1516600 (Refugee) - [2017] AATA 2683

1516600 (Refugee) [2017] AATA 2683 (21 September 2017)
DECISION RECORD
DIVISION:Migration & Refugee Division
CASE NUMBER:  1516600
COUNTRY OF REFERENCE:                  Ethiopia
MEMBER:Sophia Panagiotidis
DATE:21 September 2017
PLACE OF DECISION:  Melbourne
DECISION:The Tribunal remits the matter for reconsideration with the direction that the applicant satisfies s.36(2)(a) of the Migration Act.
Statement made on 21 September 2017 at 12:36pm

CATCHWORDS
Refugee – Protection visa – Ethiopia – Ethnicity – Tigrinya and Eritrean – Political opinion – Member of the Unity to Democracy and Justice Party (UDJ) and Ginbot 7 – Political dissident – Racial discrimination as Eritrean
LEGISLATION
Migration Act 1958, ss 36, 65, 91R, 499
Migration Regulations 1994, Schedule 2
CASES
Abebe v The Commonwealth (1999) 197 CLR 510
Any references appearing in square brackets indicate that information has been omitted from this decision pursuant to section 431 of the Migration Act 1958 and replaced with generic information which does not allow the identification of an applicant, or their relative or other dependant.
STATEMENT OF DECISION AND REASONS
APPLICATION FOR REVIEW

This is an application for review of a decision made by a delegate of the Minister for Immigration to refuse to grant the applicant a Protection visa under s.65 of the Migration Act 1958 (the Act).
The applicant, who claims to be a citizen of Ethiopia, applied for the visa [in] December 2013 and the delegate refused to grant the visa [in] November 2015.
The applicant appeared before the Tribunal on 17 May 2017 to give evidence and present arguments. The Tribunal hearing was conducted with the assistance of an interpreter in the Amharic and English languages.
The applicant was represented in relation to the review by her registered migration agent.
Background
The applicant is from Ethiopia and her ethnicity is Tigrinya and is also a Christian Orthodox. Her previous travel has been to [Country 1] from [September] 2012 to [November] 2012. She was previously employed by [Government ministry 1] as [Occupation 1].
The applicant was granted a student visa [in] order to attend [a program at a] University in [City 1]. The program was [program name]. She arrived in Australia [in] November 2013 and completed the program. Her student visa was in effect until [December] 2013. The applicant did not return to Ethiopia and has not departed Australia since her arrival. She lodged an application for a protection visa [in] December 2013.
The applicant's claims, in summary, are as follows:
·She left Ethiopia as her life was in danger and she fears imprisonment, harassment and death if she returns. She fears that different levels of the Ethiopian government will harm her due to her ethnicity and political opinion. She will not receive state protection
·Her family has experienced significant hardship and monitoring. Her father was a solider and was imprisoned by the Eritrean government during 1991 to 1993. He was convicted for political reasons in 1993 and sentenced to five years imprisonment in Ethiopia. After his release the family was subjected to ongoing monitoring and her father was sometimes taken in for questioning.
·The authorities were interested in her family because her mother is Eritrean but spent almost her entire life in Ethiopia. While her father was in prison in 1998 her mother was detained for one night by the government because she was Eritrean. Due to the civil war there is a lot of racism towards Eritreans in Ethiopia.
·The applicant was mistreated in many areas of her life including education and employment due to her family background. Her brother was involved in politics and has been shot by the Ethiopian authorities.
·The applicant had been attending Ginbot 7 meetings with her brother’s [friends]. These meetings were held under the false pretences that they were organised by the Unity for Democracy and Justice Party (UDJ). In 2009 she became a member of Ginbot 7 an outlawed political party. She became a more active member of the UDJ and Ginbot 7. She attended meetings, taking instructions from senior, attended inductions and tried to find ways to recruit more members and expand power in the country. She was a member of a secret cell made up of five people.
·She was actively campaigning for the UDJ as they were a legal party and prior to the elections she was arrested by the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) [between] April 2010 and [May] 2010 due to her involvement in mass protests. The authorities were unaware she was linked to Ginbot 7 at that time. During her detention she was physically and verbally abused and guards attempted to sexually assault her. When she was released she continued her work for the UDJ and Ginbot 7. She was motivated in her political work due to the harm she had experienced.
·She started work as [Occupation 1] with [Government ministry 1] in January 2011. She did not indicate to the Ministry which faction of the EPDRF she wished to join. When her seniors saw this their suspicions were heightened, especially given her family background and her past period of imprisonment and involvement with the UDJ. This also aroused suspicions of her involvement with Ginbot 7.
·She arrived in Australia in November [2013]. In December 2013 she received an email from her husband in Ethiopia telling her that one of the members of her cell, [Ms A] was a double agent. The other three members of her cell were arrested and are still in prison. Her husband discovered she was wanted by the authorities when they came to the family home looking for her. They searched her home and took laptops. They told her husband that they needed to question her.
·She is now fearful for her life as she is certain that her name has been blacklisted and she would be arrested at the airport if she returned. She would be treated much more harshly that her former cell members because she has left Ethiopia and not returned. The government will have determined that she is trying to evade them. Since she has worked for a government agency, this information will be available to the Ethiopian authorities.
·If she returns she fears she will be harmed or mistreated by the government because she is a political dissident. She has actively participated in anti-government organisations and campaigns and more importantly she is a member of Ginbot 7, a secret political party which is outlawed. Dissidents are treated harshly in Ethiopia. She has previously been detained, imprisoned and treated in a cruel, inhuman and degrading manner and believes this will happen again if she returns. She cannot relocate as government agents and connections are located all over the country. If she were to return she would again join Ginbot 7.
The applicant provided the Department with a statutory declaration dated [in] November 2014 in which she gives the following information:
·She was born in Harar City located in the Hararghe Province in the eastern part of Ethiopia.
·Her husband is in Ethiopia and they do not have children.
·Her parents live in Addis Ababa.
·Her father was a [soldier] in the Ethiopian army under the Halleselase and Derg regime and at the end of the civil war between Ethiopia and Eritrea in approximately 1991 he was captured and imprisoned by the Eritrean government for nearly two years and then released [in] January 1993 and returned to Ethiopia. In about August 1993 he was issued with a summons alleging he had taken part in anti-regime activities. He was later convicted for political reasons and sentenced to five years and he was released [in] August 1998. She is sure he was mistreated although he does not talk much about this period.
·After her father’s release the family was subjected to ongoing monitoring and surveillance and always in sight of government agents. Her father was also required to attend interviews with the authorities twice a year and sometimes on more occasions especially after social gatherings with his former military friends.
·Her mother is Eritrean but spent almost her entire life in Ethiopia. She was detained for one night because she was Eritrean while her father was imprisoned in 1998.she was released because her father’s relatives went to beg for this as she [had] young children and her husband was in prison.
·For these reasons, the applicant has never had a positive perception of the Ethiopian authorities. She has been mistreated in many areas of her life in education and employment due to her family’s background.
·During her university studies, in 2009 she joined an outlawed political party Ginbot 7. Her brother had already been involved in politics including in protests against the 2005 election results. She attended the Ginbot 7 meetings [with] his friends who knew about her family background and her views on the government. They formally asked her to join Ginbot 7 in 2009 and she agreed. The meetings were held secretly under the auspices of the UDJ party. She also became more active in the UDJ. She would attend meetings, take instructions, attend inductions and look to recruit more members for Ginbot 7. They were also preparing for the next election. Her cell included five [members]. The leader of the cell was [Mr B]. The Ginbot 7 structure is based on cells and each is autonomous of other cells. The members of each cell are unaware of the members of other cells. Each cell member is responsible for creating a further cell of four to five people. The aim to gain political dominance as they expand over time.
·The applicant was arrested [in] April 2010 and [in] May 2010 due to her involvement with the UDJ as she had participated in demonstrations and mass protests. The authorities were not aware that she was involved with Ginbot 7. During her detention she was physically and verbally abused and beaten. She was also sexually harassed by prison guards. Once she was released she continued with her political work as she had become even more against the regime.
·She started to look for work as [Occupation 1] in Ethiopia. Once a person obtains employment with the government they are required to fill out a lengthy form including political ideas. She was hired as [Occupation 1] at [Government ministry 1] in October 2011. While filling in her form she left out the section pertaining to political views and which faction of the EPRDF she wished to join. When her seniors saw this they became suspicious towards her and especially because of her family background and past imprisonment as well as her involvement with the UDJ. Her action also aroused suspicions regarding her involvement with Ginbot 7.
·She arrived in Australia in November [2013]. In early December 2013 she received a panicked email from her husband in Ethiopia who gold her that [Ms A] had been a double agent and her political activities and the other members of the cell were arrested and are still in prison. Her husband told her that she was wanted by the authorities and they came to their home to look for her and ransacked her home and took their laptops. Her husband told them she was not in Ethiopia. Her husband and was told they needed to question her and it was clear that it was because of her political involvement. They later discovered that the other three cell members had been detained and the identity of the informant.
·She is now fearful for her life and there is no way she can return home. She is certain that her name has been blacklisted and she would be arrested at the airport if she returned. She would be treated more harshly as she refused to return as they will already have determined she has been trying to evade them as she has not returned to her job and from Australia. Since she was exposed by [Ms A], her salary had stopped.
The Tribunal has also considered a submission made on 24 March 2015 to the Department (F99) in response to issues raised during the protection visa interview [in] March 2015. The Tribunal has taken particular note of this information as it is directly relevant to the applicant's claims:
(i)Unity for Democracy and Justice Party (UDJ letter)
·In relation to the concerns raised regarding the authenticity of the UDJ support letter provided by the applicant, she reiterates that she has not obtained this letter in a fraudulent manner and simply contacted her family requesting the letter. She was advised by her brother that the person who generally prepared these [letters] was not available at the time, hence the letter was written by another employee at the UDJ office. The applicant has little control over the drafting of the letter. Understanding her obligations to provide any evidence in support of her claims, the applicant made this letter available for the Department’s consideration.
