (IOM), which has had a strong role in assisting voluntary returns, noted that there were thousands of former LTTE members, and as some had left the country on forged identities, the issues of civil security, terrorism and the immigration laws were the focus of the government on return.[65] The fact finding mission also found that there were some allegations of ill-treatment after arrival, but these were not substantiated.[66] A UN Senior Human Rights Advisor in Sri Lanka said that civil society groups on the ground had not reported recent issues of ill-treatment on return, although some cases had been raised by the non-governmental organisation Freedom from Torture.[67]
[64] ‘Report of a Home Office Fact-Finding Mission Sri Lanka: treatment of Tamils and people who have a real or perceived association with the former Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)’, UK Home Office, 31 March 2017, DIBP CISEDB50AD3780
[65] ‘Report of a Home Office Fact-Finding Mission Sri Lanka: treatment of Tamils and people who have a real or perceived association with the former Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)’, UK Home Office, 31 March 2017, DIBP CISEDB50AD3780, pp.67-68
[66] ‘Report of a Home Office Fact-Finding Mission Sri Lanka: treatment of Tamils and people who have a real or perceived association with the former Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)’, UK Home Office, 31 March 2017, DIBP CISEDB50AD3780, pp.67-68
[67] ‘Report of a Home Office Fact-Finding Mission Sri Lanka: treatment of Tamils and people who have a real or perceived association with the former Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)’, UK Home Office, 31 March 2017, DIBP CISEDB50AD3780, pp.72-73
I note the following comments provided in the DFAT Country Report: Sri Lanka, 24 January 2017:
TREATMENT OF RETURNEES
5.17 Sri Lanka’s Constitution entitles any citizen to ‘the freedom to return to Sri Lanka’. Entry and exit from Sri Lanka is governed by the Immigrants and Emigrants Act 1949 (the I&E Act, see below for more information). Under Sections 34 and 45(1) (b) of the I&E Act, it is an offence to depart other than via an approved port of departure, such as a seaport or airport. Penalties for leaving Sri Lanka illegally can include imprisonment of up to five years and a fine of up to 200,000 Sri Lankan rupees (around AUD 2,000). In practice, penalties are applied on a discretionary basis and most cases result in the issuance of a fine and not imprisonment.
5.18 Returnees who departed Sri Lanka irregularly by boat are generally considered to have committed an offence under the I&E Act. If a returnee is travelling voluntarily on their own passport on a commercial flight they may not come to the attention of local authorities if they departed Sri Lanka legally through an official port on the same passport, because they have not committed any offence under the I&E Act.
Exit and Entry Procedures
5.19 Upon arrival in Sri Lanka, involuntary returnees, including those on charter flights from Australia, are processed by different agencies, including the Department of Immigration and Emigration, the State Intelligence Service and the Criminal Investigation Department. These agencies check travel documents and identity information against the immigration databases, intelligence databases and the records of outstanding criminal matters. Officers of the Australian Department of Immigration and Border Protection (DIBP) based in Colombo may meet charter flights carrying involuntary returnees. DIBP has observed that processing returnees at the airport can take several hours, primarily due to the administrative processes, interview lengths, and staffing constraints at the airport. Returnees are also processed en masse, and individuals cannot exit the airport until all returnees have been processed. Individuals who return to Sri Lanka voluntarily and are eligible for an Australian Government Assisted Voluntary Return package are usually met by the International Organization for Migration.
5.20 For returnees travelling on temporary travel documents, police undertake an investigative process to confirm identity, which would address whether someone was trying to conceal their identity due to a criminal or terrorist background or trying to avoid court orders or arrest warrants. This often involves interviewing the returning passenger, contacting the person’s claimed home suburb or town police, contacting the person’s claimed neighbours and family and checking criminal and court records. DFAT assesses that returnees are treated according to these standard procedures, regardless of their ethnicity and religion. DFAT further assesses that detainees are not subject to mistreatment during processing at the airport.
