Wellington International Airport Ltd v Commerce Commission HC Auckland Civ-2011-485-1031
[2011] NZHC 971
•17 August 2011
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND WELLINGTON REGISTRY
CIV-2011-485-1031
UNDER the Judicature Amendment Act 1972
IN THE MATTER OF a purported input methodology determination under Part 4 of the Commerce Act 1986
BETWEEN WELLINGTON INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT LIMITED
First applicant
ANDCHRISTCHURCH INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT LIMITED
Second applicant
ANDCOMMERCE COMMISSION Respondent
ANDAUCKLAND INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT LIMITED AND AIR NEW ZEALAND LIMITED
Affected parties
Hearing: 9 August 2011
Appearances: N M Pender and J H Williams for the Major Electricity Users' Group
Inc
V L Heine and B A Davies for the applicants
R E Schmidt-McCleave for the respondent
Judgment: 17 August 2011
JUDGMENT OF CLIFFORD J
ON APPLICATION FOR JOINDER BY THE MAJOR ELECTRICITY
USERS’ GROUP INCORPORATED
WELLINGTON INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT LIMITED V COMMERCE COMMISSION HC WN CIV-2011-
485-1031 17 August 2011
Introduction
[1] In these proceedings Wellington International Airport Limited (“WIAL”) and Christchurch International Airport Limited (“CIAL”) (WIAL and CIAL together “the Airports”) challenge the process adopted by the Commerce Commission, under Part
4 of the Commerce Act 1986,1 in determining the input methodologies (or “IMs”) to
be used in the regulation of specified airport services.2 This is an application by the Major Electricity Users’ Group Incorporated (“MEUG”) to be joined, in what it describes as a limited capacity as an interested party, to these proceedings.
Context
[2] Part 4 of the Commerce Act, which in its current form came into effect on 1
April 2009, provides generally for the “regulation of the price and quality of goods or services in markets where there is little or no competition and little or no likelihood of a substantial increase in competition”.3 The purpose of Part 4 regulation is to promote the long-term benefit of consumers in the markets for regulated goods and services by promoting outcomes that are consistent with outcomes produced in competitive markets such that suppliers of those goods and services have, among other things, incentives to innovate and invest.4 Part 4 regulation comprises four types:
(a) information disclosure regulation;5
(b) negotiate/arbitrate regulation;6
1 All references in this judgment to sections are to sections of the Commerce Act 1986 unless otherwise stated.
2 Specified airport services comprise aircraft and freight activities, airfield activities and certain passenger terminal activities – s 56A.
3 Section 52.
4 Section 52A.
5 Information disclosure regulation requires suppliers of regulated goods or services to disclose specified information in stipulated formats. The purpose of information disclosure regulation is to ensure that sufficient information is readily available to interested persons to assess whether
the purpose of Part 4 is being met.
6 Negotiate/arbitrate regulation requires suppliers to enter into negotiations with parties identified by the Commerce Commission in order to reach agreement on prices and quality standards
associated with regulated goods or services. The purpose of negotiate/arbitrate regulation is to encourage suppliers and their customers to reach agreement on those matters for specified periods, and to provide for binding arbitration if negotiation is unsuccessful – s 53G.
(c) default/customised price-quality regulation;7 and
(d) individual price-quality regulation.8
[3] Such regulation may be imposed by the Commerce Commission following an inquiry.
[4] Electricity lines services,9 gas pipeline services10 and specified airport services are, however, specifically made subject to Part 4 regulation by subparts 9 to
11 of Part 4 as follows:
(a) all electricity lines services – information disclosure regulation;
(b)non consumer-owned electricity line services – default/customised price quality regulation;
(c) Transpower – information disclosure regulation and individual price- quality regulation;11
(d)all gas pipeline services – information disclosure and default/customised price quality regulation; and
(e) specified airport services – information disclosure regulation.
[5] Pursuant to s 52P(3) of the Act, the Commerce Commission is required to make determinations (“s 52P determinations”) setting out, for each type of regulation
referred to above:
7 Default/customised price-quality regulation provides price-quality paths for a regulatory period that set maximum prices and revenues, and minimum quality standards, that must be met by regulated suppliers during that period. The purpose of default/customised price-quality regulation is to provide a relatively low-cost way of setting price-quality paths for suppliers of regulated goods and services – s 53K.
