1614849 (Refugee)

[2019] AATA 6814

1614849 (Refugee) [2019] AATA 6814 (16 October 2019)

DECISION RECORD

DIVISION:Migration & Refugee Division

CASE NUMBER:  1614849

COUNTRY OF REFERENCE:                   Turkey

MEMBER:Paul Windsor

DATE:16 October 2019

PLACE OF DECISION:  Melbourne

DECISION:The Tribunal remits the matter for reconsideration with the direction that the applicants satisfy s.36(2)(a) of the Migration Act.

Statement made on 16 October 2019 at 3:34pm

CATCHWORDS

REFUGEE – Protection visa – Turkey – Alevi religion – race – Kurd – actual and imputed political opinion– support for left-wing parties and the Kurdish cause – conscientious objection to undertaking compulsory military service – member of a particular social group – Kurdish women in Turkey – credible witnesses –– state protection not available – decision under review remitted  

LEGISLATION

Migration Act 1958, ss 36, 65

Migration Regulations 1994, r 1.12, Schedule 2

CASES

Kopalapillai v MIMA (1998) 86 FCR 547
MIMA v Rajalingam (1999) 93 FCR 220
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs and McIllhatton v Guo Wei Rong and Pam Run Juan (1996) 40 ALD 445
Randhawa v MILGEA (1994) 52 FCR 437
Selvadurai v MIEA & Anor (1994) 34 ALD 347

Any references appearing in square brackets indicate that information has been omitted from this decision pursuant to section 431 of the Migration Act 1958 and replaced with generic information which does not allow the identification of an applicant, or their relative or other dependant.

STATEMENT OF DECISION AND REASONS

APPLICATION FOR REVIEW

1. This is an application for review of decisions made by a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection on 2 September 2016 to refuse to grant the applicants, Mr [A] and Ms [B], Protection visas under s.65 of the Migration Act 1958 (the Act).

2. Mr [A] and Ms [B], who claim to be citizens of Turkey, applied for the visas on 23 May 2014.  A summary of relevant applicable law is at Attachment A.

3. In their Protection visa applications Mr [A] and Ms [B] indicated they were engaged and intending to marry in Australia.  Mr [A] indicated he was born [in] Sivas Province Turkey on [date of birth], is of Turkish ethnicity and is of the Alevi faith.  He indicated he departed Turkey legally [in] December 2013 and arrived in Australia [in] January 2014, entering on a Student visa.  Ms [B] indicated she was born [in] Istanbul Turkey on [date of birth], is of Kurdish ethnicity and is of the Alevi faith.  She indicated she departed Turkey legally [in] January 2014 and arrived in Australia [in] January 2014, entering on a Student visa.[1]

   [1] See folios 17-31 and 50-64 of Departmental file [file number deleted].

4. In statutory declarations included with their Protection visa applications Mr [A] and Ms [B] indicated that they feared they would be persecuted because of their political activities against the Turkish government and due to their Alevi religion.  Mr [A] also indicated that he fears he will be harmed because he refuses to undertake compulsory military service.  Ms [B] indicated she also fears she will be harmed due to her Kurdish ethnicity.[2]

   [2] See folio 37-49 and 70-80 of Departmental file [file number deleted].

5. The delegate accepted that the applicants are in a dependent relationship (in accordance with r.1.12 of the Regulations), are Alevis as claimed, and that Ms [B] is an ethnic Kurd. The delegate refused to grant the visas because he considered the applicants exaggerated their political profiles and fabricated their principal claims that they are being pursued by Turkish authorities due to their political activities. The delegate also considered that Mr [A] must have ‘legalised his situation regarding the deferment of military service’ in order to have been able to travel overseas.

6. The applicants sought review of the delegate’s decisions on 15 September 2016.  They provided the Tribunal with copies of the delegate’s decision records.[3]

   [3] See folios 1-36 of the Tribunal file.

7. The applicants appeared before the Tribunal on 13 September 2019 to give evidence and present arguments.  The Tribunal hearing was conducted with the assistance of an interpreter in the Turkish and English languages.

8. The applicants were represented in relation to the review by their registered migration agent.  The representative attended the Tribunal hearing.

   CONSIDERATION OF CLAIMS AND EVIDENCE

   Claims

9. Mr [A]’s claims for protection as set out in his initial statutory declaration of 20 May 2014 are summarised as follows:

   ·He fears if he is forced to return to Turkey he will be persecuted because of his political activities against the Turkish government and due to his Alevi religion, and will also be harmed because he refuses to undertake compulsory military service.

   ·His family moved to Istanbul a few weeks after he was born.  He believes this was for employment opportunities.  Initially his father had a hard time finding work in Istanbul because of his Alevi religion and background.  He eventually found work as [an Occupation 1], which is considered an underclass job.

   ·He felt he needed to hide his religion at primary school as the teachers would refer to Alevis as bad people who are sinners and not real Muslims.  

   ·Growing up he developed an interest in economics and wanted to learn more about the capitalist system and how to improve it.  He studied economics at University.  He was always very outspoken about his political views.  He defended the rights of the exploited classes and oppressed peoples such as the Kurds and Armenians.  This resulted in him being threatened by his roommates.

   ·In 2009 he helped the [ORGANISATION 1], which has a strong socialist/Marxist ideology, organise for [a] band [to] play a concert in Eskisehir, where he was studying.  Police monitored the concert and warned him not to associate with [ORGANISATION 1] because they are communists.

   ·In January 2010 he was detained by police and accused of provoking the public for petitioning against the decision by the Incirli authorities in Adana to create a military ‘flight’ base.  One of his friends was physically assaulted while being questioned.  He refused to sign a confession and eventually was allowed to leave.  He continued his political protest actives.

   ·In March 2015 [ORGANISATION 1] staged a hunger strike to protest the detention and torture of two friends.  The hunger strikers were harassed by police.

   ·[In] May 2011 he and his friends were savagely attacked on campus by fascist students.  While the police intervened there were no repercussions for the attackers.  That evening shots were fired and rocks thrown from the street to his apartment.  Police attended but laughed at him when he went down to talk to them.  He suspects the incident was set up by civil police in conjunction with fascist students to frighten them.

