Young v The Queen

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW ZEALAND
SC 21/2006
[2006] NZSC 38
DAVID JOHN YOUNG
v
THE QUEEN
Court:Elias CJ, Blanchard and Tipping JJ
Counsel:Appellant in Person

M D Downs for Crown

Judgment:6 June 2006

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

THE APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL IS DISMISSED.
REASONS
[1]       The applicant was convicted at jury trial in the District Court of possessing an airgun other than for some lawful, proper and sufficient purpose, contrary to s 45(1) of the Arms Act 1983. It was contended before the jury that the weapon possessed by the applicant was not an airgun. Expert evidence for the Crown that the weapon acknowledged by the applicant to have been carried by him was indeed an airgun seems to have been accepted by the jury.
[2]       On appeal, the applicant argued that the Judge had misdirected the jury as to the application of s 48, which justifies the use of force in self-defence. He contended that he was in possession of the airgun for the purposes of self-defence, having been previously threatened by the complainants. The Judge directed the jury that there was no evidence to form a foundation for self-defence and that therefore self-defence was not a justification for the possession of the firearm.
[3]       The applicant seeks leave to appeal from the judgment of the Court of Appeal. In submissions filed in support of the application he contends that it is necessary in the interests of justice for the Supreme Court to grant leave to appeal because of the importance of the right of self-defence under s 48 of the Crimes Act and on the basis of the right to natural justice recognised by s 27(1) of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990.
[4]       The conclusion of the Court of Appeal that there was no evidential foundation on which a jury could conclude that the applicant was in possession of the airgun for the lawful purpose of self-defence meant that the issue of self-defence was rightly withheld from the jury by the Judge. It was held in R v Wang[1] that the defence should not be put to the jury unless there is a credible or plausative narrative for the purpose of self-defence. The application of this settled law to the evidence in the trial raises no point of principle and was undoubtedly correct. No question of miscarriage of justice arises. Nor are any of the other grounds under s 13(1) made out. The application for leave to appeal is dismissed.
[1] [1990] 2 NZLR 529 at 533.
Solicitors:
Crown Law Office, Wellington

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of David John Young v The Queen, the applicant, David John Young, sought leave to appeal against his conviction for possessing an airgun without a lawful, proper, and sufficient purpose. The conviction was upheld by the Court of Appeal, and Young applied to the Supreme Court of New Zealand for leave to appeal. The court dismissed the application for leave to appeal. The central issue in this case was whether the trial judge had misdirected the jury regarding the application of section 48 of the Crimes Act, which justifies the use of force in self-defence. Young argued that he possessed the airgun for the purpose of self-defence, having been previously threatened by the complainants. However, the trial judge found that there was no evidence to support the self-defence claim, and this conclusion was upheld by the Court of Appeal. The Supreme Court found that the trial judge's direction to the jury was in accordance with established law, and the application for leave to appeal was dismissed. The court held that there was no evidential foundation for the jury to conclude that Young possessed the airgun for the lawful purpose of self-defence. The court also noted that the issue of self-defence was rightly withheld from the jury by the trial judge, as per the decision in R v Wang. The court found that no point of principle was raised, and no miscarriage of justice arose from the trial judge's direction to the jury. The application for leave to appeal was dismissed.

The Supreme Court of New Zealand concluded that the trial judge's direction to the jury was correct, and there was no evidential foundation for the jury to conclude that the applicant possessed the airgun for the lawful purpose of self-defence. The court found that the issue of self-defence was rightly withheld from the jury by the trial judge, as per the decision in R v Wang. The court held that no point of principle was raised, and no miscarriage of justice arose from the trial judge's direction to the jury. The application for leave to appeal was dismissed, and the conviction was upheld. The court found that the trial judge's direction to the jury was in accordance with established law, and the applicant's argument that the right to self-defence under section 48 of the Crimes Act and the right to natural justice recognised by section 27(1) of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 were not enough to warrant leave to appeal. The court held that the application for leave to appeal was dismissed, and the conviction was upheld.

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Orders of the court

Background to the litigation

Evidence Before The Court

Reasons for decision

Legal Principle Established