Williamson v The King
[2025] NZCA 334
•17 July 2025 at 2 pm
| IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF NEW ZEALAND I TE KŌTI PĪRA O AOTEAROA |
| CA31/2025 |
| BETWEEN | ANTHONY DAVID WILLIAMSON |
| AND | THE KING |
| Hearing: | 23 June 2025 |
Court: | Woolford, Dunningham and Walker JJ |
Counsel: | J D Munro and N B Gibson for Appellant |
Judgment: | 17 July 2025 at 2 pm |
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
The appeal is dismissed.
REASONS OF THE COURT
(Given by Dunningham J)
In September 2024, Anthony Williamson was found guilty of the manslaughter of Liang Miaoyuan (Ms Liang), a 70‑year‑old Chinese woman. On 3 December 2024, Powell J sentenced Mr Williamson to four years and six months’ imprisonment.[1] Mr Williamson now appeals that sentence.
[1]R v Williamson [2024] NZHC 3670 [sentencing notes].
Counsel for Mr Williamson, Mr Munro, says the starting point adopted by the Judge was too high because:
(a)the Judge failed to consider Ms Liang’s conduct in stepping onto Mr Williamson’s vehicle as a factor mitigating his culpability;
(b)the Judge took into account Ms Liang’s advanced age as an aggravating feature of the offending, when Mr Williamson thought she was in her fifties;
(c)the Judge failed to consider Mr Williamson’s explanation for leaving the scene without helping Ms Liang; and
(d)when compared with other cases, the starting point was too high.
The Crown disputes that the Judge erred in any of the ways identified and submits the appeal should be dismissed.
The offending
The events which led to the charge occurred around 12.30 pm on Saturday 10 September 2022. Mr Williamson, although forbidden from driving, was involved in a minor road accident when his Ford Ranger utility vehicle bumped into the back of the car driven by Mr Xie, and whose wife, Ms Liang, was in the front passenger seat.
What happened next was summarised by Powell J at sentencing as follows:
[5] There is no dispute that both you and Mr Xie got out of your vehicles to see what had happened, and you subsequently reversed your ute slightly to allow an inspection of any damage and both of you took photos of the vehicles. There is no dispute that there were communication difficulties between you and Mr Xie. Mr Xie attempted to ring his son to assist but before he could connect, he said you pointed to the side road, being Solana Court, and he thought you were wanting him to drive to the side road to get the issue resolved. In [your first] interview with Police you confirmed that this was indeed what you had indicated.
[6] However, when you started driving you did not enter Solana Court. Instead, you continued to drive along Cascades Road so as to turn right into Botany Road at the next set of traffic lights. Thinking you were trying to get away Mr Xie and Ms Liang followed you in their car and came to a halt close to your vehicle but in the next lane on the right.
[7] While the cars were stopped Ms Liang, got out of her car and approached your vehicle until she was standing next to your driver's door. She knocked firmly on your window in an apparent effort to get your attention. When the traffic lights turned green but while your ute was still stationary, Ms Liang got … onto the running board of your vehicle.
[8] When traffic ahead of you began to move, you started driving with Ms Liang on the running board and trying to hold on to your partially open front window. Your defence, and what you explained to Police, was that you did not know she was there until you reached the far side of the intersection. The jury clearly did not accept your explanation, and I reject it for the purposes of sentencing you today.
[9] There is simply no way that you cannot have known Ms Liang was there on your running board as you moved off. She was shouting at you through the partially open window as she tried to get your attention even before you drove away. The CCTV footage from the Botany Motel confirmed just how loud Ms Liang was shouting. Indeed, a key part of your own explanation was that you heard her “screaming and yelling and asking for money”. Likewise, and as was apparent from the CCTV footage available, there is no way any driver could have failed to notice Ms Liang, distinctively dressed as she was in a bright red top, where she was located hanging on against your driver's side front window.
[10] Ms Liang continued to yell and scream as you quickly accelerated. Data obtained from your vehicle showed you were already travelling at around 32 km/h as you reached the intersection and, after slowing down slightly in the intersection, thereafter generally accelerated up to a maximum speed of 43 km/h on Botany Road to a point about half‑way between Cascades Road and Vesca Place.
