Wakefield v Network Waitaki Limited
[2024] NZHC 97
•8 February 2024
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND TIMARU REGISTRY
I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TE TIHI-O-MARU ROHE
CIV-2023-476-009
[2024] NZHC 97
BETWEEN GARRY WAKEFIELD and FIONA WAKEFIELD
First Plaintiffs
OTHER PLAINTIFFS
Second to One Hundred and First Plaintiffs (detailed in Schedule A)
AND
NETWORK WAITAKI LIMITED
Defendant
Hearing: 5 February 2024 Appearances:
C M Stevens and B R D Cuff for Plaintiffs W J Hamilton and S C Riley for Defendant
Judgment:
8 February 2024
JUDGMENT OF ASSOCIATE JUDGE PAULSEN
(on application to cross-examine)
This judgment was delivered by me on 8 February 2024 at 4.15 pm pursuant to Rule 11.5 of the High Court Rules.
Registrar/Deputy Registrar Date:
WAKEFIELD v NETWORK WAITAKI LIMITED [2023] NZHC 97 [8 February 2024]
[1] On 4 October 2020 the Lake Ōhau Village was devasted by fire. The defendant owns and operates electrical lines and associated infrastructure that provides power to and in the vicinity of the Lake Ōhau Village. In this proceeding the plaintiffs allege that the defendant is responsible for the fires and resulting loss of their property.
[2] The plaintiffs believe there were in fact two fires which subsequently merged, and that the causes of the fires (which are disputed by the defendant) were that:
(a)the first fire was caused by the partial disconnection of a wooden cross- arm on the defendant’s power pole known as Pole 35693, which caused subsequent electrical short-circuit events and generated molten material that fell to earth igniting dry vegetation; and
(b)the second fire was caused by the full rotation of the wooden cross-arm on Pole 35693, causing the high-voltage wire lines between Pole 35693 and Pole 870452 to twist and clash, generating molten material along with burning aluminium particles that fell to earth igniting dry vegetation.
[3] The plaintiffs further allege the defendant failed to take reasonable steps to prevent the detachment and failure of the cross-arm on Pole 35693 or to maintain its lines in certain pleaded respects.
[4] The defendant has brought an application for orders requiring the plaintiffs to provide further particulars of their claim and initial disclosure. Importantly for present purposes, that application is supported by an affidavit of Geoffrey Douch, formerly the Chief Executive of the defendant. The defendant’s application is opposed and is set down for hearing later this month.
[5] The plaintiffs require Mr Douch to attend for cross-examination and have applied for an order accordingly under r 7.28 of the High Court Rules 2016. The defendant opposes that application. This judgment is concerned only with the application that Mr Douch attend for cross-examination.
[6]The issues that arise can be stated as:
(a)do special circumstances exist for the making of an order that Mr Douch attend for cross-examination; and
(b)if so, should I exercise my discretion to make such an order having regard to the interests of justice in the circumstances of this case.
The relevant law
[7]Rule 7.28 of the High Court Rules 2016 provides as follows:
7.28 Cross-examination of maker of affidavit
A Judge may in special circumstances, on the application of a party, order the attendance for cross-examination of a person who has made an affidavit in support of, or in opposition to, an interlocutory application.
[8] Under r 7.28 there must be “special circumstances” justifying an order requiring a deponent to attend for cross-examination. The leading decision of Kidd v Van Heeren is authority that the phrase “special circumstances” indicates something “abnormal, uncommon or out of the ordinary but something less than extraordinary”.1
[9] In Sleeman v ANZ Banking Group (NZ) Ltd it was held, in relation to a predecessor to r 7.28, that the fundamental test is whether injustice will arise (or is likely to arise) unless cross-examination is permitted.2
[10]Other helpful principles which can be found in the case law include:
