Venkataswamy v Kodoor

[2025] NZHC 305

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY

I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TĀMAKI MAKAURAU ROHE

CIV-2016-404-002374

[2025] NZHC 305

BETWEEN

SHYLA VENKATASWAMY

Plaintiff

AND

MURALI GANESH KODOOR and GEETA MURALI GANESH

Defendants

Hearing:	On the papers
Counsel:	N J Scampion and M A Ashmore for Plaintiff M I S Phillipps for Defendants
Judgment:	26 February 2025

JUDGMENT OF ANDREW J

[Final quantum calculations]

This judgment was delivered by me on 26 February 2025 at 3 pm, pursuant to

r 11.5 of the High Court Rules

Registrar/Deputy Registrar Date:

VENKATASWAMY v KODOOR [2025] NZHC 305 [26 February 2025]

Introduction

[1]        In my remedy and costs judgment of 17 April 2024, I directed that counsel confer and file a memorandum proposing final calculations on quantum, based on my findings and for my approval.1

[2]        The parties advise that they have been unable to agree a final figure, although the difference between them is relatively small.2

[3]        The defendants have paid the plaintiff the judgment debt but exclusive of interest and costs. The outstanding issues for my determination relate to interest and costs.

[4]There are five issues I need to resolve:

(a)What date was the money repaid?

(b)Should the figures compound?

(c)Should use of money interest be granted?

(d)Should judgment interest be granted?

(e)What quantum of disbursements should be awarded?

[5]I will address in turn each of the issues.

1      Venkataswamy v Kodoor [2024] NZHC 833 at [69].

2      The Court received a joint memorandum from counsel on 13 June 2024. In addition, the Court has received memoranda from the plaintiff dated 21 May 2024, 31 May 2024, 18 June 2024,    19 June 2024, 31 October 2024 and 20 December 2024. The Court has also received memoranda from the defendants dated 19 June 2024, 25 October 2024 and 20 January 2025. The memoranda filed in mid-2024 were not brought to my attention until late in the year of 2024. The Court apologises for that oversight. That is the reason for the delay in issuing this judgment.

The outstanding differences between the parties

[6]        In my remedy and costs judgment I ordered that the defendants pay to the plaintiff:3

(a)equitable compensation comprising:

(i)8.65 per cent on USD 163,910 from 21 September 2010 until 16 November 2011;

(ii)8.65 per cent on USD 200,000 from  21  September 2010  to 30 July 2012;

(iii)a return of 300 per cent on USD 634,641 from 1 February 2011 until repayment of the principal (which was repaid in November 2023); and

(iv)a further  five  per  cent  on  the  sum  of  USD  634,641  from 1 February 2011 until repayment of the principal (in November 2023).

(b)general damages of NZD 50,000; and

(c)increased costs.

[7]        There is no disagreement on general damages (NZD 50,000) and  costs  (NZD 276,775.50). However, as noted, there is a small dispute over disbursements which I will resolve in this judgment.

[8]        The parties advise that they have conferred but have been unable to agree a final figure for equitable compensation. The plaintiff calculates the figure for equitable compensation as USD 2,566,296.06. The defendants calculate the figure as USD 2,359,016.08. The difference amounts to USD 207,279.98.4

3      At [68] and [90].

4      In an interim judgment dated 19 February 2025 I ordered, by consent, that the defendants were to pay the plaintiff USD 2,359,016.08 together with general damages of NZD 50,000 and costs of

[9]The parties differ because they disagree on the following:

(a)what date the principal was finally repaid:

(i)The defendants say the principal should be treated as repaid on 20 November 2023, when they sent it.

(ii)The plaintiff says it should be treated as repaid on 21 November 2023, when it was received by the plaintiff’s solicitor.

(b)whether interest is payable on the equitable compensation sum on a compounding basis; and

(c)whether use of money interest is payable on the returns that the plaintiff would have received (and the defendants received) on the sums of USD 163,910 and USD 200,000 ([6(a)(i) and (ii)] above).

Issue — What date was the money repaid?