[11] At that point, your driver's door opened. As I discussed with counsel, I am satisfied on the available evidence that you were responsible for opening the door at that point. In your first account to Police, you explained Ms Liang was trying to hold on with her fingers on the inside of the window, and the fact that the door opened was consistent with the explanation you gave to Police that not only did you tell Ms Liang to “get the hell off [your] ute” you said you told her you were “opening the door and opened the door.”
[12] Shortly after the door opened, your speed began to gradually decrease, and Ms Liang began to fall from your vehicle. At the point at which Ms Liang started to fall, it appears that your speed had dropped to around 25km/h. As she hit the road, she received fatal head injuries and was knocked unconscious. Her body came to a stop in the middle of the intersection of Botany Road and Vesca Place. Contrary to your initial explanation that your car had stopped before Ms Liang came off, there can be no dispute that your car was still travelling at about 19 km/h as it passed through the intersection. You then brought your vehicle briefly to a halt and as you did so, you closed your door. A member of the public attempted to stop you from leaving the scene, but you drove away, reaching speeds of 89 km/h as you headed off along Botany Road.
[13] Ms Liang was taken to Middlemore Hospital. She did not regain consciousness and she died of the injuries she received from the fall from your car. She was 70 years old.
The sentencing decision
At sentencing, Powell J adopted a starting point of four and a half years’ imprisonment. He identified the aggravating features of the offending to be:[2]
(a)Mr Williamson was forbidden to drive at the time of the offence.
(b)Ms Liang was particularly vulnerable due to her age and size, noting that once Mr Williamson had decided to start driving with her on the running board “there was no feasible way for her to dismount without injury and all she could do was to try and hang on until the vehicle stopped”.[3]
(c)While the period of driving only lasted for some 24 seconds the driving was dangerous, noting that Mr Williamson accelerated to 43 kilometres per hour, appeared to swerve within his lane and then opened the driver’s door while Ms Liang was trying to hold on.
(d)Mr Williamson made no effort to check whether Ms Liang was injured or needed assistance after she fell and, when a member of the public tried to stop him from leaving the scene, he drove away at speeds of up to 89 kilometres per hour and did not subsequently call emergency services.
[2]At [23]–[26].
[3]At [24].
The Judge then addressed comparable cases.[4] The Judge considered Mr Williamson’s offending was similar to, but more serious than, the offending in Tawa and Stevens, both of which attracted a starting point of four years’ imprisonment, noting that in both those cases, the offender’s dangerous driving occurred in circumstances where they ought to have known, but did not necessarily know, that the victim was in the vicinity.[5]
[4]At [28]–[32], citing R v Towler [2024] NZHC 870; R v S [2024] NZHC 197; R v Tawa[5]Sentencing notes, above n 1, at [30]; R v Tawa, above n 4, at [21]–[22]; and R v Stevens,The Judge considered the case of R v Thompson was the closest to the present facts, where a starting point of four and a half years was taken.[6] In that case, following an altercation over disposal of rubbish, Mr Thompson drove off and the victim ended up on the bonnet of Mr Thompson’s car blocking his vision. Mr Thompson drove at speeds between 30 and 60 kilometres per hour for some 440 metres with the victim in this position. During that time the victim was yelling for help and called 111. The victim eventually rolled off the car suffering fatal head injuries and Mr Thompson drove away without assisting the victim. Mr Thompson stated that he feared for his own safety at the time, however, the aggravating factors were the distance travelled, the fact that Mr Thompson continued driving despite the victim’s calls for help and that, instead of stopping when the victim fell onto the road, Mr Thompson drove away.
[6]R v Thompson, above n 4, at [16]–[21].
The Judge considered that, like Thompson, this was a “serious but one off
case of bad judgment and bad driving”, and adopted the same starting point offour years and six months’ imprisonment.[7][7]Sentencing notes, above n 1, at [31]–[32].