   ·In mid-2011 he met [a] leader of the Association of Socialist Youth (SGD) and the Downtrodden People’s Socialist Party (ESP) at the university, and accepted his invitation to join these groups.  Some members of these groups also support the banned Marxist-Leninist Communist Party (MLKP).  Police continued to harass and threaten him and asked him why he joined SGD, telling him they are dangerous and commenting that he has not been listening to them and that people who don’t listen have terrible things happen to them. He reported this incident to a press agency.  The police also called his father and warned his father that he could be imprisoned.

   ·It was around this time he met Ms [B], who was a member of SGD and ESP and is an Alevi Kurd.  Her family have a long history of political activism and she was very committed to socialist ideology.

   ·In December 2011 the federation of all the SGD/ESP associations, SGDF, went to Malatya to protest against the construction of a NATO base.  He and Ms [B] were at the forefront of the protest.  They held placards showing Marxist activist Deniz Gemiz and were taken to court and found guilty of promoting propaganda and supporting the MLKP.  They were given suspended sentences and told if they reoffended within three years they would receive double the sentence.

   ·[In] June 2012 they sought to attend a speech by then Prime Minister (now President) Erdogan and protest Turkish involvement in the conflict in Syria.  They were recognised, called ‘dirty ESP’ and ejected.  They went to the police station to see what had happened to two friends who had been detained by the police.  Police came out and arrested them.  He was due to appear in court in February 2014 but did not attend as he had come to Australia.

   ·In late October 2012 he participated in activities in support of the Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party (BDP).  He was accused of promoting Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) propaganda and has appeared twice in court in relation to this.  He has not attended a further hearing as he was in Australia.

   ·He was accused by police of resisting arrest and investigated following an incident on [date] November 2013 where he and some ESP friends fled from police who stopped them when they were walking home from playing [sports].  The government and police target them for standing up for those who are oppressed.

   ·He participated in the Gezi Park protests.  During these protests his university friend [died] from head injuries sustained in a police beating.  His [other] friend [was] severely hurt.

   ·He graduated from university [in] 2013 and started [working].  He continued to engage in protests in the evenings.  He and Ms [B] were living together.  They started receiving visits from unknown persons they suspected were plain clothed police.  The visitors sometimes showed their guns to assert their authority.  They were threatened against attending any more political actions.  They began talking about leaving Turkey and applied for passports.  His father committed to helping him financially if necessary.

   ·In early November he and Ms [B] were abducted while coming home from an ESP meeting.  Under threat that Ms [B] would be sexually assaulted, they were forced to agree to give evidence against their friends stating that their friends are MLKP members.

   ·After this they were afraid and agreed their only option was to leave Turkey.  An agent recommended they go to Australia as overseas students, by enrolling in an English language program.  He did not disclose in his Student visa application that Ms [B] was his partner as he was concerned this would adversely affect his application. 

   ·He fears if he returns he will be arrested, tortured and imprisoned.  He has failed to appear in court on numerous occasions and did not give evidence against his friends.

   ·He also fears he will be harmed because he has not completed his military service and categorically refuses to do so because he is opposed to the government and to serve in the military would be completely against his values and ideology.  He also fears he would be mistreated or killed for voicing his political views and would be more likely to be targeted because he is Alevi.

10. Ms [B]’s claims for protection were also set out in her initial statutory declaration of 20 May 2014.  Relevant additional matters are summarised as follows:

    ·She fears if she is forced to return to Turkey she will be persecuted because of her political activities against the Turkish government and her support of socialist ideology, and also fear harm because she is an Alevi Kurd.

    ·Her parents were born in Kurdish areas in the south east of Turkey and subsequently moved to Istanbul.  Her father has a small [shop].

    ·Her father and two paternal uncles have been imprisoned and tortured in the past for involvement in pro-Kurdish left wing politics.  Three of her uncles and one of their sons have fled abroad where they were granted asylum.

    ·Her father was detained at gunpoint and held for three days three years ago because he was leading a group advocating for residents’ to be able to remain living in an area of Istanbul subject to demolition.

    ·Although she does not speak Kurdish and is not a religious person, she identifies as an Alevi Kurd because her father instilled in her a strong sense of Alevi identity from a cultural and social perspective.  She remembers that at school the teachers would put Alevi’s down and she would have arguments with people who spoke negatively about Alevis.

    ·When she was around [certain age] she became interested in politics, influenced by her father.  She became involved with a left-wing group at high school. She and her friends protested at the American consulate against the war in Iraq and she was detained for two days, beaten and denied food.  She left school after she was threatened with expulsion for planning to participate in May Day protests.   For the next few years she was less politically active because having to change schools affected her mentally and her father told her to stay away from politics.

    ·Angered by various issues, however, she felt compelled to continue her activism and in 2005 she joined Sosyalist Genclik Dernegi (SGD), a socialist youth organisation active across Turkey.  Soon after she was selected to be part of the leadership group.

    ·She started University in 2006 where she met many politically like-minded people.  She became the university spokesperson for [a] students’ rights group.  She spoke with the media and delivered speeches.

    ·Her father has been a member of the Ezilenlerim Sosyalist Patisi (ESP) for a long time.  She joined in 2010.  She was part of the women’s’ group in Eskisehir.  She met Mr [A] when he became a member of the ESP.

    ·In November 2010 she was arrested for protesting against the policies of Yok, the Turkish higher education organisation.  They were subjected to beatings and sexual harassment by the police.

    ·In around November 2011 she started volunteering for a role similar to an editor for an SGD publication (‘Ozgur Genlick’ which means ‘Free Youth’).

    ·She has been charged 8 or 9 times following protests and taken to court.  She has not committed offences but the police fabricate charges to deter political activity.

    ·Although she is not an MLKP member, she fears she will be imputed to support MLKP because she associates with some MLKP supporters.

    ·She attended the Malatya protest in December 2011 and the planned protest at the Prime Minister’s speech in Eskisehir in June 2012.

    ·She put together a group on [social media] to support the Gezi Park protests and they held a large meeting in a park in Eskisehir and attempted to march on the AKP (the ruling Justice and Development Party) building.  Police attacked the protesters and were arresting people but she and Mr [A] managed to escape.  They made a complaint through lawyers to the government but nothing came of their complaint.  They continued to meet and march towards the government building but police always reacted with violence.   She established an online campaign (which was unsuccessful) to persuade the university to let students involved in protests resit their exams.  They set up tents in a shopping centre and slept there for about two weeks as a protest, before police tore down the tents.