[10]      In my remedy and costs judgment of 17 April 2024, I ordered a return  of  five per cent on the sum of USD 634,641 for the “period of 1 February 2011 until repayment of the principal in 2023”.5 At issue is what is meant by repayment.

[11]      The defendants sent the principal sum, USD 634,641, on 20 November 2023. However, it was not received until 21 November 2023. The intervening day appears to have been lost in the bank transfer.

[12]      The plaintiff submits  that  the  principal  should  be  treated  as  repaid  on  21 November 2023, which is when it was received by the plaintiff’s solicitor. Therefore, the plaintiff submits the interest should be calculated up to 21 November 2023.

NZD 276,775.50. Those orders were subject to the final calculations that I make in this judgment. Those orders were made to ensure that, in the meantime, the defendants paid the plaintiff the agreed minimum amounts.

5      Venkataswamy v Kodoor, above n 1, at [68(a)(iv)].

[13]      The defendants submit that the  principal  should  be  treated  as  repaid  on 20 November 2023, when they sent it. They submit, therefore, that interest should be calculated up to 20 November 2023.

[14]      It is regrettable and disappointing that the Court should have to resolve this issue when the amount at stake appears to be relatively small and trivial.

[15]      In my view, the one-day delay would have occurred regardless of when the sum was repaid. That is because of the international nature of the transfer. Because of this there would always have been a day during which the money was in transit and could not be invested. In this case, the purpose of equitable damages was compensatory. Putting the plaintiff in the same position she would have been had the breach not occurred would not, I find, require the defendants to pay for this one day. That would have occurred regardless of the breach. I also find that this approach aligns with the wording of the Interest on Money Claims Act 2016 (IMCA).6

[16]      I accordingly agree with the defendants that the date of repayment is the date on which they sent the money. The one-day delay (during which the money could not be invested) was not due to the wrongdoing of the defendants and would have occurred even if there had been no breach. Causation has accordingly not been established.

[17]      I conclude that the principal is to be treated as repaid on 20 November 2023 when it was sent by the defendants.  Accordingly, interest is to be calculated up to  20 November 2023.

Issue — Should the figures compound?

[18]      The issue here is whether the interest awarded at [68(a)(i)–(ii) and (iv)] of my judgment is compounding. This interest amounts to:

(a)8.65  per  cent  on  USD  163,910  from  21  September  2010  until  16 November 2011;

6      Section 9(1)(b).

(b)8.65 per cent on USD 200,000 from 21 September 2010 to 30 July 2012;

(c)A further 5 per cent per annum on the sum of  USD 634,641 from     1 February 2011 until repayment of the principal (20 November 2023).

[19]      The plaintiff submits that compounding is appropriate as it is whenever a plaintiff is deprived of sums on which she would otherwise have earned compounding interest; this is what a reasonable and prudent trustee would have arranged. In this case, the plaintiff is claiming interest as damages.

[20]      The plaintiff says that it is established law that damages, when accrued in the past, may be calculated by reference to compounding interest. This is because:7

[Compounding damage] represents compensation for a wrongfully caused loss of the use of money and which is assessed wholly or partly by reference to the interest which would have been earned by safe investment of the money or which was in fact paid upon borrowings which otherwise would have been unnecessary or retired.

[21]      In a breach of contract claim, the question is whether it was reasonably foreseeable that the plaintiff would suffer losses of a compounding nature.8 Likewise, in a breach of contract claim it is necessary to plead and prove interest as damages.9

[22]      However, the plaintiff notes that this is a claim for equitable compensation. Courts of equity will order compound interest when justice so demands:10

Equity has long recognised that those who commit equitable wrongs which are remedied by monetary relief (such as an account of profits or equitable compensation) can also be entitled to awards of interest on such relief, including compound interest where appropriate.

