Vincent v Prison Manager, Auckland Prison
[2025] NZCA 386
•5 August 2025 at 11 am
| IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF NEW ZEALAND I TE KŌTI PĪRA O AOTEAROA |
| CA547/2024 |
| BETWEEN | DEAN MICHAEL VINCENT |
| AND | PRISON MANAGER, AUCKLAND PRISON |
| NEW ZEALAND PAROLE BOARD Second Respondent |
| Hearing: | 25 June 2025 (further submissions received 4 July 2025) |
Court: | Woolford, Dunningham and Walker JJ |
Counsel: | Appellant in person |
Judgment: | 5 August 2025 at 11 am |
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
The appeal is dismissed.
REASONS OF THE COURT
(Given by Walker J)
Mr Vincent is serving a sentence of imprisonment. The Parole Board (the Board) declined parole for the first time on 9 May 2023 and then on 16 May 2024. Mr Vincent applied to the High Court for a writ of habeas corpus. He now appeals the decision of Tahana J declining to issue a writ.[1] He says he is unlawfully confined based on, among other things, the Board’s breach of statutory duties and its lack of independence from the State and political influence. He effectively challenges the legitimacy of the Board, along with its decision‑making.
Background
[1]Vincent v Auckland Prison [2023] NZHC 2066 [judgment under appeal].
Mr Vincent was convicted of serious charges. A warrant of commitment dated 31 March 2023 records that he was sentenced by the Manukau District Court to a term of imprisonment of five years and seven months. The warrant directs the Manager of Mount Eden Correction Facility to receive Mr Vincent into their control and to detain him for the purposes of the sentence.
Due to a period of detention on remand, Mr Vincent became eligible for parole not long after his sentence was imposed. On the first occasion, the Panel Convenor of the Board recorded that Mr Vincent filed a waiver in which he recorded his professed innocence, that he had obtained a hearing date for his appeal, and he was seeking bail. The decision also recorded that Mr Vincent was not a candidate for parole because of a “very high RoC*RoI, he has committed serious offending and at [that] stage [was] untreated”.[2] The Board concluded that he was an “undue risk to the safety of the community” and declined his application.
[2]The Department of Corrections defines a RoC*RoI measure as an expression of the likelihood that a person will be both reconvicted in the future and sentenced to a term of imprisonment. Department of Corrections “Risk of Reconviction” <>
At the second parole hearing on 16 May 2024, Mr Vincent’s appeal against his convictions had not yet been determined.[3] Mr Vincent indicated that he did not wish to appear in person. However, through counsel he submitted that there is no evidence that he poses an undue risk to the community and therefore should be released.
[3]Mr Vincent’s conviction appeal was dismissed on 11 February 2025: Vincent v R [2025] NZCA 6.
The Board recorded that nothing had changed in respect to Mr Vincent’s risk since the previous hearing and declined parole. It noted that by the time of the next scheduled parole consideration in 12 months, Mr Vincent’s appeal would most likely be determined and, if his convictions remained, an identified programme for adult sex offenders may well become appropriate. In the meantime, the Board reiterated a direction that, subject to the outcome of his appeal, a psychological assessment report be prepared to traverse both risk and appropriate rehabilitative pathways.
According to Mr Vincent, his statutory release date is 6 December 2025, and his next parole hearing is due to take place in October this year.
Mr Vincent’s application for habeas corpus under the Habeas Corpus Act 2001 (the Act) was accompanied by detailed handwritten submissions.[4] The Judge summarised his arguments as follows:[5]
(a)The Board is biased and politicised.
(b)The “Government is promulgating a system whereby a parole applicant may not get parole unless he conforms to the Government’s notion of social desirability”.
(c)The Government is not meeting national and international minimum human rights for prisoners in its cases and that such abuse extends to the Government “usurping the Parole Board unto itself”.
(d)The Department of Corrections (Corrections) has failed to rehabilitate prisoners. Mr Vincent refers to the increase in the prison population and the crime rate.
(e)Mr Vincent should not be required to follow the rehabilitation pathway prescribed by Corrections because it does not work.
(f)The Board should not be responsible for reviewing its own decisions when it is biased.
Judgment under appeal
[4]On 25 November 2024, Mallon J directed that an application for an extension of time to file an appeal per s 29A of the Court of Appeal (Civil) Rules 2005 was granted by consent.
[5]Judgment under appeal, above n 1, at [6].