(ii)Reports confirming the link between UDJ and Ginbot 7
·In relation to the delegate having been unable to locate country information confirming the link between the UDJ and Ginbot 7 as claimed by the applicant and whether Ginbot 7 was in fact active in Ethiopia, it is submitted that the applicant instructs that this organisation is a secret one that did not openly announce their own presence considering it is considered illegal by the Ethiopian government. All links are kept secret and if it was exposed that the UDJ supported Ginbot 7 members, it too would be guilty of participating in ‘illegal activities’ and subsequently also risk being banned. Reference is made to a recent article; Ethiopia charges 10 of links with Ginbot 7 movement today, dated 31 October 2014, published by De Birhan. This states that that ten people were arrested for having links to Ginbot 7 and some of those arrested were continuing with their Ginbot 7 activities while at the same time being members of legally registered opposition parties:
After four months of torture and arrest, the Ethiopian government prosecutors have today charged 10 people of links, membership and leadership with and in the Diaspora based opposition movement that is banned by the Ethiopian government, Ginbot 7. At least four among the 10 are prominent members and officials of Ethiopia based legally registered opposition parties. No person has been charged in absentia.
The 10 are charged under the file of Zelalem Workagenehu, a postgraduate university student. The list includes:
1.Zelalem Workagenhu – a postgraduate student of Addis Ababa University and a writer
2.Habtamu Ayalew – Public Relations Head of the Unity for Democracy and Justice Party (UDJ)
3.Daniel Shibeshi – Organisational Affairs Head of UDJ
4.Abraha Desta – Central Committee member of Arena Party and lecturer at Mekele University
5.Yeshiwas Assfea – Council member of Blue (Semayawi Party)
6.Yonatan Wolde
7.Abraham Solomon
8.Solomon Girma
9.Berhanu Degu
10.Tesfaye Teferi
The two main morals of the charges are one “working together with terrorist organisations” and “membership in Ginbot 7 and participation in criminal activities”. The first defendant Zelalem has been charged of being a leader of Ginbot 7 and recruiting members”. The 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th defendants have been charged of using legally registered opposition party as a cover to pursue the aims of Ginbot 7 and also using social media to contact Fasil Yenealem, whom the charge referred to as a member of the Movement and others.
The next appointment has been set for November 5, 2014 to decide if they should be given bail or not.
The defendants requested not to be returned to the notorious Meakelawi prison where they stayed for the past four months and the Court ordered that they can be moved to the Addis Abeba Prison (Sostegna).
De Birhan has learnt that the defendants’ families have been called over the past week to come and collect the belongings of the prisoners such as their electronic gadgets and other materials that were taken in police custody when they were detained.[1]
·In a topical note prepared by Landinfo on the Ginbot 7 party, dated 20 August 2012, detained information is provided regarding their activities within Ethiopia. It is submitted that the applicant possesses very detailed knowledge regarding the structure within which Ginbot 7 operates. The information by the Landinfo publication is consistent with the statements made by the applicant at her interview as well as her statutory declaration dated [in] November 2014:
THE PARTY’S ACTIVITIES IN ETHIOPIA
In a conversation with Landinfo in March 2011, party leader Berhanu Nega said that G7 has a widespread, secret party network in Ethiopia. He said that the party is organised in a cell structure and is active throughout Ethiopia. The cells are autonomous and each cell consists of four to five people.
Another central G7 leader (conversation in Oslo February 2012) has described the organisation as quatero (Amharic for cell system). According to this G7 leader, the cells are found in all universities and colleges in Ethiopia, and this cell organisation was reportedly presented on Ethiopian TV in 2011 in a news broadcast in which the government asked Ethiopian to be vigilant for such activity.
…
Information on G7's ideas and organisation are available in Ethiopia. This especially applies in urban, academic environments where there is access to Internet and satellite TV. Meanwhile, the restrictions the government wants to put on oppositional political activity, and especially on illegal political groups, are so extensive that any organised activity would be difficult to track. Neither the Ethiopian government nor G7 can be considered reliable sources for the presence of a widespread G7 cell structure in Ethiopia.
[1] De Birhan (news and analysis media Horn of Africa), Ethiopia charges 10 of links with Ginbot 7 movement today, 31 October 2014
·The Topical Note goes on to confirm the arrest of many UDJ members on suspicion of being involved with Ginbot 7 which therefore confirms that the Ethiopian authorities themselves are to some extent aware of the relationship between UDJ and Ginbot 7:
6.2.1 Arrests in Ethiopia
On 14 September 2011, the journalist Eskinder Nega and the opposition politicians Andualem Arage, Nathanial Mekonnen, Asaminew Berhanu and Zemene Molla were arrested in Addis Abeba. Andualem, Nathanial and Asaminew15 have prominent positions in the opposition coalition Unity for Democracy and Justice (UDJ)16, while Zemene is the Secretary-General of the Ethiopian National Democratic Party (ENDP).17 The four were arrested on the basis of suspicion of participation in G7 (Amnesty International 2011, p. 9). According to a well-informed Ethiopian dissident (meeting in Oslo February 2012), none of those arrested were connected to G7.
In addition to these four, Yeshewale Yehunalem (member of UDJ), Mitiku Damte (member of UDJ in Desse), Yohannes Terefe (unknown background) and Andualem Ayalew were arrested. Andualem was abducted in Sudan, according to a well-informed diplomatic source (1) Landinfo spoke with in Ethiopia in March 2012. Andualem allegedly had a list of other G7 members. It is unclear why Yeshewale, Mitiku and Yohannes were arrested and what relation they had to G7.
On 10 November 2011, all eight of these people were accused of violating a number of provisions in the anti-terrorism law (Anti-Terrorism Proclamation).
6.2.2 Charges against 16 people in exile
In addition to the eight already mentioned, 16 exiled Ethiopians were charged in the same case (Andualem Arage et al.) in absentia (see attachment 8.1). Four of these are G7 leaders (Andargachew Tsige, Berhanu Nega, Efrem Madebo and Mesfin Aman), while one (Colonel Alebel Amare) is a member of the Amhara Democratic Force Movement (an armed opposition movement in exile).
According to Amnesty International (2011, p. 19), three of the accused in exile have unknown political affiliation: Desalegn Arage Wale, Wube Robe and Elias Molla. However, a well-informed Ethiopian dissident Landinfo met in February 2012 explained that Desalegn and Elias represented ENDP and not G7. The source also said that the G7 leadership in exile gave orders to G7 members in Ethiopia to support ENDP in the country. According to the same source, Alebel Amare reportedly had meetings with G7 outside Ethiopia, but did not belong to the organisation himself. According to the source, Wube Robe was a pseudonym.
There are also five journalists amongst the accused in exile (Fasil Yenealem18, Abebe Belaw19, Abebe Gelaw20, Mesfin Negash21 and Abiye Teklemariam22), one human rights activist (Obang Metho), one political leader (Zelelie Tsegaselassie23) and the leader of Ethiopian Satellite Television (ESAT) (Neamen Zeleke).
…
6.2.5 The basis for the arrest
It is uncertain what the basis for the arrests in the Ginbot 7 case was. Several of those arrested are affiliated with the opposition party UDJ. EPRDF made a clear warning to UDJ in March 2011 that members of the party were conducting "illegal activities under the guise of legal opposition," and that the government was following them closely and was going to crack down on them (Western diplomatic source, e-mail September 2011). This can be understood as an indirect reference to G7. Both G7 and UDJ have roots in CUD (Qinijit) and recruit members from the same environments. UDJ is different from G7 in being a legal political party which recognises the constitution and places candidates in elections. According to a Western diplomatic source (e-mail December 2011), the government has presented examples of opposition politicians who formerly advocated a peaceful line, now having contact with G7. In connection with the arrests, the federal police in Ethiopia said that they had proof that the accused were connected to what they referred to as G7's terrorist plans (Tekle 2011).[2]
[2] Landinfo, Country of Origin Information Centre, Topical Note – Ethiopia: the Ginbot 7 Party, 20 August 2012, (citations omitted)
·The applicant has raised claims of being monitored by the Ethiopian authorities and according to a report by Human Rights Watch, They know everything we do, which reports that those with opposition political parties are often said to be monitored by the authorities. Furthermore, the following excerpt indicates that individuals may face targeting on account of their ethnicity and/or political connections. The applicant has claimed that her family was monitored on account of her father’s employment history as well as because of her Eritrean descent:
Former intelligence officials told Human Rights Watch that prominent individuals suspected of being connected with opposition political parties and armed movements, especially Ginbot 7 and the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), are frequently the focus of targeted telecom surveillance. Intelligence officials also said that officials from registered political parties including the Union for Democracy and Justice (UDJ) are also frequent targets of surveillance. The security services may also target individuals due to their ethnicity or family connections, irrespective of whether they belong to a banned organization.[3]
[3] Human Rights Watch, They know everything we do, 25 March 2014,
·In July 2014, bloggers and journalists were arrested by the Ethiopian government under terrorism laws for their suspected ties to Ginbot 7. A report by Article 19, Terrorism charges against Zone 9 Bloggers and journalists must be dropped, is evidence that Ginbot 7 continues to operate in Ethiopia and the government is aware of this:
The Ethiopian government has charged seven bloggers and three journalists under the seriously flawed Anti-Terrorism Proclamation (652/2009), the latest move aimed at curtailing dissent in the country. Nine of the accused bloggers and journalists have been held at Maekelawi detention centre for 83 days with limited access to legal representation or visits by their family members.
The arrests of the bloggers and journalists followed two days after Zone 9, an independent collective of bloggers who use social media to campaign against political repression, announced their return to activism.
“Since the Anti-Terrorism Proclamation was enacted in 2009, it has been used to prosecute 22 journalists and bloggers. This law contains unacceptably broad definitions for ‘terrorist acts’ and grants the government almost unlimited powers to spy on and harass human rights defenders,” said Henry Maina, ARTICLE 19 Eastern Africa Director.
“The Zone 9 bloggers and journalists must be released and the charges against them dropped. This case demonstrates why the Anti-Terrorism Proclamation must be repealed urgently,” Maina added.
The seven bloggers; Soliana Shimelis (charged in absentia), Atnaf Berahane, Mahlet Fantahun, Natnael Feleke, Befeqadu Hailu, Zelalem Kiberet, Abel Wabela, and three journalists; Edom Kassaye, Tesfalem Weldeyes and Asmamaw Hailegorgis of Addis Guday magazine were accused of plotting to incite violence in cooperation with two organisations branded as terrorist networks: ‘Ginbot 7’ and ‘Oromo Liberation Front’ (OLF). The Zone 9 bloggers and journalists deny any association with these groups.