    ·After they were abducted in November 2013 she and Mr [A] stayed separately with friends who were not involved in any political activities so they could keep safe and so there would be witnesses if police did attack them.  She came to Australia a few weeks after Mr [A] because it took her father longer to gather the money needed for the visa.  She departed Turkey the same day she got her visa.

    ·She fears if she returns to Turkey she will be killed or sent to jail.  She feels even more vulnerable to persecution for her political activities because she is an Alevi Kurd and a woman.  She wants to live in a country where women are not oppressed and where there is freedom of speech.

11. Included with the application were various photographs of protests, a smashed window and a bullet, and Turkish and English language copies of a claimed ‘REASONED DECISION’ of the [Criminal] Court [in] October 2012 in relation to the claimed offence on [date] December 2011 of ‘Making Propaganda for MLKP Terrorist Organisation’.[4]

    [4] See folios 154-172 of Departmental file [deleted].

12. Following an interview with the delegate on 20 April 2016 the applicants’ representative provided a submission dated 13 May 2016 in support of their Protection visa applications.  This included a copy of their current lease agreement; a [Student] Youth Union membership application for Ms [B]; and various articles relating the applicants’ claimed protest activities (with the applicants marked in relevant photographs where appropriate).[5]  

    [5] See folios 178-200 of Departmental file [deleted] and 1-42 of Departmental file[deleted].

13. In the submission the representative comments on the applicants’ relationship status; credibility concerns raised by the delegate at the interview (submitting that any inconsistencies between their evidence that arose at interview were minor, immaterial and entirely understandable considering their comprehensive history of protest and adverse interaction with the Turkish authorities); and submits that their fear of persecution is well-founded given relevant media reports and country information corroborating their claims to fear harm from the Turkish authorities on account of their political opinion.  The representative further submits that the applicants also fear harm from Islamic State (IS) due to the risk of attack by IS on peaceful protesters; and comments on country information which it is claimed supports Mr [A]’s claim to fear harm on account of being a conscientious objector to compulsory military service; and country information which it is claimed supports the applicants’ claims to fear harm on account of their Alevi religion and Ms [B]’s Kurdish ethnicity.

14. On 9 September 2019 the representative provided a pre-hearing submission dated 9 September 2019 in support of the review application.  Included with this submission were statements by both applicants dated 9 September 2019; a ‘Timeline of Events’ for each applicant; and legal argument and references to relevant country information in support of the applicants’ claims.[6]  

    [6] See folios 58-75 of the Tribunal file.

15. Relevant additional matters raised in the statement of 9 September 2019 by Mr [A] are summarised as follows:

    ·He was very nervous at the Departmental interview and it is very difficult for him to remember all he has been through in chronological order.  He looked at his statement to clarify dates only and did not realise the delegate would use this against him.

    ·It was a very long interview and he felt the delegate had made his mind up before the interview.  He felt like he was back in Turkey being interrogated by the police.

    ·He has attended many protests in Turkey and was not able to mention all of these in his original statement because of the sheer volume.  In 2010 he was investigated for putting up political posters in the university canteen.  In 2011 he was charged with protesting without permission for attending a rally about increasing the retirement age.  In early 2012 he was charged with protesting without permission for attending a rally against changes to the education system (from a secular to a religious system).  In May 2012 he was investigated for failing to show the national anthem proper respect at the May Day parade.  In 2012 he was investigated in relation to attending a protest in memory of[Mr C], who died [due] to police violence - this case is still ongoing.

    ·He has continued his political activities since arriving in Australia, including by attending events organised by the [Organisation 2] and events organised by the [Organisation 3] in Australia.

    ·He would refuse to ‘buy-out’ his military service if he returned to Turkey because it would be contrary to his political beliefs.

    ·If he returned to Turkey he would be very politically active again.  The situation has got much worse in Turkey since the coup attempt.  The government are trying to suppress people and are mistreating people even more than they did in the past.

1. Relevant additional matters raised in the statement of 9 September 2019 by Ms [B]      are summarised as follows:

   ·More recently her father was present at a peace meeting in Ankara as a member of ESP when two suicide bombers killed many people.  She thinks this event really affected him.

   ·Her father was also arrested after attending a protest in Taksim in Istanbul about the situation of Ayse Deniz Karacagil (who was killed in Iraq after joining the PKK and whose parents were charged with ‘making terror propaganda’ for attending her funeral).[7]  He was held for three months but is now out on bail.  He has been charged with membership of MLKP and making MLKP propaganda.

   ·She joined the [Organisation 2] within three months of arriving in Australia.  She has found they are more socially and culturally oriented and more politically passive than the ESP in Turkey but she has attended some meetings and protests with them.

   ·In Australia she also follows and supports the [Organisation 3] and has participated in their activities, including some with the [Organisation 2].

   ·If she returned to Turkey she would be just as politically active as she was before.  She sometimes posts about events in Turkey.  She believes strongly in the Kurdish Alevi cause and the rights of women.  She feels compelled to change the situation faced by people affected by the actions of the Turkish government.

   ·She strongly disagrees with the delegate’s finding that she would not have problems in Turkey due to her Kurdish Alevi background.  There are many incidents where she and her family have been discriminated against because of their backgrounds.  She also believes Alevi Kurds are treated more harshly when detained, being denied food and being subject to harsh verbal abuse.

   ·Her political activities and involvement with the criminal justice system would affect her chances of employment both in the government and private sectors.

   ·Women are also treated differently to men by authorities.  Her experience is that she would be exposed to physical, emotional and sexual abuse when she had to engage with police because of her political opinion.  Police always do a full body search when people are arrested and this is not always by a women officer.  Male police officers use this opportunity to sexually assault women.

   [7] ‘Parents of girl who died fighting in PKK ranks acquitted or terror charges’, Hurriyet Daily News, 4 April 2018, >

   On 12 September 2019 the representative provided copies of further documents in support of the applicants’ claimed political activities.[8]

   [8] See folios 76-210 of the Tribunal file.

