Wallace v Royal New Zealand Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals
[2023] NZHC 617
•24 March 2023
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY
I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TĀMAKI MAKAURAU ROHE
CRI-2018-092-012517
[2023] NZHC 617
BETWEEN JANINE ANN WALLACE AND BARBARA GLOVER
Appellants
AND
ROYAL NEW ZEALAND SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO ANIMALS
Respondent
Hearing: 15 November 2022 Appearances:
D R F Gardiner for Appellants
L P Radich and S E Arnerich for Respondent
Judgment:
24 March 2023
JUDGMENT OF PAUL DAVISON J
This judgment was delivered by me on 24 March 2023 at 3:20 pm
Registrar/Deputy Registrar
Solicitors:
Kayes Fletcher Walker, Auckland
WALLACE AND GLOVER v RNZSPCA [2023] NZHC 617 [24 March 2023]
Introduction
[1] Following a trial held in the District Court at Manukau in January and February 2022, Ms Janine Wallace and her mother Mrs Barbara Glover (collectively – the appellants) were both found guilty and convicted of offences under the Animal Welfare Act 1999 (the Act). The charges which were brought by the RNZSPCA1 (the SPCA), related to the appellants’ operation of “Volkerson Kennels” located on a large rural property at Mangatangi, south of Auckland, where they kept and bred German Shepherd dogs. The charges alleged they had failed to meet the physical, health, and behavioural needs of dogs in their care,2 and that they had failed to alleviate pain or distress of an ill animal.3
[2] In her reserved decision delivered on 31 March 2022, Judge K Grau found both of the appellants guilty of 32 charges, being 26 charges of failing to meet the physical, health, and behavioural needs of an animal, and six charges of failing to alleviate the pain and distress of an animal.4 On 13 July 2022 Judge Grau sentenced the appellants.5 She sentenced Ms Wallace to 12 months’ intensive supervision and 300 hours of community work (with judicial monitoring),6 and Mrs Glover to nine months’ supervision.7 Pursuant to s 169(3) of the Act Judge Grau disqualified both of the appellants from owning or exercising authority over dogs for a period of nine years.8 Her Honour also made an order that the appellants each pay costs of $20,000.9
[3]Both of the appellants appeal their convictions and sentences.
[4] They appeal their convictions on the grounds that the Judge erred in her findings regarding inadequate care of the dogs by applying the Act in an overly prescriptive way, and by placing undue weight on the prosecution evidence of two
1 Royal New Zealand Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals.
2 Animal Welfare Act 1999, ss 10, 12(a), and 25 (maximum penalty 12 months’ imprisonment or to a fine not exceeding $50,000 or to both).
3 Sections11(1), 12(b), and 25 (maximum penalty 12 months’ imprisonment or to a fine not exceeding $50,000 or to both).
4 Royal New Zealand Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Inc v Wallace [2022] NZDC 541 [Conviction decision].
5 R v Wallace [2022] NZDC 13368 [Sentencing decision].
6 At [56] and [77].
7 At [59] and [78].
8 At [73] and [80].
9 At [81].
SPCA inspectors (Mr Kevin Plowright and Ms Laurie Davis), and SPCA staff veterinarians. The appellants say that video recordings from body cameras worn and operated by SPCA inspectors Plowright and Davis on visits to Volkerson Kennels on 12 and 13 October 2017 was not produced in evidence and accordingly not considered by the Judge. Instead the prosecution produced a series of still photographic images selected from the video recordings. The appellants say that the recorded video images are favourable to them by showing that their care and treatment of the dogs was conducted in a manner consistent with good practice, and had the recordings been produced by the SPCA and considered by the Judge, her factual findings would have been favourable to them. The appellants seek to have parts of these video recordings admitted as fresh evidence for the purposes of the appeal.
[5] The appellants further allege that the Judge failed to address and apply the provisions of the Animal Welfare (Dogs) Code of Welfare 2010. They submit that the Judge uncritically accepted key aspects of the evidence of the SPCA prosecution witnesses, and the SPCA narrative of events. The appellants also challenge the Judge’s rejection of Ms Wallace’s evidence regarding the six dogs seized by the SPCA on 18 May 2018, and say that the Judge erred in relation to some of the adverse credibility findings she made against Ms Wallace.
[6] As regards their appeal against sentence, the appellants say that the nine year disqualification imposed by the Judge under s 169(3) of the Act was manifestly excessive. They say that as Mrs Glover is now aged 84, the nine year disqualification will mean that she will not be able to have a dog for the rest of her life. The appellants both maintain that as neither of them had any previous convictions under the Act the length of the disqualification order is manifestly excessive.
Background
[7] Judge Grau set out her reasons for her verdicts on the charges in a comprehensive decision. Her Honour also summarised the appellants’ offending in her sentencing notes dated 13 July 2022, and it is convenient to set out her summary here:10
10 Sentencing decision, above n 5.
[8] Mrs Glover, it appears you bred German Shepherd dogs for many years with success and you were held in high regard in the German Shepherd breeding world. You are 83 and you have never appeared in Court or have any criminal history.
[9] Ms Wallace, your involvement with the kennels seems to have started in around the last 10 years, during or after a real estate career you had that ended in criminal charges from what I can tell. It appears that Volkerson Kennels was selling puppies online for between $2,000 and $5,000. Ms Wallace, you strongly denied at the trial that this was a money-making operation. I must say I find that hard to believe. It seems implausible given the number of dogs you had and the significant cost and effort that must have been involved.
[10] The SPCA’s involvement began in mid-2017 when they received information that raised concerns about the dogs’ welfare. The first inspection showed concerning conditions. The inspectors gave you a statutory notice, an instruction to prevent or mitigate suffering under the Animal Welfare Act 1999. That required you to take steps to improve conditions. You did not do so. When they returned there was no meaningful improvement. They told you there were far too many dogs and not enough facilities. You appeared to have some insight at that point; you agreed to surrender five dogs.
[11] A week later the investigators saw some improvement but there were still a large number of dogs that were in poor living conditions. As I have said, I accept the SPCA were trying to work with you to get you to drop your numbers to improve the conditions the dogs were living in.
[12] You have both been very critical, saying that the SPCA were focused on the numbers of dogs that you had. But that was because you had too many dogs to care for.
