IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW ZEALAND
SC 48/2009
[2010] NZSC 12BETWEENVINCENT ROSS SIEMER
Appellant
ANDSOLICITOR-GENERAL
Respondent
Hearing:26 February 2010
Court:Blanchard and McGrath JJ
Counsel:R M Lithgow QC for Appellant
M F Laracy and B C L Charmley for Respondent
Judgment:26 February 2010
Reasons:1 March 2010
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
(RECUSAL APPLICATION)[1] The appellant made an interlocutory application for an order that the Chief Justice not sit at the Court’s hearing of his appeal against a judgment of the Court of Appeal which committed the appellant to a term of imprisonment for contempt of court.[1] We now give our reasons for dismissing that application.
[2] The finding of contempt of court was made because the lower courts held that the appellant was in breach of an interim injunction obtained against the appellant by a Mr Stiassny in separate proceedings in which they were parties. The injunction required the appellant not to publish certain material defamatory of Mr Stiassny.
[3] The appellant contends that the Chief Justice is disqualified from sitting because of an association which the appellant says links the Chief Justice to Mr Stiassny.
[4] The association, which is said to give rise to apparent bias, concerns the husband of the Chief Justice, Mr Fletcher, who is a director of Vector Limited, a public company. Mr Stiassny is also a director of Vector and chairman of the board. The Chief Justice has advised the parties that she was once introduced to Mr Stiassny but has not had other contact with him. The issue we must decide is whether, in these circumstances, a fair minded, impartial and properly informed observer could reasonably have thought that the Chief Justice might unconsciously be biased in favour of the respondent to the appeal who is the Solicitor-General.
[5] The above facts are not in dispute. But Mr Lithgow QC for the appellant goes on to invite us to make factual assumptions concerning Mr Stiassny and Vector. He asserts that Mr Stiassny led a controversial capital restructuring of the company which also involved restructuring the board and the departure of a number of board members who were critical of Mr Stiassny. In this context, counsel says, Mr Fletcher “chose to join or remain on the board”. Counsel argues that their common membership of the board in those circumstances poses apparent bias concerns. He says that it is possible that Mr Fletcher is beholden to Mr Stiassny, who might be in a position to cause Mr Fletcher to lose his position on the board along with annual director’s fees.
[6] No factual material is before the Court providing a basis for these broader assertions. The recent decision of the Court which addressed an issue of apparent bias indicated that where an association between a judge and a person having an interest in litigation leads a litigant to seek recusal, that party must be specific about the connection perceived between the circumstances giving…
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- Case
- [2010] NZSC 12
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court was required to determine whether the appellant's claims of apparent bias were substantiated. The appellant argued that Mr Fletcher might be beholden to Mr Stiassny, who could influence Mr Fletcher's position on the board and potentially remove him, thereby raising concerns of bias. The court considered whether the appellant had provided sufficient evidence to support the claim of apparent bias. The court noted that the appellant's arguments were speculative and did not provide concrete evidence of a link between the association and the potential for bias in the case. The court held that the appellant had not met the burden of proof required to establish apparent bias.
The court dismissed the application for recusal. It found that the appellant's concerns were speculative and not supported by concrete evidence. The court emphasised that the appellant needed to provide specific facts that demonstrate how the association between the Chief Justice and Mr Stiassny could reasonably lead to an apprehension of bias. As the appellant had not provided such evidence, the court concluded that there was no basis for the Chief Justice to recuse herself from the case. The court also noted that Vector Limited, the company where both Mr Fletcher and Mr Stiassny are directors, had no interest in the outcome of the appeal, and thus, the association alone did not raise a reasonable concern of bias. The court made no order for costs.
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Decision
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