Webster v Police
[2017] NZHC 2685
•3 November 2017
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY
I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TĀMAKI MAKAURAU ROHE
CRI-2017-404-300 [2017] NZHC 2685
BETWEEN JERICHO WEBSTER
Appellant
AND
NEW ZEALAND POLICE Respondent
Hearing: 30 October 2017 Counsel:
M B Mortimer for Appellant
J C Bull for RespondentJudgment:
3 November 2017
JUDGMENT OF BREWER J
This judgment was delivered by me on 3 November 2017 at 9:30 am pursuant to Rule 11.5 High Court Rules.
Registrar/Deputy Registrar
Solicitors/Counsel: Maria Mortimer (Auckland) for Appellant
Meredith Connell (Auckland) for Respondent
WEBSTER v POLICE [2017] NZHC 2685 [3 November 2017]
Introduction
[1] The appellant, Mr Webster, appeals his sentence of three years’ imprisonment imposed by Judge Roberts in the District Court.1
Background
[2] Mr Webster pleaded guilty to 25 charges for offences committed between
24 November 2015 and 15 December 2016.2 The cost of the offending was said to be
$10,781.87.3 I will not address the facts forming the basis for these charges in detail. It suffices to say that most of them related to motor vehicles, but there were also charges of theft and demanding with menaces.
[3] Judge Roberts sentenced Mr Webster to a total of three years’ imprisonment on
25 August 2017.4 I attach a table of the charges and sentences as an appendix to this
Judgment.
[4] Mr Webster appeals his sentence on the ground it is manifestly excessive. He submits the Judge adopted too high a starting point for the lead offending, failed to consider the totality principle and gave insufficient discounts for his personal mitigating circumstances, particularly his youth.
Approach on appeal
[5] Section 250(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act 2011 provides that the Court must allow an appeal against sentence if it is satisfied that:
(a) for any reason, there is an error in the sentence imposed on conviction;
and
(b) a different sentence should be imposed.
1 R v Webster DC Auckland CRI-2016-004-6931, 25 August 2017 at [28].
2 In summary, there were three charges of unlawfully taking a motor vehicle, nine charges of unlawfully getting into a motor vehicle, one charge of unlawfully interfering with a motor vehicle, one charge of failing to answer District Court bail, one charge of receiving property, one charge
of theft of property in excess of $1,000, one charge of demanding with menaces, one charge of
reckless driving, one charge of failing to stop when requested to stop, one charge of failing to stop when followed by red/blue flashing lights, two charges of dangerous driving, one charge of failing to stop or ascertain injury, one charge of resisting police, and one charge of wilful damage.
3 R v Webster, above n 1, at [20].
4 R v Webster, above n 1, at [28].
[6] In any other case, the Court must dismiss the appeal.5 A sentence may be set aside where it is manifestly excessive.6 The Court will then go on to form its own view of the appropriate sentence.7
[7] Judge Roberts took an unorthodox approach to the sentencing. But what matters is the end sentence. I will adopt an orthodox analysis and cross-check Judge Roberts’s sentence to assess whether it was manifestly excessive.
[8] I will first address the starting point for the lead offending. I will then adjust the starting point to account for the other charges and the fact that Mr Webster was on bail when he committed most of the offences. Totality and Mr Webster’s personal circumstances will then be considered in order to reach an end sentence which I can compare with Judge Roberts’s end sentence of three years’ imprisonment.
Starting point for lead offending
[9] Judge Roberts took the demanding with menaces charge as the lead offending.8
So will I. The Judge adopted a starting point of 18 months’ imprisonment for that charge.9 I will now make my own assessment.
[10] That charge, along with a theft charge, resulted from an incident on
29 December 2015 where Mr Webster approached two people in the central city area. It is unclear whether his two associates also approached the victims, but they were, at the very least, nearby. After initially asking for cigarettes, Mr Webster grabbed an iPhone worth $1,400 from one of the victims. He started to walk away. But he returned moments later. He threatened to “hook” the other victim if he did not hand over his phone. Mr Webster had his fist clenched and gave the appearance that he was intending to strike.
