Wright v Wilson-Wright
[2025] NZHC 2192
•6 August 2025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND CHRISTCHURCH REGISTRY
I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA ŌTAUTAHI ROHE
CRI-2025-409-128
[2025] NZHC 2192
BETWEEN KEEGAN WRIGHT
(also known as KEEGAN JAMES KANE WILSON-WRIGHT)
Appellant
AND
NEW ZEALAND POLICE
Respondent
Hearing: 31 July 2025 Appearances:
E McElrea and P-F (C) Lee for the Appellant P J Brand for the Respondent
Judgment:
6 August 2025
JUDGMENT OF HARLAND J
Introduction
[1] The appellant appeals against a sentence of 27 months' imprisonment imposed in the Christchurch District Court by Judge Couch on 21 May 20251 in respect of charges of recklessly impeding breathing,2 assault on a person in a family relationship3 and two charges of contravening a protection order.4 He submits the starting point adopted by the Judge was too high and that the Judge ought to have allowed additional credit for background factors relevant to s 27 of the Sentencing Act 2002 but did not do so. In combination, the appellant submits this has led to a manifestly excessive sentence being imposed upon him.
1 Police v Wright [2025] NZDC 11246.
2 Crimes Act 1961, s 189A(b)—maximum penalty seven years' imprisonment.
3 Crimes Act, s 194A—maximum penalty two years' imprisonment.
4 Family Violence Act 2018, ss 90(a) and (b), and 112(1)(a)—maximum penalty three years' imprisonment.
WRIGHT v POLICE [2025] NZHC 2192 [6 August 2025]
[2] The respondent opposes the appeal and submits the sentence imposed was not manifestly excessive.
[3] I have decided to allow the appeal. This judgment sets out my reasons for doing so.
The facts
[4] The sentence relates to two separate incidents, both of which occurred between 23 September and 11 October 2024. The appellant and the victim in both sets of offending, at that time, had been in a on and off again relationship for the previous eight years. They have one child together.
[5] On 10 May 2023, the victim obtained a temporary protection order in her favour against the appellant. This was made final on 12 June 2023.
Offending on 23 September 2024
[6] On the evening of 22 September 2024, the appellant stayed with the victim at her house overnight with her consent. The following morning, 23 September 2024, at about 11.45 am, an argument developed between them about the care of the appellant's other child. The argument escalated and the appellant took the victim's phone from the lounge and hid it. When the victim noticed her phone was missing, she told the appellant she was leaving with their child. The appellant stopped the victim leaving the property by physically holding her back and standing in the way. The victim was holding their two year old child at the time. The appellant forcefully pushed her on her shoulders with two hands while she held onto the child and she fell to the floor on her back still holding the child.
[7] The appellant then attempted to pull the child from the victim while she was on the ground, it would appear unsuccessfully. The victim got up with the child and went towards the back door.
[8] The appellant then approached the victim from behind, placing one of his arms around her neck. He pulled her towards him in a tight headlock for eight seconds.
During this time, the victim was unable to breath or speak. The appellant let the victim go and she opened the back door. The appellant slammed the wooden back door on the victim's right leg multiple times as she passed through the doorframe.
[9] The victim then ran from the back of the house to the front of the property, followed by the appellant. He wrapped one arm around her head and pulled her into his chest. The victim yelled at the neighbours to call the police. The police subsequently arrived and arrested the appellant.
[10]As a result of the incident, the victim sustained a bruise to her right outer thigh.
[11] When spoken to by the police, the appellant admitted the victim and he had argued and the argument had escalated, but did not admit all of the facts outlined above.
[12] These facts resulted in the charges of impeding breath, contravening the protection order and assault on a person in a family relationship.
[13] The appellant appeared in Court to answer the charges on 24 September 2024. He was granted bail, one of the conditions of which was that he was not to contact the victim.
Offending from 29 September to 11 October 2024
[14] Between 29 September and 11 October 2024, the appellant messaged the victim approximately 12 times on Facebook Messenger using his mother's Facebook account.
