Wu v Young
[2025] NZHC 1399
•4 June 2025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY
I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TĀMAKI MAKAURAU ROHE
CIV-2024-404-3073 [2025] NZHC 1399
UNDER Sections 142 and 148 of the Land Transfer Act 2017 BETWEEN
SHUANG WU
Applicant
AND
JINYUE YOUNG
Respondent
Hearing: On the papers Appearances:
L Gellert and Z Zhao for the Applicant J Young, Respondent, in Person
Judgment:
4 June 2025
JUDGMENT OF ASSOCIATE JUDGE SUSSOCK
This judgment was delivered by me on 4 June 2025 at 10 am pursuant to r 11.5 of the High Court Rules
Registrar/Deputy Registrar
Solicitors:
Lowndes Jordan, Auckland
WU v YOUNG [2025] NZHC 1399 [4 June 2025]
Introduction
[1] I issued a judgment on 11 December 2024 granting an urgent application by Shuang Wu for removal of a caveat (Judgment).1 In addition, I held that compensation was payable pursuant to s 148 of the Land Transfer Act 2017 (LTA) as the respondent, Jinyue Young, did not have an honest belief on reasonable grounds that he personally had a proprietary right in the properties in issue at the time the caveat was lodged.2 I made directions for further memoranda and evidence to be filed setting out the losses for which compensation was claimed by Mr Wu and allowing the respondent, Mr Young, to respond.
[2] A memorandum has been filed on behalf of Mr Wu with accompanying documents seeking compensation of $47,504.16, including for reimbursement of an airfare, disbursements and legal fees on a solicitor-client basis. Mr Young has filed a lengthy memorandum in response, opposing any award of compensation, and a memorandum has been filed on behalf of Mr Wu in reply.
[3] As set out above, I have already determined that compensation is payable so this judgment relates only to the quantum of compensation to be awarded.
[4] I discuss each category of compensation sought below, beginning with legal fees as they make up the largest proportion of the compensation claimed, $45,750.20 of $47,504.16 in total.
Legal fees
[5] Mr Wu seeks compensation for legal fees incurred on a solicitor-client basis for all matters relating to the caveat including preliminary advice and the applications to remove and for compensation, as charged in the following three invoices:
1 Wu v Young [2024] NZHC 3776.
2 At [54].
Date Invoice No Amount 29 November 2024 082540 $22,120.20 6 December 2024 082550 $18,240.00 13 December 2024 082555 $5,390.00 Total $45,750.20
[6] Counsel for Mr Wu submits in reliance on Alabaster v Parkin and Cotton v Keogh that the appropriate award is the amount of loss that the claimant has in fact incurred and that this includes reimbursement for reasonable solicitor-client costs arising out of dealing with the caveat issues as set out in the invoices above.3
[7] Particulars of the attendances to which the invoices relate are set out in two emails from Mr Zhao of Lowndes Jordan to Mr Wu, one each for invoices 082540 and 082550, together with the WIP report for invoice 082555. The emails are in Chinese but an English translation has been provided.
[8] The memorandum filed by Mr Young in response does not address the particulars provided or the quantum of loss claimed under s 148 to any great extent. Instead, Mr Young sets out what would be points of appeal in relation to both the decisions to grant the application to remove the caveat and to grant Mr Wu compensation under s 148 of the LTA. However, no appeal of the Judgment has been filed in either regard.
[9] The section of Mr Young’s submissions that does address quantum states as follows:
The winning party unnecessarily increased costs-
13. Wu’s counsel submitted a lot of irrelevant precedents and even my discipline history. Wu provided a lot of precedents but did not cite them. In other words, Wu simply submits the thick bundle to show he deserves the cost. An experienced counsel should not spend so much time dealing with such a simple case. For instance, Frank Deliu charged about $16,000 for a similar case CIV-2017-404-705. Wu’s cost to prepare my discipline history and the bundle of useless precedents should be deducted.
3 Alabaster v Parkin HC Wellington CP387/93, 2 October 1996 at 39–40 (the judgment was appealed to the Court of Appeal but not on this point) and Cotton v Keogh [1995] 3 NZLR 236 (HC) at 241–242.
[10] I accept that where compensation is awarded under s 148, the solicitor-client costs included for reimbursement must be reasonable and must directly relate to the issues arising from the lodging of the caveat.
[11] However, I do not consider Mr Wu’s counsel submitted irrelevant precedents or that authorities were included to justify costs as Mr Young submits.
[12] The English translations of the emails particularising the attendances set out the work completed each day and include a breakdown of the hours spent by Mr Zhao and his supervising lawyers. The narrations record on a number of occasions that not all of the time spent was charged for various reasons, including for example, because the outcome of a callover was that the work could have been completed by one, rather than two lawyers.
