Easter Term
[2020] UKSC 19
On appeal from: [2018] NICA 8
Appellant Respondent Sean Doran QC Donal Sayers BL
Tony McGleenan QC
Paul McLaughlin BL
| (Instructed by PJ McGrory | (Instructed by Director of |
& Co Solicitors)
Public Prosecutions, Public Prosecution
Service)
LORD KERR: (with whom Lady Black, Lord Lloyd-Jones, Lord Kitchin and
Lord Burnett agree)
Introduction
1. From 1922 successive items of legislation authorised the detention without trial of persons in Northern Ireland, a regime commonly known as internment. Internment was last introduced in that province on 9 August 1971. On that date and for some time following it, a large number of persons were detained. The way in which internment operated then was that initially an interim custody order (ICO) was made where the Secretary of State considered that an individual was involved in terrorism. On foot of the ICO that person was taken into custody. The person detained had to be released within 28 days unless the Chief Constable referred the matter to a commissioner. The detention continued while the commissioner considered the matter. If satisfied that the person was involved in terrorism, the commissioner would make a detention order. If not so satisfied, the release of the person detained would be ordered.
2. An ICO was made in respect of the appellant on 21 July 1973. The order was signed by a Minister of State in the Northern Ireland Office. The matter was referred to a commissioner by an Assistant Chief Constable on 10 August 1973 and the commissioner decided that the appellant should continue to be detained.
3. The appellant tried to escape from the place where he was detained on 24 December 1973. He was convicted of the offence of attempting to escape from lawful custody on 20 March 1975 and sentenced to 18 months’ imprisonment. He tried to escape again on 27 July 1974 and was convicted of a like offence on 18 April 1975 when a sentence of three years was passed, to be served consecutively to that imposed a month earlier.
The issue
4. At stake on this appeal is the validity of the ICO made on 21 July 1973. Although an ICO could be signed by a Secretary of State, a Minister of State or an Under Secretary of State, the relevant legislation provided that the statutory power to make the ICO arose “where it appears to the Secretary of State” that a person was suspected of being involved in terrorism. There is no evidence that the Secretary of State personally considered whether the appellant was involved in terrorism. On the assumption (which is common to the parties to the appeal) that he did not, the question arises whether the ICO was validly made.
5. The reason that this matter has come to light so many years after the appellant’s convictions is that under the “30-year rule” an opinion of JBE Hutton QC (later Lord Hutton of Bresagh) was uncovered. The 30-year rule is the informal name given to laws in…
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- Case
- [2020] UKSC 19
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue in this case was whether the Secretary of State was required to personally make an ICO or whether the Carltona principle applied, permitting the making of an ICO by a Minister of State. The Supreme Court found that the statutory language was clear and unambiguous, indicating that the Secretary of State alone should exercise the power to make an ICO. The Court also considered that the seriousness of the consequences of the exercise of the power was a relevant factor in determining whether the power should be exercised personally, contrary to the view of Brightman J in Golden Chemicals Products Ltd. The Court concluded that the intention of Parliament was that the Secretary of State should personally decide on the fate of a person whose detention was sought, given the momentous nature of the power invested in the Secretary of State by article 4(1) of the 1972 Order. The invalidity of the ICO led to the quashing of the appellant's convictions for the offences of attempting to escape from lawful custody.
Orders
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
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Ratio Decidendi
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