Offences under the Immigrants and Emigrants Act
5.21 Most Sri Lankan returnees, including those from Australia, are questioned (usually at the airport) upon return and, where an illegal departure from Sri Lanka is suspected, they can be charged under the I&E Act. DFAT understands that in most cases, these individuals have been arrested by the police at Colombo’s Bandaranaike International Airport. As part of this process, most returnees will have their fingerprints taken and be photographed. At the earliest available opportunity after investigations are completed, the individual would be transported by police to the closest Magistrate’s Court, after which custody and responsibility for the individual shifts to the courts or prison services. The Magistrate then makes a determination as to the next steps for each individual. Those who have been arrested can remain in police custody at the Criminal Investigation Department’s Airport Office for up to 24 hours after arrival. Should a magistrate not be available before this time–for example, because of a weekend or public holiday–those charged may be held at a nearby prison.
5.22 According to the Sri Lankan Attorney-General’s Department, which is responsible for the conduct of prosecutions, no returnee who was merely a passenger on a people smuggling venture had been given a custodial sentence for departing Sri Lanka illegally. However, fines had been issued to act as a deterrent towards departing illegally in the future. Fine amounts vary on a case-by-case basis (but can be up to 200,000 Sri Lankan rupees / AUD 2,000) and can be paid by instalment. If a person pleads guilty, they will be fined (which they can pay by instalment) and are then free to go. In most cases where a returnee pleads not guilty, returnees are immediately granted bail by the magistrate on the basis of personal surety or they may be required to have a family member act as guarantor. Where a guarantor is required, returnees may sometimes need to wait until a family member comes to court to collect them. There are rarely any conditions in relation to the bail, and if there are, they are imposed on a discretionary basis. An accused will only need to return to court when the case against them is being heard, or if summonsed as a witness in a case against the organiser/facilitator of a people smuggling venture. There is no general requirement to report to police or police stations between hearings.
5.23 The same processes outlined above are applied to returnees who travelled illegally to India and then onwards to a third country. Children are never subject to bail or fines. DFAT has been advised by the Sri Lankan Government that no returnee from Australia to Sri Lanka has been charged under the PTA. While credible, DFAT cannot verify this claim.
5.24 Some returnees from Australia have been charged with immigration offences and other criminal offences which they allegedly committed before departure. For example, in October 2012, warrants were issued for the arrest of a group of returnees in regard to the robbery of a vessel used to travel to Australia; the causing of grievous harm to persons; and people smuggling.
5.25 The Sri Lankan Attorney-General’s Department distinguishes between those suspected of being passengers and those suspected of facilitating or organising the irregular migration of people from Sri Lanka. Facilitators or organisers can be charged with an offence under Section 45C of the I&E Act.
5.26 DFAT assesses that ordinary passengers on a people smuggling venture are generally viewed as victims and penalties are more likely to be pursued against those suspected of being facilitators or organisers of people smuggling ventures. The Sri Lankan Government plans to review the I&E Act and produce new legislation in 2017 that better reflects this approach.
Conditions for Returnees
5.27 During 2008-2015, over 1,500 failed asylum-seekers were returned from Australia to Sri Lanka. This is in addition to the many Sri Lankan asylum seekers who have been returned from other countries, including the US, Canada, the UK and other European countries. The majority of these returnees are Tamil. Although the experiences of individual returnees will vary, many Tamil returnees choose to return to the north, either because it is their place of origin, because they have existing family links, or because of the relatively lower cost of living compared to Colombo and other urban areas in the south.
5.28 Most returnees have incurred significant expenses or debt to undertake their outward journey. Many are apprehensive about finding suitable employment opportunities and reliable housing on return. Those who have skills which are in high demand in the labour market are best placed to find well-paid employment. Some returnees receive reintegration assistance in the form of financial support and transport assistance on their return to Sri Lanka. DFAT assesses that any reintegration issues experienced by returnees are not based on their failure to obtain asylum, but rather due to the employment and accommodation difficulties they may face.
The submission draws attention to the ongoing lack of resolution of cases of persons who disappeared during the civil war that ended in 2009[73].