[13] From the email narrations and other documents filed, I am satisfied in relation to the solicitor-client costs claimed that:
(a)all attendances directly relate to matters arising as a consequence of the lodging of the caveat and the related applications, including in response to Mr Young’s various correspondence and pleadings;
(b)Mr Wu wrote to Mr Young on 25 November 2024, requesting the removal of the caveat and informing Mr Young of the settlement date of the sale of the properties, but despite this request, Mr Young failed to remove the caveat;
(c)due to the time period between receiving instructions and settlement of the sale of the properties, it was appropriate for Mr Wu to issue the application to remove in the absence of Mr Young’s prompt removal of the caveat; and
(d)the amounts claimed are legal fees incurred by Mr Wu due to the lodging of the caveat, are reasonable and are of the type appropriately claimed.
[14] Mr Young further alleges that Mr Wu sought to rely on hearsay evidence in respect of Mr Young’s disciplinary history, evidence which ought not to have been admitted.
[15] This would properly be a point on appeal from the Judgment rather than a response to the appropriate level of compensation. In any event, s 18 of the Evidence Act 2006 permits hearsay statements in certain circumstances, including where the Judge considers that undue expense or delay would be caused if the maker of the statement were required to be a witness.
[16] I am satisfied it was appropriate to admit this evidence as Mr Young’s disciplinary history and his current status as a lawyer was relevant to determining whether there were reasonable grounds for his belief of a proprietary interest in the property as part of the test for whether s 148 compensation is payable.
[17] In addition, Mr Young repeats the submissions made at the caveat hearing and afterwards that he acted in the public interest in lodging the caveat. As held in the Judgment, this is not a proper basis for lodging a caveat.4 He also continues to make serious allegations without any foundation in relation to counsel for Mr Wu but not in terms of the amounts invoiced.
[18] As I have found that the amounts claimed are reasonable, relate directly to the caveat lodged and that none of the matters raised by Mr Young provide a basis for reducing the amount of solicitor-client costs awarded, the full amount claimed by Mr Wu of $45,750.20 is included in the compensation awarded below.
Disbursements
[19] Mr Wu has provided evidence of incurring the following disbursements (all exclusive of GST):
(a) Process server fees for delivering urgent letter to Respondent on 25 November
2024, requesting the removal of caveat
$260
4 Wu v Young, above n 1, at [53].
(b) Landonline searches on 26 November
2024 of the Properties
$12.00 (c) Landonline searches on 28 November 2024 of the Properties (to review
whether caveat had been removed as per Respondent’s various communications)
$6.00 (d) Landonline searches on 29 November 2024 of the Properties
(exhibits to Supplementary Affidavit)
$12.00 (e) High Court filing fee: originating
application
$610.43 (f) Process server fees for service of proceedings on the Respondent on 29 November 2024 on an urgent basis,
including urgent affidavit of service
$375.40 (g) Travel to High Court for initial callover
on 3 December 2024
$9.72 (h) High Court filing fee: defended hearing $226.09 (i) Travel to High Court for defended
hearing on 6 December 2024
$9.72 (j) Travel to High Court for urgent sealing
of order on 12 December 2024
$12.70 (k) High Court sealing fee $56.52 Total $1,590.58
[20] Copies of the two invoices issued by process servers in relation to the amounts at (a) and (f) above are attached to Mr Wu’s memorandum. The balance of the disbursements are detailed in Lowndes Jordan’s invoices 82540, 82550, and 82555, copies of which are also attached. I am satisfied the disbursements directly relate to advising on the caveat and the application to remove it and are appropriately included in the compensation awarded.
Airfare
[21] Mr Wu claims for a domestic airfare in China as he was required to travel to Beijing to have his affidavit sworn at the New Zealand Embassy to avoid any issues arising from swearing his affidavit overseas. I accept that this was appropriate and so include the expense of this airfare, $163.68, in the compensation order made.
[22] In the Judgment I recorded that Mr Wu was also seeking compensation to cover an airfare for his wife, Ms Su, to travel to New Zealand to complete her affidavit. Counsel advise that they have been instructed that Mr Wu’s wife has not retained a copy of her record of expenses for travelling from China to New Zealand and so Mr Wu is no longer seeking compensation for Ms Su’s airfare.
Result
[23] The respondent, Jinyue Young, is to pay the applicant, Shuang Wu, $47,504.16 as compensation pursuant to s 148 of the Land Transfer Act 2017, comprising:
(a)legal fees on a solicitor-client basis: $45,750.20.
(b)disbursements: $1,590.58; and
(c)reimbursement of airfare: $163.38.
Associate Judge Sussock
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