Wilde v The King
[2025] NZHC 2370
•20 August 2025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND WHANGAREI REGISTRY
I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA WHANGĀREI-TERENGA-PARĀOA ROHE
CRI-2025-488-000039
[2025] NZHC 2370
BETWEEN NICHOLAS WILDE
Appellant
AND
THE KING
Respondent
Hearing: 14 August 2025 Counsel:
D J Blaikie for appellant
A J Goodwin for respondent
Judgment:
20 August 2025
JUDGMENT OF JOHNSTONE J
This judgment was delivered by me on 20 August 2025 at 3pm pursuant to r 11.5 of the High Court Rules.
Registrar/Deputy Registrar
Solicitors:
MWIS, Whangārei D J Blaikie, Kaikohe
WILDE v R [2025] NZHC 2370 [20 August 2025]
[1] Nicholas Wilde pleaded guilty to charges involving the distribution of methamphetamine and the cultivation of cannabis. He was sentenced in the District Court at Whangārei to an overall term of two years and four months’ imprisonment.1
[2]Mr Wilde now appeals against that sentence.
[3] Assessing the substantive merit of an appeal requires consideration whether, for any reason, there was a sentencing error such that a different sentence should be imposed.2 It must be shown that the sentence is manifestly excessive or wrong in principle, or that there are exceptional circumstances requiring the correction of an in-range sentence.3
[4] Mr Wilde says, in essence, that three errors made his sentence manifestly excessive:
(a)The sentencing Judge’s starting point for the charges involving methamphetamine distribution, the uplift for the cannabis cultivation, and thus the adjusted starting point for all of the offending, were too high.
(b)The reductions for Mr Wilde’s drug addiction, and for his response to his offending (including his remorse, and rehabilitative efforts and prospects), were too low.
(c)Mr Wilde should have received greater credit for his extended period on bail with an EM condition.
1 R v Wilde [2025] NZDC 4107.
2 Criminal Procedure Act 2011, s 250.
3 Tutakangahau v R [2014] NZCA 279, [2014] 3 NZLR 482 at [30]–[36], Te Aho v R [2013] NZCA
47 at [30].
Were the starting points too high?
The starting point for the methamphetamine-related charges
[5] Mr Wilde’s methamphetamine-related offending came to light during a police investigation which turned its focus upon his partner, Carlyn Anderson. The police commenced intercepting Ms Anderson’s phone calls and messages, and captured evidence of her purchasing methamphetamine, and arranging for its distribution, in ounce lots.
[6]More particularly:
(a)On 21 July 2021, Ms Anderson arranged for Mr Wilde to deliver a half-ounce of methamphetamine for $4,000.4
(b)On 14 August 2021, Ms Anderson offered to supply two ounces of methamphetamine, and advised that Mr Wilde was on his way to deliver it.5
(c)On 22 September 2021, Ms Anderson agreed to have Mr Wilde deliver methamphetamine, observing that he would not be too far away. During the rest of that day and the next, Mr Wilde delivered around
1.5 ounces. 6
(d)On 15 October 2021, the police executed a search warrant at the couple’s home in Opononi, finding a bag, inside which were 16 half-gram bags of methamphetamine in one container and six half-gram bags in another. When stopped in a vehicle elsewhere in Northland, Mr Wilde and Ms Anderson had $1,000 cash in a purse,
4 Supplying a Class A controlled drug, methamphetamine. Misuse of Drugs Act 1975, s 6(1)(c). Maximum penalty: life imprisonment.
5 Offering to supply a Class A controlled drug, methamphetamine. Misuse of Drugs Act, s 6(1)(c). Maximum penalty: life imprisonment..
6 A second offence of supplying methamphetamine. Misuse of Drugs Act, s 6(1)(c). Maximum penalty: life imprisonment.
$1,310 cash in a wallet, and around a gram of methamphetamine in a snaplock bag.
[7] In total, Mr Wilde separately supplied, possessed for supply, and was a party to the offering, of 115 grams of methamphetamine.
