Wiringi v Police

Case

[2017] NZHC 1734

25 July 2017

No judgment structure available for this case.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND CHRISTCHURCH REGISTRY

CRI-2017-409-56 [2017] NZHC 1734

BETWEEN

FAIRMONT JOSEPH WIRINGI

Appellant

AND

NEW ZEALAND POLICE AND DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS Respondents

Hearing: 28 June 2017

Appearances:

M Starling for Appellant
S J Mallett and S Dayal for Respondents

Reasons:

25 July 2017

REASONSFOR JUDGMENT OF NICHOLAS DAVIDSON J (DISMISSING APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE)

Introduction

[1]      Judgment was delivered 28 June 2017.1  These Reasons follow.

[2]      Mr Fairmont Wiringi appeals against a sentence of 28 months imprisonment imposed by His Honour Judge Gilbert.2  The appellant pleaded guilty to:

(i)       one charge of burglary;

(ii)      one charge of unlawful possession of firearm; (iii)      one charge of reckless discharge of firearm;

1      Wiringi v New Zealand Police and Department of Corrections [2017] NZHC 1461.

2      Police v Wiringi [2017] NZDC 9296.

WIRINGI v NEW ZEALAND POLICE AND DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS [2017] NZHC 1734 [25 July 2017]

(iv)     one charge of breach of community work; and

(v)      two charges of breach of bail.

[3]      The  appellant  appeals  on  the  primary ground  that  the  end  sentence  was manifestly excessive.

Summary of facts

[4]      On  24  April  2016,  the  appellant  entered  an  address  through  a  kitchen window, removed some meat from a freezer and took other items valued at around

$420.  When the occupants of the house arrived home, the appellant ran out the back door and jumped the fence. He also stole a bicycle valued at about $600.

[5]      On 3 December 2016, the appellant was on bail and was with his brother and two female acquaintances.  An argument developed when the appellant woke up to find his brother had taken his gang patch.  The appellant told his brother he had five minutes to give his patch back or he would shoot him.  He loaded his shogun, held it in both hands, and fired one shot, which hit the carpet in front of his brother.  The defendant continued to threaten his brother until he realised the police had been called.

[6]      In December 2015, the appellant was convicted of shoplifting (under $500), and sentenced to 60 hours community work.  As of 10 February 2016, he had not completed any work which led to his conviction for breach of the community service order.  He  was  also  convicted  on  two  charges  of  failing  to  comply  with  bail conditions.

District Court Sentencing

[7]      His  Honour  Judge  Gilbert  noted  the  appellant’s  youth,  18  years  old. However, he also noted his extensive criminal history in the Youth Court.   His Honour took into account his conviction for unlawful possession and presentation of firearm in 2015.   Judge Gilbert decided not to impose an uplift for the previous

conviction,  but  did  not  provide  any  discount  for  the  appellant’s  youth.    In  his opinion, that was the right way to address these two factors.

[8]      The Judge adopted an 18 months starting point on the charge of burglary and a 24 months starting point for possession and reckless discharge of a firearm.  After applying  a  25  per  cent  discount  for  guilty  pleas,  he  made  a  further  6 months reduction under the principle of totality. An end sentence of 2 years and four months imprisonment was imposed.

Jurisdiction

[9]      Mr Wiringi appeals as of right.3     The appeal must only be allowed if the Court is satisfied that there is an error in the sentence imposed and a different sentence should be imposed.

[10]     The focus is on the correctness of the end result, not the process by which the sentence was reached.4   The Court must only intervene if it considers the sentence is manifestly excessive, and not justified by relevant sentencing principles.5  This Court must not interfere with the proper exercise of judicial discretion, or tinker with the sentence.6

Submissions

Appellant’s submissions

[11]     The appellant submits that separate starting points adopted for the charges of burglary and possession of a firearm were too high, leading to a manifestly excessive end sentence. Mr Starling of counsel, submits that an end sentence in the range of

18 months imprisonment would have been appropriate.

3      Criminal Procedure Act 2011, s 244.

4      Tutakangahau v R [2014] NZCA 269, [2015] 3 NZLR 482 (CA) at [36].

5      Ripia v R [2011] NZCA 101 at [15].

6      Maihi v R [2013] NZCA 69 at [21].

Respondent’s submissions

[12]     Counsel Mr Mallett, submits that the respective starting points of 18 and

24 months imprisonment for burglary and possession of a firearm were justified in light of the relevant authorities.  The burglary charge involved aggravating factors including entering a residential property, removal of property up to $1,000 and the risk of encountering the occupants.

[13]     With regard to the charges of possession and reckless discharge of a firearm, Mr Mallett submits that the weapon was intentionally loaded to threaten his brother. The shot fired had the potential to cause serious injury.   There were two others present when the weapon was discharged.

[14]     The  Judge  did  not  provide  a  discrete  uplift  to  reflect  the  fact  that  the Arms Act offending occurred while the appellant was on bail.  That is an aggravating factor, but appears to have been taken into account when setting the 24 month starting point.

Analysis

Starting point for the burglary charge

[15]     There  is  no  tariff  judgment  for  burglary  sentencing.    The  reason  was explained by the Court of Appeal in R v Nguyen:7

[18]     The range of circumstances in which the offence of burglary can be committed is such that not tariff can be fixed. Entry into private homes generally will have an emotional impact giving rise to a sense of violation and insecurity for the owners that may not arise in the case of commercial premises. The value of goods stolen from commercial premises may be higher.