8 Individual price-quality regulation provides for individualised price-quality paths for suppliers based on relevant IMs.
9 Electricity line services means the conveyance of electricity by line in New Zealand, including by Transpower and in the case of Transpower includes services performed as system operator – s 54C(1).
10 Gas pipeline services means the conveyance of natural gas by pipeline, including the assumption
of responsibility for losses of natural gas – s 55A(1).
11 Transpower was made subject to individual price-quality regulation in 2010 by the Commerce
(Part 4 Regulation – Transpower) Order 2010.
(a) the requirements that apply to each regulated supplier; (b) any timeframes that must be met or applied; and
(c) the IMs that apply.
[6] Input methodologies are the methodologies, procedures and rules pursuant to which the various types of regulation provided by Part 4 are applied to suppliers of regulated goods and services. Their purpose is to promote certainty for suppliers and customers as regards the application of Part 4 regulation.12 Input methodologies related to particular goods or services must include, to the extent applicable to the type of regulation under consideration:13
(a) Methodologies for evaluating or determining the following matters in respect of the supply of the goods or services:
(i) cost of capital;
(ii) valuation of assets;
(iii) allocation of common costs; and
(iv) treatment of taxation. (b) Pricing methodologies;
(c) Regulatory processes and rules, such as the specification and definition of prices, including identifying any costs that can be passed through to prices and identifying circumstances in which price-quality paths may be reconsidered within a regulatory period; and
(d)Matters relating to proposals by a regulated supplier for a customised price-quality part.
12 Section 52R.
13 Section 52T.
[7] Sections 54I, 54J, 54K, 55E and 56E of Part 4 set out how the Commerce Commission is to make the s 52P determinations for electricity lines services, gas pipeline services and specified airport services, and provide for transitional arrangements. Those provisions are complex, and are not directly relevant here.
[8] Pursuant to s 52U, the Commerce Commission had until 31 December 2010 to determine the IMs for the regulation of electricity line services, gas pipeline services and specified airport services.14 In doing so it was obliged to adopt the process outlined in s 52V.
[9] In consulting on and considering the required s 52P and IM determinations, the Commerce Commission:
(a) as regards electricity lines services, distinguished between those services provided by Transpower as operator of the National Grid, and those provided by electricity distribution businesses as operators of various regional networks; and
(b)as regards gas pipeline services, distinguished between the gas transmission services provided by Maui Development Limited and Vector and the gas distribution services provided by Powerco, GasNet and Vector,
in each case as had been its approach in the pre 1 April 2009 regime.
[10] MEUG participated in the Commerce Commission’s s 52V process. It did so in its capacity as the representative of major consumers of electricity. In that capacity, it had a particular interest in the Commerce Commission’s approach to cost of capital generally, and more specifically to the Commerce Commission’s cost of capital decisions in the IM determinations for electricity distribution businesses and
Transpower.
14 Section 52U originally required IMs by 30 June 2010. On 10 December 2009, the Minister of
Commerce announced his decision to grant the Commerce Commission an extension under s 52U(2) of the six months, to 31 December 2010.
[11] On 22 December 2010 the Commerce Commission published its IM determinations for the electricity lines services operated by the electricity distribution businesses and by Transpower, for gas transmission and gas distribution services and for specified airport services.
[12] Determinations of the Commerce Commission under the Commerce Act may, in general terms, be challenged by way of appeal to the High Court on a point of law pursuant to s 91(1B). There is also a general right of appeal under s 91(1) to the High Court against any determination of the Commerce Commission under this Act. That right of appeal does not apply to:
(a) section 52P determinations that set out how information disclosure regulation or negotiate/arbitrate regulation applies to regulated suppliers, or that sets out the default price-quality path that applies to regulated suppliers, against which determination there is no right of appeal;
(b)IM determinations, against which a separate right of appeal is provided by s 52Z.
[13] The appeal provided by s 52Z is an appeal on the merits.15 The Court may only allow a s 52Z appeal if it is satisfied that the amended or substituted IM is or will be materially better than the one appealed against in meeting the purpose of Part
4 of the Act, the purpose of IMs or both.
[14] Section 52P and IM determinations are subject to challenge by judicial review in the normal manner.
[15] Various appeals have been brought against the Commerce Commission’s IM determinations by way of appeals under s 52Z. These include appeals by MEUG against the electricity distribution services and Transpower IM determinations.