(a)a conflict of evidence will generally not amount to special circumstances;3
1 Kidd v Van Heeren (1997) 11 PRNZ 422 (CA) at 424.
2 Sleeman v ANZ Banking Group (NZ) Ltd (1994) 7 PRNZ 508 (HC) at 510.
3 Kidd v Van Heeren, above n 1, at 425.
(b)cross-examination will not be ordered if the Court will be able to properly assess the factors relevant to the substantive interlocutory application without it;4
(c)cross-examination should not be allowed as a means of collaterally delving into evidence more appropriately dealt with at the substantive hearing;5
(d)the case for cross-examination is stronger where the issues in dispute in the substantive interlocutory application affect the applicant’s substantive rights, but where the substantive application merely relates to the procedure by which the parties’ rights will be determined that weighs against allowing cross-examination;6
(e)the purpose of cross-examination is to elicit relevant and admissible evidence in order to assist the Court to determine the matter before it. It is not a tool for “disciplining” what is considered to be improper content in an affidavit;7 and
(f)cross-examination is less likely to be ordered where issues of credibility raised relate only to a small portion of the affidavit evidence and are not crucial to the substantive orders sought.8
The affidavit of Mr Douch
[11] Mr Douch’s affidavit is wide-ranging. He describes the circumstances under which he learned of the fire; steps taken by the defendant following the fire to repair Pole 35693; investigations undertaken into the origin and cause of the fire, including a report by Fire and Emergency New Zealand (FENZ) issued in November 2021;
4 Roebuck v Liddle [2023] NZHC 1479 at [33].
5 Technic Bitumen Pacific Ltd v Shell New Zealand Ltd HC Wellington CP 10/99, 22 April 1999 at 6; Matsuoka v LSG Sky Chefs Ltd [2017] NZEmpC 140.
6 Woolley v Marlborough District Council [2023] NZHC 3840 at [110], citing Smith v Smith [2016] NZHC 1197 at [32]–[33].
7 Smith v Shaw [2020] NZHC 238, [2020] 3 NZLR 661 at [63].
8 Helen & Lucy Enterprises Ltd v Steve Taylor & Associates North Shore Limited [2019] NZHC 2903 at [54].
correspondence that passed between the parties’ solicitors in relation to the preservation and provision of information; the content of the statement of claim and the initial disclosure provided by the plaintiffs; the defendant’s electronic line fault records and the significance of them; the defendant’s request for particulars of the statement of claim and initial disclosure; the reasons why the defendant considers the plaintiffs have not satisfactorily complied with the requests, and how the defendant is prejudiced by that.
The plaintiffs’ submissions
[12] The plaintiffs take issue with a great deal of what is contained in Mr Douch’s affidavit. This is apparent from their application which states:
[2.14] In the interests of a speedy and inexpensive resolution of this application the applicants only seek to cross-examine Mr Douch on a restricted basis limited to the matters dealt with:
(a)In the following paragraphs of his affidavit [12], [15], [16], [17], [26], [28], [33], [34], [37], [42], [43], [44], [45], [46];
(b)The applicants’ solicitors letters of 7 October 2020 and 27 January 2022 and the respondent’s solicitors letter in reply of 24 February 2021 [sic] annexed to the affidavit of Rebecca Kate Fredericksen dated 20 October 2023; and
(c)The plaintiffs’ statement of claim and first amended statement of claim.
[13] However, it appears the focus of the plaintiffs’ concerns are the following paragraphs of Mr Douch’s affidavit:
40 The lack of particulars and meaningful initial disclosure makes [the defendant’s] investigations difficult.
…
44In their response to [the defendant’s] notice requesting further particulars, the plaintiffs have said that several of [the defendant’s] requests are “matters for expert evidence”. However, in relation to [the defendant’s] request for initial disclosure, the plaintiffs have refused to provide any of the expert advice they have received because they say it is privileged.
45In terms of the alleged failure sequence of the cross arm at pole 35693, [the defendant] does not know precisely what the plaintiffs say caused the cross arm to fail, or why they say that [the defendant’s] maintenance regime was defective.
46[The defendant] needs this information in order to properly brief its potential expert witnesses, and to identify the experts that it needs to retain.
[14] Mr Stevens’ oral presentation largely involved taking me through the documents before the Court to demonstrate why Mr Douch’s evidence is materially incorrect.
[15] Mr Stevens contends that the authorities establish that if the veracity, good faith or bona fides of a witness is in issue that may amount to special circumstances justifying cross-examination under r 7.28.
[16] He accepts that a conflict of evidence on affidavits will not of itself usually amount to special circumstances but says that is not the case here, where the plaintiffs cannot file affidavit evidence challenging Mr Douch’s evidence in its material respects and the only means by which they can do so is by cross-examination.
[17] He also makes the bold submission that if upon cross-examination of Mr Douch it was to be found that he lacked candour or good faith in making assertions in his affidavit, then the defendant’s application for further particulars must be dismissed.