[15] The content of the messages included a photograph of the appellant's daughter, requests for updates on their child and general questions about the victim and their child's welfare. The appellant also sent a voice message in the chat talking about their child.
[16] The victim initially replied to the first message believing it was the appellant's mother messaging her. Further messages and the voice message confirmed the communications were not from the appellant's mother.
[17] The appellant admitted to sending the Facebook messages to the victim using his mother's Facebook profile.
District Court decision
[18] The Judge started his sentencing remarks by setting out the factual background referred to above. He adopted the impeding breathing charge as the lead charge but noted it was part of a sustained and a continuous attack on the victim.
[19] In fixing the starting point, the Judge also referred to certain aggravating factors in relation to this offending. First, he considered that the victim was vulnerable because she was carrying and trying to protect the parties' young child during the incident. Second he noted that, although the strangulation was short in duration, it was powerful because it prevented the victim from breathing or speaking. Third, the Judge took into account that the assault outside was to the head of the victim and, fourth, the offending was in breach of the protection order. The Judge noted that the victim had trusted the appellant to stay with her overnight but, as the offending occurred in her home, it constituted a serious breach of trust. Lastly, the Judge referred to the appellant taking the victim's phone, effectively preventing her from calling for help.
[20] The Judge also referred to two prior family violence incidents that had occurred earlier in 2024 as well as the impact of the offending on the victim's mental health, as outlined in her victim impact statement.
[21] Bearing all of these matters in mind, the Judge adopted a starting point of three years' imprisonment to reflect his view of the totality of the appellant's offending. The starting point was uplifted by four months’ to reflect the further charge of breaching the protection order between 29 September and 11 October 2024 and an uplift of three per cent was adopted to reflect that the later offending had occurred while the appellant was on bail for the charges arising from the incident on 23 September 2024.
[22] As to personal mitigating matters, the Judge adopted the maximum available allowance of 25 per cent for the appellant's guilty pleas. He also further reduced the sentence by 10 per cent because he was persuaded the appellant was committed to rehabilitation and was genuinely remorseful.
[23] The end term of 27 months' imprisonment was imposed on the lead charge of impeding breathing. The appellant was sentenced to 15 months' imprisonment on the charge of breaching the protection order on 23 September, 12 months' imprisonment on the charge of assault and four months' imprisonment on the charge of breaching the protection order between 29 September and 11 October 2024. The sentences were all directed to be served concurrently.
Discussion
[24] Appeals against sentence are allowed as of right by s 244 Criminal Procedure Act 2011 and must be determined in accordance with s 250. An appeal against sentence may be allowed by this Court only if it is satisfied that there has been an error in the imposition of the sentence and that a different sentence should be imposed.5 As the Court of Appeal commented in Tutakangahau v R, referencing the lower Court's decision, a "court will not intervene where the sentence is within the range that can property be justified by accepted sentencing principles".6 It is appropriate for this Court to intervene and substitute its own views only if the sentence being appealed is "manifestly excessive" and not justified by the relevant sentencing principles.7
[25] The appellant does not challenge the uplift for the offending between 29 September and 11 October, nor does he challenge the uplift of three per cent to reflect that this offending was on bail. But Ms McElrea submitted the starting point adopted by the Judge was too high.
[26] Although the appellant does not challenge the discounts afforded for his guilty pleas, remorse and potential for rehabilitation, Ms McElrea submits an additional deduction should be allowed to reflect his upbringing.
5 Criminal Procedure Act 2011, ss 250(2) and 250(3).
6 Tutakangahau v R [2014] NZCA 279, [2014] 3 NZLR 482 at [36].
7 Ripia v R [2011] NZCA 101 at [15].
[27]I address the issues on appeal separately.
Was the starting point appropriate?
[28] With reference to Shramka v R, Parry v Police, Jackson v Police, Oldham v R and Amituanai v Police, Ms McElrea submitted a starting point of 28 months' imprisonment was appropriate for the charge of impeding breathing,8 with an uplift of no more than four months' imprisonment for the remaining charges of assault and breach of the protection order. This would result in an overall starting point of 32 months' imprisonment.