Soliana is accused of being the founder of Zone 9. According to the charges, she has been coordinating Zone 9’s foreign communications and taking orders directly from Ginbot 7. She is also accused of organising a ‘Security in a Box’ training for the Zone 9 group.
“It is baffling that the bloggers and journalists have been charged for undertaking a training using ‘security in a box’. This is an open source software widely respected for assisting human rights defenders and journalists to protect their anonymity and maintain the privacy of their communications from illegal government snooping. Encryption is part and parcel of the right to freedom of expression and the right to privacy” added Maina.
The UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression has criticised countries for undermining the use of privacy-enhancing tools to protect online communications. In his 2013 report to the UN Human Rights Council, the Special Rapporteur stressed that “individuals should be free to use whatever technology they choose to secure their communications.”
Befaqadu is accused of organising the group locally and assigning responsibilities to the members. He is also accused of creating contact with Ginbot 7 and OLF. Natnael Feleke was also said to have locally organised the group, assigned roles to members, communicated with Ginbot 7 and allegedly received and distributed 48,000 birr ($2432) to other members for the purpose of organising violence. The rest of the defendants are accused of being members of Zone 9 or working with them, taking orders and strategies from Ginbot 7 and OLF, creating local and foreign contacts, taking part in organising the crimes, and planning and organizing to incite violence. According to the charges all the defendants are said to have confessed to having plans to overthrow the government through violence and have been working accordingly since 2012. These charges are denied by the group.[4]
[4] Article 19, Terrorism charges against Zone 9 Bloggers and journalists must be dropped, 18July 2014,
·It is submitted that it is evident based on the above reports, which are a short selection of a myriad of credible information available on-line, that there are reported to be ties between UDJ members and Ginbot 7. Furthermore, it is submitted that the ongoing arrest of Ginbot 7 members in Ethiopia verifies the group’s existence in the country.
(iii)The applicant's departure from Ethiopia
·It was put to he applicant that the fact she was able to secure a job with [Government ministry 1], issued with a passport and permitted to leave the country, is not consistent with her claims that she was under surveillance. The applicant acknowledges it is very difficult to secure a government job in Ethiopia however the recruitment process in [Government ministry 1] differed to that of other government departments. Every year, [Government ministry 1] would take [course] graduates and there are roughly 30 graduates every year and most students are based in Addis Ababa where they obtain the relevant education. The applicant instructs this it is not part of the initial hiring process to ask an individual about their political opinions. After an individual is accepted and during the stages of filling in additional paperwork, it is then that the individual’s political opinions, especially regarding their support of the government can be exposed. It is submitted that given legally registered opposition political parties are able to operate in Ethiopia, the mere fact that the applicant was not willing to become a member of the government’s party did not automatically raise warning signals she was a member of Ginbot 7.
·In terms of the applicant's passport, this was issued in early 2011, prior to the applicant's known involvement with Ginbot 7. It is submitted that given the UDJ was a legally registered party, its members could not be denied a passport on the basis of their political ties to the UDJ.
·The applicant travelled to Australia for study in November 2013 and she reiterates that she was permitted to do so because at that point she was not identified as a Ginbot 7 member. It was in December 2013 that she was informed by her husband that one of her colleagues [Ms A] turned out to be a government spy. It is noted that the country information indicates that the Ethiopian authorities have strong intelligence networks in the country and therefore the applicant's regarding [Ms A] are most certainly plausible.
(iv)The applicant's activities in Australia
·The applicant has embraced the political freedom available in Australia and has actively participated in political events organised by the Ethiopian community in Australia. She has been attending political meetings on a regular basis and has also come into contact with Ginbot 7 coordinators in [Australian City 1] and hopes to continue her involvement with the group. She has been unable to produce a support letter from the main office as she has been advised that it is their policy that she be a donating member of the group for more than 12 months.
·The applicant has attended the following events in Australia:
·[July] 2014 – a demonstration held at the British Consulate in [City 1] urging the British government to use diplomatic channels to free Andargachew Tsige as he is a British-Ethiopian dual national. He is a pro-democracy human rights advocate and also Secretary-General of Ginbot 7.
·[July] 2014 – a meeting organised by the [City 1] Ginbot 7 committee about human rights problems in Ethiopia such as freedom of expression and association which has led to the arrest, detention, politically motivated trials harassment and intimidation of opposition party members and journalists.
·[August] 2014 – a demonstration celebrating [details deleted].
·[February] 2015 – a demonstration to celebrate Andargachew Tsige’s birthday and to protest his imprisonment in Ethiopia.
·The applicant advises that Ginbot 7 and Arbegnoch, two anti-Ethiopian government regime political parties have now merged and are known as Arbegnoch-G7.
(v)The applicant’s membership of Ginbot 7
·The applicant has provided highly detailed and corroborative information in her statutory declaration and during the protection visa interview regarding the structure and workings of Ginbot 7. She currently does not possess any evidence to demonstrate she was a member of Ginbot 7 in Ethiopia given that purposeful attempts were made by Ginbot 7 to conceal the identity of its members. Hence, membership cards or other documents specifically referring to Ginbot 7 were not published.
·It is submitted that if the applicant were to return to Ethiopia, given her past political history, there is no doubt that she would resume her activities with opposition political parties and Ginbot 7. She has attended political demonstrations in Australia and is a staunch supporter of promoting human rights and better government accountability in Ethiopia. Having experienced freedom of political expression in Australia, the applicant would not be able to readjust to having to express her political onions in a secret sphere.
·Reference was made to a previous decision by the Refugee Review Tribunal where it accepted that low level members of political parties such as the G7 may be subjected to arrest and serious harm. (1316355 [2014] RRTA 188 (28 February 2014):
The Tribunal accepts that the applicant's political views are genuinely held and that she will continue to express them and participate in anti-government demonstrations and propaganda if she returns to Ethiopia. As referred to in the country information set out above, the Ethiopian Government continues to arrest and imprison political opponents and ordinary citizens who demonstrate or criticise the government. The Tribunal accepts there is a real chance the applicant's political opinion and activities would again bring her to the adverse attention of the Ethiopian authorities, and that she would again be arrested, imprisoned, and physically mistreated by the authorities.
·The applicant has provided a support letter dated [in] March 2015 from [Association 1].

The Tribunal has considered material provided to the Department [in] March 2015 which included a letter from the UDJ dated [in] April 2006, an email from the applicant's sister dated [in] December 2013, photographs, information about Ginbot 7, a letter from [Association 1] dated [in] March 2015, a certified translations of the UDJ Party membership card for 2014 and a certified translation of an email from the applicant's husband dated [in] December 2013.
The applicant provided the Tribunal with the following additional evidence:
·     A submission from the applicant's representative received by the Tribunal on 15 May 2017.
·     A letter from [a named person], Patriotic Ginbot 7 Movement for Unity and Democracy, ([Country 2]) dated [in] May 2017 who provides information about the organisation and references country information as to the current political situation in Ethiopia from a range of sources. He also states that the applicant is a member and actively engaged in activities, such as attending meetings, demonstrations, fund raising events for the prevalence of democracy in Ethiopia. She has also made membership contributions. He states that any individual suspected to have connection with this organisation faces persecution and harsh punishment which can range from lifelong imprisonment to a death penalty. The applicant's case should be seen within the ever-worsening oppressive realities in Ethiopia, particularly on members and supporters within this Patriotic Ginbot 7 movement. He states that the Ethiopian government has spies who actively operate in Australia through its embassy and outposts to target dissidents. As the applicant has participated in demonstrations against the government, they have no doubt that she will be spotted and reported by the regime’s spy networks. He states that Patriotic Ginbot 7 has no doubt that if Australia forces the applicant to return to Ethiopia she will gravely suffer in the hands of the agents of the repressive regime that has spent millions of dollars spying on individuals who have any sympathy for or affiliation with their organisation. He states it is out of their serious concern for the applicant's life, wellbeing, safety and liberty that he strongly requests the Australian authorities to consider her asylum case positively and provide her with protection.
·     A statutory declaration from [Mr C], dated [in] June 2017. He states he is the founder of the [City 1] branch of Ginbot 7 which was founded [in] January 2010 when Dr Berhanu, the leader of Ginbot 7 held a public meeting. He states he is [a senior official] of Patriotic Ginbot 7 and head of members’ affairs of [City 1] and responsible for the overall activity of the movement in [City 1]. [Mr C] has also given an outline of the [City 1] organisation. He states he first met the applicant in September 2014 at [a] public meeting organised by [City 1] Ginbot 7 and since then she has been a registered supporter. He states that it took a year of “surveying” the applicant for him to be certain she was fit for membership and she became a full member in January 2016. He states he has observed her commitment to the movement by her willingness to sell [goods] and participate in fundraising activities and she also makes monthly financial contributions to Patriotic Ginbot 7. She attends cell meetings and participates in these and has done so since 2016. The applicant recently worked on an organising committee from February 2017 to April 2017 which was for the purposes of calling a public meeting on 27 April 2017. The applicant asked him for a support letter and he therefore sent all the necessary information to the head office and they were able to send the letter to her lawyer. He states that if the applicant was to return to Ethiopia she would be arrested or killed by the regime because she is a member of Patriotic Ginbot 7. There is a strong surveillance operation by the Ethiopian government in [City 1] because the diaspora is very strongly opposing them. He believes that the applicant's activities will be known to the Ethiopian government. He states that neither he nor his family have returned to Ethiopia for the past 11 years because of fear of the government. The government has labelled Patriotic Ginbot 7 as a number one enemy of the state/system just because it is the strongest opposition group among opposition groups. The government has declared Patriotic Ginbot 7 a terrorist organisation and they have been punishing journalists, human rights activists and members and supporters of opposition groups under the so-called anti-terrorism law.