[73] “Facing Sri Lanka’s Ghosts”, US News, 18 March 2017,
The 7 June 2017 submission does not provide detail in support of [Mr A]’s claim about being subjected to army interrogation in the event of trying to relocate. Rather, it argues that if [Mr A] registers to live in a new area he will likely be monitored with the effect that information about his background would be shared.
Regarding treatment as a failed asylum seeker and former illegal emigrant, the submission argues that [Mr A] will be asked what claims he made against Sri Lanka whilst seeking asylum abroad. Again, this assertion is unsupported.
The submission suggests that [Mr A] will face ridicule and insults wherever he chooses to live in Sri Lanka. the submission does not argue how such ridicule would rise even cumulatively to serious or significant harm.
The submission asserts that [Mr A] fears being killed during remand, presumably between Colombo airport and Negombo prison, referring vaguely to treatment of Tamils in Sri Lankan prisons.
The 7 June 2017 submission includes a letter from a Sri Lankan Tamil acquaintance of [Mr A]’s. The author of the letter claims to be [a relative] of [Mr A] who he knew back in Sri Lanka. The author also states that he has not lived in Sri Lanka since 2000. His letter states that [Mr A] suffered persecution and torture at the hands of the military in Sri Lanka up till his own departure for Australia in 2012. The author of the letter does not present as an independent eye witness to any of the events claimed in [Mr A]’s protection visa application. [Mr A] is evidently the source of any relevant, substantive information about himself in his [relative’s] letter. On the evidence before me, I give the letter very little weight.
[Mr A] submitted his own statement in addition to the above-mentioned material. The statement is mainly concerned with arguing that trauma from past experiences in Sri Lanka makes it difficult for him to give consistent detailed information in support of his protection visa application. [Mr A] claimed in his statement that the SLA has a camp near his family’s house. [Mr A] claimed that the Sri Lankan Prime Minister’s invitation for all Tamils to return to the country is undermined by the extent of the army presence in the north and east of the country. I am not satisfied on the evidence before me that the presence of the SLA in [Mr A]’s home region gives rise to a real chance of persecution or a real risk of significant harm.
[Mr A] noted in his statement that I had asked for more details about the treatment of his friends when they returned to Sri Lanka. He said he would try to obtain more details about his friends provided they felt safe that they would not be harmed by Sri Lankan authorities for passing on information about themselves. He did not provide any further information in support of his claims about those friends. On the evidence before me, I give no weight to [Mr A]’s claims about the friends he described..
[Mr A] said in his statement that any remand conditions under which he might be placed in Sri Lanka pending bail would be unsanitary and particularly dangerous for Tamils. In support of this contention he referred vaguely to alleged killings of Tamil political prisoners. He contended that the authorities managing prisons make conditions as hard as possible for Tamil prisoners.
[Mr A] contended that the authorities, assuming him to be rich after coming to Australia and spending time here, will try to extort money from him. He did not provide any support for this claim. On the evidence before me, I give it no weight.
[Mr A] submitted a copy of an 18 February 2017 statement issued by the Australian Tamil Congress, as published in the Sri Lanka Guardian, asking the Australian government to act cautiously in response to the Sri Lankan Prime Minister’s undertaking on behalf of Sri Lankan authorities not to prosecute or harm returnees[74]. The statement also asks Australian authorities to consider each Sri Lankan asylum claim on a case by case basis. I have duly considered this statement.
[74]
Findings in relation to s.36(2)(a) of the Act
I accept that that [Mr A] is a young, unmarried, adult Hindu Tamil male from the [City 1] region in eastern Sri Lanka. Having regard to independent evidence cited above, including material from UNHCR, and also having regard to [Mr A]’s claims as to why he claims fear of persecution, I am not satisfied that he faces a real chance of persecution in Sri Lanka for the separate or cumulative reason of being a young unmarried adult Hindu Tamil male from eastern Sri Lanka.
I accept that [Mr A] and his father own their own agricultural land and that their family is perceived to be wealthy. I find on the evidence before me that presumptions about this wealth and the family’s ability to pay was the motivating factor in episodes of extortion described by [Mr A] in this application. I find that desire for money was the essential and significant factor motivating the harm [Mr A] suffered, and not his profile as a wealthy man or son of seemingly rich parents.