[29] Mr Brand for the respondent submitted that a global starting point of three years' imprisonment was available for the first set of offending and, arguably, could have been higher. Although acknowledging that Shramka v R is a relevant and helpful, observed that the Court of Appeal expressly stated it was a conventional sentencing appeal and not a tariff decision.9 Counsel submitted the case on appeal involves offending that is more serious than the cases referred to by counsel for the appellant and refers to Riley v R by way of comparison.10
[30] As I have noted elsewhere, it is somewhat repugnant to compare cases of serious family violence, in particular where a victim's breath has been impeded. Despite this general observation however, an important principle of sentencing is to take into account the general desirability of consistency with appropriate sentencing levels in respect of similar offenders committing similar offences in similar circumstances. There is normally a range within which a starting point will be appropriate and the focus on appeal will be whether the adopted starting point lies within that range.
[31] I am grateful to Ms McElrea for referring me to the cases she submits support her submission that the starting point adopted by the Judge was too high. Responsibly,
Shramka v R [2022] NZCA 299, [2022] 3 NZLR 348; Parry v R [2022] NZHC 486;
Jackson v Police [2023] NZHC 1100; Oldham v R [2024] NZCA 690; and Amituanai v Police
[2024] NZHC 2715.
9 Shramka v R, above n 8, at [34].
10 Riley v R [2023] NZHC 124.
Ms McElrea submitted some of the cases are on all fours with this case. However,
Oldham v R and Amituanai v Police were the most similar.
[32] Ms McElrea suggested a starting point that would place the lead charge at the upper end of the lower level offending class identified in Shramka. The starting point adopted by the Judge would place it at the bottom end of the moderate offending class.
[33] In Oldham, the Court of Appeal considered a starting point of 28 months' imprisonment for an impeding breathing charge.11 The appellant, during an argument with the pregnant victim, took her phone, struck the victim with a back-handed blow to the face and, when she told him she was leaving, he reacted by picking her up, throwing her onto a bed and jumping on top of her. He then smothered the victim by covering her mouth with his hands and pressing down with his weight. He then put a pillow over her mouth and face and again pressed down on it with his weight preventing the victim from breathing. The victim told the police she thought she was going to die.
[34] The Court of Appeal identified various aggravating features including the vulnerability of the victim by virtue of her being pregnant and her phone being taken as well as the disparity in size and strength between the appellant and the victim.12 Further, the Court noted a history of strangulation offending and that the victim suffered enduring psychological harm as a result of it.
[35] The Court of Appeal considered that the offending was less severe than that in the moderate level of Shramka and accepted that the Judge’s starting point of 28 months’ imprisonment was not out of order and was perhaps lenient.13 An uplift of four months’ imprisonment was opposed for the male assaults female charge.
[36] Ms McElrea submitted the case involved more serious offending because of its duration and the prior history of strangulation of this victim.
11 Oldham v R, above n 8.
12 At [15].
13 At [23].
[37] In Amituanai v Police, a starting point of 30 months’ imprisonment for the lead offence of strangulation was upheld on appeal with a further uplift of three months for the accompanying other offending.14
[38] In that case, the appellant was at the victim’s property where her two young children were also present. There was an argument, and the appellant grabbed the victim by the hair and dragged her into a room, jumped on top of her and punched her numerous times all over her body. He then placed her in a headlock with his arm wrapped around her neck, placing his hand over her mouth and nose.
[39] Ms McElrea submitted that the offending in this case was less serious because the violence and injuries in Amituanai were more severe.
[40] It is also instructive to refer to Jackson v Police, which Ms McElrea submitted was of assistance in relation to the starting point for the strangulation charge.15 In that case, an argument occurred, and the victim said she was leaving. Mr Jackson pushed her out the back door and placed his arm around her throat, locking her in a chokehold. The victim did not lose consciousness. He lifted the victim, carried her outside and threw her onto some pot plants. He placed his hands around her throat before she resisted. When they returned inside, the appellant pulled the victim's hair and took her to the ground, gripping her throat. Mr Jackson let her go when the children entered the room. Eaton J on appeal determined a starting point of "no more than two years, three months' imprisonment" was appropriate.16 The Judge applied a three-month uplift for the fact there was a protection order in place and a four-month uplift for the charge of injuring with reckless disregard leading to a 34-month starting point.