Following a telephone hearing, the Judge declined the writ, noting the Prison Manager’s reliance on the warrant to justify detention and the lack of challenge to the warrant itself.[6]
[6]At [11]–[12] and [24].
The Judge characterised Mr Vincent’s challenge as being both systemic and individual to his circumstances.[7] She considered that it was directed to the legitimacy of the Board’s decision‑making which in this case was not susceptible to fair and sensible summary determination in the context of habeas corpus proceedings.[8]
[7]At [7].
[8]At [17]–[22], relying on Manuel v Superintendent of Hawkes Bay Regional Prison [2005] 1 NZLR 161 (CA); and Teina v Attorney‑General [2007] NZCA 464.
The Judge concluded therefore that Mr Vincent is lawfully detained and accordingly declined Mr Vincent’s application for a writ.
Grounds of appeal
In fulsome written and oral submissions, Mr Vincent traversed similar themes in this appeal.[9]
[9]Mr Vincent’s 20‑page handwritten synopsis and a further four‑page synopsis with additional attachments were both received after the hearing. We have taken this material into consideration in this judgment.
Regarding his challenge to the judgment, he says the Judge erred:
(a)by stating that he was seeking to challenge the decision of the Board declining release, when he was challenging more generally the Government’s deliberate systemic abuse of the parole system to unlawfully imprison people;
(b)by confining the habeas corpus jurisdiction to narrow limits and determining that his challenge required a more expansive and detailed examination more appropriate for judicial review proceedings; and
(c)in summarily declining the writ.
Mr Vincent’s arguments in support of habeas corpus are variously expressed. We summarise the inter‑related themes of these arguments as follows:[10]
(a)The Board does not follow due or fair process requirements of independence, fairness or impartiality when declining release at parole eligibility dates.[11]
(b)The operation and structure of the Board violates citizens’ rights and arbitrarily imprisons New Zealanders in contravention of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990.
(c)The Board is in breach of its statutory duties; its structure and/or operation does not conform with the Parole Act 2002 because it lacks the required independence from the Government (particularly Corrections which makes recommendations to the Board). Therefore, its decision‑making is unlawful.
(d)The Board and the parole system suffers from inherent bias and inadequate public representation because, except for judges, nominees to the Board must be government employees or working for a state agency or state‑sponsored agency.
(e)As it is the State arbitrarily detaining prisoners, the Act applies.
(f)He continues to be restrained in prison based on the specious claim that he is an undue risk to the safety of the community because he has not engaged in a rehabilitation program when there is no evidence that he poses an undue risk.
(g)There is no legal obligation to engage in rehabilitation programs which are a bureaucratic mechanism for the pecuniary gain of government and prisoners should not be compelled to engage before parole.
[10]Not all these arguments were pursued with the same vigour at the hearing.
[11]In oral submissions, Mr Vincent stated that he was not in Court to argue whether the Board’s decision was right or wrong, but to argue that the State has got it wrong.
Mr Vincent seeks an immediate conditional release from prison. Alternatively, he asks that we allow his appeal to permit his writ of habeas corpus to be resubmitted and heard by the High Court.
The respondent argues that Mr Vincent’s contentions are most appropriately determined by way of judicial review and, if made out, the decisions affecting Mr Vincent quashed and remade by the Board. It says that it would not follow that an error or irregularity in a Board decision means a prisoner would otherwise have been released.
It further argues that, to the extent Mr Vincent’s contentions could be determined in a habeas corpus context (which they cannot), there is no basis on which to argue that the Board lacks independence. It refers to the case of
Miller v New Zealand Parole Board, in which this Court reviewed whether
the Board maintained the independence required by s 108(1) of the Parole Act
and was ultimately satisfied that the Board was independent.[12] Finally, it argues that it is not the case that the Board consists of “State‑service employees”.
Legal principles
[12]Miller v New Zealand Parole Board [2010] NZCA 600 at [65].
A person can make an application under the Act challenging the lawfulness of their detention if they are detained for the purposes of the Act. In the absence of someone in the position of the respondent here being able to establish the detention of the detained person is lawful, the court is obliged to grant the application and order their release.[13]
[13]Habeas Corpus Act 2001, s 14(1).
The respondent has the onus of proving the applicant is being detained lawfully. This can be done by producing a committal warrant or other authorisation for the applicant’s detention. In that case, the detained person must then show that the document produced does not provide a lawful justification for detention in the particular circumstances.[14]
[14]Bennett v Superintendent, Rimutaka Prison [2002] 1 NZLR 616 (CA) at [70].
