Whittome v Minister of Health
[2025] NZHC 939
•16 April 2025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND WELLINGTON REGISTRY
I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TE WHANGANUI-A-TARA ROHE
CIV-2024-404-000845
[2025] NZHC 939
UNDER the Judicial Review Act 2016 IN THE MATTER OF
the Right of Review under the Official Information Act 1982, s 32B, the Ombudsmen Act 1975
BETWEEN
ERIKA WHITTOME
First Applicant
JOHN ARMSTRONG
Second ApplicantCHRIS MCCASHIN
Third Applicant
ADRIENNE GRAY
Fourth ApplicantNORMAN MCFAYDEN
Fifth ApplicantBARRY DUFFIELD
Sixth ApplicantAND
THE MINISTER OF HEALTH
First Respondent
THE OMBUDSMAN
Second RespondentTHE MINISTER OF FINANCE
Third RespondentTHE MINISTER FOR COVID-19 RESPONSE
Fourth Respondent
Hearing: 26 March 2025
WHITTOME v THE MINISTER OF HEALTH [2025] NZHC 939 [16 April 2025]
Counsel: First Applicant in person
Second Applicant in person Third Applicant in person
S J Edwards and J B Cheng for First, Third and Fourth Respondents
M S Smith for Second Respondent
Judgment:
16 April 2025
JUDGMENT OF GRAU J
[Judicial review: interlocutory issues]
What this decision is (and is not) about
[1] This decision determines a number of issues in advance of the substantive judicial review proceedings commenced by the first, second and third applicants, Erika Whittome, John Armstrong and Chris McCashin, who filed a statement of claim dated 4 April 2024. Two amended statements of claim have subsequently been filed.
[2] The three statements of claim have named the Ministers of Health, Finance, and COVID-19 Response, and the Ombudsman, as respondents. The first and second amended statements of claim also named three other people, Ms Gray, Mr McFayden and Mr Duffield, as the fourth to sixth applicants.
[3] The application for judicial review concerns the decision of the Ministry of Health to decline requests under the Official Information Act 1982 (OIA) for release of the contract (or parts of it) between the New Zealand Government and Pfizer for the supply of the Pfizer COVID-19 vaccine in New Zealand (the Contract). The applicants consider that their (and other people’s) OIA requests about the Contract should have been granted and they want the Court to make an order for the release of the Contract.
[4] The issues for determination in this decision for the most part relate to the identification of the appropriate parties to the proceeding and the appropriate grounds of review and questions of law that require determination in the substantive proceeding. I have largely made the orders or directions sought by the respondents. I
have also added the Pharmaceutical Management Agency (Pharmac) as a respondent. I have made these decisions because I consider they will enable the judicial review to proceed in an efficient and orderly manner with the appropriate focus being only on the parties who made the OIA requests and the parties who made the decisions declining those requests.
[5] This decision is not about the merits of the proceeding. Nor is it about preventing the applicants from seeking the relief they want the Court to order. Rather it is intended to ensure compliance with the procedural rules of the Court and to be of benefit to all of the parties to apply their focus to the specific decisions that are at issue and that are appropriate subjects of review by the Court. The directions are also expected to expedite the filing of the statements of defence and the allocation of a hearing date.
Summary of decision
[6]I make the following orders and directions:
(a)Pharmac is to be joined to the proceeding as the third respondent.
(b)The Director-General of Health is to be substituted for the Minister of Health as the first respondent.
(c)The Minister of Finance and the Minister for COVID-19 Response are struck out as parties to the proceeding.
(d)The second and third applicants are struck out as parties to the proceeding.
(e)There is no basis for the second and third applicants, nor the proposed fourth to sixth applicants, to be joined as parties, or as interested parties, to the proceeding.
(f)Ms Whittome, as the sole applicant for the judicial review, is to replead that the Ministry of Health’s May 2023 decision and the Ombudsman’s
December 2023, together with Pharmac’s 12 June 2023 decision are the only decisions challenged in the proceeding.
(g)The two agreed questions of law are to be included in the repleaded statement of claim, along with a third question in relation to Pharmac’s 12 June 2023 decision. The two additional questions proposed by Ms Whittome are not to be included.
(h)I decline the respondents’ request to remove the pleaded causes of action of procedural impropriety and unreasonableness. However, Ms Whittome is to particularise her claims under these grounds of review in her repleaded statement of claim.
(i)The proceeding has been improperly brought pursuant to s 34B of the OIA. Ms Whittome’s repleaded statement of claim is to include an appropriate basis for the proceeding.
(j)Ms Whittome is to file her repleaded statement of claim by 30 May 2025, and the respondents are to file their statements of defence within 20 working days following service of the repleaded statement of claim.
Background
OIA requests by Mr Armstrong and Mr McCashin
[7] On 15 January 2022, Mr McCashin (the third applicant) made an OIA request to Pharmac seeking answers to a number of questions about the Contract. The request was transferred to the Ministry of Health, which granted the request in part on 25 March 2022.
[8] On 14 October 2022, Mr Armstrong (the second applicant) made an OIA request to the then Prime Minister, the Rt Hon Jacinda Ardern, requesting the
unredacted Contract. Mr Armstrong’s request was transferred to the Ministry of Health, which refused this request on 2 November 2022.1
[9] Neither Mr McCashin nor Mr Armstrong sought a review of the Ministry of Health’s decisions by the Ombudsman, despite being advised they could do so.
OIA requests by Ms Whittome
[10] On 16 April 2023, Ms Whittome made the following OIA request to the Ministry of Health:
Dear Ministry of Health,
Please would you share the “Commercially Reasonable Efforts details on the contract you have with Pfizer for supplying Comirnaty to New Zealand.
I request the details of this contract on the efforts of Pfizer are delivering as part of this contract on
1 Medicine safety,
2 Medicine efficacy and
3 pharmocovilligance.
[11] On 26 April 2023, the Ministry of Health refused Ms Whittome’s request (the April 2023 decision).2 It appears that Ms Whittome did not seek the Ombudsman’s review of this decision, despite being advised that she could do so.
[12] On 22 April 2023, Ms Whittome made another OIA request to the Ministry of Health for a range of documents and information concerning the Contract. The request read as follows:
1. … all emails, contract information, procurement information,
communications and reports pertaining to the purchaser’s limitations on itself and any of its third parties in the contract with supplying the
Pfizer Comirnaty medicine.
2. Please include any limitations on the organization known as “Medsafe” with regard to performing its routine pharmacovigilance activity as stated in the procurement agreement with Pfizer.
1 The request was declined under ss 9(2)(b)(ii) and 9(2)(ba)(ii) of the OIA, on the basis that release would unreasonably prejudice the commercial position of the person who supplied the information, and the information was subject to an obligation of confidence where making it available would be likely otherwise to damage the public interest.
2 Under ss 9(2)(b)(ii) and 9(2)(ba)(ii) of the OIA.
3. Include please any additional incentives or benefits to or from any other parties or agents to induce any other parties to perform any part of the medicines procurement agreement.
4. Provide all nature of those limitations and please provide any and all supporting communications before and after the products procurement date.
5. Please provide all the warranty information on this medicinal product from the procurement agreement and any associated emails,
communications regarding this.
[13] On 17 May 2023, the Ministry of Health refused parts one to four of Ms Whittome’s request,3 and referred part five of the request (the Warranty information) to Pharmac4 (the May 2023 decision).
[14] On 12 June 2023, Pharmac refused part five of Ms Whittome’s OIA request about the Warranty information (the Pharmac decision).5
The Ombudsman’s involvement
[15] On 19 June 2023, Ms Whittome complained to the Ombudsman about the Ministry of Health’s May 2023 decision. The complaint also referred to the request for “Product Warranty”, which Pharmac had refused.
[16] In June 2023, the Ombudsman published his opinion on OIA complaints about the refusal of OIA requests for the COVID-19 vaccine contracts.6 The opinion was in response to 17 complaints that had been investigated, but which did not include any complaints from the applicants. In the Ombudsman’s opinion, there were good reasons under ss 9(2)(b)(ii), 9(2)(ba)(ii) and 9(2)(c) of the OIA to refuse the requests for full or redacted copies of the contracts (the June 2023 opinion).
[17] The Ombudsman also recommended that the Ministry of Health work with officials from Pharmac and the Treasury, in consultation with COVID-19 vaccine
3 Under ss 9(2)(b)(ii), 9(2)(ba)(ii) and 18(e) of the OIA. Section 18(e) allows for refusal of a request for information that does not exist or cannot be found.
4 Under s 14(b)(ii) of the OIA. Ms Whittome was notified of this transfer on 12 May 2023.
5 Under s 9(2)(j) of the OIA, which is a ground to refuse if it is necessary to enable a public service agency or organisation holding the information to carry out commercial activities without prejudice or disadvantage.
6 Peter Boshier Chief Ombudsman’s opinion on OIA complaints about the refusal of Covid-19 vaccine contracts (19 June 2023) (the June 2023 opinion).
suppliers, to develop a summary statement for public release. The Ministry of Health released this statement on 18 September 2023.
[18] On 13 December 2023, the Ombudsman wrote to Ms Whittome to advise her that the Ombudsman was unlikely to investigate her complaint about the Ministry of Health’s May 2023 decision on the basis that it was unnecessary in light of his June 2023 opinion. The Ombudsman sought Ms Whittome’s comments. Ms Whittome responded, noting that the information had still not been supplied and requesting that the Ombudsman leave the matter open.
[19] On 21 December 2023, the Ombudsman wrote to Ms Whittome confirming that the Ombudsman would not investigate her complaint on the basis that it was unnecessary in light of his June 2023 opinion (the December 2023 decision).
Should Pharmac be added as a respondent to the proceeding?
[20] As noted above, Pharmac refused Ms Whittome’s OIA request in relation to the Warranty.
[21] Pharmac has observed that Ms Whittome’s complaint to the Ombudsman included Pharmac’s refusal to provide the Warranty information, and that the Ombudsman’s December 2023 decision did not address whether Pharmac had acted appropriately in doing so. Accordingly, Pharmac’s actions are the subject of the claim as it is currently drafted. However, as Pharmac also points out, it is not, as currently pleaded, “a division inside [the Ministry of Health’s] organisation”. It is a separate Crown entity. The Ministry of Health has noted that it is not responsible for Pharmac’s responses to OIA requests. Pharmac has also confirmed that it is the current holder of the Contract that is at issue in the proceeding. Indeed, it is the other party to the Contract with Pfizer.
[22] In short, it is now clear that Pharmac is separate from the Ministry of Health and made a separate decision refusing an OIA request that is relevant to this proceeding. And it would appear to be the entity that would be required to provide the Contract to the applicants if they succeeded in claiming the relief they seek in this
proceeding. The respondents abide the decision of the Court. Ms Whittome agrees that Pharmac should be joined to the proceeding.
[23] I therefore order that Pharmac is to be added to the proceedings as the third respondent. That is because, as I will go on to discuss, the currently named third and fourth respondents are to be removed as respondents.
Should the Director-General of Health be substituted for the Minister of Health as first respondent?
[24] Ms Whittome named the current respondents on the basis that they were listed in the Ombudsman’s final opinion as having received requests for the Government’s contracts with Pfizer and other vaccine providers. Her focus remains on securing the release of the Contract. Ms Whittome also notes that the Minister of Health is at the head of the Ministry of Health and that Pharmac is ultimately responsible to the Ministry of Health and the responsible Minister.
[25] Ms Whittome’s identification of respondents is understandable in the circumstances, but I agree with the submissions for the (current) first, third and fourth respondents that the Director-General of Health is the correct first respondent. As the Chief Executive of the Ministry of Health, the Director-General is the official responsible for decisions about OIA requests to that Ministry.
[26] Section 12 of the OIA makes it clear that requests for access to official information can be made to departments, interdepartmental ventures, Ministers or organisations. Section 15(4) of the OIA provides that where a request for access to official information is made to a department, the decision on that request must be made by the chief executive of the department, or an officer or employee of the department authorised by that chief executive.
[27] As noted in the agreed background, Ms Whittome’s request was made to the Ministry of Health rather than the Minister. None of the other current applicants appear to have made any OIA requests to the Minister of Health or received any response from the Minister of Health. Consequently, the decision-maker was the Director-General rather than the Minister.
[28] I make the order sought that the Director-General of Health be substituted for the Minister of Health as the first respondent.
Should the Minister of Finance and the Minister for COVID-19 Response be struck out as parties to the proceeding?
[29] As above, these Ministers were referred to in the Ombudsman’s final opinion. Ms Whittome also points to the Minister of Finance giving an indemnity to Pfizer. Ms Whittome says they should be parties to the proceedings because the Ombudsman said they were involved. She says parties should only be struck out if they do not have delegation/functions or powers to release the Contract.
