Yoshimoto v Canterbury Golf International Ltd

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF NEW ZEALAND CA 103/99
BETWEEN HIDEO YOSHIMOTO

Appellant

AND CANTERBURY GOLF INTERNATIONAL LIMITED

Respondent

Hearing: 22 March 2000
Coram: Thomas J
Doogue J
Salmon J
Appearances: F B Barton for Appellant

A J P More and L J Semple for Respondent

Judgment: 27 November 2000

JUDGMENTS OF THE COURT

THOMAS J

Introduction

  1. The Court faces a difficult question of interpretation.  A commercial contract is in issue.  A particular clause might be said to have a plain meaning, and was held to have such a plain meaning by the Judge at first instance.  The context, the commercial objective of the contract and its contractual matrix, however, point away from that meaning.  In addition, reliable extrinsic evidence is available which confirms that this plain meaning is not what the parties actually intended.  The question of interpretation, therefore, involves an examination of the contract, the commercial objective of the contract and the contractual matrix.  The extrinsic evidence and the admissibility of that evidence must also be considered.  Finally, the question arises whether, having regard to the approach of the English courts and bearing in mind that this Court is not the final appellate Court in this jurisdiction, it is open to it to have regard to such evidence and so give effect to the actual intention of the parties.

  2. The appellant, Mr Yoshimoto, is a Japanese businessman.  As from November 1995, he owned all of the shares in a company named New Zealand Plan International Limited (NZPIL).  NZPIL was formed to promote and develop an international golf course known as “The Lagoons” on the outskirts of Christchurch.  The respondent, Canterbury Golf International Ltd (CGI), developed an interest in buying the shares in NZPIL.

  3. On 14 March 1996, Mr Yoshimoto and CGI entered into a contract whereby Mr Yoshimoto agreed to sell all the NZPIL shares in return for a total sum of $3.4 million.  This sum was payable in three instalments.  Two million dollars was payable by 22 April 1996.  This sum was duly paid.  A further $1 million was payable provided the necessary planning authorisations or resource consents were secured within 12 months so as to enable the development to proceed.  The final $400,000 was payable when CGI signed unconditional agreements for the sale of ten of the proposed 30 villas on the course.

  4. The main issue in this appeal is whether the condition precedent for the payment of the $1 million, that is, securing the necessary authorisations or resource consents within 12 months, was satisfied.  There is no dispute as to the sum of $400,000 which is not yet due.  Notwithstanding that the development can proceed, CGI rely upon what it claims are the plain terms of the contract to resist this claim.  The second issue in this appeal is related to the first.  It is whether CGI misrepresented to Mr Yoshimoto that the various consents would be obtained by approximately September 1996.  It is alleged that this was an untrue statement about a present…

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Details
Case
[2000] NZCA 350
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This appeal concerns the interpretation of a clause in a contract between the appellant, Mr Yoshimoto, and the respondent, Canterbury Golf International Ltd (CGI), relating to the sale of shares in a company. The main issue is whether CGI was required to obtain certain planning authorisations or resource consents within 12 months to trigger the payment of $1 million, and the secondary issue is whether CGI misrepresented that these consents would be obtained by a certain date. The Court of Appeal held that the consent under the Proposed Plan was not a "necessary" consent for the purposes of the contract, and that the appeal should be allowed. The Court did not consider it open to them to have regard to extrinsic evidence to determine the parties' actual intention, as this would likely be contrary to the law as applied in England, which the Privy Council is likely to follow. The Court awarded costs to the appellant and remitted the matter to the High Court to determine the question of interest.

Background

Background to the litigation

In November 1995, Hideo Yoshimoto owned all shares in New Zealand Plan International Limited (NZPIL), a company focused on developing an international golf course known as “The Lagoons” near Christchurch. Canterbury Golf International Ltd (CGI) developed an interest in buying NZPIL's shares. On 14 March 1996, Yoshimoto and CGI entered into a contract for the sale of all NZPIL shares for a total of $3.4 million, payable in three instalments. The first $2 million was paid by 22 April 1996. The second $1 million was contingent on obtaining necessary planning authorisations or resource consents within 12 months to enable development. The final $400,000 was to be paid when CGI signed agreements for the sale of ten villas on the course. Yoshimoto claimed CGI failed to secure necessary resource consents within the stipulated 12 months, thus not fulfilling the condition for the payment of the second $1 million. CGI denied this, arguing that the consents under the Proposed Christchurch City District Plan were not necessary for the development. The case revolves around whether the consents under the Proposed Plan were indeed necessary as per the contract terms.

The case was initially heard by Panckhurst J in the High Court at Christchurch on 9 February 1999. Panckhurst J ruled that the condition precedent in clause 6.3 had not been met as the resource consent under the Proposed Plan was necessary for the development and had not been obtained within the time specified in the contract. Consequently, CGI was not liable for the extra $1 million. Yoshimoto's claim that he was induced to enter into the contract by a misrepresentation was also dismissed. Yoshimoto appealed this decision to the Court of Appeal of New Zealand, where the appeal was heard on 22 March 2000, with judgments delivered on 27 November 2000.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Whether the condition precedent for the payment of the $1 million, that is, securing the necessary authorisations or resource consents within 12 months, was satisfied.
2. Whether CGI misrepresented to Yoshimoto that the various consents would be obtained by approximately September 1996.
3. Whether reliable extrinsic evidence confirms that the parties did not intend a consent under the Proposed Plan to be a “necessary” consent for the purposes of clause 6.3.

Held
1. The Court held that the condition precedent for the payment of the $1 million, which required securing the necessary authorisations or resource consents within 12 months, was not satisfied as the consent under the Proposed Plan was not "necessary" within the meaning of the contract.
2. The Court held that CGI did not misrepresent to Yoshimoto that the various consents would be obtained by approximately September 1996, as the statement was a genuinely held opinion.
3. The Court held that reliable extrinsic evidence confirmed that the parties did not intend a consent under the Proposed Plan to be a "necessary" consent for the purposes of clause 6.3.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Court considered the interpretation of clause 6.3 of the contract, which required CGI to obtain all necessary authorisations or resource consents to the development within 12 months for the payment of the $1 million. The Court found that the consent under the Proposed Plan was not "necessary" within the meaning of the contract, as the parties did not intend it to be a necessary consent when they entered into the agreement. The Court examined the contract, the commercial objective of the contract, and the contractual matrix, which all pointed away from the plain meaning of the clause. The Court also considered the extrinsic evidence, including prior drafts of the contract and a recital that was later removed, which confirmed that the parties had intended the necessary consents to be those which had been applied for and were in train. The Court concluded that the extrinsic evidence was reliable and assisted in determining the parties' actual intention, which was not to include a consent under the Proposed Plan as a necessary consent. However, the Court noted that it might not be open to it to have regard to the extrinsic evidence due to the law as applied in England, which takes a more literal approach to contractual interpretation. The Court ultimately allowed the appeal, finding that the consent under the Proposed Plan did not fall within the purview of clause 6.3.