[13] When they returned in October, they had given you time to make improvements, and, importantly, to reduce the number of dogs. But that reinspection was disappointing when the change was not meaningful. So they returned the next day with a veterinarian and seized 15 dogs. Those were the dogs whose welfare was the most concerning.
[14] Dr Beer, the SPCA vet, said she was struck by the number of dogs tied up in locations that were clearly not set up for managing dogs. Dogs were tethered to poles and fences. Dogs were being housed in places that were not proper housing. Dogs were tethered unattended with choke chains which risks causing injury to them. As their name suggests, they can choke a dog. They significantly restrict movement and were described by the experts in the trial as a punitive or punishment device.
[15] Ms Wallace, you kept saying during the trial that the SPCA were only seeing these dogs at a particular moment in time and that, every time the SPCA saw a dog they had concerns with, it had only just been put there. It was obvious to me that that was simply not correct. It was clear that many dogs were being tied up or otherwise kept in unsatisfactory or risky conditions for extended periods of time.
[16] There were two dogs whose conditions were particularly bad. Debbie, a pregnant bitch, was locked in a small, filthy crate inside a locked, dark utility
shed. She had a dirty and matted coat. She had an untreated and obvious ear infection. Ms Wallace, your explanation was fanciful. You said this dog was being monitored and observed because she was pregnant and that she was being groomed for one to two hours daily by your mother and another volunteer worker. But the reality was she was hidden away lying in her own faeces and likely in pain. She had pus coming out of her ear which would have been obvious to anyone who was actually caring for her.
[17] I found it likely that she was being hidden from the SPCA. She was a dog who was about to increase the population of dogs at the very time the SPCA was telling you that you needed to reduce numbers so that you could care adequately for those dogs.
[18] Mr Radich has pointed out, in written submissions, that you said in your evidence you had her in the crate to protect her against being taken by the SPCA. I think that was a slip by you as you quickly denied you had said or meant that. But I think that was a rare example of the truth slipping out when you gave your evidence at trial.
[19] Even worse was the state that the dog, Ritza, was found in. She was tied up inside a small enclosure in a hay barn. The tether was twisted around her leg; her leg was forced up next to her head. The tether was cutting into her leg and acting as a tourniquet, cutting off the blood supply. This dog was completely helpless, not even able to make a sound. The expert evidence was that it would have been very distressing and painful for the dog and that it was likely she had been in that position for hours at least. She had to be euthanised after her treatment was unsuccessful. The leg and the dog could not be saved.
[20] Again, Ms Wallace, your explanation was fanciful. You blamed the SPCA for causing the injury. You tried to suggest the dog’s leg got tied up in a matter of seconds when the SPCA went into the hay barn, despite the expert evidence that this injury would have taken hours. You denied there was anything wrong with the dog despite it being obvious that there was. You could not give a straight answer as to how the dog came to be tethered in there and by who. You tried to blame the dog’s death on the SPCA’s treatment of her when they took her. But it was very clear to me they were trying to treat the injury that was caused from the way she had been tied up and left.
[21] Thirteen other dogs were seized that day due to concerns they were underweight. Some had obvious ear infections, some had coats that were matted with dirt and faeces. Some dogs did not have proper access to water. Some were unsafely tethered. Three puppies were unsafely housed.
[22] You attended an interview with the inspectors in November 2017, Ms Wallace. You said you wanted to work with them, but you would not give them any meaningful information about the number of dogs at the kennels. However, there was some improvement after that time, and you did build new kennels.
[23] But then in May 2018 the SPCA was alerted to the presence of distressed dogs on your property. They found six dogs by following the noise of the dogs barking. Those dogs were tied to trees at the back of the farm, a considerable distance from the house. It took the SPCA about half an hour to drive there over rough terrain. These dogs were all underweight, some had ear infections. One had an obvious skin infection. Some had no access to
water. Again, this seems to have been an attempt to hide dogs, and again, there was an explanation that was fanciful, that these dogs had just been put there to rest after exercise, despite it being obvious that they had been there for quite some time. They were only found because they were barking in distress. They were not resting and relaxing after exercise as you claimed.
[24] I need to set a starting point for this offending. I look at aggravating and mitigating features; matters that make the offending worse or less serious.
[25]What is aggravating is the scope of the neglect in this case.
[26] I accept the prosecution’s submission that the general condition showed a high level of neglect. Looking at many aspect – for example, the tethering with the choke chains, the unhygienic conditions, the lack of any opportunity for behavioural enrichment - it seems to me that dogs were simply being warehoused because there were not enough people to care for them and give them the attention they needed, not just to meet their physical needs but also to meet their emotional needs.
[27] You suggested they had a rich life because they lived on a rural property. But some of the dogs were locked away in dark conditions. Others were tied up outside, hardly able to move. Others were in filthy dog runs skating through their own faeces. That is not behavioural enrichment.
[28] Also, an aggravating factor is the opportunities that were given, but not taken, to improve matters. Instead you hid dogs; you were still breeding dogs instead of reducing the numbers. I accept the prosecution’s submission that this was conduct that can be described as wilful rather than negligent.
[29] Next there is the extent of illness and injury with associated pain and distress to the animals. Six dogs with untreated ear infections, two with untreated skin infections, seven assessed as medically underweight. I record here that there were a significant number of other dogs that were very likely underweight too. I did not find you guilty in relation to those dogs only because the evidence did not establish that to the high criminal standard of beyond reasonable doubt. Nevertheless, I consider it very likely those other dogs were underweight too. Worst, of course, was Ritza who had to be euthanised as a result of being left unsafely tethered and unattended.
[30] I also accept there appears to be a financial motivation behind the overpopulation and the neglect that has resulted, which makes this worse than the hoarder type of situation that the courts see, where a person keeps acquiring animals in the misguided hope they can care for them.
Conviction appeals
The appellants
[8] Mr Gardiner for the appellants submits that the body-camera video recordings made by SPCA inspectors Mr Plowright and Ms Davis should be admitted as fresh evidence for the purposes of the appeal. The appellants have filed a memorandum in which they have identified multiple sections of the SPCA investigators’ video
recordings as being relevant to specific charges, and have included brief particulars as to the relevance and significance of what appears in the video recordings which they contend show that the dogs were being appropriately housed and cared for. Mr Gardiner submits that the body-cam video recordings provide a “different narrative” to that presented by the SPCA evidence and should be admitted in the interests of justice in order that the Court can assess the relevance and accuracy of the prosecution evidence regarding the state of the dog kennels and the circumstances and condition of the dogs when they were seized by the SPCA investigators on 13 October 2017 and 18 May 2018.