The Judge then considered whether there were any mitigating factors personal to Mr Williamson. The Judge considered the s 27 report did not demonstrate a causative link between any of the difficulties described in it and Mr Williamson’s offending, such that a discount on sentencing was justified. Rather, he said there appeared to be a common thread in the report “whereby you blame unnamed third parties for particular events”.[8]
[8]At [37].
In terms of remorse, the Judge acknowledged Mr Williamson had written a number of letters, but he was not satisfied that any of them reflected genuine remorse on Mr Williamson’s part. Instead, they continued to minimise his involvement in the offending with the Judge observing that “at no stage have you ever recognised that Ms Liang died because you made a deliberate decision to drive while she was on the running board of your ute, to then accelerate, and then to try and get her off your car by opening the door”.[9] The Judge was also impliedly critical of Mr Williamson’s repeated assertions that Ms Liang was some sort of “unsavoury character” who was attempting a “scam”. His letters continued to reflect the views he had expressed to police which was that he could not understand why he was “the one under the gun” when he was the “one [being] extorted”.[10] Similarly, the Judge did not consider the offer to pay a modest amount in reparation, nor the fact that Mr Williamson had completed some courses while on remand, were factors justifying a discount on sentence.[11]
[9]At [42].
[10]At [43].
[11]At [45]–[47].
Consequently, the starting point of four years and six months’ imprisonment was also the end sentence imposed on Mr Williamson.
We now turn to whether any of the grounds raised warrant an adjustment to the starting point.
Does the conduct of the deceased warrant a reduction in the starting point?
Appellant’s submissions
Mr Munro points out that under s 9(2)(c) of the Sentencing Act 2002 the sentencing Judge must take into account, where applicable, the conduct of the victim. This is because there are situations where the victim’s actions materially contribute to the defendant’s actions, thereby diminishing the defendant’s moral blameworthiness and culpability.
By way of example, he points to R v Tawa, where Lang J accepted that the manner of driving was likely influenced by a sense of panic in trying to escape the risk of physical injury inflicted by the victim.[12] Similarly, in Mundy v Police, where the offender was convicted of dangerous driving causing death, the fact the driver of the vehicle he hit had failed to stop at a stop sign was considered a mitigating feature resulting in a reduction of six months in the starting point.[13] In the present case, Ms Liang stepped onto the running board of Mr Williamson’s vehicle when it was stationary at traffic lights. Mr Munro described this as a “dangerous and reckless act” which was aggravated by the fact she was screaming and yelling at Mr Williamson and pounding on his window.
[12]R v Tawa, above n 4, at [14].
[13]Mundy v Police [2020] NZHC 240 at [35].
This submission was also advanced at sentencing but rejected by Powell J who said Ms Liang climbed on the vehicle while it was stationary and “[s]he was only put at risk when [Mr Williamson] drove off into the intersection.”[14]
Discussion
[14]Sentencing notes, above n 1, at [27].
Before the victim’s behaviour can be treated as a mitigating factor, it must have “materially reduced the culpability of the defendant in responding to it”.[15] We see no reason to disagree with the Judge’s assessment that it did not in this case. First, we note that Ms Liang’s decision to pursue Mr Williamson was at least understandable in the circumstances where he had indicated he would move off the busy road and on to a side street to discuss matters further, but then proceeded to head straight down the road without making the indicated stop. Second, we agree that the risk arose because of Mr Williamson’s decision to drive off with her holding onto his vehicle. There was nothing about her behaviour which necessitated him driving off with her hanging onto the vehicle, nor to subsequently open the door she was holding onto while travelling at speed, causing her to fall.
Was the Judge wrong to take into account the victim’s vulnerability?
Appellant’s submissions
[15]Wairau v R [2015] NZCA 215 at [31].