[18] Mr Stevens relied principally on two decisions, Sleeman v ANZ Banking Group (NZ) Ltd,9 and Parker v R & D Foley Ltd.10
[19] Sleeman v ANZ Banking Group (NZ) Ltd was a proceeding in which the discovery process had become protracted, and the plaintiff made an application for an order that the first defendant give further discovery. The application was opposed. The plaintiff filed a separate application seeking to cross-examine in respect of affidavits filed in the proceeding. Master Thomson granted the application and said:11
Given the present state of affairs and the substantial conflicts on the affidavits between Mr Kite and Mr McLennan, I think that without Mr Kite being cross-examined, the Court will have great difficulty in giving a decision on the application proper and one which will then hopefully achieve finality on
9 Sleeman v ANZ Banking Group (NZ) Ltd, above n 2.
10 Parker v R & D Foley Ltd HC Palmerston North CIV-2004-454-246, 13 February 2004.
11 Sleeman v ANZ Banking Group (NZ) Ltd, above n 2, at 511.
the discovery issue. I find that special circumstances do exist here arising out of the history of this case to date, and which I have outlined, so that it is just that Mr Kite should be cross-examined. …
Finally, I think such cross-examination should clear the air and be beneficial to all parties including the Court. I say that bearing in mind that one of the issues when the application proper is heard will be whether or not any order for further discovery will be unduly oppressive on the first defendant. …
[20] Parker v R & D Foley Ltd involved an application for cross-examination at the hearing of an application by the defendants to strike out the plaintiffs’ statement of claim.12 The application for strike out was made on the basis that the plaintiffs’ claims were statute barred. The plaintiffs contended that the claims were not statute barred as they were based on fraud that was concealed by the defendants. Master Gendall allowed cross-examination, holding that whilst conflicts of evidence alone did not constitute special circumstances an important issue of credibility confined to the interlocutory application may justify cross-examination. On the facts he held:
[35] … Mr Parker’s answers to questions put to him in cross-examination will provide the Court with a basis for deciding whether the plaintiffs could with proper diligence have discovered earlier the matters upon which their claim is based. As I see it, much that it is in issue in this argument that the plaintiffs claim here is statute-barred is largely within Mr Parker’s knowledge and understanding and is therefore a proper matter for cross-examination.
[36] As I see it, filing of reply affidavits by the defendants as suggested by the plaintiffs would not be likely to meet the objection as to Mr Parker’s state of mind and the frankness of his statements in his affidavit. In my view, in the particular circumstances prevailing here, injustice might otherwise arise if cross-examination was refused …
[21] Mr Stevens also submits that the interests of justice require an order be made that Mr Douch is cross-examined. He submits that if Mr Douch’s evidence is accepted by the Court unchallenged then his assertions, such as that the defendant does not understand the case it faces or cannot identify and brief its expert witnesses, has to be taken as read. That, he submits, will give rise to the possibility that an order will be made against the plaintiffs for oppressive and extensive particulars. He submits the only way to contradict Mr Douch’s evidence is to have him cross-examined.
12 Parker v R & D Foley Ltd, above n 10.
The defendant’s submissions
[22] The defendant’s position is that there are no special circumstances to justify requiring Mr Douch to be cross-examined. Mr Hamilton submits there is nothing abnormal or uncommon about the deponent of an affidavit in support of an application for particulars giving reasons that particulars are required, and nor is there anything uncommon about the opposite party refuting the assertion that is the case.
[23] Mr Hamilton also submits that whether further particulars should be provided by the plaintiffs is fundamentally a legal issue. He says in deciding that issue the Court must decide whether the pleadings meet the objective standard prescribed by the High Court Rules, and:13
In making that assessment the court exercises its judgement based on such matters as the nature of the information exchanged, the extent to which the parties have committed to an agreed list of issues, the timing of the request for particulars, and experience as to the manner in which cases are prepared for trial.
[24] While the plaintiffs state a concern that Mr Douch’s evidence will be accepted at face value, the defendant argues even if Mr Douch’s evidence is left unchallenged that will not be a material factor in determining the defendant’s application when the test of what particulars are required is a legal and objective one.
[25] Further, the defendant argues the plaintiffs have made it abundantly clear they do not accept what Mr Douch has said in evidence and they can make submissions that his evidence should not be accepted, as they have done at some length in their counsel’s written submissions and oral presentation.
