1144 Nepean Highway Pty Ltd v Abnote Australasia Pty Ltd

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SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA

COURT OF APPEAL

No 3820 of 2009

1144 NEPEAN HIGHWAY PTY LTD Appellant
v
ABNOTE AUSTRALASIA PTY LTD
(formerly known as LEIGH MARDON AUSTRALASIA PTY LTD)
Respondent

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JUDGES WARREN CJ, NETTLE and BONGIORNO JJA
WHERE HELD MELBOURNE
DATE OF HEARING 26 November 2009
DATE OF JUDGMENT 18 December 2009
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION [2009] VSCA 308
JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM [2009] VSC 317 (Pagone J)

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CONTRACT — Construction of dispute resolution clause — Meaning of ‘appoint’ — Distinction between ‘appoint’ and ‘nominate’ — Appointment of independent expert by independent third party — Binding nature of appointment — Terms of appointment — Objection to expert’s terms — Indemnity and release — Implied term that the terms of the expert’s engagement be ‘reasonable’ — Certainty of terms — Injunction to compel engagement of expert.

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Appearances: Counsel Solicitors

For the Appellant

Mr R A Brett QC with
Mr C R Northrop

Bazzani Scully Brand Lawyers

For the Respondent Mr J J Gleeson SC with
Mr M H Whitten
Corrs Chambers Westgarth

WARREN CJ,
NETTLE JA,
BONGIORNO JA:

  1. This appeal concerns the operation of a dispute resolution regime in an agreement between a landlord and a tenant as to a new lease.  By that agreement, dated 19 November 2008, 1144 Nepean Highway Pty Ltd (‘the landlord’) agreed to undertake building works on land which it owned on the Nepean Highway, Highett, and lease that land to Leigh Mardon Australasia Pty Ltd (‘the tenant’).[1]  In fact the tenant had occupied the property for many years before the date of the agreement and was, at that date, occupying the premises as a monthly tenant, a prior lease having expired.

    [1]After filing this proceeding, Leigh Mardon Australasia Pty Ltd changed its name to, and is now known as, Abnote Australasia Pty Ltd.  In this judgment, it is referred to as ‘the tenant’.

  1. The agreement to lease was subject to a condition precedent which required the landlord to obtain, by no later than 31 January 2009, a town planning permit which would allow the proposed premises to be used for the tenant’s purposes and would enable the landlord to carry out contemplated building works.  The condition further provided that, if the necessary permit was not obtained by the specified date, either party could give the other 30 days’ notice of its intention to terminate the agreement.  If such a notice was given, the agreement would be thus terminated unless within that 30 days the permit was obtained.

  1. In fact, a town planning permit was not obtained by 31 January 2009.  On 2 February 2009 the tenant served notice on the landlord of its intention to terminate the agreement for failure of the condition.  However, within the 30 days allowed, on 16 February 2009 the relevant responsible authority, the City of Kingston, issued a town planning permit, with conditions which had to be satisfied before development could commence.

  1. Notwithstanding the issue of that planning permit, by early April 2009, the Council had still not…

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Details
Case
[2009] VSCA 308
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of 1144 Nepean Highway Pty Ltd v Abnote Australasia Pty Ltd, the primary issue was the construction of a dispute resolution clause in a contract. The court was required to determine the meaning of the term ‘appoint’ in the context of appointing an independent expert and the distinction between ‘appoint’ and ‘nominate’. The dispute arose from a disagreement between the parties regarding the terms under which an independent expert was to be engaged to resolve a dispute. The defendant argued that the term ‘appoint’ meant that they had the power to nominate the expert, whereas the plaintiff contended that ‘appoint’ meant that the expert should be engaged by an independent third party.

The court considered the language of the clause and the broader context of the contract. It held that the term ‘appoint’ did not simply mean ‘nominate’, but rather required the engagement of an expert by an independent third party. The court also found that the terms of the expert’s engagement should be reasonable, and that the defendant had the right to object to terms that were not reasonable. The court further held that the terms of the expert’s engagement should be certain, and that an injunction could be granted to compel the engagement of an expert if the parties were unable to agree on the terms.

The court’s reasoning was based on the principle that the terms of a contract should be interpreted in a manner that gives effect to the intention of the parties, and that the terms should be certain and reasonable. The court held that the term ‘appoint’ meant that the expert should be engaged by an independent third party, and that the terms of the expert’s engagement should be reasonable and certain. The court also held that the defendant had the right to object to terms that were not reasonable, and that an injunction could be granted to compel the engagement of an expert if the parties were unable to agree on the terms. The court ultimately granted an injunction to compel the engagement of an expert under certain terms.

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