Christian Institute v Lord Advocate

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Trinity Term

[2016] UKSC 51

On appeal from: [2015] CSIH 64

JUDGMENT

The Christian Institute and others (Appellants) v The Lord Advocate (Respondent) (Scotland)

before

Lady Hale, Deputy President


Lord Wilson
Lord Reed
Lord Hughes
Lord Hodge

JUDGMENT GIVEN ON

28 July 2016

Heard on 8 and 9 March 2016

Appellants Respondent
Aidan O’Neill QC W James Wolffe QC
Laura-Anne van der Westhuizen Christine O’Neill
(Instructed by Balfour & (Instructed by Solicitor to
Manson) the Scottish Ministers)
Intervener (Community
Law Advice Network)
Ailsa Carmichael QC

(Instructed by Community

Law Advice Network)

LADY HALE, LORD REED AND LORD HODGE: (with whom Lord Wilson and Lord Hughes agree)

The background to Part 4 of the 2014 Act

1. This appeal concerns the question whether the provisions of Part 4 of the Children and Young People (Scotland) Act 2014 lie within the legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament. Before considering the issues that arise (summarised in para 26 below), it is helpful to begin with an account of the

background to the legislation. A suitable starting point is the consultation paper, “A Scotland for Children”, published by the Scottish Government in July 2012. In

general terms, two ideas underlay many of the proposals. The first was a shift away

from intervention by public authorities after a risk to children’s and young people’s

welfare had been identified, to an emphasis on early intervention to promote their wellbeing, understood as including all the factors that could affect their development. The second was a shift away from a legal structure under which the duties of statutory bodies to cooperate with one another (under, for example, section 13 of the National Health Service (Scotland) Act 1978 and section 21 of the Children (Scotland) Act 1995) were linked to the performance of their individual functions,

to ensuring that they work collaboratively and share relevant information so that “all

relevant public services can support the whole wellbeing of children and young

people” (para 73). In that regard, the consultation paper stated that it was “essential

that information is shared not only in response to a crisis or serious occurrence but, in many cases, information should be shared about relevant changes in a child's and

young person’s life”. There was, however, “no commonly agreed process for routine

information sharing about concerns about wellbeing” (para 110). The establishment

of a new professional role, that of named person, was proposed in order to address
those concerns (para 111).

2. On its introduction in April 2013, the Children and Young People (Scotland) Bill was accompanied by a Policy Memorandum which was similar in content to the consultation paper. It stated, in relation to named persons:

“They can monitor what children and young people need,

within the context of their professional responsibilities, link with the relevant services that can help them, and be a single point of contact for services that children and families can use, if they wish. The named person is in a position to intervene early to prevent difficulties escalating. The…

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Details
Case
[2016] UKSC 51
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal was heard by the UK Supreme Court, which was required to determine the question whether the provisions of Part 4 of the Children and Young People (Scotland) Act 2014 lie within the legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament. The appellants contended that the provisions relating to the disclosure of information about children and young people, and the retention of that information, relate to reserved matters, with the consequence that section 29(2)(b) of the Scotland Act 1998 applies. The Court concluded that the provisions in question do relate to reserved matters, in that they have the effect of overriding certain of the requirements of the Data Protection Act 1998. In particular, the provisions in question permit the disclosure of personal data which is not "relevant" to the purpose or purposes for which it is processed, whereas the Act requires that such data must be "relevant". The Court noted that it is necessary to have both the 2014 Act and the DPA in hand to work out the cumulative effect of their provisions. However, the Court considered that it should invite the parties to produce written submissions on the terms of a section 102 order within 42 days of the date of this judgment, and make an order allowing the Scottish Parliament and the Scottish Ministers an opportunity, if so advised, to correct the defects which had been identified. The court which is best placed to make such further orders may be the Court of Session. In the meantime, since the defective provisions are not within the legislative competence of the Parliament, they cannot be brought into force.

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