[11] In assessing the starting point for that offending, the Judge commented:
5 Section 250(3).
6 Tutakangahau v R [2014] NZCA 279, [2014] 3 NZLR 482 at [33].
7 Tutakangahau v R, above n 6, at [30].
8 Crimes Act 1961, s 239(2).
9 At [22].
[21] … I focus on initially the offending 29 December 2015. This is at an early stage of the offending which was to extend over the following
12 months. Street stand-over, threat of violence, yes admittedly, in broad daylight, but with the end focus of securing property. The Crown refers to the
oft quoted paragraph in the Court of Appeal decision in R v Mako – street robbery, and the suggested start point of between three years and 18 months’ imprisonment. Of course, the charge in Mako was aggravated robbery.
[22] I am referred to various other authorities by counsel, but inevitably there are factual variations. There was, here, a threat of violence. Property was gained and you permanently deprived the owner of that property. There was premeditation and, as I say, loss followed. The victim impact statement indicates that that encounter caused the victim significant distress. With this offending I adopt a start point of 18 months’ imprisonment.
[12] Mr Webster submits the reliance on the decision of R v Mako constituted an error of law10 because Mako is the tariff decision for aggravated robbery,11 not demanding with menaces.
[13] The Crown submits that Judge Roberts’s treatment of Mako was not erroneous and is consistent with the Court of Appeal’s decision in Regan v R.12 It submits that the starting point was within the appropriate range for this offending.
[14] In Regan, the defendant appealed his sentence of two years and five months’ imprisonment for one charge of demanding with menaces on the grounds that the starting point was excessive, the uplift for previous convictions was too high and the discount for mitigating factors was inadequate. In a heavily intoxicated state, the defendant had walked into bank premises and “demanded the money in the till” from a young teller.13 The teller handed over $905.
[15] In fixing a starting point, the District Court Judge accepted Crown counsel’s submission that there was an analogy to be drawn with Mako.14 He adopted a starting point of two years’ imprisonment.
[16] The Court of Appeal commented:
10 R v Mako [2000] 2 NZLR 170 (CA).
11 Crimes Act, s 235.
12 Regan v R [2012] NZCA 227.
13 At [6].
14 At [8].
[11] We consider that the decision in Mako provides little assistance in terms of appropriate sentencing range, as the discussion in that case focussed on sentencing for aggravated robbery, which has a different maximum sentence. Although some of the same policy considerations identified in Mako apply to sentences for both aggravated robbery and demanding with menaces, it would be wrong to approach this sentence through the lens of Mako and the application of mathematical formulas to arrive at a pro-rated sentencing range.
[12] Having reviewed relevant sentencing decisions that deal with demanding with menaces we are satisfied that the starting point adopted by the Judge was set too high …
(Citations omitted)
[17] Through reference to Opetaia v R and R v Witute,15 the Court adopted a starting point of 18 months’ imprisonment instead.16 The Court helpfully summarised those two cases:
[12] … In that case Mr Opetaia and an associate, dressed in gang regalia, confronted a bar tender. They demanded protection money of $1,200 per month saying “we are masters of this land. We own this territory”.
Mr Opetaia’s associate grabbed the complainant by the shirt and threatened to damage the store if their demands were not met. The complainant handed over
approximately $5.00 in coins to Mr Opetaia who spent it in gambling machines as he left the premises. In that case a starting point of two years was
upheld on appeal.
…
[14] … Mr Witute was in a group of men out on the street at night.
Mr Witute initiated the offending by confronting two young men and demanding cigarettes. He snatched a lighter. Another of his party demanded
money, and assaulted one of the complainants. Mr Witute was sentenced on a charge of demanding with menaces and a charge of theft. On appeal the
sentence of 18 months for demanding with menaces was quashed, and a sentence of six months imprisonment followed by six months supervision
substituted. This sentence took into account an early guilty plea, Mr Witute’s
youth and rehabilitative prospects which suggests a starting point of around
12 months imprisonment.
[18] The Court saw the offending in Regan as more serious than that in Witute,17
but less than that in Opetaia.18
15 Opetaia v R [2011] NZCA 621; R v Witute CA464/00, 21 March 2001.
16 At [15].
17 At [15].
18 At [13].
[19] I agree with Mr Webster that Judge Roberts should not have referred to Mako. But the Judge did not set a starting point using the banding methodology set out in Mako. He acknowledged that Mako was concerned with aggravated robbery. He instead identified that there are similar policy considerations with aggravated robbery and demanding with menaces – something the Court of Appeal in Regan explicitly recognised.
[20] In my view, consistent with the above decisions, a starting point of 18 months’ imprisonment was within range. I regard this case as broadly analogous to Witute. Although there was physical violence in that case, the defendant did not inflict such violence nor threaten it. Here, Mr Webster threatened violence. This justifies a higher starting point. But the offending in Opetaia was more serious. A starting point in between the two cases is warranted.
[21] Unlike Judge Roberts, I would uplift the 18 months by one month’s imprisonment to reflect the theft of the iPhone. This results in a starting point of one year and seven months’ imprisonment.
Adjusting the starting point
[22] Judge Roberts adopted a cumulative starting point of two years and six months’ imprisonment for the remaining charges, which he termed the “dishonesty offending”.19 This resulted in the Judge’s overall starting point of four years’ imprisonment.20
[23] Judge Roberts described the “dishonesty offending” as follows:21
[23] … the thefts, the three unlawful takings, the eight unlawfully getting into, the one unlawfully interfering with, and the receiving …
[24] In setting this starting point, the Judge referred to Singh v R.22 There, the defendant faced one charge of unlawfully taking a motor vehicle, three counts of unlawfully getting into a motor vehicle, three charges of theft (of varying amounts)
19 At [23].
20 At [27].
21 I note that the reference to thefts must be a mistake as there was only one theft charge.
22 Singh v R [2011] NZCA 139.
and one charge of driving while disqualified. The District Court Judge adopted a starting point of two years and six months’ imprisonment for the lead offending.23 The Court of Appeal held that this was within the available range, though “near the top of that range”.24
[25] The Crown submits that Judge Roberts was correct to conclude the offending in this case was more serious than that in Singh. I was referred to Graham v Police.25
In that case, the defendant faced one charge of burglary, three charges of unlawfully taking a motor vehicle, three charges of driving while disqualified and one charge of dangerous driving. On appeal, Randerson J found that a starting point of four years’ imprisonment would have been appropriate.26
[26] For my part, I will group the 19 driving offences together, focusing first on the charges of unlawfully taking a motor vehicle.27
[27] Unlawfully taking a vehicle has a maximum penalty of seven years’
imprisonment.28 Here, Mr Webster pleaded guilty to three such charges. On 28 March
2016, Mr Webster broke into a vehicle parked on a suburban road. He then broke the ignition to start the vehicle and drove it away. Mr Webster took the vehicle to an associate’s house and left it there. The incidents which founded the other two charges represented similar examples of opportunistic offending.
[28] There is no tariff case for this type of offending. In R v Leaf, White J noted the absence of such a case and helpfully listed examples of cases dealing with the charge.29
Consistent with those cases and Singh, I would adopt a starting point of eight months’
imprisonment for the three unlawful taking charges. I would then uplift that starting
23 At [5].
24 At [10].
25 Graham v Police HC Auckland CRI-2006-404-258, 12 October 2006.
26 At [14].
27 The 19 charges are: three charges of unlawfully taking a motor vehicle; nine charges of unlawfully getting into a motor vehicle; one charge of unlawfully interfering with a motor vehicle; one charge
of reckless driving; one charge of failing to stop when requested to stop; one charge of failing to stop when followed by red/blue flashing lights; two charges of dangerous driving; one charge of failing to stop or ascertain injury.