[30] The Court has the power to order the striking out of parties under r 4.56 of the High Court Rules 2016 (HCR) or s 14(2)(b)(ii) of the Judicial Review Procedure Act 2016 (JRPA). The approach taken to striking out parties is the same as that adopted for applications to strike out for no cause of action,7 with the jurisdiction to be exercised sparingly and only where it is clear the applicant cannot succeed.8
[31] The Court should consider whether there is a right to relief sought against the party, and whether the party’s “presence may be necessary to adjudicate on and settle all questions involved in the proceeding”.9 It is relevant to note that persons whose conduct is the subject matter of the application for judicial review must be named as a party.10
[32] As is now clear, Pharmac holds the Contract, and I have added Pharmac as a respondent. Pharmac has also made a decision that is relevant to the proceeding.
[33] In contrast, there is no indication that the Minister of Finance or the Minister for COVID-19 Response were involved in the Ministry of Health’s May 2023 decision, or Pharmac’s associated decision, or that the applicants ever made an OIA request to them. What is at issue in this proceeding is the refusal to grant access to the
7 Lally v New Zealand Sikh Society [2025] NZHC 201 at [9].
8 Australian Mutual Provident Society v Architectural Windows Ltd (1988) 1 PRNZ 655 (HC).
9 Business Associates Ltd v Telecom Corp of NZ Ltd (1990) 2 PRNZ 317 at 320.
10 Judicial Review Procedure Act 2016 (JPRA), s 9(1); Air New Zealand v Queenstown Lakes District Council HC Christchurch CIV-2010-425-395, 7 April 2011, affirmed in Muir v Taxation Review Authority [2017] NZHC 846, (2017) 28 NZTC 23-013.
Contract; which were decisions of the Director-General of Health, and Pharmac, and the Ombudsman. As the persons whose conduct is the subject matter of the application, they are the appropriate respondents. The Ministers’ presence is not necessary to determine the lawfulness of decisions they did not make.
[34] Accordingly, I consider it is appropriate for the Court to exercise its discretion to strike out the Minister of Finance and the Minister for COVID-19 Response as parties under r 4.56 of the High Court Rules 2016.
Should the second and third applicants be struck out as parties to the proceeding, and an order made that there is no basis for them or the other proposed applicants to be joined as parties or as interested parties?
[35] Ms Whittome does not consider that any of the other applicants should be removed from the proceedings, when they are all people who have made OIA requests to obtain the Contract. She relies on the decision in Kelsey v Minister of Trade,11 where seven applicants were part of the claim. She says in this case, as in Kelsey, the large number of applicants represents the public interest about the Contract. Ms Whittome notes that the Contract has now been the subject of over 100 OIA requests.
[36]The respondents make the following points:
(a)The second and third applicants did not seek an Ombudsman’s review after they made OIA requests, which is a precondition to a judicial review of a decision made under the OIA.
(b)The second and third applicants are not interested parties either because Ms Whittome’s claim cannot confer a right of action on them, when they did not exercise their right of review.
(c)The fourth to sixth applicants should not be joined to the proceeding. There has been no application, as required under r 4.56 of the High Court Rules to add them to the proceeding. Ms Whittome’s actions in
11 Kelsey v Minister of Trade [2015] NZHC 2497.
adding them to the intituling of the proceeding is not sufficient for joinder. Nor are the alleged vaccine injuries and a stated interest in the proceeding a sufficient basis to join them as parties, when they have no dispute with the Ministry of Health or the Ombudsman and the proceeding is not about claims for compensation or rights and remedies under the Contract.
[37]I agree with the respondents.
[38] First, in relation to the second and third applicants, it is the case that the decisions on their 2022 OIA requests will need to be removed from the pleadings because s 34 of the OIA precludes judicial review of those decisions declining their requests when they did not seek a review by the Ombudsman. Nor is there any indication they were involved in Ms Whittome’s OIA requests or any of the other decisions that are challenged. Therefore, their presence is not required to adjudicate on and settle the questions raised in the proceeding. Nor do I consider that the Kelsey case is authority for them remaining as applicants or being retained as interested parties. In that case, the other applicants had unique interests in the release of the agreement at issue, whereas in this case the second and third respondents’ interests in the release of the Contract are the same as Ms Whittome’s.