2. On 24 September 2019 the representative provided a post-hearing submission addressing matters raised in the hearing.[9]  On 1 October 2019 the representative provided further photographic evidence in support of the applicants claimed political involvement in Turkey.[10]

   [9] See folios 215-221 of the Tribunal file.

   [10] See folios 222-248 of the Tribunal file.

   Findings and reasons

   Identity

3. Considering the copies of their passports provided to the Department, and noting the delegate’s findings in this regard, the Tribunal accepts that Mr [A] and Ms [B] are citizens of Turkey as claimed.  Accordingly, the Tribunal finds that Turkey is their country of nationality for Convention purposes and is their ‘receiving country’ for complementary protection purposes.[11]

   Key issues

   [11] See folios 117-146 of Departmental file [deleted].

4. The key issues in this review are whether Mr [A] and Ms [B] face a real chance of suffering treatment amounting to persecution involving serious harm if they were to return to Turkey, from the Turkish authorities or members of the broader Turkish community, because of their political opinions and activities, Alevi backgrounds, Ms [B]’s Kurdish ethnicity and status as a woman, and Mr [A]’s opposition to undertaking compulsory military service; and if not, whether there are substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of them being removed from Australia to Turkey, there is a real risk they will suffer significant harm for the purpose of s.36(2)(aa) of the Act.

5. For the following reasons, the Tribunal has concluded that the matter should be remitted for reconsideration.

   Credibility

6. The Tribunal is aware of the importance of adopting a reasonable approach in the finding of credibility. In Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs and McIllhatton v Guo Wei Rong and Pam Run Juan (1996) 40 ALD 445 the Full Federal Court made comments on determining credibility. The Tribunal notes in particular the cautionary note sounded by Foster J at 482:

   …care must be taken that an over-stringent approach does not result in an unjust exclusion from consideration of the totality of some evidence where a portion of it could reasonably have been accepted.

7. The Tribunal also accepts that ‘if the applicant's account appears credible, he should, unless there are good reasons to the contrary, be given the benefit of the doubt’. (The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees' Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status, Geneva, 1992 at para 196). However, the Handbook also states (at para 203):

   The benefit of the doubt should, however, only be given when all available evidence has been obtained and checked and when the examiner is satisfied as to the applicant's general credibility. The applicant's statements must be coherent and plausible, and must not run counter to generally known facts.

8. When assessing claims made by applicants the Tribunal needs to make findings of fact in relation to those claims. This usually involves an assessment of the credibility of the applicants. When doing so it is important to bear in mind the difficulties often faced by asylum seekers. The benefit of the doubt should be given to asylum seekers who are generally credible but unable to substantiate all of their claims.

9. The Tribunal must bear in mind that if it makes an adverse finding in relation to a material claim made by the applicant but is unable to make that finding with confidence it must proceed to assess the claim on the basis that it might possibly be true (see MIMA v Rajalingam (1999) 93 FCR 220).

10. However, the Tribunal is not required to accept uncritically any or all of the allegations made by an applicant. Further, the Tribunal is not required to have rebutting evidence available to it before it can find that a particular factual assertion by an applicant has not been made out (see Randhawa v MILGEA (1994) 52 FCR 437 at 451 per Beaumont J; Selvadurai v MIEA & Anor (1994) 34 ALD 347 at 348 per Heerey J and Kopalapillai v MIMA (1998) 86 FCR 547.)

11. In general, the Tribunal found both Mr [A] and Ms [B] to be credible witnesses.  

    Assessment of claims

12. Consistent with the delegate’s findings, the Tribunal accepts that Mr [A] and Ms [B] are in a genuine and ongoing de facto relationship for the purposes of r.1.12.

13. While the Tribunal accepts that both Mr [A] and Ms [B] are of Alevi background, and accepts that they continue to follow some Alevi social and cultural traditions, from their evidence at the hearing the Tribunal concludes they are not religious.  When asked if they consider themselves to be religious persons, Mr [A] indicated he is an atheist and a Marxist but is an Alevi in a cultural sense.  Ms [B] commented that she does not believe in God but her parents are Alevis and those beliefs have been passed on to her.  When asked how she reconciled not believing in God with being an Alevi she indicated that religion is a very small part of identifying as an Alevi and the cultural beliefs come before the religion.  She also indicated that she identifies as a Marxist.  The Tribunal accepts that both Mr [A] and Ms [B] are strong supporters of the Alevi community and would be outspoken in support of Alevi rights community.

14. While she indicated that she does not speak Kurdish, from her evidence the Tribunal accepts that Ms [B] is of Kurdish ethnicity.  The Tribunal accepts that Ms [B] and Mr [A] view ethnic Kurdish people as oppressed and support the ‘Kurdish cause’.  The Tribunal also accepts that Ms [B] is a member of particular social groups comprising Turkish women and ethnic Kurdish women.  The Tribunal also accepts that, if returned to Turkey, Mr [A] would become a member of a particular social group comprising Turkish conscientious objectors because he would refuse to undertake compulsory military service for moral reasons.[12]

    [12] ‘Conscientious objector : a person who refuses to work in the armed forces for moral or religious reasons’, Cambridge Dictionary, >

    After careful consideration of all the available evidence, the Tribunal accepts that both Mr [A] and Ms [B] have a history of left-wing political activism in Turkey and that this activism has brought them into adverse contact with Turkish police and security personnel.  The Tribunal accepts that both Mr [A] and Ms [B] have been investigated, charged and brought before the Turkish courts in relation to criminal matters.  The Tribunal accepts that there are outstanding judicial matters pending in relation to Mr [A].  The Tribunal finds that the applicants have continued to be politically active in relation to left-wing causes in Australia and finds that this is consistent with their political activism in Turkey.  The Tribunal accepts that if Mr [A] and Ms [B] returned to Turkey they would feel compelled to continue to be politically active and to undertake protest activity in support of left wing and pro-Kurdish causes.  The Tribunal accepts that Mr [A] has a conscientious objection to undertaking compulsory military service in Turkey.  The Tribunal accepts that Ms [B] has a strong commitment to feminist issues which may compel her to be involved in protest activity in support of such causes.   

15. The Tribunal considers it is possible that the catalyst for Mr [A] and Ms [B] leaving Turkey and coming to Australia is that they were abducted by Turkish police/security forces [in] November 2013 and beaten and threatened with death, and that, in order to prevent Ms [B] being raped, they agreed to give evidence at an unspecified time in the future that some of their friends, who are ESP organisers, are members of the banned MLKP.

