Michaelmas Term
[2015] UKSC 78
On appeal from: [2014] EWCA Civ 14
| JUDGMENT |
Thevarajah (Respondent) v Riordan and others (Appellants)
before
Lord Neuberger, President
Lord Mance
Lord Clarke
Lord Sumption
Lord Hodge
JUDGMENT GIVEN ON
16 December 2015
Heard on 17 November 2015
Appellants Respondent
Paul Letman Stephen Smith QC Miranda Butler James Bailey (Instructed by YVA (Instructed by Olephant Solicitors LLP) Solicitors) LORD NEUBERGER: (with whom Lord Mance, Lord Clarke, Lord
Sumption and Lord Hodge agree)1. This is an appeal against a decision of the Court of Appeal allowing the
respondent’s appeal from a decision of Mr Andrew Sutcliffe QC, sitting as a Deputy
High Court Judge, who granted the appellants relief against a debarring order, in circumstances where such relief had already been refused by another judge.
The background facts and proceedings
2. The respondent had entered into an agreement with the appellants, John Riordan and Eugene and Barrington Burke, to buy the shares which they owned in Prestige Property Develper UK Ltd. Having paid £1.572m to the appellants, the respondent sought specific performance of the agreement and associated relief, in proceedings issued in March 2013. After obtaining an initial order without notice a
week earlier, the respondent obtained a freezing order (“the freezing order”) from
Arnold J on 17 May 2013 at a hearing attended by the appellants and their legal representatives. This order required the appellants to provide by 24 May 2013 information and documents relating to all their assets, including details of all of their bank accounts and bank statements going back to 1 October 2010. The freezing order also stated that such assets extended to those held by Prestige Properties Ltd
(“the Company”). Arnold J also directed that the proceedings be heard during
October 2013.
3. The appellants did not afford the disclosure required by the freezing order by 24 May 2013, and the respondent gave them the opportunity to comply out of time. However, the appellants still failed to comply, although they gave some further
disclosure. The respondent issued an application for an “unless” order, which came
before Henderson J. On 21 June 2013, he gave a judgment in which he held that the
appellants’ disclosure was “in many respects seriously inadequate” - [2013] EWHC
3356 (Ch). He also described the failure to disclose “full bank statements for the
period of three years in the names of the relevant defendants” as a “particularly
glaring omission”. Accordingly, he made an “unless” order which required the
appellants to disclose certain identified assets that they had failed to disclose, and which also provided that, in default of compliance by 1 July 2013, the appellants would be debarred from defending the claim.
4. Although the appellants gave some further disclosure, they failed to comply
fully with the “unless” order. On 9 August 2013, Hildyard J heard (i) the
respondent’s application for an order debarring the appellants from defending as they had failed to comply with the “unless” order, and (ii) the appellants’ application
for (a) a…
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- Case
- [2015] UKSC 78
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered whether the Court of Appeal was correct in holding that the appellants were required to establish a material change of circumstances since the previous hearing to justify a second application for relief from sanctions. The Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeal rightly found that the Civil Procedure Rules applied to the second relief application and that the appellants needed to demonstrate a material change of circumstances. The Supreme Court rejected the appellants' argument that their subsequent compliance with the "unless" order constituted a material change of circumstances, holding that such compliance, subsequent to a first unsuccessful application for relief from sanctions, did not entitle them to a second application for relief from sanctions.
The Supreme Court concluded that the Court of Appeal was correct in upholding the debarring order and refusing relief from sanctions. The appeal was dismissed, and the debarring order was restored.
The final orders of the court were to dismiss the appeal and restore the debarring order imposed by Hildyard J. The appellants were debarred from defending the claim, and the respondent was entitled to proceed with the litigation without the appellants' participation.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi