Wedgwood v Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections

[2019] NZHC 831

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND CHRISTCHURCH REGISTRY

I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA ŌTAUTAHI ROHE

CIV-2019-409-181

[2019] NZHC 831

UNDER

the Habeas Corpus Act 2001

BETWEEN

ASTON EDWARD WILLIAM ERNEST WEDGWOOD

Applicant

CHIEF EXECUTIVE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

Defendant

Teleconference:

15 April 2019

Counsel:

A McKenzie for Applicant

K South for Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections for Defendant

Judgment:

15 April 2019

JUDGMENT OF COOKE J

[1]    On or about 8 April 2019 the District Court at Christchurch received handwritten documentation filed by the applicant, Aston Edward William Ernest Wedgwood  seeking a writ of habeas corpus.  The original documentation was dated 4 April 2019. A subsequent addendum dated 5 April 2019 was filed at the District Court. This documentation was transferred to the High Court by the Registry given that a writ of habeas corpus is within the jurisdiction of the High Court, rather than the District Court. It was received by the High Court on Friday 12 April 2019.

[2]    In accordance with the Habeas Corpus Act 2001 (the Act) writs of habeas corpus are given priority. The matter has accordingly been given a telephone conference before me today as Duty Judge. As indicated the documentation is hand written by the applicant himself, but on receipt by the High Court the Registry made

WEDGWOOD v CHIEF EXECUTIVE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS [2019] NZHC 831

[15 April 2019]

enquiry of Mr McKenzie who acts for Mr Wedgwood in the District Court. He appeared at the conference, although he had no instructions from Mr Wedgwood.  Ms South filed a memorandum on behalf of the Crown opposing the application.

[3]    In his documentation Mr Wedgwood raises a number of matters, but his key point is outlined in the original document entitled as a Writ of Habeas Corpus is in the following way:

I, Aston Edward William Ernest Wedgwood, swear that I believe I have served three years on home arrest and on remand which is equal or more than the indicated sentence and request to come before the court under habeas corpus without delay, for release.

[4]    Given the requirement for urgency in s 9(2) of the Act, I must ensure that the application is disposed of as a matter of priority and urgency.   In accordance with     s 9(3) the Registrar must allocate an inter-parties hearing no later than three working days after the date on which the application is filed. In my view that hearing can proceed by way of telephone. Indeed the requirements for utmost urgency would suggest that that would sometimes be necessary. The key point is that the application needs to be considered on its merits as soon as possible.

[5]    Ms South appears for the Crown to oppose the application. She advises that the applicant is currently remanded in custody as a consequence of a decision of the District Court on 1 April 2019 to revoke bail following the occupier of the EM bail address withdrawing consent after alleged damage to the address. She also advised that the applicant is scheduled to appear in the District Court tomorrow on the charge of wilful damage to the EM bail address. Bail can be considered at that time.

[6]    I have accordingly addressed the application on its merits. I am satisfied here that the application should be dismissed. Section 14 of the Act provides:

(2)A Judge dealing with an application must enquire into the matters of fact and law claimed to justify the detention and is not confined in that enquiry to the correction of jurisdictional errors; but this subsection does not entitle a Judge to call into question—

(a)      a conviction of an offence by a court of competent jurisdiction, the Court Martial of New Zealand established under section 8 of the Court Martial Act 2007, or a disciplinary officer acting under Part 5 of the Armed Forces Discipline Act 1971; or

(b)      a ruling as to bail by a court of competent jurisdiction.

[7]    Section 14(2)(b) is applicable have. Mr Wedgwood is in custody as a consequence of bail decisions. This is a matter that has been considered by the Court of Appeal, who in Taylor v Superintendent Waikato Prison held:1

[10]     In argument before us, Mr Pike for the respondent submitted that     s 14(2)(b) of the Habeas Corpus Act provides a complete answer to the application. We agree. The appellant is presently detained pursuant to the successive orders of Judge Tompkins and Goddard J that he be remanded in custody. Those orders were made pending clarification of the status of the grant of bail on his application. Both Judge Tompkins and Goddard J were required under s 7(5) of the Bail Act to release the appellant unless satisfied there was just cause for continued detention. Both ordered continued detention. The decisions therefore were “rulings as to bail”.

[8]    Here, in exactly the same way, Mr Wedgwood’s current detention is a consequence of the bail decisions made in the District Court. His detention is a matter for that Court. Accordingly the writ of habeas corpus is dismissed.

Cooke J

1      Taylor v Superintendent, Waikato Bay of Plenty Regional Prison (2002) 6 HRNZ 679, [2002] NZAR 425 (CA).