[9] Mr Gardiner submits that the Judge erred in her decision to reject the evidence of Ms Wallace. He submits that the effect of the Judge’s decision rejecting Ms Wallace’s evidence, was to significantly erode the presumption of innocence and the Judge effectively abdicated her responsibility for subjecting the evidence of the prosecution witnesses to careful scrutiny — specifically the evidence of inspectors Plowright and Davis and veterinarian Dr Beer — as to their evidence of what occurred on the occasions when dogs were seized from the appellants’ property. As I understand the appellants’ contention, it is that the video recordings made by the SPCA investigators should be admitted in the interests of justice, because they provide support for Ms Wallace’s evidence as to what occurred when the SPCA officers came and uplifted dogs from her property and support her evidence regarding the physical condition the dogs were in on the occasions of the inspectors’ visits, and how the dogs were being housed and cared for.
[10] Mr Gardiner submits that the body-camera video recordings constitute fresh evidence that could not with reasonable diligence have been produced at trial. He submits that the video recordings are credible and cogent evidence that in combination with other evidence produced at trial might reasonably have led to not guilty verdicts or at least some of the particulars alleged in respect of individual charges not being found proven.
[11] Mr Gardiner makes written submissions regarding specific charges, and says that the appellants contend that the body camera video recordings will assist in determining whether they were wrongly convicted and that the Judge may not have
reached the conclusions she did regarding her verdicts had she seen the video recordings.
The respondent
[12] Mr Radich for the respondent opposes the admission of the body-camera video recordings made by Mr Plowright and Ms Davis as fresh evidence for the appeal. He notes that the video recordings were disclosed to the appellants’ previous counsel in 2019, and again disclosed to their counsel Mr Gardiner in July 2020, some 18 months prior to the trial. Mr Radich also notes that well prior to the trial, the respondent notified the appellants that it was not intending to play the video recordings at the trial, and that it would produce a photo booklet comprising a selection of still photographs taken from the video recordings. The respondent notes that playing the video recordings would have taken several hours, and involve the playing of a considerable amount of irrelevant material.
[13] The composition of the prosecution photo booklet was settled by agreement between counsel before trial. However, during the respondent’s cross-examination of Ms Wallace two sections from the video recordings were played. The first was a video recording showing the dog Ritza which was played at the request of the prosecution to show Ritza’s condition when she was found tethered in a small enclosure in a hay barn and seized by the SPCA investigators on 13 October 2017. The second video recording was played to show the conditions in which the SPCA inspectors found five seven-month-old puppies being kept together in the woolshed, on their visit on 12 October 2017. The respondent notes that the appellants’ counsel did not put any of the video recordings to the prosecution witnesses during cross-examination, and did not adduce any video recordings as part of their own evidence.
[14] The respondent submits that the video evidence is not remotely fresh. It was first disclosed to the appellants over two years prior to the trial and re-disclosed to their trial counsel well prior to trial. The appellants were therefore in a position to adduce the video recordings at trial and chose not to do so. The respondent further submits that the appellants have not provided any explanation as to why they chose not to adduce the video recordings at trial if they are exculpatory of the appellants.
The respondent says that even if the Court is prepared to view the video recordings for the purposes of the appeal, it would likely require expert evidence to assist the Court in interpreting the video images and what they relate to.
Should the body camera video recordings be admitted in the interests of justice?
[15] The Court can receive fresh evidence on appeal if it thinks it necessary or expedient in the interests of justice.11 Generally, new evidence will need to be credible and cogent.12 But the overriding criterion is the interests of justice.13
[16]In R v Bain the Court of Appeal explained that:14
[22] An appellant who wishes the Court to consider evidence not called at the trial must demonstrate that the new evidence is: (a) sufficiently fresh; and
(b) sufficiently credible. Ordinarily if the evidence could, with reasonable diligence, have been called at the trial, it will not qualify as sufficiently fresh. This is not an immutable rule because the overriding criterion is always what course will best serve the interests of justice. … On the other hand the Court cannot overlook the fact that sometimes, for whatever reason, significant evidence is not called when it might have been. The stronger the further evidence is from the appellant’s point of view, and thus the greater the risk of a miscarriage of justice if it is not admitted, the more the Court may be inclined to accept that it is sufficiently fresh, or not insist on that criterion being fulfilled.
[17] The “sequential series of tests” to be considered with regard to the admission of fresh evidence on appeal is set out in Lundy v R:15
(a)Is the evidence credible?
(b)If so, is the evidence fresh in the sense that it could not have been obtained for the trial with reasonable diligence?
(c)If the evidence is fresh and credible it should be admitted unless it would have no effect on the safety of the conviction.
11 Criminal Procedure Act 2011, s 335(2)(c).
12 Lundy v R [2013] UKPC 28, [2014] 2 NZLR 273 at [120]; and R v Bain [2004] 1 NZLR 638 (CA)
at [22].
13 R v Bain, above n 12, at [22].
14 R v Bain, above n 12, approved by Bain v R [2007] UKPC 33, (2007) 23 CRNZ 71 at [34]; and
Lundy v R, above n 12.
15 Lundy v R, above n 12, at [120].
(d)If the evidence is credible but not fresh, it may nevertheless be admitted if there is a risk of a miscarriage of justice if it is not admitted.
[18] The body-camera video recordings comprise evidence that is clearly credible and reliable as they are recordings made at the time of the SPCA investigators’ visits to the appellants’ property on 12 and 13 October 2017 and 8 May 2018. However the video recordings are clearly not fresh evidence. It is evidence that was in the appellants’ possession well before trial and they could have utilised it to support their defence to the charges had they wished to do so. Having made a deliberate and informed decision not to produce the video recordings at their trial, they cannot now claim with any forceful justification that the interests of justice require that it now be admitted for the purposes of their appeal.