28 Crimes Act, s 226(1)(a).
29 R v Leaf HC Napier CRI-2011-020-2954, 8 February 2011 at [49]-[51].
point by a year to account for the other driving charges, making one year and eight months’ imprisonment.
[29] There must be a further uplift to account for the remaining charges.30 I would fix that at six months. This results in a starting point of two years and two months’ imprisonment as opposed to the two years and six months assessed by Judge Roberts. In total, my starting point at this stage is three years and nine months’ imprisonment as opposed to the final starting point of four years’ imprisonment calculated by Judge Roberts.
Offending while on bail
[30] The fact that Mr Webster offended while on bail is an additional aggravating feature.31 Judge Roberts commented:
[6] [The appellant’s] first Court appearance noted on the charging documents before me was 15 December 2015. The majority, thus, of those matters that I have just detailed were instances of [the appellant] offending while on bail and obviously, despite the increasing and ongoing nature of the offending, because of [the appellant’s] age [he was] readmitted to bail time after time …
…
[15] … [the probation officer] comments that on 17 September when [the appellant] removed [his] electronic bracelet, [he] absconded. [He] remained at large until 12 October when [he was] arrested and placed in custody prior to being bailed again on 14 October. As the probation officer notes, and as Mr Gunn submitted, [he] offended again even after that.
[31] This feature is particularly significant here because Mr Webster kept offending on numerous occasions over a 13-month period. For much of that time he was on electronically-monitored bail.
[32] Judge Roberts did not impose an uplift for this factor. I think that there must be one. I fix it at six months’ imprisonment.
30 The remaining charges are: one charge of failing to answer District Court bail; one charge of receiving property; one charge of resisting Police; one charge of wilful damage.
31 Clunie v R [2013] NZCA 110 at [22]. Section 9(1)(c) of the Sentencing Act 2002 specifically recognises that the fact that the offending was committed while on bail is an aggravating feature.
Overall starting point
[33] I have, therefore, reached an overall starting point of four years and three months’ imprisonment, which is three months higher than the overall starting point assessed by Judge Roberts.
Totality
[34] Mr Webster submits that Judge Roberts failed to consider the totality of his offending. Had he done so, he would have reduced the starting point of four years’ imprisonment. He submits that Judge Roberts should have simply had regard to totality and fixed an uplift of the starting point for the lead offence of demanding with menaces. Instead, the Judge took a cumulative approach.
[35] Cumulative sentences of imprisonment are generally appropriate if the offences for which an offender is being sentenced are different in kind, whether or not they are a connected series of offences.32 But s 85(2) of the Sentencing Act 2002 provides:
If cumulative sentences of imprisonment are imposed, whether individually or in combination with concurrent sentences, they must not result in a total period of imprisonment wholly out of proportion to the gravity of the overall offending.
[36] Judge Roberts based his cumulative starting point on the following:
[25] The police submission is that [the appellant’s] offending … is more serious. This type of offending focusing on motor vehicles particularly is separate and distinct. A cumulative sentence must be imposed having regard to all relevant matters, but particularly the following:
(a) The offending and reoffending.
(b) The fact that this was repeat offending whilst on bail.
(c) The impact of [the appellant’s] offending on [his] victims.
[37] I agree with this approach. A cumulative calculation was appropriate.
32 Sentencing Act, s 84(1).
[38] On my analysis, Judge Roberts did consider totality in assessing his overall starting point. He refused to impose uplifts for a number of the charges, instead commenting: “I do not contend, with a four year start point, it is appropriate to add additional time to accommodate those other charges.”33 In effect, the Judge reached a point beyond which – given his considerable judicial experience – he was not prepared to go.