[39] In relation to the fourth to sixth applicants, I do not consider that they should be joined to the proceeding either. There has been no application to join them, as required once a claim has been commenced. Nor do I consider such an application would succeed. While it may be appropriate to join a party whose interests are affected, or where the party has a distinctly arguable case they are affected, there is no indication these proposed applicants are actively seeking to pursue an action against Pfizer for their alleged vaccine injuries.
[40] The proceeding is not about adverse consequences of vaccination or about rights and remedies under the Contract. While I can accept that the fourth to sixth applicants will have an interest in the proceeding, it is not an interest sufficient at law to warrant their involvement. Nor is the proceeding a general enquiry into the Government’s response (including vaccination) to the COVID-19 pandemic.
I reiterate that the proceeding is only about certain decisions that were made to refuse to provide the Contract (or parts of it) to Ms Whittome.
[41] Finally, as a practical point, and as Mr Smith helpfully pointed out, s 34 of the OIA would not appear to preclude the other current applicants from supporting Ms Whittome’s claim through the affidavits that have been filed. That, and the fact that the Ombudsman’s June 2023 opinion considered at length the public interest in releasing the Contract,12 and which resulted in the Ombudsman recommending that a summary statement on the COVID-19 vaccine contracts be issued, would appear to address the public interest purpose that Ms Whittome sees as the key reason to join them.
[42]Accordingly, I order that:
(a)the second and third applicants are struck out as parties to the proceeding; and
(b)there is no basis for the second and third applicants, nor the proposed fourth to sixth applicants to be joined as parties, or as interested parties to the proceeding.
Should Ms Whittome, as the sole applicant for the judicial review, be required to replead that the Ministry Health’s May 2023 decision and the Ombudsman’s December 2023 decision are the only decisions challenged in the proceeding?
[43]The respondents say the answer is yes. I agree.
[44] As I have already determined in striking out the second and third applicants, their 2022 OIA requests cannot form part of the proceeding because they did not seek a review by the Ombudsman and so are barred from judicially reviewing the responses to their requests, under s 34 of the OIA. It is also the case that Ms Whittome did not seek the Ombudsman’s review of the April 2023 decision by the Ministry of Health. That would also preclude judicial review of that decision.
12 The June 2023 opinion, above n 6, at [34]–[46].
[45] However, as is now more clear, the decision of Pharmac to refuse release of the Warranty information (after the Ministry of Health referred that aspect of the OIA request to Pharmac) is part of Ms Whittome’s case. The Ombudsman points out that the most recent statement of claim includes a complaint that the Ombudsman did not address Ms Whittome’s request for the Warranty information in the Contract which was withheld under s 9(2)(j) of the OIA.
[46] Ms Whittome has confirmed that her complaint to the Ombudsman was only about the Ministry of Health. But it appears that was because she considered Pharmac to be part of that Ministry. She now understands it is a separate entity, although one that she says is accountable to the Ministry of Health. It does appear that Ms Whittome intended to complain to the Ombudsman about all aspects of her OIA request which was refused by the Ministry of Health, and (in respect of one part) by Pharmac. Ms Whittome does not consider that new pleadings are required.
[47] Because there is no tenable cause of action in respect of the 2022 decisions and the April 2023 decision, I agree it is appropriate to direct that Ms Whittome must replead her statement of claim to limit the scope of her proceeding to the May 2023 and December 2023 decisions.
[48] However, as I have said, it is now clear that Pharmac, as a separate entity, made a separate decision refusing Ms Whittome’s OIA request for the Warranty information. It also appears that Ms Whittome intended the Pharmac decision to form part of her complaint to the Ombudsman. As a result, I also direct that Ms Whittome is to replead her statement of claim to include as a separate decision Pharmac’s 13 June 2023 decision refusing her request for the Warranty information.
Should Ms Whittome be directed to replead her grounds of review?
[49] The respondents’ position is that the only appropriate ground of review is error of law. The following two questions have been proposed as the appropriate questions on this ground:
(a)Challenge to the May 2023 decision: Did the Director-General err in law when refusing parts 1, 2 and 4 of Ms Whittome’s OIA request of
22 April 2023 in reliance on ss 9(2)(b)(ii) and 9(2)(ba)(ii) of the OIA, and part 3 of the request under s 18(e) of the OIA?
(b)Challenge to the December 2023 decision: Did the Ombudsman err in law in deciding not to investigate Ms Whittome’s complaint on the basis that it was unnecessary in light of his June 2023 opinion?
