Wilkinson Adams v Bethune

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND DUNEDIN REGISTRY

CIV-2011-412-000860 [2012] NZHC 1873

UNDER  the District Courts Act 1947

IN THE MATTER OF     an appeal pursuant to s72 of the District Courts Act 1947 in respect of a decision of the District Court at Dunedin

BETWEEN  WILKINSON ADAMS Appellant

ANDR J BETHUNE Respondent

Hearing:         On the papers

Judgment:      30 July 2012

COSTS JUDGMENT OF CLIFFORD J

[1]      On 26 April 2012 I delivered judgment in this appeal which I heard on

7 March 2012.  In that judgment I reserved the question of costs, but said that I did not see why costs should not follow the event on a 2B basis.   If the parties were unable to resolve the matter between them brief submissions were to be filed within

30 days of my judgment.

[2]      I am now in receipt of a memorandum of Farry & Co which would appear to be dated 14 May 2012, but which is stamped as having been received in Court on

15 June 2012, a memorandum from Wilkinson Adams as to costs dated 17 July 2012, stamped as having been received in Court that day, a further memorandum from Farry &  Co  dated  23  July  2012  and  a  further  memorandum  (in  reply)  from

Wilkinson Adams dated 24 July 2012.

WILKINSON ADAMS V BETHUNE (Costs) HC DUN CIV-2011-412-000860 [30 July 2012]

[3]      In their memoranda of 14 May/15 June 2012, Farry & Co apply for costs since this matter was commenced in the District Court.  Moreover, they do so on the basis of Schedule 2 of the High Court Rules, rather than Schedule 2 of the District Court Rules.   I decline to make an award of costs with respect to matters in the District Court, even if (which is not clear) I have jurisdiction to do so – particularly as regards those aspects of proceedings in the District Court which were not the subject of an appeal to this Court.

[4]      In my view, and as I set out in my judgment, costs in favour of Mr Bethune on a 2B basis are appropriate on the appeal in this Court.  I see no reason, in terms of the matters before me, for any award of increased or indemnity costs as regards that appeal.

[5]      In  terms  of Mr Wright’s  lengthy memorandum,  I decline to  engage in  a relitigation of the underlying merits of this dispute. The appeal succeeded because in my view, which Wilkinson Adams is of course entitled to disagree with, the default judgment in question had been obtained irregularly .

[6]      I  do  not  propose  to  traverse  the  exchange  of  “views”  recorded  in  the subsequent memoranda.  My comment to the parties is this: if they have difficulties with each other, the Law Society may be an appropriate venue for those matters to be aired.

[7]      I also award Mr Bethune costs on a 2B basis with respect to Wilkinson

Adams’ application to set aside my judgment.

[8]      As I read the Farry &…

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Case
[2012] NZHC 1873
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Wilkinson Adams v Bethune, the appeal was heard in the High Court of New Zealand at Dunedin. The appellant, Wilkinson Adams, sought to appeal a decision made by the District Court at Dunedin, with the respondent being R.J. Bethune. The central issue of the appeal pertained to the validity of a default judgment obtained by Wilkinson Adams against Bethune. The appellant contested the regularity of the default judgment and sought its setting aside, arguing that the judgment had been improperly obtained.

The court was required to determine whether the default judgment obtained by Wilkinson Adams was irregular and thus invalid. Additionally, the court had to consider the costs associated with the appeal and the subsequent application to set aside the judgment. The appeal hinged on the procedural fairness of the original judgment and the legal principles governing default judgments in the District Court.

Clifford J, in his judgment, found that the default judgment had indeed been obtained irregularly. Consequently, the appeal was successful, and the judgment was set aside. The court declined to award costs for the aspects of the proceedings that had not been appealed to the High Court, emphasizing that it did not have jurisdiction over those parts. However, the court did award costs to Bethune on a 2B basis for the appeal and for the application to set aside the judgment. The court made it clear that the parties should address any disputes through appropriate professional channels rather than through further litigation.

The final orders of the court were to award Bethune costs on a 2B basis for the appeal and the application to set aside the judgment. The total costs awarded to Bethune amounted to $1,222.00, which included the costs for preparation of submissions and attendance at the appeal hearing.

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