[8] The sentencing Judge took a starting point for these charges involving methamphetamine of three and a half years’ imprisonment.
[9] For Mr Wilde, Mr Blaikie submits that this starting point was too high, because Mr Wilde’s role fell within the “lesser” category described in Berkland v R, and because his addiction and that of Ms Anderson were such that little of the 11 grams of methamphetamine possessed for supply would have been supplied.7
[10] I disagree. In my view, the starting point adopted was lenient. Mr Wilde admitted that at least a purpose of his possession of the final 11 grams was supply, should circumstances have favoured that course. But in any event, that amount was only a small portion of the amount Mr Wilde distributed, or was prepared to distribute. The overall amount the subject of methamphetamine dealing charges was squarely within Band 2 of Zhang v R, with an indicated starting point of two to nine years’ imprisonment. Further, Mr Wilde’s role was in the region, which was identified in Jack-Kino v R,8 between the updated “significant” and “lesser” role profiles described in Berkland:
(a)First, Mr Wilde had to be fully aware of the scale of the operation, defined in terms of the amounts he supplied, possessed, and (as a party) offered to supply. This was not one of those cases where large-scale amounts of controlled drugs were being transhipped or stored, where the scale of an offender’s own dealings as disclosed by police action might have surprised them. In this case, it is conceivable that Ms Anderson’s other dealings may have surprised Mr Wilde. But, aside from the single occasion of her offering a similar amount to those he
7 Berkland v R [2020] NZSC 125, [2022] 1 NZLR 509.
8 Jack-Kino v R [2021] NZHC 1468.
did supply, which she expected him to be prepared to supply, Mr Wilde was not prosecuted for, and did not take responsibility for, her other dealings. If he had taken responsibility for her other dealings, the amounts distributed would have been larger, and Mr Wilde would have been sentenced on the basis that, like Ms Anderson, the quantum of his dealings placed him in Band 3.
(b)Second, Mr Wilde’s function of delivering amounts as instructed by Ms Anderson, while neither a management nor fully operational function, was more meaningful than that of a mere “catcher” or custodian, and provided elements of support and security, deriving from his role as Ms Anderson’s domestic partner.
[11] In my view, a starting point of four years’ imprisonment for Mr Wilde’s methamphetamine-related offending could not have been criticised.
The uplift for the cannabis cultivating
[12] When the police executed the search warrant at the couple’s home on 15 October 2021, they found 12 cannabis plants starting to bud under grow lights in a shed. They also found 32 cannabis seedlings growing outside. Mr Wilde admitted growing the plants, and asserted they were for his own use.
[13] To account for Mr Wilde’s offence of cultivating cannabis, the sentencing Judge uplifted his methamphetamine-related, three and a half-year starting point by six months.
[14] Mr Blaikie submits that this six-month uplift was too high. He says there was no commerciality in the offending, and that similarly-sized cultivations are regularly dealt with by community-based sentences.
[15] In Terewi v R, the Court of Appeal described three “broad categories” of increasing seriousness.9 Category 1 consists of the growing of a small number of
9 R v Terewi [1999] 3 NZLR 62.
cannabis plants for personal use by the offender without any sale to another party occurring or being intended. The Court observed that offending in this category “is almost invariably dealt with by a fine or other non-custodial sentence”.10 Category 2, on the other hand, encompasses small-scale cultivation of cannabis plants for a commercial purpose. The Court observed that “the starting point for sentencing is generally between two and four years but where sales are infrequent and of very limited extent a lower starting point may be justified”.11
[16] These observations of the Court of Appeal do not expressly address the question of the appropriate starting point for cases in Category 1. Much will depend on whether, as here, other more serious offences are being sentenced, so that a starting point involving a term of imprisonment requires to be assessed as a logical and necessary element of the Moses v R two-stage method of sentence calculation.12
[17] In this case, as the sentencing Judge observed, the grow lights confirmed Mr Wilde’s cultivation as involving a degree of sophistication, and the seedlings confirmed its ongoing nature. I consider that for the cannabis cultivation alone an uplift in the order of 12 months’ imprisonment would have been appropriate. The Judge’s six-month uplift was unexceptional.