[19] Moreover having viewed the video recordings, I am satisfied that they show the circumstances and conditions in which the appellants’ dogs were being housed or kept, and the appearance of the dogs themselves is consistent with the descriptions of what the SPCA witnesses said they observed. There is nothing in the video recordings which appears to be exculpatory of the appellants and the overall picture they present is that of a large number dogs being housed in restricted and confined situations in wool shed pens, farm dog cages and in some cases tied up out in the open in an area of bush well away from the farmhouse and other farm utility buildings. The particulars set out in the appellants’ memorandum are of little assistance to the Court. While the particulars refer to matters which the appellants contend show that: the dogs were being housed or tethered in situations in which they had access to water; in which despite being tethered they were able to move freely; or that the physical condition of the dogs was consistent with them being healthy and well-nourished; such matters are not evident from viewing the video recordings. Where video recordings are said by the appellants to show features of a dog’s physical condition or how a specific dog was being housed and cared for, it was open to them to adduce the video recordings as evidence at trial in order to challenge the evidence of the SPCA inspectors and veterinary witnesses who described the conditions in which the dogs were being housed or tethered, as well as the physical condition of the dogs themselves.
[20] In their memorandum identifying “segments” of the Mr Plowright and Ms Davis body camera video recordings filed in support of their appeal, in respect of each video recording segment they have identified, the appellants have added brief notes to show why or how the identified video images are considered relevant to their appeal and justify the manner in which the dogs were being housed and cared for. However these brief notes fall well short of demonstrating that the Judge’s factual findings regarding the conditions the dogs were found in were in error. As I have noted, in addition to the oral evidence of the prosecution witnesses, the Judge had the benefit of also seeing the photographs taken by SPCA inspectors as well as the still photograph images taken from the body-camera video recordings made by inspectors Plowright and Davis.
[21] In my view the images and contents of the body-camera video recordings are consistent with the evidence given by the prosecution witnesses, and the appellants have failed to show that the video images are exculpatory of them. The overriding criterion regarding the admission of fresh evidence on appeal is the interests of justice, and I am well satisfied that the interests of justice do not require the admission of the video recordings in this case. I further find that the appellants have not shown that there is a risk of miscarriage of justice if the video recording evidence is not admitted, and I decline to admit them as fresh evidence for this appeal. As a result, the appellants’ conviction appeals based on the submission that, had the body-camera video recordings been played a trial, the Court’s finding of fact may have been different cannot succeed.
Did the Judge err in her assessment of Ms Wallace’s credibility?
[22] The appellants submit that the Judge erred in her adverse finding regarding Ms Wallace’s credibility and discounting her evidence. The appellants say that whatever view the Judge took of Ms Wallace’s credibility, it should not have determined the Judge’s approach to all of her evidence. The appellants submit that the Judge’s approach and her rejection of Ms Wallace’s evidence resulted in an injustice to both Ms Wallace herself and also to Mrs Glover whose position the Judge found to be closely aligned with that of her daughter. As already noted, the appellants say that the approach adopted by the Judge effectively eroded the presumption of innocence
and represented an abdication by the Judge from her responsibility for determining “where the truth or otherwise lay on each charge”. The appellants submit that the Judge’s adverse finding regarding Ms Wallace’s credibility should not mean that the evidence of the prosecution witnesses should not be carefully scrutinised.
[23] Mr Radich for the respondent says other than saying that they disagree with and don’t accept her findings, the appellants have failed to show why the Judge erred in making adverse credibility findings against Ms Wallace. Mr Radich notes that appellate courts are appropriately cautious about departing from a trial judge’s credibility findings.
[24] It is clear from Judge Grau’s reasons for verdicts decision that Her Honour gave careful consideration to the issue of the credibility and reliability of Ms Wallace’s evidence. The following passages of the Judge’s decision illustrate the careful manner in which the Judge addressed this issue. She said:16
[219] My second observation is that Ms Wallace would change her evidence to suit her case. For example, Ms Wallace’s evidence about the use of the sheep shed for housing dogs shifted repeatedly. She had initially said it was only a temporary measure. She had also said that when she described a dog being in a particular place temporarily, it did not mean overnight. She also said dogs were in the sheep shed because of the weather and this was only a moment in time (although she did not say where their actual home was). When it was put to her that dogs would be housed there for days, her response was that people work in there, so it is a good spacious area. She added that bedding was taken out in the morning and washed or thrown out. When her inconsistency was pointed out, i.e. that bedding indicated dogs were in there overnight, she said she thought she was talking about tethering and that dogs would sometimes overnight there. She then said that, when she meant temporary, it was until the new kennels were completed.
…
[222] Ms Wallace was often unwilling or incapable of giving a straight answer: For example, she said under cross examination that she did not accept there was a risk of injury from dogs being housed in the wool shed. She said people worked there and it was MPI approved. When it was put to her that it was not MPI approved for the housing of dogs, she responded that MPI do not have documents for kennels. Asked to give the reason why she would say it was MPI approved when that did not relate to dogs, her response was to ask the prosecutor if he was saying it was good enough for people but not good enough for dogs. I found myself regularly having to ask Ms Wallace during her cross examination to answer the questions she was being asked.
16 Conviction decision, above n 4.
[223] As another example, Ms Wallace was asked to comment on the prosecution evidence that dogs in general prefer to defecate away from where they are housed. Ms Wallace first said that all dogs were different, and they would just decide themselves and it was a natural process. Asked again, she gave a general example that some dogs will defecate in a kennel even after having been out for a run, and some will not. Asked a third time, she said it would be lovely if they were all like that and said she agreed in part. When pressed she said she could only talk about her dogs. When asked if she would agree that it appeared there was a large proportion of her dogs that seemed to prefer to defecate where they live and sleep, she said it depends on how many times they are going, what they have been fed and how they have been trained. She also appeared to suggest a dog seen in a photograph had defecated because a person had arrived, and that the kennel had just been water blasted. I comment that this evidence also appeared to me to be at odds with her evidence of rigorous training in general and of giving families a chance to buy a world class puppy as a family pet.
[224] Ms Wallace was utterly unwilling to accept any proposition put to her by the prosecution, however reasonable. As a general example, she was asked whether she accepted there were any shortcomings regarding the dogs’ care at all. She did not (although I note she had accepted there were areas with room for improvement when she was interviewed in November 2017). She said the animal husbandry was exemplary and that is revealed in the results that come out of Volkerson Kennels. In particular, she would not accept there were any shortcomings in relation to Ritza, despite that Ritza was obviously injured. Nor would she accept that Ritza would not have been injured if she had not been left tethered and unattended. Her response included that “I don’t know if that was staged.” Nor would she accept the SPCA had a fair concern that she had not been upfront about the number of dogs at the property, saying “… this has all been fabricated and it’s been a created story to give it drama.”