Where the respondent produces a warrant of detention, there is little scope to argue that a person’s detention is not lawfully justified.[15] The High Court may decide to refuse an application for the issue of the writ if satisfied that it is not the appropriate procedure for considering the allegations made by an applicant.[16]
[15]Hyslop v Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections [2021] NZHC 2719 at [6].
[16]Habeas Corpus Act, s 14(1A)(b).
This Court said in Manuel v Superintendent of Hawkes Bay Regional Prison that “it will be a rare case … where the habeas corpus procedures will permit the Court to inquire into challenges on administrative law grounds to decisions which lie upstream of apparently regular warrants”.[17]
[17]Manuel v Superintendent of Hawkes Bay Regional Prison, above n 8, at [49].
Such a case could however arise if the challenge to detention is properly susceptible to fair and sensible summary determination.[18]
Analysis
[18]At [49]–[50].
In his oral submissions, Mr Vincent contended that he is currently detained only because the Board has declined him parole. This is a misconception. He is detained because he has been sentenced to imprisonment by a sentencing judge following his conviction. Parole eligibility is no more than a statutory entitlement to be considered for parole, not an entitlement to be released.[19]
[19]Parole Act 2002, s 28(1AA).
As this Court said in Miller v New Zealand Parole Board, a detention is not arbitrary where it follows a sentence imposed by the sentencing judge and the Board has carried out the required public safety assessments in accordance with the parole legislation.[20]
[20]Miller v New Zealand Parole Board, above n 12, at [70].
Having sighted the warrant under which Mr Vincent is detained, it is apparent that Mr Vincent’s arguments depend on his case being a rare instance in which the warrant of detainment is not decisive.[21] We are satisfied that this is not one of those instances. Our reasons follow.
[21]Manuel v Superintendent of Hawkes Bay Regional Prison, above n 8, at [49].
Like the Judge, we are satisfied that Mr Vincent’s systemic challenge to the Board, its make‑up and the way it exercises its statutory functions, is seeking review of statutory decision‑making. It fits the rubric of a judicial review proceeding in which the respondent is entitled to adduce relevant evidence.
The heads of argument are broadly consistent with orthodox grounds of judicial review. Examples are Mr Vincent’s assertions that the Board is biased, does not follow due process and is in breach of its statutory duties.
Mr Vincent’s primary argument is directed at the parole system at a general or abstract level, such as the Board’s reliance on recommendations of Corrections and its attempts to compel prisoner participation in such programmes by hinging parole suitability on attendance. He claims not to be arguing about the decision of the Board declining his parole but against the Board’s “assumed right” to make the decision on his parole application. Yet, he also says that he cannot be characterised as a danger to the community simply because he has refused to participate in rehabilitative programs provided by Corrections and there is no other basis on which to draw this erroneous conclusion. This appears to be an argument directed also at the Board’s decision in relation to him individually.
We do not overlook that, as counsel for the respondent submitted, the remedy in judicial review is primarily the quashing of the impugned decision and to have the decision‑maker remake the decision lawfully. We apprehend this explains, at least in part, Mr Vincent’s objective in framing his challenge as an application for a writ of habeas corpus.
That these challenges are more appropriate to a judicial review proceeding is not the sole reason for reaching our view. Relatedly, they are also completely ill‑suited to a summary process without evidence. We further agree with the Judge that it would be wrong to allow such a challenge to proceed without appeal rights, the absence of which is one of the features of the habeas corpus jurisdiction.
We do not accept that the Judge overlooked the more general thrust of his challenge. On the contrary, she specifically noted that Mr Vincent indicated at the hearing that his concern is more with the way in which the Board is structured and operating, than with the decision to decline him parole.[22] But, as noted, Mr Vincent’s notice of appeal does specifically challenge the Board’s conclusion in his case that his non‑participation in rehabilitation programmes makes him unsuitable for release.
[22]Judgment under appeal, above n 1, at [7].
In conclusion, we find that the appeal lacks merit. There is no error in the Judge’s dismissal of the writ of habeas corpus and no proper grounds are advanced to demonstrate that Mr Vincent is detained without justification.
Result
The appeal is dismissed.
Solicitors:
Meredith Connell, Auckland for First Respondent
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