·     A submission by the applicant's representative received on 14 June 2017 who states that the statement from [Mr C] signifies that the letter of support provided by the applicant namely the Patriotic Ginbot 7 movement letter dated [in] May 2017 has been requested by him pursuant to a formal process. He has indicated the formal process for support letters to ensure they are only issued to legitimate members and supporters of the organisation. It is submitted that the presence of such a process adds to the legitimacy of the support letter and therefore it is clear it provides categorical evidence of the applicant's membership of that organisation. It is submitted that in light of the totality of the evidence it is abundantly evident that the applicant attends public functions which indicate she is not supportive of the Ethiopian regime. It was also submitted that opposing groups need to act covertly in Ethiopia and therefore it is conceivable the applicant does not have a lot of corroborating evidence with respect to her political involvement in Ethiopia. In light of the overall consistent nature of the applicant's evidence it is submitted she should be afforded the benefit of the doubt that she was politically active in Ethiopia and details of her activities were provided to the Ethiopian authorities. It was further submitted that country information raised during the hearing that there are many returnees to Ethiopia, this information was not relevant to the applicant given her specific profile emanating from her political activism both in Ethiopia and Australia. Reference was made to the April 2016 DFAT report[5] that assesses that people who openly criticise the government while they are outside Ethiopia face a high risk that the authorities would be aware of these activities and may take action against these people upon their return and furthermore, credible country information notes that the Ethiopian government is effective in its surveillance efforts abroad.[6]
[5] [5] Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, DFAT Country Information Report Ethiopia, 1 April 2016
[6] F Horne, How Ethiopia Spies on its Diaspora in Europe, Human Rights Watch, 1 April 2014,
The hearing
The applicant was asked to confirm when and where she was born. She told the Tribunal she is [age] years old and was born in Ethiopia. She was raised in Addis Ababa. She said her mother had been an Ethiopian citizen but this was taken away and not restored. She has an identity card but continues not to have citizenship of Ethiopia. The applicant confirmed her ethnicity is Eritrean and Tigray. She also confirmed she does not have a right to citizenship in Eritrea as she was not born there. She confirmed she is an Orthodox Christian.
The applicant was asked about her education and employment in Ethiopia. She said she has a [degree] which was awarded in 2010 by [a university]. She was also awarded a fellowship in Australia in 2013 at [an Australian ] University. She was employed by [Government ministry 1] from October 2011 to [November] 2013 as [Occupation 1]. She is currently studying towards becoming a [different occupation] and is in her second year of study.
The applicant was asked about her family composition, their occupation and whereabouts. She said her father is in management and [in a certain field] and works in Addis Ababa. Her mother is at home. Her sister completed college and now works in [the private sector] as [an occupation] and her brother works in [another field] in a private business. He also finished college. Her [other] sister had a job in the government sector but is not employed at the moments. She does not know why she lost her job. She married her husband in November 2012 and his ethnicity is Amhara and Oromo. He is [in a profession] and works at a private [workplace]. They do not have any children. She said she has no family in Australia.
The applicant was asked about her previous travel and she confirmed she had previously travelled to [Country 1] from September to November 2012 to attend training in her field of [study].
The applicant confirmed she arrived in Australia [in] November 2013 and she travelled alone. She did not intend to remain in Australia when she came but to complete the fellowship at [an Australian] University. In Ethiopia she lives with her husband and his family and they all expected her to return home after she completed her study. She did not know anyone in Australia but she met someone in [City 1] who helped her get in touch with members of the Ethiopian community when she found she could not return home. She calls her husband and her family using different telephones because it is not safe for them.
The Tribunal noted that the applicant's Ethiopian passport had expired [in] 2016 and asked her if she attempted renew it. She said she had not as she had allied for protection.
The applicant was asked who helped her with the protection visa application. She said she obtained advice and help from members of the Ethiopian community. She agrees with the contents of her application and has nothing to add.
The applicant was asked if her husband shares her political views. She said he does and contributing financially to both the UDJ and Ginbot 7. However he is not actively involved. He was aware of her political activities.
The applicant was asked if her husband had experienced any problems with the authorities after she left Ethiopia. The applicant said that her husband told her that the police came to their home two times and took him away and he was questioned about her and her activities both in Ethiopia and in Australia. She said he is afraid and he thinks he is being watched.
The applicant was asked about her brother who she claims was politically active. She said he was involved in political activities when he was at university. This was especially in 2005 when there was the election campaign and there were massive demonstrations after the results were released. He was a member of the CUD but he is no longer a member of that party but still involved in politics. He has become a supporter of the Blue Party. When he was at university he was shot [during] the demonstration and there was a lot of violence, especially on his campus. Many people died during those demonstrations. Her brother influenced her a lot in terms of her politics. The whole family knew about her involvement in the UDJ party as well as Ginbot 7.
The applicant was asked by she joined the UDJ party in particular. She said she did so because it is a strong party and they have a large membership and a good chance of winning a fair election. The party has a good democratic structure and good ideology which she agrees with. They also believe in peaceful means of gaining government. Their philosophy is about unity and to bring tribes together not being divisive or discriminatory. She explained that Ginbot 7 is different as they also believe in armed struggle. Firstly they believe in democracy and free and fair elections but if this cannot be achieved, they are prepared to use violence and force to remove the government and establish a transitional government through a coalition of parties and non-government organisations. That is why they are not formally in the country as it is impossible to gain government in the present time. She agrees with this approach. She said there are spies everywhere in and outside the country. She has noticed and heard that after demonstrations or meetings here in [City 1], family members of genuine supporters of Ginbot 7 are being arrested in Ethiopia. She knows that activities of Ginbot 7 and any other anti-government activities overseas are reported on the radio and an internet newsletter and the Ethiopian government monitors these as well. The applicant said she found out about people’s family members being arrested after the demonstration in August 2016. It is risky attending these and she is conscious of this but she is in a free country and she wants her government and others to see this is the right way of doing this. She wants to see a free Ethiopia. She is now taking more care when she attends after having heard of the consequences and is not attending public meetings without covering her face.
The applicant was asked if the UDJ have a presence in Australia and if so what her involvement is with this party. The applicant said they do not have a formal presence in Australia.
The applicant indicated she was hoping that [Mr C] would be able to attend the hearing and give evidence but was unable to do so due to other commitments. He is the leader of Ginbot 7 in [City 1]. She indicated that he has obtained a letter of support and first had to contact the head office in [Country 2] as there is a process to ensure that such letters are given to those who are genuine members. The letter she has provided is from [a named person] who is in the head office of Ginbot 7 in [Country 2].
The applicant was asked if either of them have any actual knowledge of her membership of Ginbot 7 in Ethiopia. The Tribunal was told that the evidence they are giving is essentially that the applicant is involved in and participating in Ginbot 7 activities in Australia. The Tribunal was told that she became involved with Ginbot 7 in 2015 and has been attending meetings and demonstrations. From January 2016, the applicant has become a financial member. Although the applicant attended activities in 2014 and was receiving texts and messages, she was not a member at that time. She was attending as a general member of the Ethiopian community. At that time she was settling in and familiarising herself with her new country and with the Ethiopian community and was informing herself what was happening politically. The applicant has provided photos of herself at a demonstration in 2016 which was arranged by Ginbot 7 together with a coalition of other parties and this event was generally about the abuse of human rights in Ethiopia.
The applicant was asked to explain about the links between the UDJ party and Ginbot 7 and how she became aware of these. She said that at university she found out about the links through her brother’s friends and she became interested in finding out more. She was introduced to the coordinator of their cell by her brother’s friends and found there were official members of the UDJ who were also secret members of Ginbot 7. Her brother’s friends had their own cell and as she understands it, each cell has a coordinator. The coordinator of her cell was [Mr B] and he introduced her to the other members. They would meet every 3 or 4 weeks at UDJ offices. They also met at other locations from 2009 to 2013. She remained in the same cell with the same people. During the meetings they organised to collect monthly fees and recruit members and they also distributed information especially for the UDJ party as well as other activities for the party. The way the recruitment works is to speak to people, friends, acquaintances and get to know them and their background and talk to others about them. Gradually they wold speak about politics and once they got to know them and felt they were trustworthy they would give them information and slowly introduce the topic of Ginbot 7. It was a long process. She managed to recruit someone from her work who she had known for three years. They had discussions over that time and she found he was interested in the same issues she was and they talked. He was invited to join the UDJ and over time he was introduced to Ginbot 7. He was then recruited to another cell and the whole process of recruiting him took six or seven months.
The applicant discussed the present situation in her country regarding the deterioration of the political environment, the state of emergency and her fears for her family. She also described her recruitment efforts and fund raising as well as the instructions received by her cell to develop relationships with a range of organisations in order to pass on information and to grow Ginbot 7 internally in the country. Their role essentially as explained by the applicant was encourage internal dissent and to promote and raise awareness of other options in order to lead to the overthrow the government. She explained that in the present environment, no other parties will ever win government. Therefore the process she and other members of the Ginbot 7 cell undertook was very important to effect change in her country and she said this is why Ginbot 7 is different from other organisations.
The applicant explained that at the protection visa interview she was not happy with the interpreter and her answers were limited and short. She was unable to clearly explain and was dissatisfied with the answers the interpreter was giving, so she stopped the interpreter and she tried to explain directly with the case officer but she was unable to express herself satisfactorily. She tried to explain that her situation and that of her family and her background was such that she has grown up with a lack of respect by the authorities and the discrimination she has faced has led to the formation of her political opinion. She said that the treatment of the authorities faced by her father, the discrimination faced by her mother have influenced her. She said that overall she and members of her family have not been treated well because her family name is associated with the Eritrean ethnic group and such ill treatment is widespread. Her identity card shows her ethnicity as Tigray and her mother’s name is included which is an Eritrean name. This led to her fearing to approach government agencies and there were always delays when she did so. The applicant explained when a person applies for something through a government department in Ethiopia there are always delays, such as applying for a driver’s licence. Her application was not actioned for a long time and when she continually enquired about the process of the application she was not given satisfactory answers. It took two years to get her licence. She was told there was a long waiting list but she knows that it should take no more than three to six months. She believes this delay was due to her ethnicity and her name and in the end she had to pay a bribe equal to $[amount] to get her licence. These types of situations are common for people from her background.