[39] I have stood back and considered whether the starting point I have reached (four years and three months) properly reflects the criminality of all of Mr Webster’s offending considered as a whole, or whether it should be reduced. In my view, the starting point should stand. I take into account the approximately one year of offending on multiple occasions and mostly while Mr Webster was on bail. There is a variety of offences.
Discounts for personal circumstances
[40] Judge Roberts discounted Mr Webster’s sentence by a total of 12 months’ imprisonment to reflect his youth and his guilty plea.34 Mr Webster submits these discounts were insufficient. He submits there should have been further discounts given his personal circumstances and prospects for rehabilitation.
[41] I regard Mr Webster’s prospects for rehabilitation as directly relevant to his youth discount and will address it under that heading.
Personal circumstances
[42] Mr Webster submits that he should have received a discount due to his well- documented history of ‘complex psychiatric disability including specific learning difficulty, ADHD, conduct disorder and a history of psychosis probably secondary to substance abuse’.
[43] Judge Roberts acknowledged the existence of these difficulties:
33 At [27].
34 At [28].
[14] … I accept that you have difficulties. You had issues with substance abuse. You had issues with associates and an anti-social lifestyle and attitude
…
[15] You have had an involvement with mental health services previously
and I do note the ADHD diagnosis …
[44] The Judge also referred to a report from Dr Pillai.35 I have considered the report. It concludes that Mr Webster has ADHD and a learning disability. But he is not mentally disordered within the meaning of the Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992. Doctor Pillai found that “there is no information to suggest that this abnormal state of mind leads to significant diminishment in Mr Webster’s capacity for self-care or leads to a serious danger to the health and safety of others”.
[45] In my view, a separate discount is not warranted. The Court of Appeal’s decision in E (CA689/10) v R is the leading case on the availability of discounts for mental illness:36
[68] A mental disorder falling short of exculpating insanity may be capable of mitigating a sentence either because: if causative of the offending, it moderates the culpability; it renders less appropriate or more subjectively punitive a sentence of imprisonment; or because of a combination of those reasons. The moderation of culpability follows from the principle that any general criminal liability is founded on conduct performed rationally by one who exercises a willed choice to offend.
(Citations omitted)
[46] Here, there is no evidence to indicate that Mr Webster’s conditions were causative of his offending. Nor was there diminished moral responsibility. The Court of Appeal’s later remarks in Nixon v R are applicable here:37
[43] … A person with a mental disorder may warrant no discount at all where it is not causatively related to the offending and cannot be seen as reducing the moral wrong, or where any compassionate discount is cancelled by an increased risk to the community posed by the offender on release …
35 At [14].
36 E (CA689/10) v R [2010] NZCA 13.
37 Nixon v R [2016] NZCA 589.
Youth
[47] The age of a defendant can be a mitigating factor.38 But there is no presumption, or upper limit, on a discount for youth. An assessment must be made in the circumstances of the case. Ultimately:39
[96] … the fact [that] an offender is a young person can sometimes be given radical effect on sentence, unconstrained by any normative percentage, even where offending is serious. In other cases that is not possible. The young age of the offender cannot be accorded presumptive, let alone paramount, weight. The objective seriousness of the offending, the young person's part in it, anything aggravating and otherwise mitigating must also be weighed …
[48] The Court of Appeal in Churchward v R has found youth to be relevant during sentencing in the following ways:40
(a) Age-related neurological differences between young people and adults, including that young people may be more vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and outside pressure, and may be more impulsive than adults;
(b) The effect of imprisonment on young people — long sentences may be crushing;
(c) Young people have a greater capacity for rehabilitation, particularly as their character is not as well formed as that of adults.
[49] Judge Roberts recognised all of this and granted a discount of four months’
imprisonment:
[5] … Of course, your age is a factor that I must take into account. I recognise, as the Courts have now for some time, that young people make stupid mistakes and the Court should be wary to ensure that the repercussions are not life long. Undoubtedly, though, your age was the issue at the point of your various appearances through 2016 particularly.
