Wilson Parking New Zealand Limited v Jaques

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY

I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TĀMAKI MAKAURAU ROHE

CIV-2024-404-002573

[2025] NZHC 757

BETWEEN WILSON PARKING NEW ZEALAND LIMITED
Plaintiff

AND

DAVID ARTHUR JAQUES

Defendant

Hearing: 27 March 2025

Appearances:

R Hucker / R Lakhan for the Plaintiff Defendant in Person

Judgment:

2 April 2025


JUDGMENT OF ASSOCIATE JUDGE COGSWELL


This judgment was delivered by me on 2 April 2025 at 4.00 p.m. pursuant to Rule 11.5 of the High Court Rules.

Registrar/Deputy Registrar Date.......................................

Solicitors:

Molloy Hucker, Auckland

WILSON PARKING NZ LTD v JAQUES [2025] NZHC 757 [2 April 2025]

Introduction

[1]        The plaintiff seeks summary judgment against the defendant for advances it made to Digital Advertising Limited (DAL) for the construction and supply of two electronic billboards. The advances were guaranteed by the defendant.

[2]The defendant opposes summary judgment on two grounds:

(a)DAL was not in breach of its obligations under the loan agreements as the “performance of the contract was paused while the parties renegotiated” and, as the time for payment under the loan agreements by DAL had not arisen, there was no default.

(b)The receivers appointed by the plaintiff were invalidly appointed because the plaintiff did not have the right to appoint receivers to DAL under the general security agreement (GSA) which DAL granted to the plaintiff to secure the advances.

[3]It is not in dispute that neither DAL nor the defendant have repaid the advances.

Legal principles

[4]Rule 12.2(1) of the High Court Rules 2016 provides:

The court may give judgment against a defendant if the plaintiff satisfies the court that the defendant has no defence to a cause of action in the statement of claim or to a particular part of any such cause of action.

[5]        The relevant principles governing a summary judgment application are well-established:1

(a)The question on a summary judgment application is whether the defendant has no defence to the claim; that is, that there is no real question to be tried. The Court must be left without any real doubt or uncertainty.


1      Krukziener v Hanover Finance Ltd [2008] NZCA 187, [2010] NZAR 307 at [26].

(b)The onus is on the plaintiff, but where the evidence is sufficient to show there is no defence, the defendant will have to respond if the application is to be defeated.

(c)The Court will not normally resolve material conflicts of evidence or assess the credibility of deponents. But it need not accept uncritically evidence that is inherently lacking in credibility, for example, where the evidence is inconsistent with undisputed contemporary documents or other statements by the same deponent or is inherently improbable. In the end, the Court’s assessment of the evidence is a matter of judgment. The Court may take a robust and realistic approach where the facts warrant it.

[6]        The defendant is under an obligation to lay a proper foundation for their defence in the affidavits filed in support of the notice of opposition.2

The contractual framework

[7]…

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Details
Case
[2025] NZHC 757
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Wilson Parking New Zealand Limited sought summary judgment against David Arthur Jaques, who had guaranteed a loan made to Digital Advertising Limited (DAL) by the plaintiff for the construction and supply of electronic billboards. The defendant opposed the application on two grounds: (a) that the plaintiff had agreed to pause performance of the loan agreements while the parties renegotiated, and (b) that the receivers appointed by the plaintiff were invalidly appointed because the plaintiff did not have the right to appoint receivers to DAL under the general security agreement (GSA). The court dismissed both grounds of opposition. It found that the plaintiff had not agreed to pause performance under the loan agreements, and that the defendant's argument was contradicted by contemporaneous documents and inherently improbable. The court also found that the plaintiff was entitled to appoint receivers to DAL because the terms of the GSA incorporated the Memorandum, which provided for the appointment of a receiver on default. The court granted judgment in favour of the plaintiff for the principal sum of $456,000.00, interest at the rate of 14 per cent from the date of default to the date of judgment, and costs of and incidental to the proceeding on an indemnity basis.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established