The applicant was asked to describe her access to education. She said she attended a public school and fees were payable. She attended a government secondary school and did not have to pay fees. She managed to win a place at university due to her academic achievements and she did not have to pay fees. The applicant said she graduated as [Occupation 1] and there is a shortage of these in the country. The government makes it a policy to employ graduates. Each year there are 35 [course] graduates and the policy by [Government ministry 1] is to employ them. She worked in the [deleted] department in [Government ministry 1]. This department is responsible for issuing licences for [conducting work and] research and surveys. [Details deleted]. She was responsible for evaluating proposals by [the] companies and if satisfied she would grant the licence. She worked in a [team]. She wanted to be in [another section] which is run jointly by the government and non-government organisations but they were not recruiting. She agreed with the delegate’s assessment that generally it is difficult for someone of her background to get a job in a government department but she was fortunate in her profession and the fact there are shortages.

The Tribunal referred to country information including that from the International Crisis Group and other sources that indicates that membership with the EPRDF is a precondition for employment with any government agency. She said she does not disagree with this information but things have changed a little and due to a shortage in some professions people who are not members of the EPRDF are employed.
The applicant explained that when she started work she had to complete a form which contained questions about political affiliations and she had to indicate if she was willing to become a member of the government party. She left this blank and because of this she thinks her employers were suspicious that she was not affiliated or supportive of the government. She said there were spies in the department she worked in who would inform senior management about discussions and conversations among the staff. It was common knowledge who in the staff was an informer. She said that her employers would have assumed since she did not complete the question about her political affiliations she belonged to an opposition party not that she was apolitical. Not all staff are monitored in the workplace if their affiliations to the government are considered sound.
The applicant said it is every citizen’s right to pursue an education if they have the ability. Her sister [is an Occupation 2] and she was recruited to [a government] [department]. The country needs a lot of man power to develop and therefore there is a high need for graduates. Her sister has a [a postgraduate qualification] and worked as [Occupation 2]. She also did not complete her form.
The applicant said that the delegate inappropriately related her having obtained an education and employment to impute her political opinion. This was an error.
The applicant was asked to explain about her arrest in 2010. She said she was at home when she was arrested. The authorities came to her house and arrested her because of her extreme activities in the campaign for UDJ. The reason for her arrest as well as others from various opposition parties was to restrict the extent of the opposition to the government. They arrested many people from opposition parties but especially members of the UDJ because of their large membership and because of all the parties they had a good chance of winning the election. She said she was taken to a prison and was questioned many times and asked the same questions about the same thing over and over again. These concerned her activities for the party. She gave the same answers that she was allowed to campaign under the constitution. She was kept in a cell and questioned twice day. She said that at the time, there had been a lot of scrutiny by international media and she thinks that is why they were released. While she was detained she was not allowed to see her family and fed bread. During the interrogations, she was physically pushed and verbally abused. She was questioned by the same man repeatedly. She said that senior leaders of political opposition parties were also arrested.
The applicant was asked how she was approved for the [program] if the authorities knew she was not a supporter of the government. She said she applied because she wanted the scholarship for her professional development. As far as she is aware she is the only one who applied for that particular scholarship as it is highly targeted to her profession and she was successful. The government could not refuse her permission to go if they wanted to save face.
The applicant was asked why her salary was stopped as it can be inferred it was stopped because she did not return to Ethiopia not for any other reason. The applicant said she was paid in November 2013 and then her payment was suspended in December before she was due to return. She said her salary was stopped because of the information discovered about her membership of Ginbot 7 and before she was due to return.
The applicant said that since coming to Australia she has attended three public demonstrations in Australia since 2014 to 2016. One of these was a protest to free the UDJ general secretary who had been arrested. In April 2017 she attended a conference and fundraising event for Ginbot 7. It was held at a community centre in [a location]. There were many people in attendance as there was a speaker, Ephraim Madebo who is a freedom fighter and a leader with Ginbot 7 and who is currently located on borders with Eritrea.
The applicant was asked what she believes would happen if she were to return to Ethiopia. She said she would be arrested at the airport and detained. She will be imprisoned for a long time because of her membership of Ginbot 7 as it is considered a terrorist organisation.
CONSIDERATION OF CLAIMS AND EVIDENCE
The criteria for a protection visa are set out in s.36 of the Act and Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (the Regulations). An applicant for the visa must meet one of the alternative criteria in s.36(2)(a), (aa), (b), or (c). That is, the applicant is either a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under the ‘refugee’ criterion, or on other ‘complementary protection’ grounds, or is a member of the same family unit as such a person and that person holds a protection visa of the same class.
Section 36(2)(a) provides that a criterion for a protection visa is that the applicant for the visa is a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations under the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees as amended by the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees (together, the Refugees Convention, or the Convention).
Australia is a party to the Refugees Convention and generally speaking, has protection obligations in respect of people who are refugees as defined in Article 1 of the Convention. Article 1A(2) relevantly defines a refugee as any person who:
owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.
If a person is found not to meet the refugee criterion in s.36(2)(a), he or she may nevertheless meet the criteria for the grant of a protection visa if he or she is a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the Minister has substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the applicant being removed from Australia to a receiving country, there is a real risk that he or she will suffer significant harm: s.36(2)(aa) (‘the complementary protection criterion’).
In accordance with Ministerial Direction No.56, made under s.499 of the Act, the Tribunal is required to take account of policy guidelines prepared by the Department of Immigration –PAM3 Refugee and humanitarian - Complementary Protection Guidelines and PAM3 Refugee and humanitarian - Refugee Law Guidelines – and any country information assessment prepared by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade expressly for protection status determination purposes, to the extent that they are relevant to the decision under consideration.
The issue in this case is whether Australia has protection obligations in respect of the applicant.
For the following reasons, the Tribunal has concluded that the matter should be remitted for reconsideration.
Country of reference
Based on the applicants’ passports and other identity documents which were provided to the Department, and the applicants’ evidence, the Tribunal finds that the applicant is an Ethiopian national and the Tribunal has assessed her claims against that country for the purposes of s.36(2)(a).
On the evidence before it, the Tribunal finds that the applicant does not have the right to enter and reside in any third country.
Assessment of the evidence and findings
One of the fundamental principles of protection claims assessment is that applicants ought to be given the benefit of the doubt. The UNHCR Handbook states:[7]
“ After the applicant has made a genuine effort to substantiate his story there may still be a lack of evidence for some of his statements. […] It is hardly possible for a refugee to ‘prove’ every part of his case and, indeed, if this were a requirement the majority of refugees would not be recognized. It is therefore frequently necessary to give the applicant the benefit of the doubt.”
[7] UNHCR Handbook, paragraph 203.
The principle recognises that an applicant’s life and/or integrity may be put at grave risk if international protection is wrongfully declined.[8]
[8] “Beyond Proof: Credibility Assessment in EU Asylum System”, UNHCR, May 2013, accessed at on 23 June 2017.
Decision makers from time to time use the so-called domino effect in relation to credibility assessment, that is, they reject one aspect of an applicant’s case and proceed from there to conclude that because one fact (whether material or not to the issues in the case) which is being asserted by the applicant is not true, therefore none of the applicant’s claims are true.
The Tribunal noted that the delegate had a number of concerns about the applicant's claims and evidence and during the hearing the Tribunal discussed these in great detail and asked the applicant for her comments. These are discussed further below. The applicant has provided a great deal of information for consideration that was not before the delegate and has considered these in some detail as well. Further, in reaching its conclusions, the Tribunal has noted the country information referred to by the delegate, the applicant and its own sources (see attached).
Ethnicity
The applicant has claimed that she is at risk of harm in relation to her Tigray and Eritrean ethnicity and has claimed that her mother was arrested because of her Eritrean background. She has also claimed that at the end of the civil war between Eritrea and Ethiopia in about 1991, her father was captured and imprisoned for two years by the Eritrean government. On his release he was imprisoned by the Ethiopian government for a further five years. After this the applicant has claimed that her family was subjected to ongoing monitoring and her father was at times taken in for questioning. The Tribunal understands that these events took place at a particularly volatile time politically in Ethiopia where many people in her mother’s and father’s position were targeted because of their ethnicity and in her father’s case as a former prisoner of war by the Eritreans and therefore considered to be suspect. The Tribunal accepts her evidence and has considered country information and discussed this with the applicant. The Tribunal accepts that people of Eritrean or mixed Eritrean ethnicity may be of interest to the Ethiopian authorities; however this would be in the context of any ongoing anti-government activity which may bring them to their attention, not simply on the basis of ethnicity itself.
In line with the country information the Tribunal does not accept there is a real risk of harm for this reason alone. The country information indicates that having Tigray ethnicity has in the past been an advantage for some. The Tribunal also accepts that if a person who is of Tigrinya ethnicity and is associated with an opposition party, this may bring them to the attention of the authorities, but this of itself is not an indicator for being targeted.
Political opinion
The applicant has described the evolution which has led to her political opinion, including her anti-government opinion and the injustices she sees in the current political situation in Ethiopia. The Tribunal accepts that her political opinion has been influenced by the events experienced by her mother and father and the stigma she has felt due to her ethnicity, particularly her Eritrean ethnicity. The Tribunal accepts that people who have Eritrean ethnicity have been targeted in the past and it is plausible that the authorities and the community in general still view these people with some suspicion. The Tribunal accepts that this background has given the applicant little reason to trust the government as it has been this government which has harmed her parents in the past and for the continuing systemic suspicion of Eritreans or people from Eritrean backgrounds (even in part). The Tribunal considers as plausible and understandable that this had led the applicant to support an opposition political party in Ethiopia and her decision as to which party was also influenced by [her] brother who was a member of the Unity for Democracy and Justice Party. The Tribunal discussed her reasons for her choice in some detail and considered she gave credible evidence on this point. Given the volatile nature of politics in Ethiopia and the effective dominance by the government’s party, the campaigning of opposition parties would be intense and elections would be very hotly contested. The country information indicates that many members of opposition parties were arrested while campaigning towards the 2010 elections. The Tribunal accepts the applicant's evidence on this point as consistent and plausible.
The Tribunal discussed the applicant's membership with the UDJ in some length and the applicant displayed a detailed knowledge of politics and political parties in Ethiopia as well as the government’s attitude towards opposition parties. The Tribunal notes the concerns by the delegate regarding the applicant's membership of the UDJ and essentially was not satisfied that the applicant would have been given the opportunity to work for the government and travel overseas for study if she were of interest to the authorities due to her membership of an opposition political party or her opposing political opinion to the government. The delegate also noted that country information suggests that the applicant would have been a member of the EPRDF and would therefore not have been perceived as anti-government or opposition.