Mr Munro points out that under s 9(1)(g) of the Sentencing Act the sentencing Judge must take into account, as an aggravating factor, “that the victim was particularly vulnerable because of his or her age or health or because of any other factor known to the offender”. He submits that the word “known to the offender” means that for her age to have been taken into account as an aggravating factor, Mr Williamson must have known, or ought to have known that the deceased was elderly. However, here Mr Williamson did not know how old she was. When he was interviewed he was asked to guess the age of the deceased and her husband, and he said “roughly 50s”. He was then surprised to be told that the victim was 70 years old, saying she “certainly wasn’t acting like a 70‑year‑old”. Mr Munro submits that this case should be distinguished from those where the offender takes advantage of someone because of their age or vulnerability, where it is proper to consider this increases the offender’s culpability.
In oral submissions, Mr Munro also submitted that any vulnerability of the victim simply arose from the circumstances of the offending, and not from her age, and to take her age into account was to “double count” her vulnerability.
Discussion
We accept, as the Crown submits, that Powell J did not focus on her age alone as making her particularly vulnerable. Whether she was 50 or 70, she was clearly a petite, older woman.[16] While any person is at risk if they are trying to hold on to a vehicle, particularly when it swerves and then the door is deliberately opened, as a matter of logical inference, a slight, elderly woman (whether 50 or 70) will find it more difficult to hold on in such circumstances than a strong young person.
[16]The evidence from Dr Glenn, who conducted the post‑mortem, was that she was 161 cm tall, weighed 51 kg and had grey hair.
We are satisfied the Judge did not err in taking her age and size into account as increasing her vulnerability.
Did the Judge err in the weight he placed on the fact Mr Williamson left the scene?
Appellant’s submissions
Mr Munro submits that Powell J placed too much weight on Mr Williamson leaving the scene after Ms Liang fell from the vehicle. His decision to leave was in part due to the fact:
(a)he was assaulted by a member of the public when he stopped; and
(b)he believed that Ms Liang was scamming him.
Discussion
However, we rely on the findings of the trial Judge and consider Mr Williamson overstated both these factors. In his interview, Mr Williamson claimed to have been “clocked” more than once by a witness to the accident who “grabbed [his] throat”. However, when that witness gave evidence he said he first tried to grab the keys from Mr Williamson’s vehicle so he could not leave and when he realised it was a modern vehicle which had no keys, he instead “grabbed the driver … around the scruff of the neck on his shirt” for “a couple of seconds max” before releasing the shirt, allowing Mr Williamson to drive away. Mr Williamson’s account of what happened was not put to that witness in cross‑examination. Even if Mr Williamson had perceived that person to be a threat, it does not explain why he drove at up to 89 kilometres per hour, or why he failed to contact the police as soon as he was away from any perceived danger.
Any suggestion that Mr Williamson was being extorted did not appear to be accepted by the sentencing Judge.[17] In any event, this did not explain why he left the scene. If Mr Williamson genuinely believed he was the victim, that is an explanation that could have been given to police attending the scene. Furthermore, this allegation does not explain why he took no steps to contact the police or emergency services after he left the scene.
[17]See, for example, sentencing notes, above n 1, at [43].
We are satisfied the Judge put appropriate weight on Mr Williamson’s failure to stop and assist, or to promptly summon emergency services, as aggravating features of the offending.
Was the starting point out of step with comparator cases?
Appellant’s submissions
Mr Munro took issue with how Powell J applied comparator cases to reach the starting point of four years and six months for this offending. First, counsel submits that this case is significantly less culpable than the offending in Thompson, and
so the Judge could not sensibly have reached an equivalent starting point of
four years and six months’ imprisonment. Second, he says that the offending of the driver Mr G in R v S was more serious, as was the offending of his co‑offender Ms S. As Mr Williamson’s case was less serious, it should have attracted a lower starting point.We have already outlined the facts of the offending in Thompson at [8] above. Mr Munro submits this is more serious because Mr Thompson travelled with the victim on his bonnet for 440 metres as opposed to 194 metres and at speeds of between 30 and 60 kilometres as opposed to up to 43 kilometres in this case. Mr Thompson also went through two give way signs without stopping and while the victim’s position on the bonnet of the car obstructed Mr Thompson’s vision. The victim in that case was crying out for help and calling 111 on his cell phone. Mr Thompson did not stop when the victim fell off and continued driving home. Furthermore, Mr Munro says Mr Thompson deliberately drove forward into the deceased causing him to mount the bonnet of his car, whereas here, Ms Liang climbed onto the side of his vehicle.