I accept that [Mr A] was kidnapped and held for two months by members of the Karuna group in 2006 and was only released after his local council negotiated with the group. However, I find on the evidence before me that this was an isolated event, all the more isolated by having occurred during the civil war, which ended in 2009. I give this isolated 2006 episode very little weight in the present matter.
I accept that the Karuna group maintained an active and oppressive presence in [Mr A]’s home region even after the civil war ended in 2009, with tacit and active protection from the Rajapaksa government. However, I find on the evidence before me that the Karuna faction has been forced to evolve in more recent years with the decline of the influence and finance it was able to command during the chaos of the war and more recently with the change of government that saw Rajapaksa and his faction go into opposition. On the evidence before me, I do not accept [Mr A]’s contention about the Karuna group manifesting such a presence in his home region as to be able to pose a significant ongoing threat to him.
Whereas I am prepared to accept that the Karuna group extorted money from [Mr A] between April 2011 and March 2012, and whereas I accept that he was threatened and beaten when he refused to pay, I note that by his own evidence the extortion stopped some months before he came to Australia. Whereas he claims his family also faced demands for money from the Karuna group, I am not satisfied on the evidence before me that this continued at all in recent years. In view of my findings about the decline of the Karuna faction in Sri Lanka, and having regard to evidence about his family’s day-to-day circumstances in and around [City 1], I am not satisfied that [Mr A] faces a real chance of being extorted for money by the Karuna faction or any other faction or group in Sri Lanka in the reasonably foreseeable future.
I accept that in 2008 or 2009 [Mr A] was detained when he refused to lend his tractor to a CID office near his house. However, this was an event that is evidently peculiar to circumstances during and shortly after the civil war, which ended in 2009, and, on the overall evidence before me, including evidence of a change of government and evidence of [Mr A]’s family still running its paddy farm, I give these claims about borrowing and commandeering vehicles and farm equipment little weight in this matter.
When asked by the previously-constituted Tribunal why he did not wish to return to Sri Lanka, [Mr A] claimed that his main problem was that he supports the TNA and that this will cause him problems. However, at the hearing before me, he stressed that this is not his main problem, telling me that his main problem was. [Mr A] has presented a very confused position over time as to whether his main claims are about harassment from opponents of the TNA in response to his open support for that party, or about his relationship with [Mr D], when the latter was the head of the Karuna’s group in [Town 1] and also in charge of a local [team]. This ongoing confusion makes it hard to accept that the [Mr A] has genuine fear of future persecution in relation to either issue.
In evidence before me, [Mr A] continued to claim that he assisted his brother in campaigning for the TNA in the lead-up to a past election. However, the evidence to that effect is inconsistent. Overall, I do not accept that [Mr A] has been involved in political campaigning. Even if it were true that [Mr A] assisted his brother with a past campaign, and even if it were true that he or they encountered some hostility whilst campaigning, there is insufficient evidence for me to be satisfied that the harm was other than isolated and localised to the campaign. I find on the independent evidence before me that more recent campaigns have been more civil and that the chance of [Mr A] encountering campaign violence in the reasonably foreseeable future is very remote. As [Mr A] has stated a number of times, the whole of his immediate family openly supports the TNA and all of its members who are currently residing in Sri Lanka are evidently not facing harassment for supporting the TNA. I give weight to this and I also give weight to the fact that the TNA has only increased and strengthened its position amongst the voting community in eastern Sri Lanka. On the evidence overall, I am not satisfied that [Mr A] faces a real chance of persecution in [Town 1], or eastern Sri Lanka or Sri Lanka generally for reasons of supporting or campaigning for the TNA.
As to [Mr A]’s claims about the [league], the evidence he has provided is inconsistent, the letters he has provided in support of his claims are quite vague and in at least one respect not consistent with his own evidence. Overall, I find that [Mr A]’s own evidence about the [league] is not reliable, and in view of this I give the witness evidence no weight.