16. In considering whether Mr [A] and Ms [B] face a real chance of suffering persecution involving serious harm given their personal circumstances, the Tribunal has considered the following country information, drawn from the most recent DFAT Country Information Report on Turkey, and discussed with the applicants at the hearing:[13]

    [13] DFAT Country Information Report, Turkey, 9 October 2018.

    Background

    ·Turkey has a population of approximately 80.8 million people.

    ·It is reported that between 70-75 per cent of the population is ethnically Turkish and around 19 per cent (approximately 15 million people) Kurdish.

    ·The overwhelming majority of Turkish citizens are Muslim, with most (75-80 per cent) being Sunni.

    ·Estimates of the size of the Alevi population vary considerably.  Some Alevi leaders estimate that Alevis comprise between 25 to 31 per cent of the Turkish population (20 to 30 million); academic estimates suggest the number is closer to ten to 15 per cent (eight to 12 million).

    ·Many Alevis are also Kurds, although estimated numbers again vary considerably (between half a million and several million). DFAT understands that Kurdish Alevis are more likely to identify primarily as Alevi.

    Political Situation

    ·Following the June 2018 elections the ruling conservative Justice and Development Party (AKP) holds 290 seats in the 600 seat Turkish parliament (Grand National Assembly).  AKP governs in an electoral alliance with the far right Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), which holds 50 seats.

    ·The left-wing Kurdish aligned People’s Democratic Party (HDP) holds 67 seats.

    Security Situation

    ·On 15 July 2016, elements of the Turkish military, likely aided by elements of the Gulen movement, attempted a coup d’état against the government, deploying tanks in the streets of Istanbul and Ankara, bombing parliament and opening fire on protestors. At least 251 citizens and security personnel died in the fighting, and around 2,000 people were injured. The coup failed as most of the military remained loyal to the government.

    ·In response to an extraordinary event in a democratic country, the government implemented exceptional measures after suppressing the attempted coup. These measures included a state of emergency that remained in place until July 2018 and which gave the government enhanced powers.

    ·Kurdish resistance to central rule in majority Kurdish areas has been a recurrent feature of modern Turkish history.  An insurgency led by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) killed an estimated 40,000 people between 1984 and a ceasefire in 2013. The ceasefire collapsed in July 2015, leading to a resumption of security operations.

    ·Since the collapse of the ceasefire, security forces have conducted operations in a number of provinces in south-eastern Turkey. These operations have involved thousands of troops in infantry, artillery, and armoured land divisions, as well as the air force. The International Crisis Group (ICG) reported that, as of the end of September 2018, conflict since the end of the ceasefire had caused over 4,114 deaths of PKK militants, state security force members and non-combatants. Clashes continued throughout late 2017 and early 2018.

    Alevis

    ·Alevism is a heterodox branch of Islam that emerged in the medieval period and incorporates Shi’a, Sufi, Sunni and local traditions.

    ·The Turkish state does not recognise Alevism as a separate religion and considers Alevis to be Muslims. Cemevis (Alevi prayer halls) are not recognised as official places of worship and, unlike mosques, do not receive public funding to support their construction or maintenance.

    ·While most Alevis regard their faith as a separate religion, some identify as Shi’a or Sunni or see their Alevi identity predominantly in cultural rather than religious terms. Alevis are mostly secular, supporting strict separation of religion and politics. Alevis report they are generally able to conduct their religious ceremonies and celebrate their religious festivals without official interference.

    ·Although the Alevi community suffered significant societal violence in the past, DFAT is not aware of any instances of significant societal violence against the community in recent years. Like other religious minorities, Alevis have occasionally been the subject of negative portrayal in state media, and to low-level societal threats of violence.  

    ·DFAT assesses that Alevis face a low risk of official and societal discrimination. While they do not enjoy the benefits of official recognition as a separate religion, they are generally able to worship freely and participate in most areas of Turkish life (including politics).

    Kurds

    ·International and domestic observers have reported that the government’s response to both the resumption of conflict in the south-east between the government and the PKK, and to the July 2016 attempted coup, have significantly affected the rights and freedoms of Kurds. In particular, security operations since 2015 have resulted in significant hardship for local residents in the south-east. OHCHR reports in 2017 and 2018 detailed extensive human rights violations arising from the conflict, including killings, torture, violence against women, excessive use of force, destruction of housing and cultural heritage, prevention of access to emergency medical care, safe water and livelihoods, and severe restrictions on freedom of expression.

    ·The government has used state of emergency powers to target a wide range of Kurdish individuals, journalists, politicians and political activists, and civil society organisations accused of supporting the PKK.

    ·One domestic human rights group reported in January 2018 that 31 per cent of all people arrested in government operations since October 2016 were allegedly associated with Kurdish or leftist groups.

    ·Kurds in western Turkey do not face the same risk of conflict-related violence as those in the south-east. Many Kurds who are not politically active, and those who support the AKP, are integrated into Turkish society, identify with the Turkish nation, and live their lives in a normal fashion. Human rights observers report, however, that some Kurds in western Turkey are reluctant to disclose their Kurdish identity, including through speaking Kurdish in public, for fear of provoking a violent response.

    ·Notwithstanding government efforts to wind back discriminatory restrictions on the public expression of minority identity, DFAT assesses that Kurds in Turkey face both official and societal discrimination based on their ethnicity. The extent and form of this discrimination depends on geographical location and personal circumstance. Those residing in the south-east, Kurdish women and those active (or perceived to be active) in Kurdish political or civil society organisations are at higher risk than men and those who are not politically active or who support the AKP.

    Political activists and protestors

    ·In the past, protests were a regular occurrence in Istanbul, Ankara and other major cities. The Gezi Park demonstrations of 2013 marked a change in official response to public protest. These demonstrations initially began as a small-scale protest against the felling of trees in Istanbul’s Gezi Park for development purposes, but grew in early to mid-2013 to incorporate groups protesting other issues, including human rights violations, increasing authoritarianism, and social injustices.