[23]      The plaintiff further submits that the rules of pleading relating to damages claims in contract have no application to equitable causes of action (like breach of fiduciary duty).11 Rather, the question is whether the pleading gave the defendants

7      Hungerfords v Walker [1989] 171 CLR 125 at 152.

8      Clarkson v Whangamata Metal Supplies Ltd [2007] NZCA 590, [2008] 3 NZLR 31 at [46].

9      Clarkson v Whangamata Metal Supplies Ltd, above n 8, at [38]–[49].

10     Whitford Properties Ltd v Bruce [2017] NZHC 1674 at [12] and [15] (footnote omitted).

11     Whitford Properties Ltd v Bruce, above n 10, at [17].

sufficient notice that they were at risk of an award of interest which might be higher than statutory interest.12

[24]      The plaintiff says that she pleaded and proved interest as damages, and that the pleading gave the defendants sufficient notice that they were at risk of an award of interest which might be higher than statutory interest.

[25]      In opposing the plaintiff’s claim for compounding interest, the defendants rely on the decision of this Court in Clarkson v Whangamata Metal Supplies Ltd.13 In that case, the Court of Appeal held that to obtain compound interest as compensation for breach of contract a claimant must both plead and prove that their losses were caused by late payment of a debt. The defendants submit that an unparticularised and unproven claim for damages is insufficient (i.e. that is the case here).

[26]      The defendants further submit that the plaintiff cannot rely on Clarkson v Whangamata Metal Supplies Ltd for the following reasons:

(a)The plaintiff’s contractual cause of action was rejected in my substantive judgment14 and the plaintiff only succeeded on her actions for breach of trust and fiduciary duty.

(b)The plaintiff neither specifically pleaded nor proved a claim for compound interest.

(c)While courts of equity will order compound interest where justice so demands,15 there is no reason in this case for any additional award of damages to be made against the defendants.

(d)The remedies judgment, rather than award any further compensation for the lost opportunity of re-investment, found that the best way to deal with this aspect of the plaintiff’s claim was to provide an allowance of

12     Whitford Properties Ltd v Bruce, above n 10, at [18].

13     Clarkson v Whangamata Metal Supplies Ltd, above n 8.

14     Venkataswamy v Kodoor [2023] NZHC 1189 at [164(a)].

15     Whitford Properties Ltd v Bruce, above n 10, at [12].

five per cent on the sum of USD 634,461. Given this allowance, there is no need to compound interest. To do so would overlap with the compensation that has already been awarded.

(e)The Court (i.e. my remedies judgment) has already rejected other attempts by the plaintiff to increase compensation for her losses, such as for leverage or interest on a student loan.

[27]      I reject the plaintiff’s claim for compounding interest. I agree with the defendants’ submission that the five per cent allowance I made in my remedies judgment was intended as a global allowance for all re-investment interest/loss. That allowance therefore subsumes the claims of the plaintiff for compounding interest.

[28]      As Duffy J held in Whitford Properties Ltd v Bruce,16 courts of equity will order compound interest when justice so demands. Here I have already made a large and generous global allowance for re-investment. I find there is no reason in this case for any additional award of damages to be made against the defendants.17

[29]      I also accept the submission of the defendants that there are substantial defects with the plaintiff’s pleading in relation to compounding interest. It is too late for those to be rectified. There is also an issue as to whether the sums claimed should be denied or reduced in accordance with a reduction to the rate of return due to the plaintiff’s reneging on the agreed three-year period.18 The global allowance of five per cent was intended to cover all these variables.

Issue — Should use of money interest be granted?

[30]      In my remedies judgment, I held that the defendants ought to have paid the plaintiff interest on the sums returned part-way through the relevant period.19

16 Whitford Properties Ltd v Bruce, above n 10, at [12].

17 My remedies judgment awarded a sum to the plaintiff to reflect that income returns would have increased by virtue of re-investment. That sum was  five per  cent on  the principal  sum  of  USD 634,641. If this is interpreted as non-compounding interest, the parties agreed that it would equal approximately USD 406,000.

18 Venkataswamy v Kodoor, above n 1, at [32].

19 Venkataswamy v Kodoor, above n 1, at [68(a)(i) and (ii)].

Therefore, the defendants  ought  to  have  paid  the  plaintiff  USD  17,237.91  on  16 November 2011, and USD 34,912.24 on 30 July 2012.

[31]      The defendants did not pay that money. The plaintiff therefore says that she was denied use of that money over the intervening period.