In any event, whether I accept that they are true or not, these are claims about conduct, some five or more years ago, within a local junior league. I find there is no real chance of [Mr A], who is now [age], continuing to be involved with that junior league. Although [Mr A] has presented statements from himself and witnesses about the behaviour of [Mr D] and the Karuna group towards him and his junior [team] several years ago, there is not sufficient evidence before me to the effect that the population in his home region continues to be affected by such behaviour since then, let alone since the Karuna group’s decline. I give weight to these events having purportedly occurred over half a decade ago before the Karuna group’s reported decline. I also give weight to [Mr A] having long since aged himself out of junior sport, and therefore out of the league that he claimed to have had unhappy dealings with the Karuna group’s local then-leader, [Mr D]. Furthermore, [Mr A] is on record having claimed that his [sporting] claims are not his main claims, leading me to conclude, as discussed above, that he does not have an overriding, genuine, subjective fear of harm arising from the his interest in or talent for [sport]. I also find that, at the hearing before me, his claims about what might happen to him in future were very baldly speculative. I am not satisfied that [Mr A] would be prevented from playing [sport] due to potentially-relevant political pressure, or be forced to do so either. Overall, I give no weight in this matter to [Mr A]’s [sport] claims.
I accept that [Mr A] was the subject of extortion in his home area between April 2011 and March 2012. I accept that he was targeted and pressed to pay a portion of his income to the Karuna group. I find on the evidence before me that this harm was motivated by the perception that [Mr A] and his family were wealthy. I accept that when he refused to pay, he was threatened with death and beaten. However, I give weight to the following facts: that this treatment ended some months before [Mr A] departed Sri Lanka; that he was still in his home region working and playing [sport] up until May 2012; that the influence of the Karuna group has decreased dramatically in Sri Lanka generally, including the north and east; and the evidence indicating that [Mr A]’s family members have not faced extortion from anyone in recent years. I am not satisfied on the evidence before me that [Mr A] faces a real chance of extortion in the reasonably foreseeable future from the Karuna group, or from anyone else, such as soldiers or the authorities presuming him to be a rich returnee from Australia.
I have considered separately and cumulatively [Mr A]’s claimed fear of persecution for reasons of being a Tamil who left Sri Lanka illegally and who might be viewed on return as a “failed asylum seeker”.
I have considered whether the kind of “returnee processing” in Sri Lanka potentially faced by [Mr A] would amount to Convention-related persecution.
I accept on the basis of the DFAT material cited above that returnees are identified, and subjected to questioning in relation to their identity, and possible breaches of the immigration laws. I give weight to the available evidence, including the DFAT report, suggesting that all people are checked upon arrival in Sri Lanka as to their identity and their immigration status, with further enquiries being made if there are difficulties with their immigration status. I do not accept that there is credible evidence before me to suggest that the law, which is a law of general application, would be applied to [Mr A] in a discriminatory manner.
There is insufficient detailed information before the Tribunal, at this stage, to confirm that the Sri Lankan Prime Minister’s February 2017 undertaking to persons who departed Sri Lanka illegally has been implemented in policy and practice.
Supposing, then, that [Mr A] is charged with illegal departure from Sri Lanka and held in a cell pending appearance before, and release on bail by, the Negombo court, I give weight to the DFAT information regarding that process and, having regard to guidance from the High Court[75], I have made a qualitative assessment of the evidence presented in this case in my consideration as to whether the period and conditions of remand in this case would amount to “serious harm”. I have taken into account the evidence as to the brevity of remand for returnees who have charged with having left Sri Lanka illegally. I give weight to the evident purpose and consequence of remand being to release the detainee on bail, on conditions usually no steeper than their own recognisance, those persons who have been charged under the I & E Act in a matter involving no greater penalty than a monetary fine. I have considered in particular [Mr A]’s claims about his fear of being treated in a discriminatory way by jailers and non-Tamil detainees, et al.
[75] MIBP v WZAPN; WZARV v MIBP [2015] HCA 22, High Court, French CJ, Kiefel, Bell, Gageler and Keane JJ, M17/2015 & P10/2015, 17 June 2015
I have considered the material in [Mr A]’s submissions about conditions for criminal and political suspects and convicted prisoners in Sri Lankan jails. Having considered all of the evidence in this case in its entirety, I give little weight to that material as it evidently refers to people who were jailed, some of them as political prisoners under the Rajapaksa regime. I give more weight to the DFAT information to the effect that returnees have not been subject to mistreatment during their processing at the airport.