[225] There was a repeated insistence that the dogs were “working dogs.” This moniker was used, among other things, to justify dogs being outside without shelter, and to assert that the dogs were of ideal weight despite veterinarian evidence that they were not. Even if the dogs did work on the farm, I do not consider the law relating to animal welfare provides for lesser obligations on their owners. Nor, despite the repeated reference to the German Shepherd breed being classified as a ‘working dog’ did it appear likely from the evidence that many, or any, of the dogs were thus employed, when Ms Wallace made it clear that the farming operation was very separate from the dog kennels and she had nothing to do with the farm operation. Nor did her sister Ann (who dealt with the farm) have anything to do with the kennels.
[226] There was the implausibility of some of Ms Wallace’s evidence. For example:
(a)Ritza’s injury: Ms Wallace continued to insist there was nothing wrong with Ritza. However, I could see the dog’s injury with my own eyes in photographs. The video footage made it even clearer. When that video was shown to Ms Wallace she still would not accept there was a problem with the dog’s leg. Yet it was obvious the dog could not put its injured leg down, consistently with how she was found with her lead acting as a tourniquet on her leg.
(b)That a water blaster, which must have been used every day (if it was true that dog enclosures were cleaned daily) just happened to have broken down on exactly two of the days when the SPCA inspected the property – the time of the first inspection on 28 July 2017 then again on 12 October 2017.
(c)That Ms Wallace and her mother had a lot of help with the dogs from international students who were volunteer workers at the farm. At one stage she said there were 37 people from 30 countries staying anywhere between a week to five or six months. It was said there were two to seven at any one time, who stayed in the cottage and in their house. In my view, however, if there had been such assistance, the dogs’ conditions would not have been as the SPCA inspectors found them.
Nor were there any signs of these people in the SPCA’s case, beyond one photograph of (the bottom half of) a person cleaning out a puppy pen in the deer stables on 4 August 2017. Ms Wallace referred to this photograph a number of times to assert that dog enclosures (that one and others) were cleaned regularly. She said that this was just one example but there were many others. Yet there was no other evidence of the presence of any other workers, which I would have expected if there was always a team of workers (even a small team) helping with the care of so many dogs.
Ms Wallace said the SPCA spoke to various people and took photos of international students on their body-cam footage. If that was so, I would have expected it to be produced as part of the defence case, or at least put to the SPCA witnesses.
Ms Wallace would not, or could not, provide any other supporting evidence of the presence of these workers, either to the SPCA when they interviewed her in November 2017, or to the Court, stating that she would not breach their privacy. When asked about declining to answer SPCA questions about these workers in her interview, Ms Wallace’s response was to refer to what she said was an invalid search warrant,17 and then to say she could give all names, addresses and phone numbers. She also said maybe some could write and explain their experiences and that it was so valued even the Danish Government paid for their students to come and work on the farm.
It is important I note here that Ms Wallace did not have to provide evidence on this (or any other) issue. But because she
17 At various times in her evidence Ms Wallace referred to illegal search warrants. I had not previously been aware of any search warrants executed as part of the SPCA’s investigation, and it did not form part of the SPCA’s case. I had assumed from Ms Wallace’s evidence there might have been a ruling that the search warrant was unlawful, but Mr Radich advised that was not the case. Mrs Glover’s written submissions filed after the hearing also contain complaints about an unlawful search warrant.
did not, it makes it easier to accept the prosecution’s case that there were insufficient personnel to care for the dogs properly.
(d)There were repeated assertions of evidence being suppressed by the SPCA, or of other evidence that was available. But no such evidence was provided to the Court.
(e)There was the odd coincidence that Ms Wallace was not responsible for the three dogs who were arguably in the worst state; Debbie, who was said to have been in the garage as her mother said it was the best place for her, Ritza who Ms Wallace had (at least initially) denied putting in the haybarn (and then denied putting her in the place she was found), and Tiffany, who was said to have a skin infection because someone else (unnamed) had poured a chemical on her.
(f)That the SPCA’s investigation was not motivated by animal welfare but was designed to take Volkerson Kennel’s best breeding stock for financial purposes - either to breed from them or sell them, and/or as a fundraising exercise. While Ms Wallace may believe this to be the case, there was no evidence at all for her contention. Mr Plowright’s response to Ms Wallace’s belief they had been deliberately targeted by the SPCA as a result of an ill-intentioned complaint was to accept they were deliberately targeted, but that was because of animal welfare problems. He said they (the SPCA) had “bent over backwards to avoid today” (i.e. the trial). He also rejected the proposition it was advantageous to the SPCA to seize pedigree dogs and publicise it to assist funding, saying the costs involved were incredible and that is why they went to so much effort to avoid this from happening. He described as absolutely ludicrous the proposition that the stock seized was of very good bloodlines and was taken for the purpose of crippling Volkerson Kennels. The allegation that the SPCA’s motivation was to breed from the seized dogs was made but was not put to Mr Plowright.
(g)There was an assertion that the six dogs were seized on 18 May 2018 “…because it was all in their [SPCA] strategic plan that there was going to be a disposal hearing of our 15 dogs in the beginning of June and at the same time from the beginning of January to beginning of June, it was– we had publications asking the public for donations.” However the evidence was that the SPCA was alerted to the presence of these dogs on 18 May 2018 by a neighbour who heard them barking in distress. That is consistent with the conditions these dogs were found in, and inconsistent with Ms Wallace’s evidence they were happy dogs resting after a workout. It appears much more likely to me that the dogs were being hidden well out of the way at a time when Ms Wallace and Ms Glover were in the process of trying to get their seized dogs back.
[25] The Judge’s comprehensive examination of Ms Wallace’s evidence demonstrates that there were multiple and compelling reasons for rejecting her evidence as being implausible. However, having found Ms Wallace’s evidence and her explanations to be unreliable, the Judge did not fail to subject the prosecution witnesses’ evidence to scrutiny. She said:
[227] Finally, there is the fundamental problem that, to make a finding Ms Wallace was a credible and reliable witness, I would have to find that all of the SPCA witnesses - the inspectors, the veterinarians, and the pathologist
- were not credible or reliable or both. I would have to find that they were all either mistaken, though lack of expertise, or they were lying. In the case of the SPCA inspectors, this would have to be because they had an ulterior motive for their investigation into Volkerson Kennels. And if the SPCA inspectors were indeed lying, they would need to have colluded to produce a consistent account. Further, I would also have to find that two other District Court Judges, and a High Court Judge, were all wrong when they upheld the SPCA’s seizure of dogs and declined to return them to Ms Wallace and Ms Glover.18
[228] However, as I have already recorded, rejection of Ms Wallace’s account does not automatically lead to a finding of guilt. I must consider the evidence that I do accept in relation to each charge against each defendant and decide if it proves each charge beyond reasonable doubt.
