1506212 (Refugee) [2018] AATA 998 (1 March 2018)
DECISION RECORD
DIVISION:Migration & Refugee Division
CASE NUMBER: 1506212
COUNTRY OF REFERENCE: Vietnam
MEMBER:Nicola Findson
DATE:1 March 2018
PLACE OF DECISION: Perth
DECISION:The Tribunal sets aside the decision to refuse to grant the applicant a Protection (Class XA) visa and substitutes a decision to refuse to grant the applicant a Protection (Class XD) visa.
Statement made on 01 March 2018 at 1:41pm
CATCHWORDS
Refugee – Protection visa – Vietnam – Imputed political opinion – Anti-regime – Religion – Psychic ceremony – Superstitious activity – Particular social group – Family involvement with the French Colonial authorities – Evading military service – Government blacklist – Police summonses – Illegal departure – Failed asylum seeker – Data breach – Fear of arrest – Witness credibility – Inconsistent evidence
LEGISLATION
Migration Act 1958, ss 5(1), 36, 45AA, 65, 91R, 91S, 375A, 438, 499Migration Regulations 1994, r 2.08F, Schedule 2
CASES
Kopalapillai v MIMA (1998) 86 FCR 547
MIMA vRajalingam (1999) 93 FCR 220
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs and McIllhatton v Guo Wei Rongand Pam Run Juan (1996) 40 ALD 445
Randhawa v MILGEA (1994) 52 FCR 437
Selvadurai v MIEA & Anor (1994) 34 ALD 347SZSSJ v MIBP (2015) FCAFC 125
Any references appearing in square brackets indicate that information has been omitted from this decision pursuant to section 431 of the Migration Act 1958 and replaced with generic information which does not allow the identification of an applicant, or their relative or other dependant.
STATEMENT OF DECISION AND REASONS
APPLICATION FOR REVIEW
This is an application for review of a decision made by a delegate of the Minister for Immigration to refuse to grant the applicant a Protection visa under s.65 of the Migration Act 1958 (the Act).
The applicant, who claims to be a citizen of Vietnam, applied for the visa [in] June 2014 and the delegate refused to grant the visa [in] April 2015.
The applicant applied for a Protection (Class XA) visa. However, by operation of s.45AA of the Act and r.2.08F of the Migration Regulations 1994, from 16 December 2014 the application is taken to be, and to have always been, a valid application for a Temporary Protection (Class XD) visa and is taken not to be, and never to have been, a valid application for a Protection (Class XA) visa.
RELEVANT LAW
The criteria for a protection visa are set out in s.36 of the Act and Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (the Regulations). An applicant for the visa must meet one of the alternative criteria in s.36(2)(a), (aa), (b), or (c). That is, the applicant is either a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under the ‘refugee’ criterion, or on other ‘complementary protection’ grounds, or is a member of the same family unit as such a person and that person holds a protection visa of the same class.
Refugee criterion
Section 36(2)(a)…
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- Case
- [2018] AATA 998
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the Tribunal were whether Australia had protection obligations towards the applicant, specifically whether he held a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion. This required the Tribunal to assess the applicant's credibility and the plausibility of his claims, including his fear of arrest and mistreatment upon return to Vietnam due to his alleged anti-government activities, his family's history, and his unlawful departure. The Tribunal also considered whether the applicant was prohibited from protection by the third country protection provisions of the Act.
The Tribunal applied principles of credibility assessment, referencing case law such as *Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs and McIllhatton v Guo Wei Rong and Pam Run Juan* and the UNHCR Handbook. It acknowledged the difficulties faced by asylum seekers and the importance of giving the benefit of the doubt to generally credible applicants unable to substantiate all claims, provided their statements were coherent, plausible, and did not contradict known facts. The Tribunal considered all available evidence, including the applicant's statements, oral evidence, documentary evidence, and country information. It found that the applicant was a national of Vietnam and that Vietnam was the country of reference, with no evidence of a right to enter and reside in another country.
The Tribunal affirmed the delegate's decision to refuse the protection visa. While accepting certain biographical details about the applicant, it ultimately found that the applicant was not a credible witness and rejected his claims regarding the religious ceremony incident, his fear of persecution due to his family's history or evasion of military service, and his "sur place" claim related to the data breach. Consequently, the Tribunal concluded that Australia did not have protection obligations towards the applicant.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
There is no evidence before the Tribunal to indicate that the applicant has a right to enter and reside in any other country than Vietnam. The applicant is therefore not prohibited from protection by operation of the third country protection provision in s.36(3) of the Act.Credibility considerations. The Tribunal is aware of the importance of adopting a reasonable approach in the finding of credibility. In Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs and McIllhatton v Guo Wei Rongand Pam Run Juan (1996) 40 ALD 445 the Full Federal Court made comments on determining credibility. The Tribunal notes in particular the cautionary note sounded by Foster J at 482:…care must be taken that an over-stringent approach does not result in an unjust exclusion from consideration of the totality of some evidence where a portion of it could reasonably have been accepted. The Tribunal also accepts that ‘if the applicant's account appears credible, he should, unless there are good reasons to the contrary, be given the benefit of the doubt. (The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees' Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status, Geneva, 1992 at para 196). However, the Handbook also states (at para 203):The benefit of the doubt should, however, only be given when all available evidence has been obtained and checked and when the examiner is satisfied as to the applicant's general credibility. The applicant's statements must be coherent and plausible, and must not run counter to generally known facts. When assessing claims made by applicants the Tribunal needs to make findings of fact in relation to those claims. This usually involves an assessment of the credibility of the applicants. When doing so it is important to bear in mind the difficulties often faced by asylum seekers. The benefit of the doubt should be given to asylum seekers who are generally credible but unable to substantiate all of their claims. The Tribunal must bear in mind that if it makes an adverse finding in relation to a material claim made by the applicant but is unable to make that finding with confidence it must proceed to assess the claim on the basis that it might possibly be true (see MIMA vRajalingam (1999) 93 FCR 220). However, the Tribunal is not required to accept uncritically any or all of the allegations made by an applicant. Further, the Tribunal is not required to have rebutting evidence available to it before it can find that a particular factual assertion by an applicant has not been made out. (see Randhawa v MILGEA (1994) 52 FCR 437 at 451 per Beaumont J; Selvadurai v MIEA & Anor (1994) 34 ALD 347 at 348 per Heerey J and Kopalapillai v MIMA (1998) 86 FCR 547.) The Tribunal carefully considered all of the evidence available to it in this case. It considered the applicant’s written statements, his oral evidence before the Tribunal, and the detailed written submissions made by his representative. It considered the records of his interviews with the Department, the applicant’s documentary evidence submitted to the Department, and the material included in attachments to the submissions received by the Tribunal. On the basis of the evidence before it, the Tribunal accepts the applicant was born on [date] in Quang Binh, Vietnam; is a Buddhist; is married with [number] children; and is a [Occupation 1].