…
[28] As to youth, it is well-recognised young persons, as I have already stated, make stupid decisions. Yours, however, was maintained. I intend to allow you an initial concession of four months …
38 Churchward v R [2011] NZCA 531 at [76]. Section 9(2)(a) of the Sentencing Act specifically recognises the age of the offender as a mitigating factor.
39 Pouwhare v R [2010] NZCA 268.
40 Churchward v R, above n 38, at [77].
[50] I note that Mr Webster had a limited, but relevant, record of offending. On
7 April 2016 he was dealt with in the Youth Court on one charge of possession of instruments for conversion and one charge of unlawfully getting into a motor vehicle. Nevertheless, I consider Mr Webster was eligible to a discount for his age. He was
17 years of age for most of his offending and not legally an adult.41
[51] This was a spree of low-level offending. Mr Webster has some learning difficulties. He was often accompanied by associates during the offending. Focusing on the last of the Churchward factors in particular, Mr Webster submits that he has significant prospects for rehabilitation. Judge Roberts noted that Mr Webster had spent the large part of 2017 incident-free.42 Doctor Pillai commented there appears to have been a significant change in the appellant’s “developmental trajectory over the past 6 to 9 months as evidenced by a significant reduction in offending behaviour and stability in employment and relationships”.
[52] I accept that Mr Webster has exhibited a change in attitude. He has full time employment. He has a partner and two children. But this must still be balanced against Judge Roberts’s observation:
[15] … There are Correction reports. I have the first dated 1 June initially. The probation officer preparing this report … says that you were vague with your engagement and had no appreciation or understanding as to the impact your offending had on others …
[53] It must also be balanced against Judge Roberts’s point that this was persistent and repeated offending made possible in large part because Mr Webster was given bail time and time again on account of his youth. Nevertheless, I consider that the four months discount given by Judge Roberts (8 per cent of the starting point) did not adequately address Mr Webster’s position. Due to the balancing factors, I would not give the high discount which would be possible where clear mitigating factors related to youth have been identified, and where there are established rehabilitation prospects. In my view, a 15 per cent discount is appropriate. This reduces the starting point I
have calculated to three years and seven months’ imprisonment.
41 The appellant turned 18 years of age on 1 November 2016.
42 At [14].
Guilty plea
[54] A defendant is entitled to a reduction in sentence for a guilty plea.43 But:44
[74] … the credit that is given must reflect all the circumstances in which the plea is entered, including whether it is truly to be regarded as an early or late plea and the strength of the prosecution case. Consideration of all the relevant circumstances will identify the extent of the true mitigatory effect of the plea.
[55] Any reduction cannot exceed 25 per cent.45 In this regard:
[75] … Whether the accused pleads guilty at the first reasonable opportunity is always relevant. But when that opportunity arose is a matter for particular inquiry rather than formalistic quantification. A plea can reasonably be seen as early when an accused pleads as soon as he or she has had the opportunity to be informed of all implications of the plea.
[56] Judge Roberts allowed a discount of eight months’ imprisonment for
Mr Webster’s guilty pleas at a case review hearing.46 This constituted a discount of
18 per cent after the discount for Mr Webster’s youth.
[57] Mr Webster submits that he should have been given the full 25 per cent discount. He submits that due to the number of charges, it took time to ensure that pleas were entered to the correct charges. He had been in discussion with the police throughout and had indicated from an early stage that resolution was sought.
[58] On the other hand, the Crown submits that the discount was open to the Judge. More than one case review hearing had occurred for a number of the charges. The prosecution also had a strong case.