[26] Mr Hamilton submits Parker v R & D Foley Ltd and Sleeman v ANZ Banking Group (NZ) Ltd are both distinguishable on their facts,14 and a more relevant authority is Paugra Holdings Ltd (in liq) v Harvestfield Holdings Ltd where Associate Judge Bell refused an application for leave to cross-examine because there was already material on which the party wishing to cross-examine could base its arguments.15
13 Goodman-Jones v Hughey (t/as Dave Hughey Builders) [2020] NZHC 1489 at [18].
14 Parker v R & D Foley Ltd, above n 10; Sleeman v ANZ Banking Group (NZ) Ltd, above n 2.
15 Paugra Holdings Ltd (in liq) v Harvestfield Holdings Ltd [2013] NZHC 2200.
[27] Mr Hamilton also makes submissions that the plaintiffs wish to cross-examine as either part of a wide-ranging evidence gathering exercise or to have Mr Douch disciplined for what is perceived to be improper content in his affidavit. He argues that these are not proper or permissible bases for granting the plaintiffs’ application.
My analysis
[28] The authorities are clear that the existence of a conflict on the evidence will not usually amount to special circumstances justifying the making of an order requiring deponents to attend for cross examination. I do not accept Mr Stevens’ submission that the situation is different when a deponent’s veracity is in issue. The Court almost always determines interlocutory applications on affidavit evidence without cross-examination, and assesses the evidence based on what is before it even in circumstances where the veracity of witnesses may be questioned.
[29] Neither Sleeman v ANZ Banking Group (NZ) Ltd nor Parker v R & D Foley Ltd are authority for the proposition that was advanced, and both are distinguishable on their facts.16
[30] As will be apparent from the extract from the judgment in Sleeman at [19] above, there the Court was faced with a protracted discovery process over an extended period of time and, most importantly, Master Thomson was of the view the Court would have great difficulty resolving the issues before it without cross-examination. That is not the case here.
[31] Parker v R & D Foley Ltd concerned an application that had the potential to determine the parties’ substantive rights in circumstances where there was a direct allegation of fraud. Here the substantive application is entirely procedural and does not concern allegations of fraud.
[32] It is unnecessary for Mr Douch to be cross-examined to determine the application for further particulars. The argument advanced that the plaintiffs have no way of challenging Mr Douch’s affidavit is not correct. Mr Stevens spent a great deal
16 Sleeman v ANZ Banking Group (NZ) Ltd, above n 2; Parker v R & D Foley Ltd, above n 10.
of time skilfully and cogently identifying errors and contradictions in Mr Douch’s evidence, relying on material that is already before the Court. That material is contained in documents attached to Mr Douch’s affidavit and in two affidavits of Rebecca Fredericksen filed for the plaintiffs.
[33] I also do not accept the submissions made for the plaintiffs that in the absence of cross-examination there is a risk that Mr Douch’s evidence will simply be taken as read, nor the flip side of that argument that if Mr Douch’s veracity is successfully challenged the application for further particulars must necessarily fail. The Court will not look at Mr Douch’s affidavit uncritically when there is a great deal of information available against which his assertions can be assessed. Further, even if after hearing from Mr Douch under cross-examination I was to arrive at the view that he did not genuinely hold some of the views he has expressed it is still quite possible further particulars might be ordered.
[34] The plaintiffs’ submissions misunderstand the nature of the Court’s enquiry which is essentially to determine whether, in the circumstances of this case, the plaintiffs’ statement of claim is sufficiently detailed to state a clear issue and inform the other party and the Court of the case that is to be met.17 I have no doubt I can answer that question without cross-examination.
[35] Recently, in Woolley v Marlborough District Council, I dismissed an application to cross-examine witnesses at the hearing of an application for discovery orders on the ground that “’Permitting cross examination would have unnecessarily added to the length and costs of hearing”.18 I believe that is the case here also.
[36] The plaintiffs’ application therefore fails as there are no special circumstances, nor do the interests of justice require the making of the order sought.
Result
[37]The application for leave to cross-examine Mr Douch is dismissed.
17 Price Waterhouse v Fortex Ltd CA179/98, 30 November 1998 at 19.
18 Woolley v Marlborough District Council, above n 6, at [109].
[38] The defendant is entitled to costs on the application on a 2B basis plus disbursements.