    ·At their peak, hundreds of thousands participated in the protests, which occurred nationwide. The protests were generally peaceful, although there were some incidences in which demonstrators used violence against security forces. Security forces responded to the protests forcefully, dispersing demonstrators with teargas and rubber bullets. The Turkish Medical Association reported eight people were killed during the protests, of whom at least four died as a result of police violence. Over 8,000 were injured, including hundreds of security personnel.

    ·In January 2014, the government introduced legislative amendments which could be used to criminally punish the provision of emergency medical treatment during protests: a number of doctors were disciplined and two were criminally prosecuted for providing first aid in makeshift medical clinics.

    ·Protests have continued to occur in Turkey since the Gezi Park demonstrations, but none has approached the same scale. The government has regarded many anti-government demonstrations as security threats to the state, and deployed large numbers of riot police to control crowds. Authorities have also detained organisers ahead of the event, notably where the event has related to a sensitive subject, such as the conflict in the south-east or issues relating to sexual orientation or gender identity.

    ·Authorities have regularly declined permission for demonstrations or rallies by groups perceived to be against the government, including ahead of the April 2017 constitutional referendum. Where they have granted permission, they have limited access to some sites. Security forces have at times responded to protests with force causing large numbers of injuries.

    ·DFAT assesses that the ability of critics to protest government policies through political demonstrations has been significantly reduced by measures introduced during the state of emergency which remain in place. Those seeking to protest on sensitive issues are likely to be denied official permission, and to face a security response involving force if they proceed.

    ·DFAT assesses that the government’s active use of defamation laws has limited the ability of critics to protest government policies. In particular, those perceived to have criticised the president personally face a high risk of prosecution and conviction, which may lead to a prison sentence.

    ·DFAT assesses that human rights defenders face a high risk of official discrimination in the form of arrest, monitoring, harassment, prosecution, and being prevented from travelling abroad. This risk is particularly high for those working on the rights of cultural, religious and sexual minorities, and labourers.

    ·DFAT assesses that pro-Kurdish political activists face a high risk of official discrimination in the form of arrest, monitoring, harassment, and prosecution, which may be enhanced during election periods. They also face a moderate risk of physical violence from both security authorities and ultra-nationalist supporters. The level of risk is the same for both high-level politicians and low-level activists, and applies nationwide.

    Women

    ·Article 10 of the Constitution states that all individuals are equal without any discrimination before the law, regardless of sex. A May 2004 amendment to Article 10 added a provision stating that women and men have equal rights, and that the state has the obligation to ensure that this equality exists in practice.

    ·Women enjoy considerable legal protection in many areas, including on personal safety, participation in the workforce, and mandatory schooling for girls. Marriage, divorce, inheritance, and child custody are regulated by a civil law code that respects gender equality.

    ·While women participate in all areas of Turkish society, including government, business and civil society, societal, cultural and religious barriers continue to limit that participation.

    ·Gender-based and family violence is widespread in Turkey in both urban and rural areas. According to research undertaken by the Ministry of Family and Social Policies, 86 per cent of women surveyed stated they had experienced physical or psychological violence from their partners or family, and 70 per cent of women reported having been physically assaulted by partners, family members or neighbours.

    ·The July 2016 CEDAW report expressed concern about the situation of Kurdish women, particularly those affected by the resurgence of violence between the security forces and the PKK in the south-east since in 2015. CEDAW noted that women displaced from their homes face particular difficulties, including access to housing, education, and health services, and an increased risk of sexual and other violence. CEDAW documented allegations of harassment, sexual violence, and threats against Kurdish women. Security forces have reportedly shared naked pictures of raped or killed civilian and militant women on social media as a means of intimidation.

    ·DFAT assesses that most Turkish women face a risk of societal discrimination that will range from low to moderate dependant on geographic location and socio-economic level. Turkish women face a moderate risk of gender-based violence. Kurdish women residing in conflict-affected areas in the south-east face an additional high risk of conflict-related violence. Most women in Turkey face a low risk of official discrimination in the form of legislation that acts to restrict their participation in the workforce and community.

    Conscientious objectors

    ·Article 72 of the Constitution states that national service is the right and duty of every Turk. Males are required to register at age 20 for service that commences once they turn 21. University students can defer their service until they have completed their studies. Males aged 20 to 41 are eligible for conscription and must undertake military service of six months for university graduates and 12 months for non-graduates.

    ·Although military service is viewed as a rite of passage for young men, exemption or deferment from military service is possible. University students can delay their service until they have completed their studies, and potential conscripts can be exempted for being medically unfit, for residing outside the country, or for ‘proving’ their homosexuality.

    ·The government has periodically provided the option of paying a fee to reduce or waive the period of required military service.

    ·Military authorities issue documents for exemption of service that indicate the person has no outstanding liability or obligation in terms of military service. Authorities maintain a sophisticated national database of military service, making evasion for an extended period almost impossible. Any interaction with authorities, such as being stopped for a traffic infringement, can lead to a cross-check of an individual’s military service record. In addition, the bar code in biometric passports is linked to the national database, meaning authorities can identify and detain draft evaders on their return to Turkey.

    ·The government does not recognise the right to conscientious objection to military service. Those who oppose mandatory military service on religious grounds may face charges in military and civilian courts, with potential prison sentences of between two months and two years.

    ·The first known case of conscientious objection was lodged in 1989. The number of cases has steadily risen, however: a media report in August 2016 estimated the total number to be in the thousands. Activists formed a Conscientious Objection Association (COA) in 2014, with the support of leftists, religious Muslims, Kurdish militants, pacifists, and feminist allies. As with other human rights defenders, the ability of COA to conduct activities has been restricted under the state of emergency. Prosecutions against conscientious objectors have continued: international human rights observers reported that, in August 2017, 68 Jehovah’s Witnesses faced prosecution for objecting to military service.

    ·Authorities treat draft evasion and desertion seriously: those who attempt to evade military service face prison time. Article 63 of the Law on Absentee Conscripts, Draft Evaders, Persons Unregistered [for Military Service] and Deserters (1930) provides for penalties for those evading military service in peacetime ranging from one month imprisonment for those who report to the authorities within seven days, to up to thirty-six months’ imprisonment for those who are arrested after three months. Article 63 can be applied multiple times, with a separate case for each time the evader or deserter refuses to carry out military service; and evaders and deserters may also be charged under Articles 87 or 88 of the same law, for refusal to take the military oath, to wear a uniform, or to obey orders.