Were the reductions for addiction and response too low?
[18] Mr Wilde has a history of criminal convictions including for violence, unlawful firearm possession, non-compliance with protection orders, and (in 2009) for possessing methamphetamine for supply. Ms Anderson had no convictions prior to her entry of guilty pleas in respect of the dealings for which she was sentenced, alongside Mr Wilde. The sentencing Judge imposed no uplift for Mr Wilde’s historic drug-related offending.
[19] Both Mr Wilde and Ms Anderson have a lengthy history of methamphetamine addiction. Following their arrest, both resided at and made considerable rehabilitative
10 At [4].
11 At [4].
12 Moses v R [2024] NZCA 121.
efforts at the Grace Foundation. Both took on positions of responsibility as residents at the foundation.
[20] The sentencing Judge applied a 35 per cent reduction, from the overall starting point selected in respect of Ms Anderson’s offending, to take into account her addiction, efforts at rehabilitation, good work at Grace Foundation, and remorse. In respect of Mr Wilde, the Judge applied a 20 per cent reduction from his overall starting point.
[21] For Mr Wilde, Mr Blaikie submits that there was no proper reason for the distinction drawn. He says that the scale of Mr Wilde’s addiction, his recognition of wrongdoing, and his commendable efforts in response to his prosecution (including during his time with Grace Foundation) should also have resulted in a 35 per cent reduction.
Analysis
[22] In my view, some distinction needed to be drawn between the reductions assessed as appropriate for each of Mr Wilde and Ms Anderson. Mr Wilde deserved credit for his commendable response to being prosecuted. By the time of his sentencing, he had achieved 18 months of sobriety. And he had worked consistently, with Ms Anderson, in a respected position of responsibility within one of the Grace Foundation’s programmes. However, having reviewed the material provided to the sentencing Judge in respect of both Mr Wilde and Ms Anderson, I consider Ms Anderson’s response to have gone further. She had achieved two years of sobriety. Her involvement in supporting programme members was more direct, and thus more demanding. And her correspondence with the Court frankly recognised the amount of damage her offending caused the community, and thus confirmed her remorse.
[23] Further, while Mr Wilde’s historic conviction for a methamphetamine dealing offence did not warrant a sentencing uplift, its existence in Mr Wilde’s history dampened the extent to which the Judge could weigh the rehabilitative purpose of his sentencing against a residual need to promote the sentencing purposes of deterrence and accountability.
[24] But that said, the distinction drawn between Mr Wilde’s 20 per cent reduction and Ms Anderson’s 35 per cent reduction was excessive. In light of the 20 per cent reduction allowed to the appellant in Berkland (for a “genuinely exceptional” response to prosecution which saw that offender break the “cycle of his own life”) Ms Anderson’s reduction may have been generous. Nevertheless, in my view, Mr Wilde’s starting point should have been reduced by 30 per cent, in order to avoid the appearance of disparity with Ms Anderson’s reduction.
Should there have been greater credit for Mr Wilde’s EM bail condition?
[25] Both Mr Wilde and Ms Anderson were on electronically monitored (EM) bail for lengthy periods prior to their sentencing. Mr Wilde was on EM bail, under a 24-hour seven-day curfew at his home, and then at the Grace Foundation, from November 2021 to October 2022. At that point, he absconded, was arrested, and was held in custody for a month. From November 2022, he was readmitted to EM bail. He resided at the Grace Foundation on the same full-time curfew for a further five months, before it was relaxed to the evening curfew which he then substantially observed until his sentencing in February 2025.
[26] In sum, Mr Wilde spent around 15 months on a full-time curfew, and around 22 months on an evening curfew, while on EM bail.
[27] The sentencing Judge allowed both Mr Wilde and Ms Anderson a further reduction of six months, from their respective overall starting points, to account for their time on EM conditions. In doing so, the Judge referred to the reductions he had already allowed for their rehabilitative efforts and work at the Grace Foundation, indicating that this limited the extent to which a reduction for time spent on EM bail was appropriate.