[50] Ms Whittome agrees with these questions of law, but proposes two additional questions, namely:
(a)Did the Ombudsman comply with the OIA?; and
(b)Was the Treasury permitted by law to withhold details of the indemnity?
[51] Ms Whittome does not consider that new pleadings are required when the substantive matter, being the refusal to release the Contract, is abundantly clear in the existing claim. Ms Whittome is of the view that the respondents are using their considerable resources to preclude her from progressing the judicial review, which is undermining justice.
[52] For the Ombudsman, it is said that the first additional proposed question is part and parcel of the agreed question, in that any non-compliance with the OIA by the Ombudsman would be an error of law. However, Mr Smith says that the ways in which the Ombudsman is said not to have complied with the OIA should be articulated, so that the Ombudsman is able to respond and answer by evidence.
[53] Mr Smith also said that consideration needs to be given as to whether a separate question was needed to relate to Pharmac’s separate decision not to disclose the Warranty information. Mr Smith observed too that if Ms Whittome wished to challenge the Ombudsman’s decision for not dealing with the Pharmac refusal, it would appear to fall into the error of law question.
[54] All of the respondents consider that the question relating to the indemnity is not relevant to the proceedings and note that no OIA requests were made in relation to the indemnity which would preclude judicial review in relation to that issue.
[55] The first respondent takes issue with the current grounds of review of procedural impropriety, which is not particularised, and with the ground of unreasonableness, which it says is a high threshold and, as with procedural impropriety, it lacks a proper basis.
[56] I have thought carefully about all of the points raised. I agree that sharper focus needs to be brought to the proceeding. But at the same time, I am reluctant to prescribe how an applicant must plead. Therefore, I take a middle ground:
(a)I direct that the two questions relating to error of law agreed by the parties should be pleaded; namely:
Challenge to the May 2023 decision: did the Director-General err in law when refusing parts 1, 2 and 4 of Ms Whittome’s OIA request of 22 April 2023 request in reliance on ss 9(2)(b)(ii) and 9(2)(ba)(ii) of the OIA, and part 3 of the request under s 18(e) of the OIA?
Challenge to the December 2023 decision: did the Ombudsman err in law in deciding not to investigate Ms Whittome’s complaint on the basis that it was unnecessary in light of his June 2023 opinion?
(b)I add a third question which is also to be pleaded, being in relation to Pharmac’s decision to refuse the part of Ms Whittome’s OIA request about the Warranty information that the Ministry of Health referred to Pharmac. That question is:
Challenge to the 12 June 2023 decision: Did Pharmac err in law when refusing part 5 of the 22 April 2023 request in relation to the Warranty Information?
(c)Ms Whittome’s first additional proposed question will not be added, because it falls under the error of law question as it relates to the Ombudsman. Instead, Ms Whittome is directed to particularise the ways in which the Ombudsman is said to have not complied with the OIA.
(d)Ms Whittome’s second additional proposed question will not be added either. I agree with the respondents that it is precluded by s 34 of the OIA and it is of no relevance to the issues for determination in the proceeding.
(e)I decline to remove Ms Whittome’s pleaded grounds of review of procedural impropriety and unreasonableness. However, I direct that Ms Whittome is to particularise her claims in respect of these grounds of review.
The right of review under s 32B of the OIA
[57] The respondents seek a determination from the Court that the proceeding has been improperly brought pursuant to s 32B of the OIA.
[58] The respondents are correct that this proceeding cannot be brought under s 32B. Ms Whittome responsibly and fairly accepts that s 32B does not apply.
[59] Accordingly, I find that the proceeding has been improperly brought under s 32B of the OIA. I direct that Ms Whittome’s repleaded statement of claim specifies the appropriate basis for bringing her claim.
Result, resulting timetable, and costs
[60] I have made the orders and directions set out above and summarised at the beginning of the decision.
[61]I make the following timetabling directions:
(a)Ms Whittome is to file her repleaded statement of claim in accordance with the orders and directions in this decision by 30 May 2025.
(b)The respondents are to file their statements of defence within 20 working days following service of the repleaded statement of claim.
[62] The respondents have, for the most part, been successful. It is likely therefore that they will be entitled to costs in relation to this hearing. Costs will be determined at the conclusion of the substantive proceeding.
Grau J
Solicitors:
Crown Law, Wellington for Respondents
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