[32]      The plaintiff submits that this issue was squarely addressed in relation to the principal sum. However, she says that my judgment did not expressly address the issue in relation to the outstanding interest payments. She submits that the same approach should be taken as, conceptually, the same principles apply. Alternatively, if this was merely the result of an accidental slip or omission she submits that it should now be corrected.

[33]      The plaintiff contends that the outstanding interest sums are properly conceived of as part of the trust sum; there is no suggestion the interest payments were kept apart from the defendants’ personal funds and investments and a prudent trustee would have re-invested those sums.

[34]      The plaintiff says that the same conservative five per cent calculation that was applied to the re-investment calculation ought to apply on these interest payments.

[35]      The defendants, on the other hand, submit that my judgment made provision for the payment of these amounts and there is no basis for the plaintiff to claim them. Moreover, they highlight and emphasise the passages in my judgment noting that the plaintiff reneged on the three-year term of her contract. The defendants say there should be some reduction in the rate of return to recognise the premature demand for early payment in the context of a property investment.

[36]      This issue of use of money interest is, of course, similar to the previous issue just considered, namely that of compounding interest. Both relate to the matter of re-investment.

[37]      The plaintiff’s use of money interest claim is premised on the similar idea that had the plaintiff obtained the amounts set out at [68(a)(i) and (ii)] when the relevant

interim principal payments were made, then she would have been able to re-invest that money and obtain a return.

[38]      I also reject the plaintiff’s claim for use of money interest. My reasons are essentially the same as those given in relation to rejecting the claim for compounding interest. As noted above, my five per cent global allowance for re-investment is to be interpreted as a global allowance intended to address all issues of re-investment. This consequently subsumes both the plaintiff’s fresh claims for compounding interest and use of money interest.

Issue — Should judgment interest be granted?

[39]      The plaintiff submits that a judgment debt carries interest from the time judgment is given, until it is satisfied. As a result, she claims five per cent interest on a variety of judgment sums set out at [37] of her updated submissions dated 19 June 2024.

[40]      All but three of the sums sought for judgment interest relate to interest on interest.20 In my view, this is essentially a request for compounding interest, albeit framed as one for judgment interest. As the defendants contend, the Judicature Act 1908 expressly prohibits this type of interest.21

[41]      The plaintiff acknowledges the impact of s 87. However, she submits that interest on interest can be awarded in equity or where a contractual entitlement exists.22 The plaintiff contends that this discretion should be exercised in this case because of the multiple egregious breaches of trust and fiduciary duty, the serious nature of the wrongs and the high degree of moral turpitude. She contends there is no reason why the defendants should benefit and she should suffer from any further delay in making payment to the plaintiff.

20 For example, the  plaintiff  has included  interest at  the  rate  of  five  per  cent on  the  sums of USD 17,237.91 and USD 34,912.24 being the compound interest she has claimed to be owing on the sums of USD 163,910 and USD 200,000. The three exceptions are the judgment sum of  USD 634,641, the general damages of NZD 50,000 and the agreed costs of NZD 276,775.50.

21 Judicature Act 1908, s 87(1)(a): because this proceeding was commenced prior to the coming into force of the Interest on Money Claims Act 2016, s 87 of the Judicature Act 1908 applies — see sch 1 cl 1 of the Interest on Money Claims Act 2016.

22 Equiticorp Industries Group Ltd (in statutory management) v R (No 51) [1996] 3 NZLR 690 at 695–701; IFC Securities Ltd (in rec) v Sewell [1990] 1 NZLR 177.

The non-interest sums

[42]      I find that judgment interest should be awarded on the non-interest sums,23 namely the USD 634,641, the general damages of NZD 50,000 and the agreed costs of NZD 276,775.50.24 In my view, those claims are straightforward and should be allowed in accordance with the Judicature Act 1908. Interest is to run until the date of payment.

[43]      In granting interest on the costs award, I take into account the fact that these proceedings have been underway since 2016.25

[44]      For completeness, and because the award and rate of interest under s 87(1) are discretionary, I note that section 87(1) sets out that:

… the court may, if it thinks fit, order that there shall be included in the sum for which judgment is given interest at such rate, not exceeding the prescribed rate, as it thinks fit on the whole or any part of the debt or damages for the whole or any part of the period between the date when the cause of action arose and the date of the judgment.