It is well established that evidence that the applicant had been persecuted in the past would give powerful support to the conclusion that the claimed fear is well-founded: Abebe v The Commonwealth (1999) 197 CLR 510 per Gleeson CJ and McHugh J at [82].
The Tribunal further finds that the applicant holds anti-government views and this is why she supported the UDJ.
The Tribunal considers that the applicant chose to become a member of the UDJ and gave cogent and credible reasons for doing so. The country information confirms that there are a number of opposition parties in Ethiopia despite the difficulties these face by opposing the government. Based on the applicant's consistent and detailed account of her reasons for joining the UDJ, the description of her activities for the party and the knowledge she demonstrated about the political situation in Ethiopia, the Tribunal accepts that the applicant had been involved in and was a member of the UDJ.
The available country information from reputable sources including DFAT, the US Department of States, the UK Home Office, Amnesty International and various international media indicates that political opposition activity in Ethiopia is severely repressed.
Opposition activists are arrested and anti-terrorism laws are used against them. Members of opposition parties are arrested, detained for long periods of time, tortured, disappeared, ill-treated and often killed. Even though the UDJ party is legal, the authorities have shown that they are prepared to fabricate charges against a member of an opposition party, a fictitious link to a prohibited organisation in order to achieve a conviction under anti-terrorism laws.
DFAT’s assessment, (see attached) is that people who are openly critical of the government face a high risk of harassment, arrest and detention in Ethiopia and members and supporters of all opposition parties, legal and illegal, face a high risk of harassment and detention.
The Tribunal finds that although the applicant was detained for a relatively short period of time in 2010 she suffered serious harm in the form of physical and verbal ill-treatment on that occasion.
In relation to the applicant's claim to have been an active member of Ginbot 7 in the guise or under cover of the UDJ party in Ethiopia she provided a consistent and credible account of the reasons for her involvement, details of her participation and the reasons for doing so. The applicant's representative has provided country information which confirms that Ginbot 7 is active in Ethiopia. The organisation is highly secretive and in view of its designation as a terrorist organisation by the Ethiopian authorities the Tribunal accepts it functions covertly and secretively. Given that most of the opposition parties oppose the government in Ethiopia, it is plausible that they work with organisations such as Ginbot 7 at various levels, including at the community level and to undermine the government with a view of affecting political change. The Tribunal found that the applicant spoke convincingly and knowledgably at the hearing about her support for the UDJ and about her activities, including recruitment for Ginbot 7 and its goals. The Tribunal finds that the applicant remains a supporter of Ginbot 7 and to a lesser extent of the UDJ party and is an opponent of the current government of Ethiopia.
In relation to the applicant's activities in Australia, including attending anti-government demonstrations and meetings the Tribunal has considered s.91R(3) in relation to whether the applicant has engaged in these activities in Australia for the sole purpose of strengthening her protection claims. The Tribunal notes that s.91R(3) requires the application of a “sole purpose” test, that is conduct can only be disregarded if the sole motivation of the applicant in engaging in such activities was to strengthen her claims to be a refugee. In considering the applicant's background and history in Ethiopia, including her past political activities with the UDJ party and Ginbot 7, the treatment of his her family in the past by the Ethiopian authorities, the Tribunal is satisfied that her involvement in such activities is for reasons of genuine opposition to the Ethiopian government and an expression of her political views. The Tribunal is satisfied that the available country information from reputable sources including DFAT, the US Department of State, the UK Home Office and non-government organisations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch all indicate that political opposition activity in Ethiopia is severely repressed.
Further, as discussed earlier, the applicant came to Australia pursuant to a professional development program [and] signed an undertaking in her application for the student visa that she will leave Australia before the expiry of her visa and she will not apply for protection. She has breached that undertaking and “absconded”. Since then, the Tribunal is aware that a decision was made in 2015 by DFAT to cease all long term and short term Australian award programs. More importantly, from the point of view of the Ethiopian government, the applicant is a person who must have applied for protection in order to remain in Australia for nearly four years after the expiry of her visa. The Tribunal has accepted that the applicant has a history of political involvement personally in Ethiopia and in Australia, as well as being a person of interest due to her part Eritrean ethnicity and because her mother is Eritrean and her father had previously been imprisoned by both Eritrean and Ethiopian governments. The Tribunal also accepts that the applicant did not make a decision to remain in Australia until she received a warning from her husband that one of the members of her Ginbot 7 cell had informed on the other members including the applicant and the authorities were looking for her. The Tribunal accepts that she was forced to therefore abandon any thoughts of returning to Ethiopia as she believed she would be arrested and imprisoned on her return for her activities with a proscribed terrorist organisation. Given this profile, the Ethiopian government would be aware or become aware of her activities in Australia through an on-line presence through Ethiopian independent media sources and Ethiopian nationals living in the Australian community. This community in Australia is small but local and in the main an anti-government diaspora[9]. There is therefore a real chance the authorities will arrest the applicant and subject her to significant physical harassment or ill treatment, detain her, try her and sentence her to long term imprisonment. The Tribunal considers any of these acts, individually and cumulatively would constitute serious harm for the purpose of s.91R(1)(b) of the Act. The Tribunal further finds that the essential and significant reason for the harm will be the applicant's political opinion as required by s.91R(1)(a) and that the conduct feared by the applicant is systematic and discriminatory as required by s.91R(1)(c).
[9] See e.g. B. Hall, “There is no hope for her to survive: Ethiopian woman fears deportation”, The Age, 30 July 2015, accessed at on 23 June 2017.

For the reasons given above, the Tribunal is satisfied that the applicant is a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under the Refugees Convention. Therefore the applicant satisfies the criterion set out in s.36(2)(a).
State protection
In relation to state protection, the Tribunal finds that as the harm the applicant faces is at the hands of the Ethiopian government and security forces, she will be unable to obtain protection by those authorities from the harm he faces.
Internal relocation
In relation to internal relocation, the Tribunal is satisfied that the real chance of persecution exists in the country as a whole and that safe relocation within the country is therefore not reasonably open to the applicant.
For the reasons given above the Tribunal is satisfied that the applicant is a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations. Therefore the applicant satisfies the criterion set out in s.36(2)(a).
DECISION
The Tribunal remits the matter for reconsideration with the direction that the applicant satisfies s.36(2)(a) of the Migration Act.
Sophia Panagiotidis
Member

ATTACHMENT – Country information
Country information
Border conflict 1998 – 2000
1.    The Tribunal notes the UK Home Office Country Information and Guidance report on Ethiopia[10] provides detailed background information about the border conflict with Eritrea.
[10] UK Home Office Country Information and Guidance: Ethiopia: People of mixed Eritrean/Ethiopian nationality, Version 1.0, 31 August 2016,
Education in Ethiopia
2.    The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) country report on Ethiopia has the following information on education in Ethiopia:
2.11 As with the health system, substantial economic growth rates have allowed the Ethiopian government to increase expenditure on education across the country over the past decade. While educational attainment has expanded across all levels, the main focus has been on pursuing the Millennium Development Goal of universal primary education, and it is at this level that the gains have been most impressive. Primary education (typically from seven years to fifteen years of age) is officially provided free of charge and is compulsory. National gross enrolment rates (GERs) are around 99.5 per cent for males and 93.2 per cent for females, although this masks large regional discrepancies. According to the Education Policy and Data Centre, the Afar region had the lowest GER of around 40 per cent, whereas Gambella region’s GER was around 132 per cent (the gross enrolment rate can exceed 100 per cent, as it represents the total number of people—regardless of age—enrolled in a particular level of schooling as a percentage of the number of people in the age group corresponding to that level of schooling). Net enrolment rates (i.e. the ratio of the number of children of an appropriate age enrolled in an education level compared to the number of children of that age group) across the country have almost tripled since 1994, with around 86 per cent of Ethiopian primary-aged children attending primary school. Secondary school enrolment rates have increased as well, although they remain well below primary school enrolment rates.
2.12 There is evidence that the increase in enrolments is translating into better education outcomes, although these improvements are coming off a very low base. Literacy and numeracy rates have increased significantly over the last decade, although they remain low by global standards. For example, adult literacy rates increased from 37.9 per cent to 46.7 per cent between 2004 and 2011 (compared with a global rate of around 86 per cent). The primary school completion rate increased from 34.3 per cent to 52.8 per cent between 2004 and 2013.[11]
[11] Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, DFAT Country Information Report Ethiopia, 1 April 2016
Race and ethnicity
3.    In relation to race and nationality DFAT reports there are more than 80 different ethnic groups in Ethiopia and while most political parties are ethnically based, the ruling EPRDF is made up of a coalition of several of these parties, in effect making it a multi-ethnic party, albeit with certain factions. DFAT advises that it is aware of some concerns among the population that positions of power in the EPRDF, the public service and military are dominated by ethnic Tigrayans, despite this group making up only around six percent of the population. DFAT also assesses that:
3.3… in most cases, official discrimination (e.g. systematic state-sanctioned discrimination, denial of public services, higher detention rates) on the basis of race and/or ethnicity is rare in Ethiopia. This assessment is in line with the constitutional prohibitions on discrimination, and in part reflects the need for the government to maintain its legitimacy through inclusiveness, given the large number of diverse ethnic groups within the country.