O G Paulsen Associate Judge
Solicitors:
Wotton + Kearney, Auckland Chapman Tripp, Christchurch
SCHEDULE A
GARRY WAKEFIELD, FIONA WAKEFIELD AND
ELEANOR SMART as trustees of the WAKEFIELD FAMILY TRUST
Second Plaintiffs
ERIC and MICHELLE BREETVELT
Third Plaintiffs
CAMPBELL DYKES
Fourth Plaintiff
SALLY BRIGET HOLLOWAY and JEFFREY IRVIN HOLLOWAY
Fifth Plaintiffs
DAVID HONEYFIELD
Sixth Plaintiff
ANNE ELIZABETH DENNIS, FRANK
EDGERTON DENNIS and MARINUS ANTONIUSBAKX as trustees of the LINDISBURN TRUST Seventh Plaintiffs
BARBARA and NORMAN McKAY
Eighth Plaintiffs
MALCOLM McMILLAN
Ninth Plaintiff
OHAU SNOW HOLDINGS LIMITED
Tenth Plaintiff
ANTHONY RYAN
Eleventh Plaintiff
WILLEM SANDBERG and NAPIER
INDEPENDENT TRUSTEES LIMITED as trustees of the SANDBERG TRUST
Twelfth Plaintiffs
STEPHEN SIMMONS
Thirteenth Plaintiff
JANE SIMPSON and DAVID CRAIG OVENDEN
Fourteenth Plaintiffs
VIVIENNE SMITH-CAMPBELL
Fifteenth Plaintiff
ROWENA and SIMON SMITHIES
Sixteenth Plaintiffs
HUGH SPIERS and DWAYNE RENNIE
Seventeenth Plaintiffs
BRIAN TREVATHAN, LOIS TREVATHAN and NEW ZEALAND TRUSTEE SERVICE LIMITED as
trustees of the MARYBRAE TRUST Eighteenth Plaintiffs
BRIAN and LOIS TREVATHAN
Nineteenth Plaintiffs
MARCUS WELLS
Twentieth Plaintiff
BERNIE WICHT and HELEN McMAHON
Twenty-first Plaintiffs
LEWES JOHN BUTLER and ROBERT GLENDENNING BUTLER
Twenty-second Plaintiffs
DESMOND and JUNE JELLYMAN
Twenty-third Plaintiffs
IAN and NICOLA ADAMSON
Twenty-fourth Plaintiffs
LINDA ANDERSON
Twenty-fifth Plaintiff
WARREN and RACHEL BAKER
Twenty-sixth Plaintiffs
WILLIAM DANIEL BENNETT, SUSAN MARGARET BENNETT and RUSSELL KELVIN D
RODGERS as trustees of the BENNETT FAMILY TRUST
Twenty-seventh Plaintiffs
CATHERINE BOYLE
Twenty-eighth Plaintiff
BRYAN DAVIES
Twenty-ninth Plaintiff
BRENDAN and JACQUELINE DURCAN
Thirtieth Plaintiffs
ESTELLE EASTON
Thirty-first Plaintiff
PAUL EDMONDSTON
Thirty-second Plaintiff
JOHN FRASER
Thirty-third Plaintiff
GLEN MARY SKI CLUB INCORPORATED
Thirty-fourth Plaintiff
DAVID GREEN
Thirty-fifth Plaintiff
VICTORIA KELLAND
Thirty-sixth Plaintiff
RODNEY and RACHEL McLELLAN
Thirty-seventh Plaintiffs
DAVID McMILLAN
Thirty-eighth Plaintiff
PERPETUAL TRUST LIMITED and MALCOLM
DAVID McMILLAN as trustees of the E A McMILLAN FAMILY TRUST
Thirty-ninth Plaintiffs
JANET MITCHELL
Fortieth Plaintiff
STUART and MICHELLE PATERSON
Forty-first Plaintiff
KATHERINE MARGARET POULSEN
Forty-second Plaintiff
JOANNA RANDALL
Forty-third Plaintiff
ROOPALI JOHRI
Forty-fourth Plaintiff
JOSHUA SCHAAR
Forty-fifth Plaintiff
KARLA SCHMIDT
Forty-sixth Plaintiff
ANNE SIMPSON
Forty-seventh Plaintiff
STANLEY SPIERS
Forty-eighth Plaintiff
GARY STICHBURY
Forty-ninth Plaintiff
TARBIT BUILDING LIMITED
Fiftieth Plaintiff
VIVIENNE MARY SMITH-CAMPBELL and JOHN
LOUIS CAMPBELL as trustees of the INLAND TRUST
Fifty-first Plaintiffs
VOODOO PROPERTY HOLDINGS LIMITED
Fifty-second Plaintiff
WARREN ANDERS BAKER and RACHEL ANNE
BAKER as trustees of the WA & RA BAKER FAMILY TRUST
Fifty-third Plaintiffs
CLARE WILLIAMS
Fifty-fourth Plaintiff
