IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW ZEALAND
SC 61/2006
[2006] NZSC 82
BETWEENYI HUA JIAO & ORS
Applicants
ANDIVAN BARGE
Respondent
Court:Blanchard, Tipping and McGrath JJ
Counsel:Applicants in Person
M J Fisher for Respondent
Judgment:2 October 2006
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
THE APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL IS DISMISSED WITH COSTS OF $2,500 TO THE RESPONDENT. THE APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO ADDUCE FURTHER EVIDENCE IS ALSO DISMISSED.
REASONS
[1] The applicants have sought leave to appeal against the Court of Appeal’s dismissal of determinations by the High Court that (a) the applicants induced a breach of a contract of sale and purchase of land to which the respondent, Mr Barge, was a party as purchaser and (b) the applicants were parties to an unlawful means conspiracy, causing loss to Mr Barge. An inquiry into damages has been ordered by the High Court.
[2] The proposed appeal concerns factual issues only. It raises nothing of general or public importance. Furthermore, the applicants appear to wish to run arguments not actually advanced in the Court of Appeal. They say there was never a binding agreement between the vendor of the land, Freeport, and Mr Barge because the person who signed on behalf of Freeport, Ms Chu, did not hold a valid power of attorney from Freeport. Alternatively, the applicants wish to argue that they had no reason to know when entering into the arrangements to buy the Bank of New Zealand’s mortgage and precipitate the default by Freeport, that Ms Chu had no authority to bind the company when she signed the agreement on its behalf.
[3] There is an application for the Court to admit further evidence. It is neither fresh nor cogent. Indeed, the evidence appears to confirm that, whether or not Ms Chu held a valid power of attorney from the company at the relevant time, she was nevertheless acting as an authorised agent of the directors of the company. Whilst it is necessary for a contract for the sale of land, or a memorandum of its terms, to be in writing, there is no requirement that an agent who is authorised to sign on behalf of the party has herself to have been appointed in writing.[1] So a continuing oral authority from the directors of the company would have been enough to enable her to bind it by signing the contract document.
[1]Maclean v Dunn (1828) 4 Bing 722; 130 ER 947; Auckland Bus Co Ltd v New Lynn Borough [1965] NZLR at 553 (North P), addressing s 2(2) Contracts Enforcement Act 1956.
[4] The suggestion that the applicants had no reason to think that there was a valid contract can be met with the rather obvious response “Why then did you bother to go through the elaborate arrangements which the Court of Appeal fairly described as a spider’s web?” It is implausible.
[5] None of the criteria for leave in s 13 of the Supreme Court Act 2003 has been met.
Solicitors:
Murdoch Price, Papatoetoe for Applicants
Castle Brown, Auckland for Respondent
- AGLC
- Yi Hua Jiao v Ivan Barge [2006] NZSC 82
- Case
- [2006] NZSC 82
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues that the Court had to address were whether the applicants could appeal the Court of Appeal’s decision on the grounds that the applicants wished to run arguments not actually advanced in the Court of Appeal, and whether the application for leave to adduce further evidence was fresh and cogent. The Court had to determine if the arguments presented by the applicants met the criteria for leave under section 13 of the Supreme Court Act 2003.
The Court found that the applicants' proposed appeal did not concern any issues of general or public importance and did not meet the criteria for leave to appeal. The Court also found that the application for leave to adduce further evidence was not fresh or cogent. The evidence presented appeared to confirm that the agent who signed the contract on behalf of the company had authority to bind the company, regardless of whether she held a valid power of attorney or not. The Court found that the applicants’ suggestion that they had no reason to think there was a valid contract was implausible and did not meet the criteria for leave to appeal.
The Supreme Court dismissed the application for leave to appeal with costs of $2,500 to the respondent and also dismissed the application for leave to adduce further evidence. The Court concluded that the applicants had not met the criteria for leave to appeal under section 13 of the Supreme Court Act 2003.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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