[16] Following the filing of those merits appeals, the Commerce Commission began the process of preparing the record for hearing. Section 52ZA(2) provides that the appeal is to be by way of rehearing and is to be conducted “solely on the basis of the documentary information and views that were before the Commerce Commission when it made its determination, and no party may introduce any new material during the appeal”. At a relatively early point in the process for settling that record, issues arose between the Commerce Commission and appellants due to the fact that it became obvious that the Commerce Commission considered that all of the material it had received and considered in the course of making IM determinations across the three categories of regulated goods and services was potentially relevant for the decisions it had made as regards each one of those individual categories. That this was the Commerce Commission’s view, and that that view reflected the consultation process that the Commerce Commission considered it had undertaken, was clearly stated in an affidavit provided by the chair of the Commerce
Commission, Dr Berry, on 15 April. Dr Berry explained:16
From the start of the process of determining input methodologies, the Commission envisaged that there would be service-specific input methodology determinations made for each of the airports, electricity distribution, electricity transmission (i.e. Transpower), gas distribution, and gas transmission sectors.
In reaching those determinations, however, my fellow Commissioners and I applied our collective mind to the totality of the relevant information before us. This meant that submissions on matters which had implications across other sectors were considered across those sectors. The Commission made no attempt to limit its consideration of submissions to the sector from which they were generated where those submissions had wider relevance.
[17] Very much, as I understand matters, in response to the Commerce Commission’s approach as described by Dr Berry, Vector, and WIAL and CIAL together, are separately applying to judicially review the Commerce Commission’s decision-making process as regards the IM determinations. Vector is also applying for a declaratory judgment in terms which reflect the relief it seeks in its review proceedings. At the same time, Transpower – by reference to more specific aspects of the Commerce Commission’s consultation process relating to the Transpower IM determination, is also reviewing that.
[18] As a matter of convenience it has been agreed that those proceedings (“the Process Challenges”), although not consolidated, will be heard together in as much as:
(a) the common factual context is the Commerce Commission’s
consultation and decision-making process described by Dr Berry; and
(b)the parties challenging the Commerce Commission’s process, but especially Vector on the one hand and WIAL and CIAL on the other hand, argue in various ways that the Commerce Commission erred by regarding as relevant material generated in the context of its consultation on the specified airport services IM determination when making the electricity, gas distribution and gas transmission IM determinations, and vice versa.
[19] Against that background, MEUG applied by interlocutory application dated
17 June 2011 to be joined as an interested party to the Process Challenges. As recorded in my Minute (No. 20) of 1 July 2011, MEUG was, effectively by consent, joined to Transpower and Vector’s judicial review proceedings, and Vector’s application for declaratory judgment, on the basis applied for. At the same time, and on the Commerce Commission’s application, Auckland International Airport Limited and Air New Zealand Limited were also, by consent, joined to these proceedings as affected parties.
[20] WIAL and CIAL, however, oppose MEUG’s application for joinder to these proceedings. Hence this hearing and judgment.
MEUG’s joinder application
[21] As indicated at the outset, MEUG applies to be joined to these proceedings on a limited basis. It seeks the right to:
(a) be served with all Court documents filed;
(b) file evidence in response to evidence filed by any other party;
(c) make written submissions in reply to the submissions of any other party;
(d) appear at the hearing; and
(e) with leave of the Court, make oral submissions.
[22] MEUG has subsequently advised that it does not intend to file any further evidence but, if joined, would rely in these proceedings on the affidavits of Mr R Matthes, MEUG’s executive director, filed in support of its joinder application.
[23] MEUG applies for joinder on the basis that:
(a) it gave views to the Commerce Commission as regards the IM
determinations which are challenged in the Process Challenges;
(b)it has appealed, as noted, against the electricity distribution services and Transpower IM determinations;
(c) the relief sought in these proceedings may affect its conduct of its merit review appeals and joinder is necessary to protect its interests as regards those appeals; and
(d)its presence before the Court may be necessary to adjudicate on and settle questions involved in these proceedings.
[24] MEUG relies on s 10(2) of the Judicature Amendment Act 1972, r 4.56 of the High Court Rules, and various supporting authority including, in particular, Wilson v Attorney-General.17
[25] Mr Matthes filed two affidavits in support of MEUG’s joinder application. He confirmed that MEUG approached the Commerce Commission’s consultation process as regards the IM determinations on the basis that, whilst MEUG was
principally interested in the determinations applying to electricity distribution
17 Wilson v Attorney-General [2010] NZAR 509 (HC).
services and Transpower, it understood that the approach the Commerce Commission took for any one regulated sector would reflect conclusions the Commerce Commission had reached as regards principles and theories applicable to the regulated sectors generally. This was particularly the case for issues related to cost of capital which are of central concern to it. Therefore, it considered the cost of capital material and evidence submitted to the Commerce Commission across all the sectors. Moreover, it was of the view that it was readily apparent that that was the Commerce Commission’s approach. In its view, that approach was necessary.
The Commerce Commission’s support for MEUG’s joinder application
[26] The Commerce Commission consented to and supported MEUG’s application to be joined to these proceedings. It did so in reliance on the principles summarised in Wilson. It contended that MEUG was properly an interested party because, although not affected by the specified airport services IM determination, it was the process that culminated in that and other determinations which was the subject of these proceedings, as it was the subject of Vector’s proceedings as well. That process was, as a matter of fact, conducted by the Commerce Commission on a cross-sector basis. MEUG participated in that process on that basis, and support the lawfulness of it. Therefore to exclude MEUG from being heard in these proceedings on the question of whether that was a lawful process would, in effect and as far as MEUG’s interests were concerned, be to pre-suppose the outcome on the ultimate issue in these proceedings and on that basis would be unjust.
[27] The Commerce Commission further contended that there was considerable overlap between the substance of all the Process Challenges and the remedies sought. Granting MEUG’s application, on the limited basis it sought and particularly now as it had indicated it did not wish to file any further evidence, would add only negligible additional costs.
The Airports’ position
[28] The Airports emphasised that MEUG was neither a supplier nor acquirer of specified airport services. It therefore had no direct interest in the specified airport
services IM determination. Rather it was an industry group representing major users of electricity. Reflecting that position, MEUG was properly not a party to the various merits appeals against the specified airport services IM determination. Therefore:
(a) MEUG was not a person whose interests or rights were affected by the outcome of these proceedings. It did not have an interest in these proceedings which entitled it, under a proper construction of the authorities, to be joined.
(b)Its application proceeded on an incorrect understanding as to the separate nature of the respective applications for review which comprise the Process Challenges, and improperly invited the Court to make findings of a substantive nature in an interlocutory context.
(c) Moreover, the joinder of MEUG would add additional and unjustifiable costs to the current parties to these proceedings.
[29] In their written and oral submissions, the Airports contended that whilst cases such as Wilson might suggest a relatively fluid approach to the question of joinder, careful review of the authorities in the judicial review context indicated that the Courts applied a more rigorous framework. Joinder was more constrained than Wilson might, on one reading, suggest.
[30] Third parties might be joined if they met a threshold question of establishing an interest in the proceeding which the law recognises as legitimate. These were, as characterised for the Airports, “recognised susceptible rights” which joinder would seek to protect. Such rights had to be of a legal nature and must impact on the proprietary interests of the joinder applicant. Parties with lesser interests might be permitted to be joined if in some way they could add something which otherwise would not be before the Court. That authority had, however, only been applied in cases involving complaints in disciplinary or similar cases, namely McFadden and Wilson. This framework was supported by High Court r 4.1, with its clear emphasis on limiting the persons to be joined as parties as far as practicable.
[31] Applying that framework, MEUG had no susceptible right or interest sufficient to provide a basis for joinder. Rather, its position was similar to that of the unsuccessful applicants for joinder in Kellian v Minister of Fisheries.18 As set out in careful submissions from Ms Heine and Ms Davies for the Airports:
The underlying proceedings were three judicial review applications which had been formally consolidated, but which related to paddle crab, butter fish, pilchard and anchovy fisheries. The applicants for joinder were the scampi fishery industry and the arguments advanced are very similar to those now advanced by MEUG (at paragraph [31]):
The applicants are scampi fishers. There is no suggestion that they have any interest whatever in the fisheries the subject matter of the consolidated proceedings. Rather, the submission for the applicants is that the same issues will arise in respect of the scampi fishery and that in the event of the scampi fishers not being joined in the present proceedings there is a real risk of duplicity of outcomes in this Court in respect of different fisheries in relation to the same issues of statutory interpretation and policy. It is submitted for the applicants that the issues are basically the same under the Act, regardless of the fishery. The applicants therefore say that they should be entitled to join the present proceeding so that they have an opportunity to be heard in respect of issues which will be relevant to their fishery.