[26] In her decision the Judge explained her reasons for finding the prosecution witness Kevin Plowright and the other prosecution witnesses to be credible and reliable. The Judge had the benefit of observing the prosecution witnesses giving their evidence. In the case of Mr Plowright his evidence in chief occupied over a day and a half of the hearing and his cross-examination occupied approximately three days. The Judge said of Mr Plowright:
[209] I had ample time to form the view that Mr Plowright was well experienced in his role and he gave his evidence in a straightforward manner without exaggeration. He made concessions where appropriate. He was unshaken in cross examination. Despite its length, and some of the propositions that were put to him, he remained mostly patient. He appeared very knowledgeable about dogs and animal welfare as would be expected. He was assisted by the notes he had taken in relation to the various inspections which were made within 24 hours of the visit, and he had made those notes with reference to body-worn camera footage of the inspections.
[27]As regards the other prosecution witnesses, the Judge said:
18 This is another matter that was not part of the SPCA’s case but was raised by Ms Wallace. It is also referred to in the written submissions of Mrs Glover.
[212] All of the other prosecution witnesses gave their evidence in a straightforward manner without exaggeration. In relation to evidence given in the capacity of an expert, I had no reason to doubt the expertise or experience or impartiality of any prosecution witness.
[213] I reject the contentions made regularly throughout the defence case that various witnesses did not have experience regarding German Shepherds, pedigree and/or show dogs, with the apparent suggestion being that the Volkerson Kennels’ dogs were somehow different to other dogs, or that different standards applied. I also reject the various suggestions that prosecution witnesses were “city people” and so did not understand life in the “country.”
[214] This case involved minimum standards of hygiene, health and care of dogs which must be the same for any dog in any location, and I consider the witnesses were well qualified to comment on what they had seen.
[28] The evidence of the prosecution witnesses was supported by a large number of photographs taken by the SPCA inspectors showing the dogs in the various locations where they were found, and including photographs of the injuries observed on Ritza.
[29] It is therefore quite clear that the Judge did not fail to examine the evidence of the prosecution witnesses and consider whether on the basis of their evidence she was satisfied that the prosecution had proved each of the charges beyond reasonable doubt. The Judge accepted the evidence of the prosecution witnesses SPCA Inspectors Mr Plowright and Ms Davis and of veterinarian Dr Jess Beer, the SPCA’s head veterinarian, regarding the condition of the dogs when seen by the SPCA investigators during their visit to the appellants’ property on 13 October 2017 when 15 dogs were seized and on 18 May 2018 when a further six dogs were seized. For the reasons the Judge herself explained, she was entitled to find that the evidence of the prosecution witnesses was such as to satisfy her beyond reasonable doubt that the prosecution had proved its case on each of the charges in respect of which she returned verdicts of guilty.
[30] The proper approach to be taken by an appellate court when considering an appeal where a trial judge’s credibility findings are challenged, was explained by the Supreme Court in Sena v R. The Court observed:19
[38] … If an appellate court comes to a different view on the evidence, the trial judge necessarily will have erred and the appeal must be allowed. But,
19 Sena v R [2019] NZSC 55, [2019] 1 NZLR 575 (footnotes omitted).
to the extent that [counsel] was suggesting that the role of an appellate court is to consider the issues de novo as if there had been no hearing at first instance, then we do not agree. Since it is an appeal, it is for the appellant to show that an error has been made. Further, in assessing whether there has been an error, an appellate court must take into account any advantages a trial judge may have had. Because of this, where the challenge is to credibility findings based on contested oral evidence, an appellate court will exercise “customary caution”. There are two main reasons for this.
[39] The first is that a slow-paced trial, at which the evidence emerges gradually, provides a good opportunity for evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of a case. In assessing the plausibility of what is said by the witnesses, the judge has the advantage of being also able to form a view as to what sort of people they are. This is an appreciable consideration despite the now well-recognised difficulties with demeanour-based credibility assessments.
[40] The second consideration, in effect the other side of the coin to the first, is that appellate judges dealing with a case on the basis of a written record of what happened at trial and the submissions of counsel are unlikely to be as well-placed as a trial judge to determine contested questions of fact based on contested oral evidence. For instance, what a witness means may be conveyed, at least in part, by gesture or intonation, something which will not be apparent on the written record. More generally, the appellate process in which appellate judges are taken, sometimes rather selectively, to the aspects of the evidence on which counsel rely does not replicate the advantages of a trial judge which we have just described.
[31] Here, the appellants have failed to demonstrate that the Judge erred in her credibility assessments of the prosecution witnesses and Ms Wallace. I am satisfied that the prosecution evidence which the Judge accepted to be credible and reliable, provides a comprehensive and compelling basis for the Judge’s evidential findings and for her verdicts. I accordingly find that the appellants have failed to demonstrate that the Judge erred in reaching guilty verdicts on the 32 charges for which convictions were entered for both appellants, and I shall dismiss their appeal against their convictions.
Sentence appeal
[32] As I have noted, the appellants appeal against their sentences, and in particular the nine year disqualification from owning or exercising control over any dogs. Mr Gardiner says that having regard to the Judge’s factual findings and verdicts, the sentences imposed on the appellants of 12 months’ intensive supervision and 300 hours community work in the case of Ms Wallace, and eight months’ supervision in the case of Mrs Glover, appear justified.
[33] Mr Gardiner submits that the Judge erred in relation to the length of the disqualification order. In relation to Mrs Glover, Mr Gardiner notes that she has no previous convictions and has had a lifetime of involvement with successfully breeding and showing German Shepherds. Counsel notes that in her sentencing remarks the Judge observed that:20
….it is important for me to record that this is not a case of deliberate violence or abuse of animals, this is a case of neglect and failing to care for sick animals. It is a bad case of neglect, in my view.