In terms of R v S, both defendants had assaulted the victim on a night out, with Ms S having assaulted him several times.[18] In the early hours of the morning the victim approached the defendant’s vehicle and Ms S struck the victim in the head. Mr G then reached out of the driver’s side window and grabbed onto the victim’s shirt, forcing him to run alongside the vehicle. Both defendants purposely held on to the victim dragging him alongside their ute. At some point he managed to jump onto the running board, but as Mr G continued to drive the victim lost his footing and was run over.
[18]R v S, above n 4, at [5]–[13].
The violence in the lead up to the manslaughter charge was reflected in assault charges for which the defendants were also sentenced. The fact they deliberately held on to the victim as they drove was regarded as an aggravating feature. Mr G received a starting point of four and a half years and Ms S, three years.[19] In Mr Munro’s submission the appellant’s offending was less serious than this case because it lacked the prior aggression and actual violence.
[19]At [35] and [60].
Finally, Mr Munro submits Mr Williamson’s offending was similar to, but less serious than, the offending in Tawa and Stevens where the deaths were caused by the offenders driving over their victims in circumstances where they ought to have known that the victim was in the vicinity. In both those cases a four‑year starting point was taken.
Discussion
We consider the appellant’s submissions have been selective in drawing comparisons with the cases cited. As the Crown points out, in both Tawa and Stevens the defendant was convicted in circumstances where they ought to have known there was a risk of running over the deceased, but it is clear that they did not actually know they had done that.[20] By comparison here, Mr Williamson both knew that Ms Liang was holding onto his vehicle, and deliberately opened his driver’s door while moving, causing her to fall off on the road and then left without stopping to help even though he knew she had fallen.
[20]R v Tawa, above n 4, at [19]; and R v Stevens, above n 4, at [8(a)].
In respect of the decision R v S, we agree with the Crown that the comparable offender is Mr G who was the driver. He pleaded guilty to one charge of common assault for punching the deceased before the fatal driving event and this appeared to be a low‑level assault described by Gault J as “an excessive reaction to what [the deceased] said” and where Mr G immediately assisted the deceased up and apologised.[21] It does not appear to us to have materially aggravated the offending. There was also a further factor to take account of in respect of the driving, as there was evidence that the deceased had tried to punch Mr G while on the running board and where the Judge could not rule out that it was a case of excessive self‑defence.[22]
[21]R v S, above n 4, at [31].
[22]At [29].
Ms Pridgeon, for the Crown, also points out that the deceased in R v S lost his footing while on the running board whereas, here, Mr Williamson deliberately opened the driver’s door causing Ms Liang to fall and suffer the fatal injuries.[23] Furthermore, Ms S called 111 shortly after she and her co‑defendant left the scene which did not occur here.[24] Thus, while it is a serious case we cannot say that it renders the starting point adopted here too high.
[23]At [12].
[24]At [13].
In terms of the comparison to Thompson, we agree it is the most similar case. While the dangerous driving in Thompson occurred over a longer distance, Gilbert J described it as a “one‑off incident involving bad judgment and bad driving on [Mr Thompson’s] part”.[25] In Thompson the victim simply fell from the vehicle whereas here, it was Mr Williamson who deliberately caused Ms Liang to fall from the moving vehicle by opening his door. We do not consider that Mr Williamson’s case is so materially different in overall culpability that it warrants a lesser starting point being adopted in the present case than the four years six months adopted in Thompson.
Conclusion
[25]R v Thompson, above n 4, at [21].
None of the grounds of appeal have satisfied us that there was an error in the sentence imposed or that a different sentence should be imposed.
Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.
Solicitors:
Ian Tucker, Auckland for Appellant
Te Tari Ture o te Karauna | Crown Law Office, Wellington for Respondent
[2020] NZHC 95; R v Stevens [2017] NZHC 727; and R v Thompson [2012] NZHC 2526.
above n 4, at [13].
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