[32] Just as for those applicant scampi fishers, MEUG’s position was essentially “no different from those who might be interested indirectly in certain other litigation where the same issues arise or may arise”. Thus, the Airports submitted, it was not enough for insurance company B to be joined to a proceeding involving insurance company A and its insured simply because that proceeding raised a question of insurance law that might be of wider interest to insurers.
[33] That there was no basis for joinder was confirmed by MEUG’s acceptance that it allied itself to the Commerce Commission. The Commerce Commission, the proper defendant in this fundamentally public law dispute, had every interest in defending the process it had taken. There was no question of MEUG’s absence leaving any relevant ground uncovered.
[34] It was not enough simply to be an interested party. More was required. Here
that did not exist and MEUG’s application should be declined.
18 Kellian v Minister of Fisheries [2002] 16 PRNZ 223
Analysis
[35] Joinder in judicial review is provided for under s 10(2) of the Judicature
Amendment Act 1972 which empowers a Judge to:
(b) Direct what persons shall be cited, or need not be cited, as respondents to the application for review, or direct that the name of any party be added or struck out:
(c) Direct what parties shall be served:
[36] Commenting on those provisions, a full Court of this Court in Wilson
observed:19
We express our agreement with this comment by Gendall J in Deadman v Luxton HC Wellington CP71/99, 4 May 1999 at 6 in the very different context of judicial review of decisions about fishing quota:
It may often be the case that there is more scope for rights of others to be affected in judicial review proceedings, than in other types of “plaintiff versus defendant” civil litigation, because frequently the challenge to the exercise of the statutory power or decision of a public body will have consequential affects upon others who obtained beneficial entitlements or expectations following upon the exercise of such power. [P 6]
Emerging from the cases is that joinder is appropriate where the party’s interests are, or may be, directly or indirectly affected by the judicial review application. In such situations, it would be unjust to decide the issues in the absence of the party so affected, or potentially affected. As Hammond J pointed out in Westhaven Shellfish Ltd v Chief Executive of Ministry of Fisheries (2002) 16 PRNZ 501 (HC) at [14], “joinder is not an all or nothing thing”. Fairness to the plaintiff, who is having another party interposed in his proceeding, demands that the Court consider whether the joinder should be for all or only limited purposes. The level of participation should be only what is necessary to protect the interests of the party being added.
[37] In my view, those observations correctly set out the principles to be applied to MEUG’s application. They are consistent with earlier cases such as Mainzeal Corp Limited v Contractors Bonding Limited, Wellington International Airport Ltd v Commerce Commission and the cited Westhaven decision itself.20
[38] In that context, I think that the position taken by the Airports, which
Ms Heine categorised as being one which conformed with the approach taken by the
19 At [19] – [20].
20 Mainzeal Corp Limited v Contractors Bonding Limited (1989) 2 PRNZ 47 (HC); Wellington International Airport Ltd v Commerce Commission HC Wellington CP151/02, 17 July 2002; Westhaven Shellfish Ltd v Chief Executive of Ministry of Fisheries (2002) 16 PRNZ 501 (HC).
Court in Wilson when that decision was properly understood, risks an overly strict categorisation of where joinder may be allowed, particularly in judicial review proceedings. As Hammond J observed in Westhaven Shellfish,21 in a passage cited with approval by Ellen France J in Wellington International Airport Ltd v Commerce Commission:22
(1) It is not possible and would be inappropriate to lay down any general propositions which apply to all cases of this kind.
(2) To the extent that it is possible to articulate useful guidelines, it may well be appropriate to join a party, where that party’s interests are directly or indirectly effected, or possibly even where that party has a distinctly arguable case to be so affected. This because it would then be unjust to decide such issues in their absence.
