IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND CHRISTCHURCH REGISTRY
CRI-2015-409-000118 [2016] NZHC 520
BETWEEN BRETT WILLIAMSON
(AKA) BRIAN MAX PALMER Appellant
AND
NEW ZEALAND POLICE Respondent
Hearing: 15 March 2016 Appearances:
R Peters for the Appellant
A C Trinder for the PoliceJudgment:
23 March 2016
JUDGMENT OF NATION J
Introduction
[1] Mr Williamson appeals against a sentence of two years seven months’ imprisonment on three charges of obtaining by deception and two charges of attempting to obtain by deception.1
[2] The charges arose out of offending between 15 and 17 December 2014, when Mr Williamson falsely purported to be a representative of Downer Construction at several machinery stores in Christchurch. On three separate occasions, he placed orders for, and took possession of, machinery (generators and a water blaster) under fictitious order numbers, having no intention to pay for the items. The orders were for four different items with a total value of $8,890. On two further and separate occasions, he attempted to obtain three generators valued at $2,500 each. The total
offending was thus to obtain or attempt to obtain plant worth $16,390.
1 New Zealand Police v Williamson (aka) Palmer [2015] NZDC 2348 per Judge Couch.
WILLIAMSON (AKA PALMER) v POLICE [2016] NZHC 520 [23 March 2016]
[3] As this sentence was imposed on 12 February 2015, Mr Williamson also applies for leave to appeal out of time.
Approach on appeal
[4] Section 250 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2011 requires that the appeal be allowed if I am satisfied that, for any reason, there is an error in the sentence imposed and a different sentence should be imposed.2 I must dismiss the appeal in any other case.3 To allow the appeal, I must be satisfied that the sentence imposed
was “manifestly excessive”.4 As has been stated:5
The High Court will not intervene where the sentence is within the range that can properly be justified by accepted sentencing principles. Whether a sentence is manifestly excessive is to be examined in terms of the sentence given, rather than by the process by which the sentence is reached.
Leave to appeal out of time
[5] Mr Peters, for Mr Williamson, does not advance any particular grounds for granting leave to appeal out of time. No reason is provided for the delay. Mr Peters simply asks that such leave be granted on the basis that there are valid grounds for the appeal being considered.
[6] As the enactment conferring the right of appeal, the Criminal Procedure Act permits such an extension.6 However, the “touchstone” for granting such an application is the interests of justice in the particular case.7 Such applications for leave routinely reduce to the reasons for the delay and the merits of the proposed appeal.8 It is for the appellant to provide sufficient information to satisfy the court
that granting leave is in the interests of justice.9
2 Criminal Procedure Act 2011, s 250(2).
3 Section 250(3).
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- Case
- [2016] NZHC 520
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court were whether the sentence was manifestly excessive and whether leave to appeal out of time should be granted. The court assessed the starting point for the sentence, the uplift for previous convictions, and the discount for guilty pleas and remorse. The court noted that the Crown did not oppose the application for leave to appeal out of time, finding that the appeal was arguable and there was no prejudice to the Crown. The court granted leave to appeal out of time.
The court found that the starting point for the sentence should have been two years' imprisonment, with an uplift of 12 months for previous convictions, leading to a starting point of three years. The court considered a 25% discount for guilty pleas and remorse, resulting in a final sentence of two years and three months. The court concluded that the sentence imposed was manifestly excessive because the starting point was too high, and thus allowed the appeal. The sentence of two years and seven months was quashed, and a new sentence of two years and three months was imposed. The existing reparation orders remain in effect.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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