Ward v Forsyth HC Auckland CIV 2010-404-6188

Case

[2010] NZHC 1892

22 September 2010

No judgment structure available for this case.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY

CIV-2010-404-6188

BETWEEN  ROSALYN FRANCES WARD First Plaintiff

ANDROY IVON FORSYTH AND DAVID OWEN ASHER

Defendants

Hearing:         22 September 2010

Counsel:         V T Bruton for First Plaintiff

P A B Mills for Defendants

Judgment:      22 September 2010 at Oral

ORAL JUDGMENT OF MACKENZIE J

[1]      This proceeding was for mention in this list pursuant to direction given by Lang J in a minute issued on 17 September 2010.  The proceedings themselves are quite  complex  and  relate  to  the  position  of  the  plaintiff  who  is  the  widow  of Mr Ward who was the effective settlor of a trust called the Tomorrowland Family Trust (“the Trust”).

[2]      In  the  substantive  proceedings  the  plaintiff  seeks  a  range  of  remedies effectively that her status as a beneficiary of the Trust be recognised or established and seeking payment as a beneficiary from the Trust.  It is unnecessary to describe the proceedings in detail and indeed their complexity is such that I am by no means sure that I have a clear understanding of the issues which they raise.

[3]      The matter before the Court is an application for a freezing order in respect of assets  held  by  the  defendants  in  their  capacity  as  trustees  of  the  Trust.    The

WARD  V FORSYTH AND ASHER HC AK CIV-2010-404-6188  22 September 2010

application was made on a without notice basis but Lang J considered that it should not be dealt on with on a without notice basis.  He directed that the proceedings be served immediately on the trustees and the matter be listed for mention today.

[4]      I have had lengthy exchanges with counsel as to whether some interim arrangement can be reached and counsel have had the opportunity to discuss that possibility among themselves.  It is clear that the application for a freezing order will have to be dealt with at a defended hearing.  The issue for me then is the timetable to that defended hearing and what interim arrangements might be appropriate between now and the date of that defended hearing.   Counsel have discussed whether an undertaking might be agreed rather than have the Court make a formal order.  While those discussions have been able to achieve some measure of agreement there are two aspects of the proposed interim arrangements which are not agreed.   In those circumstances I consider that the better course is for the Court to make a formal order which addresses both what had been offered by way of undertaking and the additional matters which cannot be agreed.

[5]      I should also mention at this stage that counsel for the plaintiff has signalled an  intention  to  make  application  for  an  order  directing  that  the  trustees  make available certain accounting information.  There is no formal application presently before the Court but the directions which I have discussed with counsel, and will now formalise, will make provision for that application.

[6]      The timetable for the interim freezing order application and for the proposed application in relation to accounting information is as follows:

a)       By 29 September 2010 the plaintiff is to make a formal application for the provision of the accounting information which the plaintiff seeks;

b)By 20 October 2010 the respondents are to file and serve a notice of opposition to the application for an interim freezing order and for the other application if it is made;

c)       The respondents will also file by that date (20 October 2010) any affidavits in opposition to those applications;

d)By 3 November 2010 the plaintiff will file and serve any affidavits in reply.

e)       The matter is to be allocated a fixture.  It is anticipated that there is likely to be cross-examination on affidavits and so a two day fixture should be allocated.

f)        Any application to cross-examine any deponent in respect of these applications,   by   either   party,   is   to   be   filed   and   served   by

10 November 2010.   Any opposition to any application for leave to cross-examine is to be filed and served by 17 November 2010.   If necessary, the applications for leave to cross-examine can be listed for hearing   in   the   duty   Judge   list   in   the   week   commencing

22 November 2010.

g)       The fixture of two days, to be allocated as directed above for the hearing of the interim application for freezing order and the intended application relating to the provision of accounts, is to be arranged for a date as soon as practicable after the completion of the timetable.

[7]      There is also before the Court an application to consolidate these proceedings with some related proceedings which have been commenced.   Ms Bruton submits that that application could be dealt with at that same fixture.   However, that application involves other parties who are not parties to the present proceedings.  I think that dealing with the consolidation application at that fixture would be likely to hinder rather than help the expeditious handling of the application.   I consider it better that that matter be kept separate.  There is an application which is currently listed before the Associate Judge on 24 November and that seems a more appropriate mechanism for dealing with the issue of consolidation.   I make that by way of comment without giving any formal direction to that effect.  It will be for the parties and for the Associate Judge to decide how that aspect is best handled.

[8]      Having fixed that timetable I now turn to the question of what arrangements should be in place to preserve the status quo until the interim freezing order application can be heard.  The timetable which I have fixed makes it likely that that will be into the new year.  So the position needs to be considered between now and then.

[9]      The form of the order will be that trustees will not, pending the hearing of the application which I have just timetabled, make any distribution to beneficiaries from the assets of the trust except as approved by an order of this Court.  The trustees will not make any payments other than in the ordinary course of business without the approval of the Court, save in respect of the matters which I now mention.

[10]     The first is payment of trustees’  fees.   The trustees are said  to be both professional persons who are, on the face of it, entitled to charge fees under the terms of the trust deed.  Ms Bruton does not accept that position so far as Mr Asher is concerned.  He is described as an engineer but there is no formal evidence to that effect.  It is not in dispute that Mr Forsyth is a chartered accountant.

[11]     Ms Bruton submits that during the term of this order no payments should be able to be made.  I do not think that it is appropriate to make an order which would go as far as that.  I direct that the trustees will not make any payments to themselves by way of fees until an invoice has been rendered to the Trust and a copy of that invoice has been made available to counsel for the plaintiff.  Payment in accordance with any such invoice may be made at the expiration of seven days  after such delivery of the invoice, unless in the meantime application is made by the plaintiff to the Court to challenge that payment.

[12]     The second matter is payment of legal fees.  Ms Bruton also seeks an order that any payments by way of legal expenses be prohibited at least unless approved.  I do not consider that it is appropriate to impose such a condition.  It seems likely that potentially substantial legal fees may have to be incurred in the defence of these proceedings and of related proceedings.   I do not consider that it is appropriate to restrain the trustees from making proper payment of legal fees, nor to direct that details of the fees should be provided to the plaintiff.  Of course any fees charged

will  have  to  meet  the  proper  professional  requirements  in  respect  of  any  such payment.

[13]     Costs on the present application are reserved.

[14]     Leave is reserved to all parties to apply further in respect any matters that may arise as a result of these directions.

Solicitors:           Brookfields Lawyers, Auckland for First Plaintiff

Patricia Mills, Barrister, Auckland for Defendants

A D MacKenzie J

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