[39] In terms of Ms Heine’s “susceptible rights” analysis, I accept it may be possible to categorise cases where joinder has been granted on such a basis after the event. It is not clear to me, however, that that was the conceptual basis upon which joinder was actually granted by the Court at the time. As McGechan notes, albeit in the context of HR4.56 and plaintiff/defendant litigation, traditionally Courts have taken a liberal approach to joinder.23
[40] At the same time, as also stated by Doogue J in Kellian, a general interest in a matter, because that matter raises the same or a similar issue as may or is likely to be raised in future litigation involving a person, is not enough to provide for the joinder of that person. Something more is required, as set out in Wilson in the passage already quoted.
[41] In oral argument, Ms Pender placed particular emphasis on MEUG’s concern that, in some way, it may be adversely affected by relief that may be granted to the Airports, particularly as to the basis upon which any reconsideration by the Commerce Commission of the specified airport services IM determination might proceed. MEUG’s concern appeared to be that, as these proceedings have been pleaded by the Airports, MEUG could be excluded from any specified airport
services airport sector specific reconsideration by the Commerce Commission of that
21 At [14].
22 At [23].
23 McGechan on Procedure (looseleaf ed, Brookers) at [HR4.56(04)].
determination. As Ms Heine pointed out, this would appear to have arisen – at least in large part – because of a misunderstanding by MEUG of the Airports’ pleadings. I simply observe, as I think was accepted for the Airports, that if as a result of their judicial review proceedings the Commerce Commission is required to reconsider and therefore reconsult on the specified airport services IM determination, it seems unlikely that MEUG would not be in a position to participate in that consultation as an interested party, given the interest it has in the Commerce Commission’s approach to Part 4 regulation in general and cost of capital issues more specifically. I am therefore, in general terms, not persuaded that MEUG’s interest in the relief which may be granted to the Airports would, of itself, provide an appropriate basis for its joinder.
[42] Having said that I think the point made, in a helpfully succinct fashion, by Ms Schmidt-McCleave for the Commerce Commission is the more persuasive one. That is, it is MEUG’s position, as it is the Commerce Commission’s, that the process described by Dr Berry was lawfully adopted by the Commerce Commission. MEUG participated in that process. In my view, to the extent therefore that that process is challenged in these proceedings by the Airports separately to the challenges brought by Transpower and Vector, MEUG has a direct interest in the outcome of these proceedings as it is the lawfulness of that process which it argues in favour of.
[43] MEUG is therefore, in my view, in a quite different position to the scampi fishers in Kellian, and to the hypothetical insurance company B. It has a direct interest in the Commerce Commission’s process that is challenged in these proceedings. It is not, in my view, an answer to that proposition that in these proceedings Transpower only challenges the Commerce Commission’s process as that process involved Transpower, and that therefore these proceedings have no relevance for MEUG, and MEUG has no proper interest in them. That is undoubtedly the proposition Transpower advances. It is, however, precisely the opposite proposition that MEUG advances, as the Commerce Commission does also. Therefore, in my view, MEUG has a sufficient interest in the subject matter of these proceedings (the Commerce Commission’s challenged process) to support its joinder.
[44] More particularly, and in terms of s 52ZA(2), MEUG contends that its appeals should be conducted on the basis of a record that includes matters put before the Commerce Commission relating to specified airport services. To the extent that these proceedings indirectly question the appropriateness of the record for MEUG’s appeals being prepared on that basis, MEUG does, in my view, have an interest that is thus affected.
[45] In these circumstances, I think it is appropriate to exercise the discretion of this Court on a joinder application to grant MEUG’s application, on the limited basis sought, noting further that MEUG does not now seek leave to file evidence as it will rely on the evidence filed by Mr Matthes for the purposes of this application.
[46] I therefore grant MEUG’s joinder application on the basis that MEUG: (a) be served with all Court documents filed in these proceedings;
(b)may file Mr Matthes’ affidavits in support of its interlocutory application as evidence in these proceedings;
(c) may make written submissions in reply to the submissions of any other party in these proceedings;
(d) may appear at the hearing of these proceedings; and
(e) may make oral submissions with the leave of the Court. [47] The question of costs is reserved.
[48] On that basis, I make timetable directions as sought by MEUG in its memorandum of 5 August 2011.
“Clifford J”
Solicitors:
Chapman Tripp, P O Box 993, Wellington for the applicants ([email protected];
briony [email protected])
Crown Law Office, P O Box 2858, Wellington for the respondent ([email protected]) Franks & Ogilvie, P O Box 10388, Wellington for MEUG ([email protected];
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