I have duly considered that the conditions in which [Mr A] will be remanded could be very basic, uncomfortable, unsanitary and crowded, but having regard to the evidence overall, I am not satisfied that his being held for questions at the airport, or being held in remand even in the poor conditions alluded to here detention in any case would rise to the level of serious harm instanced by s.91R(2)(a) of the Act. I am not satisfied on the evidence before me that conditions in airport cells or remand cells reflect or manifest an intention to harm remandees, whether for reasons of being Tamils, returnees, illegal emigrants, or former asylum seekers, or for any other potentially relevant reason.
I am not satisfied that [Mr A] will face serious harm during or pursuant to the processing at Colombo airport. I am further not satisfied that a Convention reason is the essential and significant reason for [Mr A] facing investigation for possible breaches of the I & E Act as an illegal emigrant. I am satisfied that the terms of the I & E Act do not have a discriminatory intent or impact and that it is not being applied selectively or in a discriminatory manner for a Convention reason. I find that the I & E Act is a law of general application and does not give rise to persecution under the Refugees Convention for the applicant facing prosecution or its consequences as a failed asylum seeker/returnee.[76]
[76] Ref. s 91R(1)(a) and (c) of the Act.
100. I am not satisfied on the evidence before me that the fine for illegal departure would be so onerous as to amount even cumulatively to serious harm or persecution in [Mr A]’s case in the reasonably foreseeable future.
101. Overall, I am not satisfied that there is be a real chance of [Mr A] facing serious harm amounting to persecution during or as a result of returnee processing procedures at the airport, in the event of the Sri Lankan Prime Minister’s February 2017 undertaking to returnees not yet being implemented.
102. I give some weight to the sentiments and considerations expressed in the Sri Lankan Prime Minister’s February 2017 undertaking to returnees in finding that there is not a real chance of [Mr A] facing a real chance of persecution by Sri Lankan authorities in the reasonably foreseeable future for reasons of his illegal departure.
103. I accept that [Mr A] will be assumed to have sought asylum in Australia, and that this presumption may also be shared by officials and SLA monitors in his home area. However, I am not satisfied on the evidence before me that the profile of failed asylum seeker will give rise to negative presumptions such as having been a supporter of the LTTE or some kind of traitor to the state or the Rajapaksa regime whilst abroad. Overall, I am not satisfied on the evidence before me that [Mr A] faces a real chance of persecution in Sri Lanka in the reasonably foreseeable future either separately or cumulatively for reasons of having sought asylum abroad generally, or in in Australia in particular.
104. I am not satisfied on the evidence before me that monitoring of [Mr A] subsequent to his return to Sri Lanka (including reporting conditions) would amount even cumulatively to persecution.
105. I am not satisfied that [Mr A] would be unable to relocate safely and practicably to Colombo should he feel uncomfortable at the prospect of rejoining his family in the country’s east.
106. Having considered all of the evidence before me separately and cumulatively, I am not satisfied that [Mr A] faces a real chance of Convention-related persecution in Sri Lanka in the reasonably foreseeable future. His claimed fear of Convention-related persecution is not well founded. He is not a refugee.
107. For the reasons given above, I am not satisfied that [Mr A] is a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under the Refugees Convention. Therefore the he does not satisfy the criterion set out in s.36(2)(a).
Findings in relation to s.36(2)(aa) of the Act
108. Having concluded that [Mr A] does not meet the refugee criterion in s.36(2)(a), I have considered the alternative criterion in s.36(2)(aa).
109. A person who is found not to meet the refugee criterion in s.36(2)(a) may nevertheless meet the criteria for the grant of a protection visa if he or she is a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the Minister has substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the applicant being removed from Australia to a receiving country, there is a real risk that he or she will suffer significant harm.