[16]     In R v Nguyen, although the Court of Appeal was not willing to fix a tariff for burglary, but identified factors relevant to the seriousness of offending:

(i)       the degree of planning and sophistication in the offending;

7      R v Nguyen CA 110/01, 2 July 2001 at [18].

(ii)      the nature of the premises entered;

(iii)     the kind and value of the property stolen; (iv)  damage done;

(v)      the impact and potential impact upon occupants of the property; and

(vi)     the extent of the offending where multiple burglaries are involved.

[17]     The factor which the courts have tended to consider as the most aggravating is the nature of the premises.   The Court of Appeal noted in Arahanga v R that “[burglary] of a domestic residence is a significant aggravating feature at sentencing due to the heightened risk of confrontation with the occupants”.8  Dwelling house burglaries at the relatively minor end of the scale tend to attract a starting point of approximately 18 months to two years six months imprisonment.9

[18]     The appellant, through Mr Starling, submits that Arahanga and the cases it refers to are distinguishable by the fact that burglaries involved in those cases were either committed at night while occupants were likely to be at home, or had other aggravating features such as significant damage to property, higher value property taken, or multiple charges.

[19]     I accept that, to an extent, the facts of Arahanga was more serious than the current facts, but I also note that the starting point in Arahanga was higher than the starting point adopted by the Judge.  In Arahanga, the Court of Appeal upheld a starting point of four years imprisonment for residential burglaries that involved the risk of confronting the victims who were asleep, the high value of the property stolen  and  the  potential  for  violence  demonstrated  by  the  defendants’  brazen

behaviour.

8      Arahanga v R [2012] NZCA 480 at [78].

9      At  [78],  citing  Wilson  v  R HC  Auckland  CRI-2011-404-445, 7  February  2012;  Dudley  v Police HC Christchurch CRI-2009-409-1, 26 February 2009; Police v Vincent DC Palmerston North CRI-2008-054-4634, 21 April 2009; and Arps v Police HC Christchurch CRI-2010-409-

167, 2 September 2010.

[20]     Applying the factors in R v Nyugen, this offending is aggravated by the fact that it was carried out in a dwelling house, and the occupants returned during the burglary.  The property stolen, up to the value of $1000, is significant.  The victims were emotionally traumatised by the offending as demonstrated in the victim impact statement:

I feel like I have been run over by a bus today since finding out my house has been burgled.

I feel sick and I have not stop crying since this has happened.

I don’t understand why someone would do something so cruel to me.

All of our belongings have been touched and the burglar has been in my room.

I am sick of living in this area with all the crime.

[21]     At a relatively young age, the appellant has already appeared more than

30 times in the Youth Court on charges of burglary.  The most significant sentencing purposes when sentencing a habitual burglar, such as the appellant, are deterrence and community protection.  I conclude that 18 months imprisonment on the charge of burglary was comfortably within the range of possible sentences at the Judge’s discretion.

Starting point for possession of firearms

[22]     Mr  Starling  submits  that  the  24  months  starting  point  adopted  for  the possession of a sawn-off shotgun “seems excessive”.  He submits that the offending was less serious because the firearm was discharged into the floor and did not cause injury or damage to property.

[23]     On reviewing the relevant authorities, I find that a starting point of two years imprisonment for possession and reckless discharge of the firearm is justified.   In R v Richardson   the  Court   of  Appeal   upheld   a  starting  point   of  two   years imprisonment for possession of a sawn-off shotgun and a shotgun.10    The sawn-off shotgun was found under a bed and the other gun was loaded and found in the boot

of the car. Torea v R, Martel v Police, and Byles v R, involved similar facts and

10     R v Richardson CA45/02, 25 March 2003.

adopted starting points between two years and six years and six months imprisonment.11

[24]     The modified state of the firearm is relevant.  In Herewini, the appellant was found with a loaded sawn-off shotgun under the front passenger seat of his vehicle.12

Moore J held that a starting point of two and a half years was “well within the

Judge’s discretion”:

[27]      In the present case, the fact that the weapon was a sawn-off shotgun makes the offending more serious than if the weapon had been unmodified. Apart from the inherent dangerous features of a sawn-off shotgun the fact of its modified state infers it is to be used for a criminal purpose.

[25]     Consistent with Herewini, I find the fact that the appellant’s shotgun was sawn-off  and  a  serious  aggravating  factor.     A  starting  point  of  two  years imprisonment is within the range of available sentence at the Judge’s discretion.

Totality principle

[26]     Even  if  I  accepted  that  the  cumulative  starting  point  for  the  appellant’s offending was manifestly excessive, the Judge’s six months reduction, after giving the full discount of 25 per cent for the guilty pleas, puts the sentence well within the range of those available.

[27]     This offending, and the appellant’s current predicament trouble me.    His Youth Court offending is extensive.  He transitioned into the District Court for this offending.  The wanton disregard of Court orders does not bode well for Mr Wiringi. He has ended up in a world where his associations in and out of prison will not assist his rehabilitation.

[28]     The  District  Court  Judge  was  right  to  recognise  the  seriousness  of  the offending and to impose the sentence upheld on appeal.   There was little else he could do.  No Court wants to impose imprisonment for any significant term on a still

young person but the record of offending here leaves no viable option.

11     Torea v R i[2011] NZCA 96; Martel v Police HC Hamilton CIV-2010-419-69, 4 October 2010;

Byles v R [2013] NZCA 18.

12     Herewini [2014] NZHC 2396.

[29]     The Court can only express its hope that Mr Wiringi develops an intent, and in due course resolve, to stand apart from or address the influences which have led him to offend in such a serious way.

Disposition

[30]     The appeal was dismissed, for these reasons.

……………………………………………….

Nicholas Davidson J

Solicitors:

Raymond Donnelly & Co., Christchurch

Michael Starling, Barrister, Christchurch

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