3.4 Societal discrimination on the basis of ethnicity can occur, but is predominantly in the form of positive discrimination in favour of a particular ethnic group (especially Tigrayans in the government/public service sector) rather than active discrimination against people of a different race or ethnicity. However, there are some exceptions to this general tendency. Official policies can also limit opportunities for some groups; for example, the use of Oromiffa as the language of instruction in schools in the Oromia region can limit opportunities for Oromos in the public sector if they do not also speak Amharic or English. [12]
[12] Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, DFAT Country Information Report Ethiopia, 1 April 2016
4.    According to DFAT there are reports that Eritreans in Ethiopia tend to conceal their background and avoid political engagement to avoid adverse attention from authorities. However, DFAT assesses that Ethiopians with an Eritrean background do not face a significantly greater risk of official or societal discrimination or violence than other groups on their basis of their ethnicity or nationality.[13]
[13] Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, DFAT Country Information Report Ethiopia, 1 April 2016
Political parties and political opinion in Ethiopia
5.    A recent report by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace summarises the political situation in Ethiopia thus (footnotes omitted):[14]
[14] S. Brechenmacher, “Civil Society Under Assault: Repression and Responses in Russia, Egypt and Ethiopia”, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 18 May 2017, at p. 74, CISEDB50AD4351
[T]he state has become increasingly intertwined with the ruling party, and political and economic power has gradually become concentrated in the hands of a small elite. Ethiopia’s regions are governed by ethnoregional parties that are de facto subordinate branches of the EPRDF—which remains dominated by the ethnic Tigray, who make up only 6 percent of Ethiopia’s total population. Party leaders know that if the EPRDF were to open space for civic mobilization, it could mean the end of Tigray rule. The opposition’s unexpected gains in the 2005 election justified these fears. Throughout the 1990s and the early 2000s, Ethiopia had held regular elections, but the hegemony of the ruling EPRDF was never threatened. The opposition remained divided, and the ruling party used coercive means and its incumbency advantage to prevent rival parties from participating on a level playing field.464 When political space temporarily opened up in the lead-up to the 2005 polls and opposition actors unified, the EPRDF’s grip on power proved to be tenuous. As a result, the EPRDF under the leadership of Zenawi embarked on a de facto restoration of the one-party state.
6.    The US State Department Human Rights report for Ethiopia for 2013 outlines the Ethiopian regime, dominated for 20 years by the Tigray ethnic minority under Meles Zenawi, gained political stability not through input-legitimacy (such as the rule of law or free and fair elections), but through output legitimacy in line with the Asian model of successful “tiger states.” The regime intimidated opponents and harassed the opposition, especially following the 2010 elections (in which the EPRDF achieved 99% “victory”), and started an ambitious and state-driven economic development strategy. [15]
[15] Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 2013 – Ethiopia, US Department of State, 27 February 2014
7.    The 2014 Ethiopia Country Report by Bertelsmann Stiftung[16] depicts the ruling party as having a virtual monopoly on power resulting in little serious political debate and a lack of control on the part of the populace over government decisions. The report further states:
[16] German-based, the Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Transformation Index (BTI) analyzes and evaluates whether and how developing countries and countries in transition are steering social change toward democracy and a market economy. The project is carried out in consultation with an interdisciplinary board of experts that helps to define the project focus, identifies challenges and debates project results.
Opposition parties have been undermined to the extent that they no longer pose a threat to the ruling party; several attempts to form a united opposition front failed, due to rivalries among personalities and politicians’ ethnicity.[17]
[17] BTI 2014 – Ethiopia Country Report, Bertelsmann Stiftung, accessed 4 June 2014 DFAT reports that political freedoms in Ethiopia are very restricted:
3.35 Article 25 of the Constitution provides for equality under the law, without discrimination on the grounds of political or other opinion; Article 30 provides for freedom of assembly, demonstration and petition; Article 31 provides for freedom of association; and Article 38 provides for the right to vote, to be elected and to be a member of a political organisation.
3.36In practice, political freedoms in Ethiopia are very restricted. Opposition groups and independent commentators such as journalists and bloggers who oppose the government’s policies are regularly harassed and detained. While Ethiopia’s ATP is similar in wording to legislation in some western countries such as the UK and Australia, its implementation is significantly more restrictive of political freedoms. These restrictions, combined with the government’s effective security and intelligence infrastructure, have been partly responsible for the relative security in Ethiopia during a period of instability and violence in the region. However, the government has been criticised for perceived breaches of human rights. These alleged breaches include restrictions on freedom of expression, freedom of association and the activities of civil society organisations and journalists, as well as more serious allegations of extrajudicial killings, torture, arbitrary detention, harassment and abuse, particularly against political opponents and independent journalists and bloggers. There are reports of public servants who are not EPRDF members having their career progression curtailed. Government security forces reportedly regularly detain and torture—and sometimes commit extrajudicial killings of—vocal opponents of government policies. Armed opposition groups, including the ONLF and the OLF, have also been accused of carrying out abuses and violent attacks on government forces and civilians.
3.37 Prominent members of all opposition groups—including legal opposition groups not classified as terrorist organisations—are regularly monitored, harassed, arrested and either charged under the ATP or held without charge. Periods of detention can vary from a few days to several years. There were reports of a crackdown in the lead-up to the 2015 elections. For example, on 8 July 2014, four prominent members of three opposition parties, the Unity for Democracy and Justice, the Arena Tigray Party and the Blue Party, were arrested and held in the Maekelawi detention facility. At least one of those arrested claimed to have been tortured in detention, and all were reported to have been denied access to lawyers and family members. The four were charged in October 2014 under the ATP. In August 2015, more than 12 months after their arrest (and several months after the 2015 elections) the Federal Court found no evidence that these individuals had links to terrorist acts or organisations.
3.40 The active suppression of opposition parties and activists has limited their strength and effectiveness. Some opposition groups run their operations from outside Ethiopia. The election results reflect this suppression, with the ruling EPRDF winning 100 per cent of the seats in the Ethiopian parliament at the 2015 elections. The African Union was the only international observation mission permitted to observe the election, and there were complaints from opposition parties such as the Medrek coalition and the Blue Party about access to polling stations, harassment of voters and restrictions on campaign activities. Local media reports suggested that up to 500 opposition-party members had been arrested and detained in the lead-up to the elections. The African Union, the European Union and the US all commented publicly that the elections were generally peaceful, but stopped short of calling them ‘free and fair’, given concerns over the constraints faced by opposition parties and supporters.
3.41 DFAT assesses that people who are openly critical of the government face a high risk of harassment, arrest and detention in Ethiopia. This is particularly the case for leaders of opposition parties and organisers of protests against the government or its policies. Members and supporters of all opposition parties, legal and illegal, face this high risk of harassment and detention. There are also reports that family members and neighbours of members and supporters (or perceived supporters) of opposition groups may be harassed, arrested and detained by authorities.
9.    In relation to ethnicity and the political system in Ethiopia, DFAT reports:
2.18 Ethnicity is an important factor influencing politics in Ethiopia. The EPRDF is made up of a coalition of predominantly ethnically-based political parties, dominated by the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). In addition to the parties aligned to the EPRDF, there are a number of ethnically-based opposition political groups. Some of these, including the Tigray People’s Democratic Movement (TPDM, based predominantly in Eritrea near the Ethiopian border), the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF, based in the Somali region), and the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF, with leadership based in Eritrea and a presence in the US and Europe) have armed militant wings that occasionally launch attacks against government facilities and personnel. These groups have been declared terrorist groups and outlawed by the Ethiopian government. Of the main legal political opposition groups, Medrek (also known as the Forum for Democratic Dialogue in Ethiopia), is a coalition of political parties, some of which are ethnically-based, while the Semayawi Party (widely known as the Blue Party) is a nationwide, non-ethnically aligned party made up of (predominantly young) people opposed to the ruling EPRDF.[18]
[18] Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, DFAT Country Information Report Ethiopia, 1 April 2016
10. The UK Home Office country information and Policy Note – Ethiopia: Opposition to the government[19] provides the following on the relevant political parties in Ethiopia:
[19] UK Home Office Country Information and Policy Note – Ethiopia: Opposition to the government, United Kingdom Home Office, December 2016
9.2      Forum for Democratic Dialogue in Ethiopia (Medrek)
9.2.1    Medrek is an opposition coalition bringing together:
·     Unity for Democracy and Justice (UDJ or Andnet)
·     Oromo Federalist Democratic Movement (OFDM)
·     Oromo People Congress (OPC)
·     United Ethiopian Democratic Forces (UEDF)
·     AARENA Tigray
·     Ethiopian Social Democratic Party
·     Southern Ethiopia People's Democratic Union (SEPDU)
·     Coalition of Somali Democratic Forces[20]
[20] Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment Ethiopia, Internal Affairs, posted 13 January 2016. Subscription site, accessed 25 July 2016
9.2.2 Medrek also contains a number of renowned opposition figures, such as former president Negasso Gidada, former defence minister Siye Abraha, and Gebru Asrat, the former president of the Tigray region. Medrek has a largely urban support. The current leader is Beyene Petros. Of the eight member parties, the UDJ is the one that is currently most active.[21]
[21] Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment Ethiopia, Internal Affairs, posted 13 January 2016. Subscription site, accessed 25 July 2016
9.2.3 An article posted on the Africa News and Analysis site on 8 June 2015 stated that the opposition parties of Medrek, Blue Party, All Ethiopia Unity Party, Ethiopian Raey Party and the Ethiopian Democratic Party all rejected the results of the 2015 election.[22] …
[22] Africa News and Analysis site, More Ethiopian parties reject election results, 8 June 2015 accessed 24 August 2016
9.3      The Unity for Democracy and Justice (UDJ)
9.3.1 The Immigration and Refugee board of Canada in a response of July 2012, quoting several sources, noted that the UDJ is commonly known as Andinet (also spelled Andnet and Andenet) and was formed in Addis Ababa in June 2008. It was formed after the dissolution of the Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD, also known as Kinijit), which had been the main opposition alliance in Ethiopia. Many UDJ members were former members of the CUD.[23]
[23] Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Ethiopia: The Unity for Democracy and Justice Party (UDJ); its formation, leadership, structure, mandate, membership, issuance of membership cards; treatment by authorities; branches outside of Ethiopia; membership requirements at Toronto and Atlanta branches (2008-2012), 23 July 2012, accessed 2 August 2016
9.3.2 It is unclear about the current situation of this party. Various sources indicate that the party was splitting into factions and each electing its own leader[24]: Tigistu Awelu[25] , Belay Fekadu[26].
