| IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF NEW ZEALAND | CA 103/99 |
| BETWEEN | HIDEO YOSHIMOTO |
| Appellant | |
| AND | CANTERBURY GOLF INTERNATIONAL LIMITED |
| Respondent |
| Hearing: | 22 March 2000 |
| Coram: | Thomas J Doogue J Salmon J |
| Appearances: | F B Barton for Appellant |
| A J P More and L J Semple for Respondent | |
| Judgment: | 27 November 2000 |
| JUDGMENTS OF THE COURT |
THOMAS J
Introduction
The Court faces a difficult question of interpretation. A commercial contract is in issue. A particular clause might be said to have a plain meaning, and was held to have such a plain meaning by the Judge at first instance. The context, the commercial objective of the contract and its contractual matrix, however, point away from that meaning. In addition, reliable extrinsic evidence is available which confirms that this plain meaning is not what the parties actually intended. The question of interpretation, therefore, involves an examination of the contract, the commercial objective of the contract and the contractual matrix. The extrinsic evidence and the admissibility of that evidence must also be considered. Finally, the question arises whether, having regard to the approach of the English courts and bearing in mind that this Court is not the final appellate Court in this jurisdiction, it is open to it to have regard to such evidence and so give effect to the actual intention of the parties.
The appellant, Mr Yoshimoto, is a Japanese businessman. As from November 1995, he owned all of the shares in a company named New Zealand Plan International Limited (NZPIL). NZPIL was formed to promote and develop an international golf course known as “The Lagoons” on the outskirts of Christchurch. The respondent, Canterbury Golf International Ltd (CGI), developed an interest in buying the shares in NZPIL.
On 14 March 1996, Mr Yoshimoto and CGI entered into a contract whereby Mr Yoshimoto agreed to sell all the NZPIL shares in return for a total sum of $3.4 million. This sum was payable in three instalments. Two million dollars was payable by 22 April 1996. This sum was duly paid. A further $1 million was payable provided the necessary planning authorisations or resource consents were secured within 12 months so as to enable the development to proceed. The final $400,000 was payable when CGI signed unconditional agreements for the sale of ten of the proposed 30 villas on the course.
The main issue in this appeal is whether the condition precedent for the payment of the $1 million, that is, securing the necessary authorisations or resource consents within 12 months, was satisfied. There is no dispute as to the sum of $400,000 which is not yet due. Notwithstanding that the development can proceed, CGI rely upon what it claims are the plain terms of the contract to resist this claim. The second issue in this appeal is related to the first. It is whether CGI misrepresented to Mr Yoshimoto that the various consents would be obtained by approximately September 1996. It is alleged that this was an untrue statement about a present…
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- Case
- [2000] NZCA 350
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
Background
Background to the litigation
The case was initially heard by Panckhurst J in the High Court at Christchurch on 9 February 1999. Panckhurst J ruled that the condition precedent in clause 6.3 had not been met as the resource consent under the Proposed Plan was necessary for the development and had not been obtained within the time specified in the contract. Consequently, CGI was not liable for the extra $1 million. Yoshimoto's claim that he was induced to enter into the contract by a misrepresentation was also dismissed. Yoshimoto appealed this decision to the Court of Appeal of New Zealand, where the appeal was heard on 22 March 2000, with judgments delivered on 27 November 2000.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the condition precedent for the payment of the $1 million, that is, securing the necessary authorisations or resource consents within 12 months, was satisfied.
2. Whether CGI misrepresented to Yoshimoto that the various consents would be obtained by approximately September 1996.
3. Whether reliable extrinsic evidence confirms that the parties did not intend a consent under the Proposed Plan to be a “necessary” consent for the purposes of clause 6.3.
Held
1. The Court held that the condition precedent for the payment of the $1 million, which required securing the necessary authorisations or resource consents within 12 months, was not satisfied as the consent under the Proposed Plan was not "necessary" within the meaning of the contract.
2. The Court held that CGI did not misrepresent to Yoshimoto that the various consents would be obtained by approximately September 1996, as the statement was a genuinely held opinion.
3. The Court held that reliable extrinsic evidence confirmed that the parties did not intend a consent under the Proposed Plan to be a "necessary" consent for the purposes of clause 6.3.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Court considered the interpretation of clause 6.3 of the contract, which required CGI to obtain all necessary authorisations or resource consents to the development within 12 months for the payment of the $1 million. The Court found that the consent under the Proposed Plan was not "necessary" within the meaning of the contract, as the parties did not intend it to be a necessary consent when they entered into the agreement. The Court examined the contract, the commercial objective of the contract, and the contractual matrix, which all pointed away from the plain meaning of the clause. The Court also considered the extrinsic evidence, including prior drafts of the contract and a recital that was later removed, which confirmed that the parties had intended the necessary consents to be those which had been applied for and were in train. The Court concluded that the extrinsic evidence was reliable and assisted in determining the parties' actual intention, which was not to include a consent under the Proposed Plan as a necessary consent. However, the Court noted that it might not be open to it to have regard to the extrinsic evidence due to the law as applied in England, which takes a more literal approach to contractual interpretation. The Court ultimately allowed the appeal, finding that the consent under the Proposed Plan did not fall within the purview of clause 6.3.