[41] Mr Brand submitted that while stern, the starting point was not too high and was within range. The aggravating features of the offending included that the victim was 15 weeks pregnant and holding a two-year old child when her breath was impeded. She was also holding the child when the appellant forcefully pushed her causing her to fall to the ground.
14 Amituanai v Police, above n 8, at [13]-[15].
15 Jackson v Police, above n 8.
16 At [50].
[42] Ultimately, adopting a starting point with reference to previous cases, is a difficult exercise because each case is dependent on its own facts. But the cases referred to me do suggest that the starting point adopted in this case was out of range. But I am not persuaded that a starting point of 28 months properly reflects the severity of this offending particularly because the victim was holding a two-year old child at the time. For these reasons, I consider a starting point of 32 months’, as opposed to 36 months’ imprisonment was justified.
[43] Given that no issue is taken with the uplift for the assault charge of four months, this takes the starting point to 36 months’ imprisonment (rounded down).
[44] No issue was taken with the three per cent uplift for personal aggravating factors. This takes the adjusted starting point up to 37 months’ imprisonment (rounded down).
Should a further discount for personal mitigating factors have been allowed?
[45] The appellant seeks a further discount to reflect the appellant’s background.17 Ms McElrea submitted there is a causative connection between the appellant’s background and his offending, which justify a deduction of 15 per cent for personal matters, as opposed to the 10 per cent allowed by the Judge. The pre-sentence report writer noted the following:
Mr Wright has had a disrupted childhood in that, from the age of seven years, he was "in and out" of foster care and Te Puna Wai. He described being born in Dunedin, but moving to Christchurch with his mother at the age of six and "my Dad was in and out of prisons. I got released to him when I was 13, but that only lasted for a term and a half and then I was locked up again".
Mr Wright stated that he had received psychological interventions until he was 23 years of age, having used drugs from 14 until 23. …
[46] Counsel also referred to the appellant's affidavit detailing his upbringing and a number of traumatic events he was exposed to as a child. This included being exposed to domestic violence, being subject to violence by his stepfather, witnessing his stepfather disembowel himself and being placed in Te Oranga (a care and protection residence). The appellant's affidavit annexed medical notes and case notes
17 Sentencing Act, s 27.
from Oranga Tamariki to support this evidence and substantiate the face he has experienced trauma and deprivation. These in turn have impacted upon his mental health and his ability to handle conflict in relationships in a positive way.
[47] As well, Ms McElrea referred to the appellant’s age at the time of the offending (25 years) and his lack of previous convictions for violence.
[48] Mr Brand submitted that the appellant's personal background and affidavit were before the Judge at sentencing but, even if a causal connection is established, no adjustment is warranted because the appellant had benefited from a minor uplift to reflect his offending on bail and the Judge allowed generous discounts for his guilty pleas, remorse and rehabilitation prospects.
[49] In my view, a further discount was justified on the facts of this case. There is a clear causal connection between the appellant’s background and his offending. Although Mr Brand highlighted that the appellant’s background has not resulted in him offending in this way before with the inference invited that this somehow weakens the causal connection, there is insufficient evidence to establish how frequently situations have arisen where a response such as this would be triggered. I accept that reductions allowed by the Judge for guilty pleas, remorse and rehabilitation were generous. But these do not necessarily reflect the appellant's background factors, which I agree are causative to a sufficient extent to justify consideration. The additional five per cent sought is within range. Arguably, the appellant's lack of previous like convictions and age at the time of the offending relate to the Judge's assessment of his rehabilitation prospects, but this is not entirely clear.
[50] I agree that, on the facts of this case, a 15 per cent discount in addition to the 25 per cent discount for early pleas was justified.