110. Relevant to this, s.36(2)(aa) refers to a “real risk” of an applicant suffering significant harm. The “real risk” test imposes the same standard as the “real chance” test applicable to the assessment of “well-founded fear” in the Refugee Convention definition (ref. MIAC v SZQRB [2013] FCAFC 33).
111. “Significant harm” for these purposes is exhaustively defined in s.36(2A): s.5(1). A person will suffer significant harm if he or she will be arbitrarily deprived of their life; or the death penalty will be carried out on the person; or the person will be subjected to torture; or to cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment; or to degrading treatment or punishment. “Cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment”, “degrading treatment or punishment, and torture, are further defined in s.5(1) of the Act.
112. Article 7 of the ICCPR prohibits torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.
113. Essentially, all three of these definitions require that there be an intention to inflict harm by some act or omission. Torture does not include an act or omission arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions that are not inconsistent with the Articles of the ICCPR. “Cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment’ does not include an act or omission which is not inconsistent with Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (the ICCPR), nor one arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions that are not inconsistent with the Articles of the ICCPR. “Degrading treatment or punishment’ does not include an act or omission which is not inconsistent with Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (the ICCPR), nor one that causes, and is intended to cause, extreme humiliation arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions that are not inconsistent with the Articles of the ICCPR.
114. There are certain circumstances in which there is taken not to be a real risk that an applicant will suffer significant harm in a country. These arise where it would be reasonable for the applicant to relocate to an area of the country where there would not be a real risk that the applicant will suffer significant harm; where the applicant could obtain, from an authority of the country, protection such that there would not be a real risk that the applicant will suffer significant harm; or where the real risk is one faced by the population of the country generally and is not faced by the applicant personally: s.36(2B) of the Act.
115. Essentially, [Mr A]’s complementary protection claims rely on the same facts as his refugee claims. Those claims generally failed for not meeting the “real chance” test.
116. With particular regard to conditions in remand in Colombo airport and adjacent to the Negombo courthouse, I have considered if such conditions would amount to significant harm, were the policy and procedures detailed in the last DFAT Country Information Report still to be implemented.
117. Relevant to this consideration, I have had regard to policy guidelines prepared the Department of Immigration, particularly in its Procedural Advice Manual 3 “Refugee and humanitarian - Complementary Protection Guidelines” and country information from DFAT. In particular I have had regard to the following PAM3 guidelines:
2.19 To meet the definition of torture, cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment, or degrading treatment or punishment, an act or omission must be intended to cause harm. In some circumstances it may be appropriate to infer an intention to inflict harm if it is evident that such harm was or may be knowingly inflicted.
2.20 When assessing whether or not an applicant's claims meet the complementary protection criterion the decision maker must establish if the applicant will personally be at risk from suffering one of the forms of significant harm outlined above, bearing in mind that the existence of a consistent pattern of human rights violations in a country does not in itself constitute sufficient grounds for determining that there is a real risk of significant harm upon return to that country.
2.21 Decision makers should be aware that lawful sanctions can constitute torture, cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment or degrading treatment or punishment. For example, almost all forms of corporal punishment, including caning, whipping, flogging and stoning constitute cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment. An extremely mild form of corporal punishment may not be inconsistent with Article 7, however, this is a very narrow window.
2.22 Particularly harsh conditions of detention may also constitute cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment if they seriously or systematically deprive a detainee of human dignity. When assessing whether particular prison conditions amount to torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, decision makers should consider all the circumstances of the case, including the nature and context of the detention, its duration, physical and mental effects as well as the characteristics of the applicant, including their gender, age and state of health. (refer also to 2.19)
[my emphasis]
118. I have considered submissions from [Mr A] and his adviser including country information reporting detention conditions and alleging use of torture by authorities in Sri Lanka. I have considered the evidence in this case as to the nature and context of detention, both during questioning and in the application of remand, having regard to the evidence as to its brief duration, to possible physical and mental discomfort due to possible crowding to some degree and concomitant strain on reportedly minimal sanitary conditions, and to other relevant factors. I am not satisfied that there would be an intention on the part of the authorities to harm [Mr A] by remanding him under the I & E Act during re-entry into Sri Lanka. I have considered the evidence about authorities exploiting detention to torture detainees, as exemplified in reports about the treatment of some Tamils, including political prisoners, those suspected of LTTE links, in the aftermath of the civil war, but I am not satisfied on the evidence before me that there is a real risk that the applicant would be tortured. I am not satisfied on the evidence before me that there is a real risk that the applicant would suffer significant harm of any kind from other people during remand. On the evidence overall relating to detention and remand on return to Sri Lanka, I am not satisfied that I have substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of being removed from Australia to Sri Lanka, there is a real risk that [Mr A] will suffer significant harm.