[59] In my view, Judge Roberts’s discount was appropriate. There was not, for example, any ambiguity about the lead charges of demanding with menaces and theft, yet he first appeared on those charges on 5 January 2016 and pleaded not guilty on
15 March 2016 after nine appearances. He did not change his plea until 19 April 2017.
43 Hessell v R [2010] NZSC 135, [2011] 1 NZLR 607 at [73].
44 Hessell v R, above n 43.
45 Hessell v R, above n 43, at [75].
46 At [28].
[60] This results in an end sentence of two years and 11 months’ imprisonment, compared to Judge Roberts’s end sentence of three years’ imprisonment.
Decision
[61] Ultimately, I cannot say that Judge Roberts’s sentence was manifestly excessive. It was within a range of available sentences.
[62] The appeal is dismissed.
Brewer J
Appendix
| Offence | Legislation | Maximum penalty | Sentence imposed by Judge Roberts |
| Failure to answer District Court bail | Bail Act 2000, s 38(a) | Imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year or a fine not exceeding $2,000 | Convicted and discharged |
| Receiving | Crimes Act 1961, ss 246(1) and 247(c) | Imprisonment for a term not exceeding three months | One month’s imprisonment (concurrent) |
| Theft of property in excess of $1,000 | Crimes Act, ss 219(1) and 223(b) | Imprisonment for a term not exceeding seven years | One year and six months’ imprisonment (concurrent) |
| Demanding with menaces | Crimes Act, s 239(2) | Imprisonment for a term not exceeding seven years | One year and six months’ imprisonment (concurrent) |
| Unlawfully takes a motor vehicle | Crimes Act, s 226(1)(a) | Imprisonment for a term not exceeding seven years | Three years’ imprisonment |
| Unlawfully takes a motor vehicle x 2 | Crimes Act, s 226(1)(a) | Imprisonment for a term not exceeding seven years | Three years’ imprisonment (concurrent) |
| Reckless driving | Land Transport Act 1998, ss 35(1)(a) and 35(2) | Imprisonment for a term not exceeding three months or a fine not exceeding $4,500. The court must also order the person to be disqualified from holding or obtaining a driver licence for six months or more. | Two months’ imprisonment and six months’ disqualification |
| Failing to stop when requested to stop | Land Transport Act, ss 52A(1)(a)(i) and s 52A(2) | A fine not exceeding $10,000 | Convicted and discharged |
| Failing to stop when followed by red/blue flashing lights | Land Transport Act, ss 52(1)(c) and s 52(2) | A fine not exceeding $10,000 | Convicted and discharged |
| Unlawfully getting into a motor vehicle x 9 | Crimes Act, s 226(2) | Imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years | Six months’ imprisonment (concurrent) |
| Dangerous driving | Land Transport Act, ss 35(1)(b) and 35(2) | Imprisonment for a term not exceeding three months or a fine not exceeding $4,500. The court must also order the person to be disqualified from holding or obtaining a driver licence for six months or more. | Two months’ imprisonment (concurrent) and eight months’ disqualification |
| Dangerous driving | Land Transport Act, ss 35(1)(b) and 35(2) | Imprisonment for a term not exceeding three months or a fine not exceeding $4,500. The court must also order the person to be disqualified from holding or obtaining a driver licence for six months or more. | Two months’ imprisonment (concurrent) and 12 months’ disqualification |
| Unlawfully interferes with a motor vehicle | Crimes Act, s 226(2) | Imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years | Six months’ imprisonment (concurrent) |
| Failing to stop or ascertain injury | Land Transport Act, ss 35(1)(c) and 35(2) | Imprisonment for a term not exceeding three months or a fine not exceeding $4,500. The court must also order the person to be disqualified from holding or obtaining a driver licence for six months or more. | Two months’ imprisonment (concurrent) and 12 months’ disqualification |
| Resisting police | Summary Offences Act 1981, s 23(a) | Imprisonment for a term not exceeding three months or a fine not exceeding $2,000 | One month’s imprisonment (concurrent) |
| Wilful damage | Summary Offences Act, s 11(1)(a) | Imprisonment for a term not exceeding three months or a fine not exceeding $2,000 | Two months’ imprisonment (concurrent) |
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