[34] Mr Gardiner says that the disqualification period imposed by the Judge is too severe, and he notes that this is not a case where the seized dogs were found to have untreated medical conditions. He says with the exception of the dog Ritza, Ms Wallace provided explanations in relation to the ear infections and skin conditions observed, and says that where they were found to be present they were not untreated as Ms Wallace was able to treat them with medication obtained from a medical doctor’s practice. Mr Gardiner says that the prosecution failed to produce any evidence to show Ms Wallace had not provided the treatment she said she had, or to show that the medication she had available to her to use would not be effective. He submits that the Judge adopted an unduly severe approach to the issue of disqualification, and in any event failed to distinguish between Ms Wallace and Mrs Glover who although implicated, did not have day to day control over the dogs on the property. He further submits that a disqualification order could be made which limited the number of dogs Mrs Glover and Ms Wallace could own or have under their control.
[35] As regards the costs order, Mr Gardiner notes that in making the order directing each of the appellants to pay costs of $20,000, the Judge did not explain the basis on which the order was made. Mr Gardiner says it is therefore not clear whether the Judge was relying on s 173 of the Act21 or s 13(3) of the Costs in Criminal Cases Act 1967.
[36] He notes that at sentencing the respondent had submitted that $50,000 would be an appropriate total sum and that the respondent had filed a memorandum stating
20 Sentencing decision, above n 5, at [4].
21 Counsel erroneously cites s 127 of the Animal Welfare Act. Section 173 of the Act contains the power for the recovery of expenses incurred by a territorial authority and its inspectors.
that the respondent’s costs of the criminal prosecution of the appellants were $71,250, and that the SPCA costs associated with the investigation exceeded $300,000.22 He also notes that the court has the power to award costs for legal fees pursuant to the Costs in Criminal Cases Act, and to exceed the scale costs provided for in Schedule 1 of the regulations if satisfied that having regard to the special difficulty, complexity, or importance of the case, the payment of greater costs is desirable.23
[37] Mr Gardiner says that while the appellants accept that an order for the payment of expenses can be made under the Act and an order for the payment of legal costs can be made under the Costs in Criminal Cases Act, in the absence of any explanation by the Judge as to which provision or provisions she relied on and for what amount, it is not possible to determine whether the Judge correctly determined the quantum of the costs ordered. The appellants therefore question the Judge’s decision to award costs at the level that she did. Mr Gardiner submits that the appellants were entitled to defend the charges and entitled to the benefit of the presumption of innocence. He submits that having regard to these issues and the appellants’ limited financial ability to pay costs, the costs award should be reviewed and reduced to “a more realistic level”.
[38] In relation to the period of disqualification imposed by the Judge, Mr Radich says that periods of disqualification in the region of 10 years in cases involving offending such as in the present case are not uncommon.24 He says that here there is also the additional factor of the appellants being completely unrepentant, and therefore presenting a high risk of re-offending. He notes that the appellants reject any criticism of their standards of animal husbandry. The respondent submits that the Judge did not err in imposing the nine year disqualification, and could not have been criticised if it had been for a longer period. Counsel also says that it is relevant that the appellants were running a commercial operation which involved the selling of dogs for substantial sums.
22 The amount included veterinary costs, SPCA board costs and other expenses. Mr Gardiner notes that the court had power pursuant to the Animal Welfare Act to order the payment of expenses incurred by the respondent’s investigators.
23 Costs In Criminal Cases Act 1967, s 13(3).
24 Kondratyeva v R [2015] NZCA 266; and Hiha v Wairarapa SPCA [2014] NZHC 390.
The disqualification period
[39] In fixing the disqualification period, the Judge explained that she had chosen the nine-year period having regard to the reservations she had about the appellants’ ability to care for animals and their unwillingness to provide the Court with any reassurance in that regard. The Judge also explained that she did not distinguish between the appellants because she considered that Mrs Glover has the same inability to care for dogs properly as Ms Wallace, and because Mrs Glover’s counsel informed her that in any event Mrs Glover did not own or care for any dogs. The Judge also observed that enforcement would be impossible where the appellants are both living on the same property, if one of the appellants were to have a different disqualification period than the other.
[40]The Judge said:25
[61] … I consider that a disqualification order is consistent with the purpose of the Act to ensure that owners and persons in charge attend properly to welfare. I also consider that a disqualification is warranted given the seriousness of the offending, Ms Wallace’s character and previous offending history that I consider demonstrates dishonesty, as did her conduct during this lengthy investigation. There is also now this conduct in asserting that they do not own any dogs, yet there are 30 dogs at the property possibly, it is quite likely there are more, it is simply impossible to know.
[62] It seems staggering to me that having been found guilty of neglecting animals, there is a sudden ownership change which can only be, in my view, an attempt to avoid the effects of being disqualified.
[63] Only a few days ago it was said that these dogs belonged to a company called Dogs NZ. Today it is said that it is sister Anne. A couple of weeks ago it was said that Anne does not have anything to do with the dogs’ care.
[64] I have no evidence that the numbers have been reduced and I would not accept any submission that they have, without evidence in that regard. The fact that you acknowledge no deficiencies in care is another matter. Mr Gardiner says you have now been in charge of dogs without incident for about two and a half years but I do not have any comfort that any dogs that are currently there are being adequately cared for when you are saying that you do not own them or care for them.
[41] The case of Kondratyeva v R concerned an appeal against sentence on two charges laid under the Act relating to the offenders’ failure to provide appropriate care
25 Sentencing decision, above n 5.
for 50 cats found living on her property.26 The offender was sentenced to 125 hours community work, 12 months supervision, and disqualified from owning animals for a period of 10 years. The 50 cats found on her property were living in conditions described as filthy and disgusting. The sentence and disqualification period were upheld on appeal.27
[42]Section 169 of the Act relevantly provides:
Court may disqualify person from owning or exercising authority in respect of animals
…
(3)If this section applies in relation to a person, the court may (in addition to or in substitution for any other penalty or order) make an order disqualifying that person for any period that it thinks fit from being the owner of, or exercising authority over, or being the person in charge of,—
(a)an animal or animals of a particular kind or description; or
(b)animals generally.
(4)In considering whether to make an order under subsection (3), the court must have regard to—
(a)the purposes of Parts 1 and 2; and
(b)the maximum penalty specified for the charge from which the conviction arose; and
(c)the seriousness of the offending, including (without limitation) the nature and gravity of the harm, the number of animals involved, and the frequency of the offending; and
(d)the character of the person; and
(e)the previous offending history (if any) of the person; and
(f)any other circumstances of the case.
