Young v KPSS New Zealand Limited

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND DUNEDIN REGISTRY

CIV-2011-412-000314 [2012] NZHC 305

UNDER  the District Courts Act 1947

IN THE MATTER OF     an appeal pursuant to s 72 of the District

Courts Act 1947

BETWEEN  PHILIP JOHN YOUNG Appellant

ANDKPSS NEW ZEALAND LIMITED Respondent

Counsel:         L A Andersen for Appellant

B L Gray for Respondent

Judgment:      29 February 2012

JUDGMENT OF HON JUSTICE FRENCH

as to Costs

Introduction

[1]      Mr Young wanted to set aside a judgment obtained against him by KPSS in the District Court.  His solicitors had overlooked filing a statement of defence and KPSS had obtained the judgment by default.  Mr Young applied to have it set aside, but the application was refused by a District Court Judge.  Mr Young then appealed that decision to this Court.  I upheld his appeal and set the judgment aside.

[2]      There is now an argument about the costs of the appeal and about costs in the

District Court.

YOUNG V KPSS NEW ZEALAND LIMITED HC DUN CIV-2011-412-000314 [29 February 2012]

Discussion

[3]      A party seeking to set aside a judgment entered because of its own default is seeking the Court’s indulgence.  Thus, costs are generally awarded to the other side even if the application is granted.[1]

[1] Active Leisure (Sports) Pty Ltd v Crocodile Sports and Leisurewear Ltd [1997] 1 NZLR 350 at

358 (HC); Callis v Ward McCulloch (1993) 7 PRNZ 175 at 176 (HC).

[4]      KPSS accordingly argues that it is entitled to costs on the appeal to this

Court.  It seeks costs in the sum of $2632.

[5]      However,  the  reason  I  set  the  judgment  aside  was  because  I  considered Mr Young had a complete defence to the claim.  Or, to put it another way, KPSS had a judgment to which it was not entitled and would never be entitled.  It was not the usual situation where the default judgment is set aside and the case set down for a defended hearing.  My decision amounted to a final disposition.

[6]      In my view, in those circumstances the general rule about indulgences should not apply.  Rather, costs should follow the event and be awarded to the successful appellant.

[7]      Mr Young’s  costs,  calculated  on  a 2B basis  together  with  disbursements,

amount to $4378.30.

[8]      However, that is not the end of the story.   There are other complicating factors in this case.  In order to explain these I need to set out some more detail of the surrounding facts.

[9]      Mr Young was formerly the director of a company called Ricochet.   On 9

December 2008, Ricochet went into liquidation owing $4436.21 to KPSS.

[10]     In mid-2009, KPSS made demand of Mr Young under a personal guarantee

he  had  signed,  guaranteeing  payment  of  Ricochet’s  debt.    Mr Young  (wrongly)

resisted payment and applied to the Disputes Tribunal for relief.

[11]     The Disputes Tribunal (wrongly) granted him partial relief.  KPSS appealed, and on 19 April 2010 the District Court quashed the Disputes Tribunal decision.  The Judge did not award costs on…

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Details
Case
[2012] NZHC 305
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This case involves an appeal by Philip John Young against a decision of the District Court, which refused his application to set aside a default judgment obtained by KPSS New Zealand Limited. The default judgment was entered against Mr Young due to his solicitors' failure to file a statement of defence. After the District Court's refusal to set aside the judgment, Mr Young appealed to the High Court, which upheld his appeal and set the judgment aside. The primary legal issue in this case was whether Mr Young was entitled to costs on the appeal to the High Court, given that he was seeking to set aside a judgment obtained by default. The court noted that, in general, a party seeking to set aside a judgment due to their own default is seeking the court's indulgence, and costs are usually awarded to the other side. However, the court determined that in this case, the general rule about indulgences should not apply because the court found that Mr Young had a complete defence to the claim, and KPSS was not entitled to the judgment. Therefore, the court decided that costs should follow the event and be awarded to the successful appellant, Mr Young. The court calculated Mr Young's costs on a 2B basis, along with disbursements, and came to a total of $4378.30. However, the court made adjustments to the costs to account for the costs incurred by KPSS in enforcing the guarantee and the interest on the principal debt. The court also quashed the costs orders on the application to set aside and the stay application, stating that they could not stand in light of the court's decision. The final order of the court was that Mr Young was to receive costs on the appeal to the High Court, calculated in accordance with the formula provided in the judgment. The costs awarded by the District Court on the stay application and the application to set aside were quashed.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established