119. I have also considered other aspects of the process of being prosecuted for illegal exit, taking account of the DFAT evidence regarding a monetary fine, monitoring and reporting conditions, but also of the process evidently involving freedom to return home to family, and on the evidence before me I am not satisfied that I have substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of being removed from Australia to Sri Lanka, there is a real risk that [Mr A] will suffer significant harm.
120. Having considered all of [Mr A]’s claims I am not satisfied, on the evidence overall, that I have substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of being removed from Australia to Sri Lanka, there is a real risk he will suffer significant harm.
121. Accordingly, I am not satisfied that [Mr A] is a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under s.36(2)(aa).
Other considerations
122. There is no suggestion that [Mr A] satisfies s.36(2) on the basis of being a member of the same family unit as a person who satisfies s.36(2)(a) or (aa) and who holds a protection visa. Accordingly, he does not satisfy the criterion in s.36(2).
DECISION
123. The Tribunal affirms the decision not to grant the applicant a Protection visa.
Luke Hardy
MemberATTACHMENT A
RELEVANT LAW
124. The criteria for a protection visa are set out in s.36 of the Act and Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (the Regulations). An applicant for the visa must meet one of the alternative criteria in s.36(2)(a), (aa), (b), or (c). That is, the applicant is either a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under the ‘refugee’ criterion, or on other ‘complementary protection’ grounds, or is a member of the same family unit as such a person and that person holds a protection visa of the same class.
125. Section 36(2)(a) provides that a criterion for a protection visa is that the applicant for the visa is a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations under the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees as amended by the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees (together, the Refugees Convention, or the Convention).
126. Australia is a party to the Refugees Convention and generally speaking, has protection obligations in respect of people who are refugees as defined in Article 1 of the Convention. Article 1A(2) relevantly defines a refugee as any person who:
owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.
127. If a person is found not to meet the refugee criterion in s.36(2)(a), he or she may nevertheless meet the criteria for the grant of a protection visa if he or she is a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the Minister has substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the applicant being removed from Australia to a receiving country, there is a real risk that he or she will suffer significant harm: s.36(2)(aa) (‘the complementary protection criterion’).
128. In accordance with Ministerial Direction No.56, made under s.499 of the Act, the Tribunal is required to take account of policy guidelines prepared by the Department of Immigration –PAM3 Refugee and humanitarian - Complementary Protection Guidelines and PAM3 Refugee and humanitarian - Refugee Law Guidelines – and any country information assessment prepared by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade expressly for protection status determination purposes, to the extent that they are relevant to the decision under consideration.
imprisoned for 8 months and reportedly tortured in 2009 after having been deported to Sri Lanka from Australia. They were reported to be re-arrested in August 2010. The same case has been reported in more detail in the Asian Human Rights Commission’s report, Police torture Cases, 1998 – 2011, Sri Lanka, case 299, page 379, also: Balachandran, PK, ‘UNP-Led Coalition Wins Lankan Elections’, The New Indian Express, 18 August 2015,
Barstow, D, ‘Former President Concedes, Then Reverses, in Sri Lanka’, The New York Times, 18 August 2015, ‘Sri Lanka 2015 parliamentary elections: Final Results’, Colombo Page, 18 August 2015,Key Legal Topics
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Immigration
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Administrative Law
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Statutory Interpretation
Legal Concepts
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Procedural Fairness
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Natural Justice
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Citations1620681 (Refugee) [2017] AATA 2208
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Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v WZAPN [2015] HCA 22