ROSS and BRENDA YEAGER
Fifty-fifth Plaintiffs
DAVID and JENNIFER HOWEY
Fifty-sixth Plaintiffs
UPWEY FARMING COMPANY LIMITED
Fifty-seventh Plaintiff
PAUL and NICHOLA WHEARTY
Fifty-eighth Plaintiffs
NEVILLE and LINDA LEWIS
Fifty-ninth Plaintiffs
PAUL AUBREY
Sixtieth Plaintiff
OLD STONE HUT FOREST LIMITED
Sixty-first Plaintiff
WILLIAM and ANDREW SUTHERLAND of the WH & AJ SUTHERLAND PARTNERSHIP
Sixty-second Plaintiffs
VERITY FARMS NZ LIMITED
Sixty-third Plaintiff
SHARON FAE ENGLISH and CAROLYN SUE
ENGLISH as trustees of the ENGLISH FAMILY TRUST
Sixty-fourth Plaintiffs
STEPHEN and JULES MARK
Sixty-fifth Plaintiff
BARRY BIGGS
Sixty-sixth Plaintiff
ANNA-MARIE MILLER and SARAH LOUISE
MILLER as trustees of the CM MILLER FAMILY TRUST
Sixty-seventh Plaintiffs
SALLY GREAVES
Sixty-eighth Plaintiff
VIVIENNE MARY SMITH-CAMPBELL and JOHN
LOUIS CAMPBELL as trustees of the OHAU FAMILY TRUST
Sixty-ninth Plaintiffs
MARIE BERNICE McAUGHTRIE and RICHARD NIGHTINGALE
Seventieth Plaintiffs
DANIEL WILLIAM JOHNSTON and MJO
TRUSTEE COMPANY LIMITED as trustees of the D J P SHARE TRUST
Seventy-first Plaintiffs
MICHAEL GEORGE GOULD, JANET KATHLEEN GOULD, SIMON GEORGE GOULD and
BENJAMIN JAMES TAYLOR as trustees of the RED TREE TRUST
Seventy-second Plaintiffs
WILLEM ALEID CORNELIS SANDBERG
Seventy-third Plaintiff
DAVID FRASER RENDALL and MEGAN ELIZABETH JANE RENDALL
Seventy-fourth Plaintiffs
JAMES ANTHONY CARNIE and MARGARET
MARY CARNIE as trustees of the OHAU TRUST Seventy-fifth Plaintiffs
WILLIAM PATRICK CHISHOLM
Seventy-sixth Plaintiff
MICHAEL TATTERSALL and PAULETTE TATTERSALL
Seventy-seventh Plaintiffs
XU
Seventy-eighth Plaintiff
FIVE RIVERS LIMITED
Seventy-ninth Plaintiff
MAREE CAROLINE HORO as trustee of the OHAU COMPANY TRUST
Eightieth Plaintiff
CHARLES SPIERS
Eighty-first Plaintiff
JANET ELIZABETH MUIR and RICHARD
HANDLEY BROWN as trustees of the WELBOURNE TRUST
Eighty-second Plaintiffs
AARON GILMORE
Eighty-third Plaintiff
TIM MUELLER
Eighty-fourth Plaintiff
PHILLIPPA WALTER
Eighty-fifth Plaintiff
KATHLEEN LAWSON
Eighty-sixth Plaintiff
MARTIN HEAL
Eighty-seventh Plaintiff
NYREE SCHAAR
Eighty-eighth Plaintiff
ROGER MEE
Eighty-ninth Plaintiff
JOY MARGARET HALL
Ninetieth Plaintiff
SARAH JANE LOVIE, JAMES NEVILLE SCHEIWE and MARK JONATHAN TAVENDALE
as trustees of the JAMES SCHEIWE & SARAH LOVIE FAMILY TRUST
Ninety-first Plaintiffs
JILLIAN STONE, DAVID STONE and MAINLY TRUSTS LIMITED
Ninety-second Plaintiffs
PHIL DUNCAN
Ninety-third Plaintiff
DEBORA LETHBRIDGE
Ninety-fourth Plaintiff
GENEVIEVE BECROFT
Ninety-fifth Plaintiff
ROBIN FINNEY
Ninety-sixth Plaintiff
STEWART NEGUS
Ninety-seventh Plaintiff
ANDREW LONIE
Ninety-eighth Plaintiff
DAVID LITTLETON
Ninety-ninth Plaintiff
KRIS BREETVELT
One hundredth Plaintiff
SARAH HOLLOWAY, JEFFREY HOLLOWAY and DOWNIE STEWART TRUSTEE LIMITED as
trustees of the JEFF AND SALLY HOLLOWAY FAMILY TRUST
One hundred and first Plaintiffs
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7
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