Wilson v Police
[2013] NZHC 138
•29 January 2013
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND WELLINGTON REGISTRY
CRI 2012-485-95 [2013] NZHC 138
HELEN ELIZABETH ANN WILSON
Appellant
v
NEW ZEALAND POLICE
Respondent
Hearing: 29 January 2013
Counsel: Appellant in Person
A J Ewing for Respondent
Judgment: 29 January 2013
JUDGMENT OF RONALD YOUNG J
[1] Ms Wilson was convicted of careless driving by two Justices of the Peace. She appeals. The grounds of appeal appear to be as follows:
(a) that the appellant was disadvantaged by the fact she was not represented by counsel;
(b)that the appellant did stop her vehicle at the intersection where these events occurred and not just slow down before the accident;
(c) the complainant’s speed was excessive and that he should have been able to take evasive action to avoid the accident.
HELEN ELIZABETH ANN WILSON V NEW ZEALAND POLICE HC WN CRI 2012-485-95 [29 January
2013]
[2] The facts broadly, save for one issue, were not in dispute. The appellant was driving to work; she drove along Halswater Drive in Churton Park and came to a T-intersection with Middleton Road. She intended to turn right into Middleton Road. There was a stop sign at the intersection controlling her movement. At this time two cyclists, Mr Broadhead and Mr Jaffray were cycling along Middleton Road. Mr Broadhead was cycling ahead of Mr Jaffray. The appellant pulled out of Halswater Drive into the path of Mr Broadhead. Mr Broadhead hit the appellant’s vehicle, tumbled over the windscreen of the car and onto the ground.
[3] Subsequently the appellant talked about the accident with a Police officer. She said that when she arrived at the stop sign at the bottom of Halswater Drive, she checked both ways and was satisfied the way was clear. She then said that she cautiously began making a right turn. She was very familiar with the intersection and was aware of the need to be cautious. She slowly moved off and was looking right when suddenly she was hit by a cyclist coming from her right. The appellant told the constable that she simply did not see the cyclist and the first thought that came to her after the crash was “where the hell has he come from”.
[4] At the District Court there was some different in the evidence given by the two cyclists and the appellant. Mr Broadhead, the victim, said as he cycled down Middleton Road he saw the appellant’s car coming towards the intersection with the stop sign about 75 metres ahead. He said he was going about 45 kilometres an hour. He said that the appellant’s car was slowing down to the point where he thought it would stop at the intersection but it did not. He said the appellant’s car went through the stop sign at about five to ten kilometres an hour and that when he hit the appellant’s car most of the car went into the intersection.
[5] Mr Jaffray, the other cyclist, affirmed Mr Broadhead’s evidence that the
appellant did not stop at the stop sign.
[6] The appellant, however, said she did stop at the stop sign. She said that she was well aware of the need to stop at the stop sign at the intersection. She said to Mr Broadhead after the accident that he must have been going fast but accepted she could not say how fast he was going. She said she had looked to the right but
nothing had been coming when she had pulled into the intersection. She emphasised that had Mr Broadhead been riding defensively on his bike he would have seen her and been able to stop in time.
[7] The two Justices of the Peace concluded that they did not need to decide whether or not the appellant had stopped at the stop sign. They were satisfied that the appellant had driven carelessly when she had driven into the intersection and had not seen the cyclist.
[8] Dealing firstly with the ground of appeal unrelated to the facts. The appellant chose not to be represented by a lawyer. It is clear from a reading of the transcript that she confidently conducted the hearing and gave an appropriate account of herself. She was able to question witnesses and give evidence herself. This was a simple case involving a simple set of facts. There is nothing to suggest that the appellant was significantly disadvantaged by her lack of representation. I reject this ground of appeal.
[9] As to the merits much of the appellant’s submissions focused on what the cyclist/complainant should have done. But as has been often observed in such cases, contributory negligence on the complainant’s behalf is not a defence to a charge of careless driving of a motor vehicle.
[10] The focus of the Court must be on the appellant’s driving and whether her driving fell below the standard of care required of a competent driver. The intersection here was controlled by a stop sign governing the appellant’s conduct. I agree with the Justices of the Peace that it does not matter whether the appellant stopped or did not stop at the stop sign. Her obligation was to ensure that she gave way to all traffic. It is clear she failed to do so. There was no evidence which established that the complainant’s speed exceeded by any margin the maximum speed limit in the circumstances. The appellant’s obligation was to ensure she saw what was there to be seen. The complainant was there to be seen but for whatever reason the appellant did not see him. That was a failure to exercise the degree of care and attention that a reasonable and prudent driver was required to exercise in these circumstances.
[11] For those reasons, the appeal against conviction will be dismissed.
Appeal against sentence
[12] The appellant was fined $600 and ordered to pay reparation of $5,000 to cover the cost of replacement of the complainant’s bike. Ms Wilson explained that her insurance company would pay the cost of replacing the bike. I am satisfied that although the fine was substantial, it was within the range available to the Justices.
[13] The appeal against sentence is also dismissed.
Ronald Young J
Solicitors:
H E A Wilson, 24 Burbank Crescent, Churton Park, Wellington, email: [email protected]
A J Ewing, Crown Solicitor, Luke Cunningham & Clere, Wellington, email: [email protected]
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