[45]      Since 1 July 2011, cl 4 of the Judicature (Prescribed Rate of Interest) Order 2011 prescribes that rate as five per cent per year. This is the upper limit of interest that can be awarded under the Judicature Act 1908.

[46]      In exercising this discretion to impose judgment interest, I concur with  Jagose J’s finding in Apollo Bathroom & Kitchen (in liq) v Ling:26

While not here applicable in its terms, also relevant to the exercise of my discretion is s 10(1) of the Interest on Money Claims Act 2016, which provides “[i]n every money judgment, a court must award interest under this section as compensation for a delay in the payment of money”. While I have discretion whether to award interest at all, the 2016 Act illustrates a general expectation [that] delays in payment of money will be compensated. …

23 See the plaintiff’s updated memorandum dated 19 June 2024 at [37(a) and (h)] and [42].

24 As held in Chesterfields Preschools Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [2013] NZCA 44, [2013] 2 NZLR 499 at [20], an award of costs accrues interest when the Court has, although not awarding a specific sum, made a costs order in terms that enable the costs to be calculated or determined without reference back to the Court — as occurred at [90] of my remedy and costs judgment of 17 April 2024.

25 See also Cable Bay Wine Ltd v Auckland Council [2021] NZHC 3181 at [20]–[21].

26 Apollo Bathroom & Kitchen Ltd (in liq) v Ling [2019] NZHC 237 at [48]. I also note the plaintiff’s submission that r 11.27 of the High Court Rules 2016 may also be relevant in this regard.

[47]      Accordingly, I find that an award of interest is warranted. Turning to consider the appropriate rate of interest under s 87(1), I adopt a similar approach to that adopted by Jagose J in Apollo Bathroom & Kitchen Ltd (in liq) v Ling.27 As in that case,28 I take judicial notice of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand’s retail 6-month term deposit rate, which has been above five per cent since March 2023 (with the exception of January 2025).29 Accordingly, I consider granting the maximum statutory amount of five per cent interest would not grant the plaintiff a meaningful premium. I order therefore that judgment interest at the maximum rate of five per cent per annum (i.e. I cannot go higher) should be granted in respect of these sums.

The interest sums

[48]      I reject the plaintiff’s claims relating to judgment interest for use of money interest as I have declined to grant such interest30 — see above at [30]–[38].

[49]      However, as to judgment interest on the other interest-sums (the equitable compensation awarded at [68(a)(i)–(iv)] of the remedy and costs judgment — i.e. the sum of USD 2,359,016.08)31 I agree and adopt the submissions of the plaintiff that the courts of equity have a jurisdiction to award interest which is outside and additional to the statutory power contained in s 87(1) of the Judicature Act 1908.32 The discretion to grant judgment interest on the equitable compensation sum ordered is to be exercised in this case because of the multiple and egregious breaches of trust and fiduciary duty that I identified in my substantive judgment.

[50]      Crucially, as opposed to my discussion of compounding and use of money interest above, the five per cent allowance for re-investment does not subsume this amount because that allowance applied retrospectively rather than attempting to compensate for the plaintiff’s ongoing losses post-judgment. In fact, the five per cent

27     Apollo Bathroom & Kitchen Ltd (in liq) v Ling, above n 26.

28     Apollo Bathroom & Kitchen Ltd (in liq) v Ling, above n 26, at [50].

29     “Retail interest rates on lending and deposits (B3)” Reserve Bank of New Zealand

< the plaintiff’s updated memorandum dated 19 June 2024 at [37(f) and (g)].

31     See the plaintiff’s updated memorandum dated 19 June 2024 at [37(b)–(e)].

32 Rama v Millar [1996] 1 NZLR 257 (PC); Equiticorp Industries Group Ltd (in statutory management) v R (No 51), above n 22; and Kabushiki Kaisha Sony Computer Entertainment v van Veen CIV-2004-485-1520 HC Wellington, Associate Judge Gendall, 10 June 2009.

allowance is included in the judgment interest sought. Accordingly, I consider it is appropriate to grant judgment interest in relation to the equitable compensation.