    ·DFAT assesses that most, but by no means all, Turkish men will undergo military service. Exemption from military service is possible, but depends heavily on individual and socio-economic circumstances. Conscientious objectors and draft evaders are likely to face prosecution, imprisonment, and restricted access to a wide range of social benefits and civil rights, which may include the ability to leave the country.

1. The Tribunal finds that the country information indicates that the government’s tolerance of those who support pro-Kurdish causes, left-wing political activists and protestors generally has declined markedly since the collapse of the ceasefire agreement with the PKK in July 2015 and the resumption of ‘security operations’ in south-eastern Turkey, and the attempted a coup d’état against the government in July 2016.  In this regard, the Tribunal notes DFAT’s assessments that the ability of critics to protest government policies through political demonstrations has been significantly reduced by measures introduced during the state of emergency, which remain in place.  DFAT comments that those seeking to protest on sensitive issues are likely to be denied official permission, and to face a security response involving force if they proceed.

2. Noting the applicants’ past involvement in political activities and protests critical of the government and in support of left-wing causes and minority group (including Kurdish) causes, and the likelihood that they would continue to engage in such activities should they return to Turkey, the Tribunal finds that DFAT’s assessments that those perceived to have criticised the president personally face a high risk of prosecution and conviction under defamation laws, which may lead to a prison sentence; that human rights defenders face a high risk of official discrimination in the form of arrest, monitoring, harassment, prosecution, and being prevented from travelling abroad; that pro-Kurdish political activists face a high risk of official discrimination in the form of arrest, monitoring, harassment, and prosecution, and a moderate risk of physical violence from both security authorities and ultra-nationalist supporters, are relevant to the applicants’ particular circumstances.

3. Noting the DFAT comment that human rights observers report some Kurds in western Turkey are reluctant to disclose their Kurdish identity, including through speaking Kurdish in public, for fear of provoking a violent response; and DFAT’s assessment that Kurdish women and those active (or perceived to be active) in Kurdish political or civil society organisations are at higher risk than men and those who are not politically active or who support the ruling AKP, the Tribunal also accepts that Ms [B] faces additional risks of harm as a person who may be identified as or perceived to be a Kurdish woman.

4. The Tribunal also finds that there are additional risks of harm to Mr [A] arising from his conscientious objection to undertaking compulsory military service.  The Tribunal finds that the DFAT advice indicates that all males aged from 20 to 41 are eligible for conscription and that while university students can defer their service while undertaking their studies there are limited grounds for exemption and most Turkish men will be required to undergo military service.  The DFAT advice indicates that the government does not recognise the right to conscientious objection to military service and conscientious objectors and draft evaders  have been prosecuted and face imprisonment.  In considering this matter the Tribunal has noted the delegate’s finding that Mr [A], because he departed Turkey lawfully, must have ‘legalised’ his situation regarding the deferment of military service and therefore would not be sent to prison (on the basis of country information that ‘draft evaders’ are not permitted to travel overseas until they legalize their situation).  The Tribunal finds, however, that Mr [A] would have been able to defer his military service at the time of his [age] birthday because he was a university student at that time, and there is nothing in the evidence to indicate or suggest that he was considered to have been a ‘draft evader’ at the time he departed Turkey in December 2013.  

5. Having considered Mr [A]’s individual circumstances, the Tribunal finds that there is a real chance that he would suffer treatment amounting to persecution involving serious harm from government authorities and/or Turkish ultra-nationalists due to his support for left-wing political parties and engagement in anti-government political activities and protests, including in support of minority groups such as ethnic Kurds and Alevis, and his conscientious objection to undertaking military service, should he return to Turkey.

6. Having considered Ms [B]’s individual circumstances, the Tribunal finds that there is a real chance that she would suffer treatment amounting to persecution involving serious harm from government authorities and/or Turkish ultra-nationalists due to her support for left-wing political parties and engagement in anti-government political activities and protests, including in support of minority groups such as ethnic Kurds and Alevis, her Kurdish ethnicity and status as a member of a particular social group comprising Kurdish women in Turkey, should she return to Turkey.

7. The Tribunal is satisfied that the real chance of serious harm Mr [A] and Ms [B] will face if they return to Turkey will be a result of systematic and discriminatory conduct in that it will be done to them selectively and intentionally.  The Tribunal finds that the essential and significant reasons for the serious harm Mr [A] faces is his actual and imputed political opinions of opposition to the ruling AKP political party and support for left-wing parties and the Kurdish cause, his Alevi background, and his membership of the particular social group of conscientious objectors to compulsory military service in Turkey.  The Tribunal finds that the essential and significant reasons for the serious harm Ms [B] faces is her actual and imputed political opinions of opposition to the ruling AKP political party and support for left-wing parties and the Kurdish cause, her Kurdish ethnicity and Alevi background, and her membership of the particular social group comprising ethnic Kurdish women in Turkey.

   Availability of State protection

8. In this case the real risk of harm the applicants face includes harm from state actors.  In this regard the Tribunal notes DFAT’s comments that, while Turkey has a wide range of state protection mechanisms and its security forces and judicial institutions are well established, civilian-run, and benefit from a long tradition of public service, the government’s strong response to the failed coup of July 2016, particularly towards those accused of links with the Gulen movement, has weakened the capacity of the security and criminal justice system to deliver state protection.  DFAT comments that while official avenues exist to lodge complaints of human rights abuses and improper treatment by police and other security authorities, DFAT assesses that it is unlikely that a complaint from a high-risk group, such as an ethnic minority or political activist, alleging abuse by a member of the security forces would result in prosecution.[14]  Against this background, the Tribunal concludes that state protection is not available to the applicants in Turkey.

   Relocation

   [14] DFAT Country Information Report, Turkey, 9 October 2018, section 5.1.

9. In the circumstances of this case, where the harm feared includes harm from state actors, and noting DFAT’s assessment that the requirement for a local certificate of residence and the nationwide reach of security services means that an individual facing adverse official attention is unlikely to be able to escape this adverse official attention through internal relocation, the Tribunal finds that Mr [A] and Ms [B] cannot remove the real risk of serious harm they face by relocating to another area of Turkey away from their home area.[15]

   [15] DFAT Country Information Report, Turkey, 9 October 2018, sections 5.22-5.24.