[43] Pursuant to s 169(3) the court has the power to disqualify an offender from owning or exercising authority over an animal or animals for any period that it thinks fit. In deciding whether to make a disqualification order and if so the duration of the order, the Court must have regard to the matters set out in s 169(4).
26 Kondratyeva v R, above n 24.
27 At [24]–[26].
[44] The purpose of the provisions contained in Part 1 of the Act is to require owners of animals, and persons in charge of animals, to take all reasonable steps to ensure that the physical, health, and behavioural needs of the animals are met in accordance with both good practice and scientific knowledge, and to require owners of ill or injured animals (and persons in charge of such animals) to ensure that the animals receive treatment that alleviates any unreasonable or unnecessary pain or distress from which the animals are suffering.28 The purpose of the provisions in Part 2 is the prohibiting certain types of conduct relating to animals. 29
[45] As I have noted, the maximum penalty for offending against ss 12(a) and 12(b) of the Act is 12 months’ imprisonment or a $50,000 fine or both.
[46] Pursuant to s 169(4)(c) the court is also required to have regard to the seriousness of the offending, including the nature and gravity of the harm, the number of animals involved, and the frequency of the offending. The Judge found the appellants’ offending was a bad case of neglect that related to 32 dogs. The Judge found that the appellants had far too many dogs to be able to care for them properly and that they did not have proper living conditions, with many living in filth. The Judge also noted that despite being visited by the SPCA inspectors in mid-2017 and being given a statutory notice requiring them to improve the conditions in which the dogs were living and mitigate the dogs’ suffering, the appellants did nothing to improve their dogs’ conditions. When the SPCA inspectors returned several months later in October 2017 they found that the living conditions for the dogs had not been significantly improved, and the number of dogs on the property had not been reduced. Five dogs were voluntarily surrendered and the following day a further 15 dogs were seized by SPCA inspectors. In May 2018 the SPCA inspectors seized a further six dogs which they found tied to trees at the back of the appellants’ farm. These dogs were all underweight and some had ear infections. One dog was suffering from an obvious skin infection, and some had no access to water. The Judge found that the dogs were found as a result of their barking in distress and it appeared that they had been tied up at the back of the farm in an attempt to hide them from the SPCA inspectors. The Judge also noted that the appellants had never disclosed the true
28 Animal Welfare Act, s 9.
29 Section 27(b).
number of dogs under their care and had transferred ownership of some of their dogs in an attempt to avoid the effects of a disqualification order.
[47] Although neither appellant had a history of prior offending under the Act, having regard to: the seriousness of the offending; the appellants’ failure to take any remedial measures following the SPCA’s statutory notice; their refusal to accept any responsibility for the conditions in which the dogs were being kept; the poor physical condition of the dogs; and the appellants taking steps clearly intended to thwart the effects of a disqualification order, the nine year disqualification period imposed by the Judge was certainly open to her. It is consistent with the 10 year disqualification imposed in Kondratyeva v R which was upheld on appeal, and where the offending was broadly similar to the appellants’ and also involved a large number of animals. In my view a nine year disqualification is consistent with meeting the purposes of the Act, and protecting animals, specifically in this case German Shepherd dogs, and ensuring that their needs are properly met in accordance with good practice.
[48] While the nine year disqualification may well mean that Mrs Glover may not be permitted to own or exercise authority over dogs during her lifetime, I do not consider that factor demonstrates that the Judge erred in imposing it. Having regard to her extensive experience as a dog breeder, Mrs Glover was obviously well aware of the standard of care required of a dog owner and having regard to the large number of dogs on the property she could not have been in any doubt that they were not being properly cared for. As the Judge appropriately observed, although Ms Wallace had a more direct involvement and responsibility for the care of the dogs, both appellants were equally responsible for the welfare of the dogs, and they were both involved in running a commercial operation by breeding and selling dogs. As both Ms Wallace and Mrs Glover continue to live at the farm property, enforcement disqualification orders for different periods would be impossible.
[49] A judge deciding whether or not to make a disqualification order and determining the length of an order involves the exercise of the discretion in s 169(3). An appellant must show that there was an error of law or principle, or that the Judge took into account irrelevant considerations or failed to take into account relevant
considerations, or that its decision was plainly wrong, before this Court will interfere with the Judge’s decision.30
[50] I find that the appellants have failed to show that the Judge erred in relation to the considerations she took into account or that her decision is plainly wrong. I find that the Judge did not err by imposing the same period of disqualification on Mrs Glover as on Ms Wallace, and I am also not persuaded that the Judge erred by imposing a nine year disqualification order in respect of both appellants.
The costs order
[51] Pursuant to s 173(1) of the Act all expenses reasonably incurred by inspectors exercising any of the powers conferred by inter alia ss 133 and 138 of the Act in relation to the execution of search warrants and the destruction of injured or sick animals, including the costs of any veterinary treatment reasonably required in respect of an animal and the costs of destroying an animal, are recoverable from the owner or person in charge or appearing to be in charge of the animal.
[52]In making the order for costs and directing that each appellant pay costs of
$20,000, the Judge noted that the SPCA’s legal costs were slightly over $70,000 and the actual costs incurred were $311,161.63. Although the Judge did not specifically refer to s 173(1) of the Act, it is clear that she had the power pursuant to that section to make an order requiring the appellants to pay costs to contribute to the expenses incurred by the SPCA in the course of executing the search warrants at their farm including the veterinary expenses incurred. The order for costs the Judge made was around 13 per cent of the $311,161 sum incurred by the SPCA as expenses, which does not include the $70,000 legal costs. It is therefore apparent that the Judge’s costs order was based on s 173(1) of the Act and that the Costs in Criminal Cases Act was not engaged.
[53] I am satisfied that the Judge’s order requiring the appellants to pay costs totalling approximately 13 per cent of the actual costs incurred by the SPCA is
30 May v May (1982) 1 NZFLR 165 (CA) at 170.
reasonable if not generous given that the SPCA was seeking costs totalling $50,000. I accordingly reject the appellants’ submission that the order for costs was excessive.
Result
[54]The appeal of both appellants against their convictions are dismissed.
[55]The appeal of both appellants against their sentences are dismissed.
[56] The appeal of both appellants against the order for costs imposed by the Judge are dismissed.
Paul Davison J
0
4
0