[28] For Mr Wilde, Mr Blaikie submits that Mr Wilde should have received at least a 15-month reduction, comprised of half of the period spent on a full-time curfew and at least one third of the period spent on an evening curfew.
Analysis
[29] Sentencing courts are required, under s 9(2)(h) of the Sentencing Act 2002, to take account of offenders spending time on bail with EM conditions. In doing so, the court must consider:13
(a) the period of time that the offender spent on bail with an EM condition; and
(b) the relative restrictiveness of the EM condition, particularly the frequency and duration of the offender’s authorised absences from the electronic monitoring address; and
(c) the offender’s compliance with the bail conditions during the period of bail with an EM condition; and
(d) any other relevant matter.
[30] In Shramka v R, the Court of Appeal observed that considering these matters requires an evaluative assessment.14 Reductions commonly range between 30 and 50 per cent, with 50 per cent not being uncommon.15 Further, in Glassie v R, the Court of Appeal found a sentencing Judge to have been wrong to decline an allowance for time on EM bail on the basis that it allowed the offender to access rehabilitation, so earning a separate reduction. The Court said:16
It is true that time spent complying with bail conditions evidences rehabilitative potential. To that extent there is a connection. But it does not follow that an offender who has made good use of bail by engaging in rehabilitation should be refused credit for restrictive bail at sentencing. Credit is given because strict conditions may seriously constrain liberty and time on bail is not taken into account when calculating the time served.
[31] In Glassie, the Court allowed the appellant a reduction of 10 months, or around 40 per cent of the time spent on EM bail with a 24-hour curfew that was subject only to exceptions permitting attendance at rehabilitative programmes. The appellant had complied with his conditions throughout.
[32] In the present case, taking into account that Mr Wilde absconded and was briefly returned to custody during the shorter period he spent on a 24-hour curfew, but
13 Sentencing Act 2002, s 9(3A).
14 Shramka v R [2022] NZCA 299, [2022] 3 NZLR 348.
15 At [62] citing Paora v R [2021] NZCA 559 at [53].
16 Glassie v R [2022] NZCA 556 at [73] (footnote omitted).
also that Mr Wilde spent an additional extended period on an evening curfew, and that the Judge appears to have erred by declining a fuller reduction because time spent on EM bail was at a rehabilitative facility, I consider a reduction of nine months (approaching the 10-month reduction in Glassie) should have been allowed.
Result
[33] In my assessment, there was no error in the Judge’s starting points. However, Mr Wilde should have received the benefit of:
(a)an additional five-month reduction to account for his serious methamphetamine addiction, and his commendable response to prosecution (being an additional 10 per cent of the Judge’s four-year overall starting point); and
(b)an additional three-month reduction to account for his extended period on EM bail.
[34]The sentencing end point reached is 18 months’ imprisonment.
[35] Mr Blaikie invited the Court, should it allow Mr Wilde’s appeal, to substitute a sentence of home detention. However, he recognised that doing so might not be in Mr Wilde’s interests given his periods in custody both before and after Mr Wilde’s sentencing on 24 February 2025.
[36] In any event, the pre-sentence report before the sentencing Judge (to which the Court would be required to have regard before substituting home detention) is now outdated. It relates to a Grace Foundation address which, now that Ms Anderson cannot reside there with him, is no longer available to Mr Wilde. Mr Blaikie identified a suitable alternate Grace Foundation address, but that address has not been reported upon under s 26A of the Sentencing Act as a sentence of home detention would require.
In the circumstances:
(a)I allow Mr Wilde’s appeal.
(b)I substitute a sentence of 18 months’ imprisonment for the sentence of two years and four months imposed on the methamphetamine-related charges, and a concurrent sentence of three months’ imprisonment on the cannabis offence.
(c)In thus re-sentencing Mr Wilde, I make an order under s 80I of the Sentencing Act granting him leave to apply to the District Court for cancellation of the sentence of imprisonment and substitution of a sentence of home detention if he finds a suitable residence at a later date.
Johnstone J
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