Is the overall sentence manifestly excessive?
[51] Adopting a starting point of 37 months’ imprisonment and deducting 40 per cent for mitigating matters, the result (rounded up) is an end sentence of 22 months’ imprisonment. The Judge’s assessment resulted in an end term of
imprisonment of 27 months. I therefore conclude that the overall sentence was manifestly excessive.
[52] It is therefore necessary to include whether granting leave to apply for home detention would be appropriate in this circumstance.
[53] Ms McElrea submits Mr Wright should be granted leave to apply for home detention whereas the Crown has not submitted on whether a conversion of sentence would be appropriate.
[54] Sentencing courts must apply the least restrictive outcome appropriate in the circumstances.18 This must be balanced against the sentencing principles of deterrence and denunciation.19 I note home detention is not precluded simply by nature of the charges20 however strangulation is a serious offence which will not always be appropriate for conversion to home detention.21
[55]The factors weighing in favour of home detention are:
(a)Mr Wright is only 26 years of age and has a limited criminal history with no violent offending convictions (albeit there have been multiple family harm incidents which he has been involved in);
(b)Mr Wright completed 16 of the 20 “Stopping Violence” sessions whilst he was in Dunedin and, since being on remand, has completed a parenting course;
(c)the pre-sentence report writer considered Mr Wright displayed genuine remorse and was at low risk of re-offending; and
18 Sentencing Act, s 8(g).
19 Sentencing Act, s 7(1)(e) and subs (f).
20 See for example Police v Sahib [2025] NZDC 12078; and Police v Larson [2024] NZDC 30219.
21 Chandra v R [2023] NZCA 600 at [69] and [71]. See also Jackson v Police, above n 8, at [57].
(d)Mr Wright successfully completed a nine-month sentence of supervision in 2019.22
[56] The main factor weighing against granting leave to apply for home detention is the gravity of the offence. I refer to the Court of Appeal case of Solicitor-General v Hutchison where it was said “[f]amily violence has become one of the scourges of New Zealand Society”23 and to the dictum of Toogood J in Hounuku v Police that:24
… home detention would not be sufficient to denounce that type of conduct. Sentences of imprisonment for this type of offending are intended to send a clear message to men that violence of this kind against women will not be tolerated.
[57] This issue is finely balanced, but I consider Mr Wright’s rehabilitative efforts, his attitude towards his offending and lack of previous convictions make it appropriate for leave to be granted to apply for home detention should a suitable address become available. I note further, home detention can and would fulfil the sentencing purposes of deterrence and denunciation in this case it being a significant sentence in its own right.25
Result
[58]The appeal is allowed.
[59] The appellant’s sentence of 27 months’ imprisonment is quashed and substituted with a sentence of 22 months’ imprisonment. This outcome impacts on the end sentence imposed on all of the charges because, although the charge of breaching the protection order on 29 September 2024 (dealt with by way of uplift by the Judge) was not challenged, the reference point for the end sentence was the end starting point adopted. For this reason, the substitute of sentences imposed as a result of this appeal are:
22 The report writer also makes reference to a three-month term of community detention (and conviction for breach of community work) but this is not reflected on Mr Wright’s criminal history.
23 Solicitor-General v Hutchison [2018] NZCA 162, [2018] 3 NZLR 420 at [27].
24 Hounuku v Police [2015] NZHC 2734 at [17].
25 Fairbrother v R [2013] NZCA 340 at [28].
(a) impeding breathing (CRN ending 2957), a sentence of 22 months' imprisonment;
(b) assault in a family relationship (CRN ending 2959), a sentence of seven months' imprisonment;
(c) breach of protection order (CRN ending 2958), a sentence of 10 months' imprisonment; and
(d) breach of protection order (CRN ending 3412), a sentence of two months' imprisonment.
[60]These sentences remain concurrent as the Judge had ordered.
[61] The remaining consequence of this appeal is however that the appellant is also granted leave to apply for home detention.
Harland J
Solicitors:
Public Defence Service, Christchurch Crown Solicitor's Office, Christchurch
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