[24] Horn Affairs English, Ethiopia: Police disbands a rally on an Opposition party’s fate, as deadline draws near, 25 January 2015. accessed 2 August 2016
[25] Fana Broadcasting Corporate UDJ – led by Tigistu Awelu – holds a general assembly meeting, 24 January 2015 accessed 2 August 2016
[26] Awrabatimes, Ethiopia: Electoral Board Bans a faction of UDJ led by Belay Fekadu, 30 January 2015 accessed 2 August 2016
9.3.3 A January 2015 article published by Somaliland Press noted that the government controlled Election board, NEBE, banned the UDJ opposition party, marking the biggest blow to democracy since 2005. The report stated that following over a million Ethiopians demonstrating in favour of the UDJ joining the 2015 election, the election board awarded the name and logo of the UDJ to a new group led by Tigistu Awelu. Analysts said that Mr Awelu was a government agent secretly planted by the ruling party to divide the opposition from the inside.[27]
[27] Somaliland Press, Election 2015 Update: Ethiopia’s top opposition banned by Govt, 29 January 2015, accessed 6 September 2016
8.        Ginbot 7 (G7)
8.1.1 Landinfo noted, in a report published on 20 August 2012, that, Ginbot 7’s full name is Ginbot 7 Movement for Justice, Freedom and Democracy[28]. The report went on to say ‘Ginbot 7 was established [on] 15 May 2008. The name means 15 May in Amharic and refers to the date when the election for the parliament in Ethiopia was held in 2005.’ [29]
[28] Landinfo - Country of Origin Information Centre, Ethiopia: The Ginbot 7 party, 20 August 2012, (Footnote 3) accessed 25 July 2
[29] Landinfo - Country of Origin Information Centre, Ethiopia: The Ginbot 7 party, 20 August 2012, (Section 3) accessed 25 July 2016
8.1.2 According to a 2015 Global Security report, the group was founded in the United States by Berhanu Nega, one of the opposition leaders in the 2005 elections, and advocates for change in the government "by any means."[30] Voice of America noted in a July 2105 report that the Ginbot 7 party is comprised of former members of the disbanded Coalition for Unity and Democracy [CUD], an opposition group that made unprecedented gains in the 2005 elections.[31]7
[30] Global Security.org Ethiopian Politics,19 December 2015 accessed 26 July 2016
[31] Voice of America, Ethiopian Opposition Group Threatens Armed Resistance, 25 July 2015. Ethiopian Opposition Group Threatens Armed Resistance accessed 26 July 2016
8.1.3 The official site for Ginbot 7 states that their primary mission is: ‘the realization of a national political system in which government power and political authority is assumed through peaceful and democratic process based on the free will and choice of citizens of the country.’[32]
[32] Ginbot7, About Us, Mission accessed 25 July 2016
8.1.4 There is little current information on the political activities of Ginbot 7 within Ethiopia, however Landinfo’s 2012 report about the organisation stated:
‘…party leader Berhanu Nega said [in 2011] that G7 has a widespread, secret party network in Ethiopia. He said that the party is organised in a cell structure and is active throughout Ethiopia. The cells are autonomous and each cell consists of four to five people.
‘Another central G7 leader (conversation in Oslo February 2012) has described the organisation as quatero (Amharic for cell system). According to this G7 leader, the cells are found in all universities and colleges in Ethiopia and this cell organisation was reportedly presented on Ethiopian TV in 2011 in a news broadcast in which the government asked Ethiopian to be vigilant for such activity.’ [33]
[33] Landinfo - Country of Origin Information Centre, Ethiopia: The Ginbot 7 party, 20 August 2012, (Section 4) accessed 25 July 2016
8.1.5 However, Landinfo also stated that several western diplomatic and immigration authorities emphasised that there is no confirmed information regarding G7 activities in Ethiopia. It was considered likely that any activities ceased after the arrests of dissidents in the spring of 2009.[34]
[34] Landinfo - Country of Origin Information Centre, Ethiopia: The Ginbot 7 party, 20 August 2012, (Section 4) accessed 25 July 2016
8.1.6 With regard to activities outside Ethiopia, Landinfo quoted Berhanu Nega from 2011, ‘G7 has been active in the diaspora and since 2008 has built up an organisation with many former CUD members in Europe, Australia and North America. The party has offices in many European countries, including Norway, Denmark, England, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland and Germany.’ [35]
[35] Landinfo - Country of Origin Information Centre, Ethiopia: The Ginbot 7 party, 20 August 2012, (Section 5) accessed 25 July 2016
8.1.7 Landinfo also noted that G7’s website and a series of other similar websites are sometimes shut down by the authorities in Ethiopia and that G7 is also responsible for radio broadcasts which are transmitted to Ethiopia twice a day, three times a week. The radio broadcasts are transmitted on four different bandwidths to avoid the government's attempts to block the transmissions.[36]
[36] Landinfo - Country of Origin Information Centre, Ethiopia: The Ginbot 7 party, 20 August 2012, (Section 5) accessed 25 July 2016
8.1.8 Landinfo commented on arrests connected to G7: ‘Several people have been arrested, indicted and convicted of terrorist acts under the auspices of G7 in 2009 and 2011. However, it is unclear whether the arrests reflect the defendants' concrete connection to terrorist plans or acts, or whether the charges camouflage measures to limit unwanted oppositional activity.’ [37]
[37] Landinfo - Country of Origin Information Centre, Ethiopia: The Ginbot 7 party, 20 August 2012, (Summary) accessed 25 July 2016
8.1.9 The Sudan Tribune, in an article of 22 December 2015, with reference to the Oromo Protests, stated that the government ‘…has blamed some anti-peace forces including the terrorist designated opposition movements of the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and Ginbot-7 of being behind the unrest.’[38] …
[38] Sudan Tribune, Ethiopia arrests journalist amidst violent anti-government protests, 22 December 2016. accessed 3 August 2016
8.1.10 In June 2014, Andargachew Tsige, a British citizen and, according to DFAT’s sources, leader of Ginbot 7, was arrested in Yemen while travelling to Eritrea, and removed to Ethiopia. Mr Tsige had previously been convicted in absentia of an attempted coup and terrorism charges. [39]
[39] Australian Government, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), Country Information Report Ethiopia, 1 April 2016. Accessed 26 July 2016
8.1.11 On 24 June 2015, Philip Hammond, the then UK Foreign Secretary, released this statement ‘“… a year after he was first detained, British national Andargachew Tsege remains in solitary confinement in Ethiopia without a legal process to challenge his detention [and that the UK’s]… requests for regular consular access have not been granted, despite promises made…”’[40]
[40] Gov.uk, Foreign Secretary concerned over detention of Andargachew Tsege, 24 June 2015. accessed 3 August 2016
8.1.12 The International Business Times UK subsequently reported on 16 August 2016 that a Foreign Office spokesman had told them ‘"The Government has raised Mr Tsege's case with the Ethiopian Government repeatedly and at the very highest levels. We have received a commitment from Prime Minister Hailemariam that Mr Tsege will be allowed access to independent legal advice to allow him to discuss options under the Ethiopian legal system."’[41]
[41] International Business Times, Yemi Hailemariam: Partner of Andargachew Tsege 'doesn't want to see people die in the streets' 16 August 2016. accessed 24 August 2016
8.1.13ESAT News reported on 13 May 2016 that G7 had taken responsibility for an attack in southern Ethiopia earlier that month which had killed 20 government soldiers and injured fifty. Berhanu Nega, speaking from Eritrea said “this is an indication of the beginning of the fight in all directions and areas of the country.”[42]
[42] ESAT News, Patriotic Ginbot 7 Claims Responsibility for Southern Ethiopia Attack, 13 May 2016 accessed 26 July 2016
Treatment of returnees
11. DFAT provides the following information on the treatment of returnees[43]:
[43] Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, DFAT Country Information Report Ethiopia, 1 April 2016
5.16 Large numbers of people attempt to move from Ethiopia to other countries in search of better economic opportunities. These people typically travel along three routes: through Somalia, Djibouti or Eritrea to Yemen and then on to Saudi Arabia; north through Sudan and Libya in an attempt to reach Europe; or south, in an attempt to reach South Africa. In 2013 and 2014, the Saudi Arabian government launched a crackdown on Ethiopian migrants, reportedly returning around 160,000 people to Ethiopia. Since this crackdown, and the April 2015 killing of dozens of Ethiopians in Libya by a group affiliated with the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), the Ethiopian government has restricted legal migration and intensified its efforts against illegal migration. Even with legal means of migration reduced and an active war zone in Yemen, some people still use people smugglers to travel through Yemen to Saudi Arabia in search of domestic work (women) or construction work (men). Of those who travel south, many are stopped prior to making it to South Africa, and returned to Ethiopia. According to credible sources in Addis Ababa, some of these people use the reintegration assistance provided upon their return to fund another migration attempt.
5.17 There are a smaller number of people returned to Ethiopia after making asylum claims in western countries. The bulk of those returned from western countries are voluntary returnees; the Ethiopian government is reportedly reluctant to accept involuntary returnees. There has been some (limited) monitoring of voluntary returnees by the government, and DFAT is not aware of any problems having been faced by returnees on the basis of their being failed asylum-seekers. Nonetheless, DFAT assesses that people who are returned to Ethiopia and who are perceived as being political activists opposed to the government face a high risk of being monitored, harassed, arrested and detained, particularly if they continue to engage in political activities upon their return and if they are associated with groups that have an armed militant component. This is consistent with an April 2015 report on the conditions for returned political activists by Norwegian organisation LandInfo, which found that ‘those who will be under the Ethiopian authorities’ suspicion are … people they apprehend as a threat and who may mobilize and are prepared to use military force for change’. DFAT also assesses that people who openly criticise the Ethiopian government while they are outside Ethiopia face a high risk that the Ethiopian authorities will be aware of these activities and may take action against these people upon their return. DFAT notes that Ethiopian authorities have tried, convicted and sentenced a number of political and human rights activists and journalists in absentia.
Current state of emergency in Ethiopia
12. The Tribunal notes that in October 2016, the Ethiopian government declared a state of emergency. In the following month, the authorities arrested at least 11,000 people and the majority of these arrests were made in the Oromo and Amhara regions.[44]
[44] ‘Ethiopia state of emergency arrests top 11,000’, Al Jazeera, 13 November 2016, accessed at: on 16 March 2017

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Citations

1516600 (Refugee) [2017] AATA 2683

Cases Citing This Decision

Cases Cited

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Kioa v West [1985] HCA 81

Abebe v the Commonwealth [1999] HCA 69