10. For the reasons given above, the Tribunal is satisfied that Mr [A] and Ms [B] are persons in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under the Refugees Convention. Therefore they satisfy the criterion set out in s.36(2)(a).

    DECISION

11. The Tribunal remits the matter for reconsideration with the direction that the applicants satisfy s.36(2)(a) of the Migration Act.

    Paul Windsor

    
    

    Member

    
    ATTACHMENT A

    Relevant law

12. The criteria for a protection visa are set out in s.36 of the Act and Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (the Regulations). An applicant for the visa must meet one of the alternative criteria in s.36(2)(a), (aa), (b), or (c). That is, the applicant is either a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under the ‘refugee’ criterion, or on other ‘complementary protection’ grounds, or is a member of the same family unit as such a person and that person holds a protection visa of the same class.

    Refugee criterion

13. Section 36(2)(a) provides that a criterion for a protection visa is that the applicant for the visa is a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations under the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees as amended by the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees (together, the Refugees Convention, or the Convention).

14. Australia is a party to the Refugees Convention and generally speaking, has protection obligations in respect of people who are refugees as defined in Article 1 of the Convention. Article 1A(2) relevantly defines a refugee as any person who:

    owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.

15. Sections 91R and 91S of the Act qualify some aspects of Article 1A(2) for the purposes of the application of the Act and the Regulations to a particular person.

16. There are four key elements to the Convention definition. First, an applicant must be outside his or her country.

17. Second, an applicant must fear persecution. Under s.91R(1) of the Act persecution must involve ‘serious harm’ to the applicant (s.91R(1)(b)), and systematic and discriminatory conduct (s.91R(1)(c)). Examples of ‘serious harm’ are set out in s.91R(2) of the Act. The High Court has explained that persecution may be directed against a person as an individual or as a member of a group. The persecution must have an official quality, in the sense that it is official, or officially tolerated or uncontrollable by the authorities of the country of nationality. However, the threat of harm need not be the product of government policy; it may be enough that the government has failed or is unable to protect the applicant from persecution.

18. Further, persecution implies an element of motivation on the part of those who persecute for the infliction of harm. People are persecuted for something perceived about them or attributed to them by their persecutors.

19. Third, the persecution which the applicant fears must be for one or more of the reasons enumerated in the Convention definition - race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion. The phrase ‘for reasons of’ serves to identify the motivation for the infliction of the persecution. The persecution feared need not be solely attributable to a Convention reason. However, persecution for multiple motivations will not satisfy the relevant test unless a Convention reason or reasons constitute at least the essential and significant motivation for the persecution feared: s.91R(1)(a) of the Act.

20. Fourth, an applicant’s fear of persecution for a Convention reason must be a ‘well-founded’ fear. This adds an objective requirement to the requirement that an applicant must in fact hold such a fear. A person has a ‘well-founded fear’ of persecution under the Convention if they have genuine fear founded upon a ‘real chance’ of being persecuted for a Convention stipulated reason. A ‘real chance’ is one that is not remote or insubstantial or a far-fetched possibility. A person can have a well-founded fear of persecution even though the possibility of the persecution occurring is well below 50 per cent.

21. In addition, an applicant must be unable, or unwilling because of his or her fear, to avail himself or herself of the protection of his or her country or countries of nationality or, if stateless, unable, or unwilling because of his or her fear, to return to his or her country of former habitual residence. The expression ‘the protection of that country’ in the second limb of Article 1A(2) is concerned with external or diplomatic protection extended to citizens abroad. Internal protection is nevertheless relevant to the first limb of the definition, in particular to whether a fear is well-founded and whether the conduct giving rise to the fear is persecution.

22. Whether an applicant is a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations is to be assessed upon the facts as they exist when the decision is made and requires a consideration of the matter in relation to the reasonably foreseeable future.

    Complementary protection criterion

23. If a person is found not to meet the refugee criterion in s.36(2)(a), he or she may nevertheless meet the criteria for the grant of a protection visa if he or she is a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the Minister has substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the applicant being removed from Australia to a receiving country, there is a real risk that he or she will suffer significant harm: s.36(2)(aa) (‘the complementary protection criterion’).

24. ‘Significant harm’ for these purposes is exhaustively defined in s.36(2A): s.5(1). A person will suffer significant harm if he or she will be arbitrarily deprived of their life; or the death penalty will be carried out on the person; or the person will be subjected to torture; or to cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment; or to degrading treatment or punishment. ‘Cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment’, ‘degrading treatment or punishment’, and ‘torture’, are further defined in s.5(1) of the Act.

25. There are certain circumstances in which there is taken not to be a real risk that an applicant will suffer significant harm in a country. These arise where it would be reasonable for the applicant to relocate to an area of the country where there would not be a real risk that the applicant will suffer significant harm; where the applicant could obtain, from an authority of the country, protection such that there would not be a real risk that the applicant will suffer significant harm; or where the real risk is one faced by the population of the country generally and is not faced by the applicant personally: s.36(2B) of the Act.

    Section 499 Ministerial Direction

26. In accordance with Ministerial Direction No.84, made under s.499 of the Act, the Tribunal has taken account of policy guidelines prepared by the Department of Home Affairs (the Department) - PAM3 Refugee and humanitarian - Complementary Protection Guidelines and PAM3 Refugee and humanitarian - Refugee Law Guidelines and any country information assessment prepared by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) expressly for protection status determination purposes, to the extent that they are relevant to the decision under consideration.

    Member of the same family unit

27. Subsections 36(2)(b) and (c) provide as an alternative criterion that the applicant is a non-citizen in Australia who is a member of the same family unit as a non-citizen mentioned in s.36(2)(a) or (aa) who holds a protection visa of the same class as that applied for by the applicant. Section 5(1) of the Act provides that one person is a ‘member of the same family unit’ as another if either is a member of the family unit of the other or each is a member of the family unit of a third person. Section 5(1) also provides that ‘member of the family unit’ of a person has the meaning given by the Regulations for the purposes of the definition. The expression is defined in r.1.12 of the Regulations to include spouse or de facto partner and dependent children.