[51]There remains the issue as to the rate of interest that should apply.

[52]      The approach of Smellie J in Equiticorp33 is helpful. In that case, Smellie J held that a judge’s role in determining the rate of interest was to reach a fair and conservative assessment by taking cognisance of rates charged during the relevant period.34

[53]      Although not a case in equity, in Apollo Bathroom & Kitchen Ltd (in liq) v Ling Jagose J considered how to calculate the appropriate rate of interest when applying the discretion under s 87(1) of the Judicature Act 1908.35 His Honour held that while he was “attracted to simple application of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand’s retail six-month term deposit rate”, he considered “the more just calculation is in accordance with the 2016 Act’s calculator”.36

[54]Jagose J described the calculator as follows:

[49]   Section 13 of the 2016 Act mandates establishment of an “internet site calculator” which calculates interest rates for the purposes of the Act. The site’s FAQ explains:

The interest rate is calculated for a specific day by:

1Taking the six most recent observations for the retail six-month term deposit rate that have been published by the Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ), and taking an average of these six rates. The average is the base rate.

2Adding the base rate to the premium (0.15 per cent) the result becomes the per annum simple interest rate.

3Converting the per annum simple rate into a daily effective rate. The formula for this conversion is as follows:

Daily effective rate = ((1+“per annum simple interest rate as
%”/100)^(1/“Days in the year”)-1) x 100

33     Equiticorp Industries Group Ltd (in statutory management) v R (No 51), above n 22.

34     At 702.

35     Apollo Bathroom & Kitchen Ltd (in liq) v Ling, above n 26.

36     Apollo Bathroom & Kitchen Ltd (in liq) v Ling, above n 26, at [11].

The result is the interest rate expressed as a daily effective rate for the specific day.

(footnotes omitted)

[55]      In this case I intend to adopt the same approach. I consider the application of the internet site calculator (established pursuant to s 13 of the Interest on Money Claims Act 2016) will produce a fair and conservative assessment that takes cognisance of rates charged during the relevant period. Notably, as this is a claim in equity rather than under the Judicature Act 1908, the prescribed upper limit of five per cent does not apply.

[56]      Accordingly, I find that the defendants are to pay interest to the plaintiff on the equitable compensation sum of USD 2,359,016.08 from the judgment date of 17 April 2024 until payment at the rate calculated in accordance with the internet site calculator under the Interest on Money Claims Act 2016.

Disbursements

[57]The plaintiff claims the following disbursements:

(a)flights: USD 2,620.26;

(b)accommodation: USD 1,700; and

(c)taxi travel: NZD 1,000.

[58]      The plaintiff has provided a receipt from Malaysian Airlines in support of the flight expenses claimed. There are no receipts for the accommodation (which she paid in cash) or the taxi travel. The plaintiff says she did not keep receipts for taxis or public transport but has provided no explanation for why that is so. In her affidavit of 20 June 2024, the plaintiff says that she stayed with a family in Auckland and paid them USD 100 per day in cash (a total of 17 days). The plaintiff says she asked the host to provide an affidavit to support her claim for accommodation costs but he refused to get involved in the proceedings and does not want to provide an affidavit.

[59]      The defendants say that the plaintiff was based in Los Angeles and not India. The receipt therefore for the return airfare from India to New Zealand on Malaysian Airlines is not relevant. The defendants say there are direct flights from Los Angeles to Auckland which are cheaper than the airfare claimed by the plaintiff.

[60]      The defendants reject the claims for disbursements as made by the plaintiff but say they will accept a total of NZD 5,000 for the costs incurred by her in travelling to New Zealand, and to accommodation and travel costs while here.

[61]      I reject the plaintiff’s claims for disbursements for both accommodation and travel costs while in New Zealand. No receipts have been provided and the payments were obviously made in cash. Accordingly, the disbursements are not sufficiently verified as required by r 14.12(2) of the High Court Rules 2016.37 The Court has real doubt as to whether any proper accounting for GST and/or other tax has been made.

[62]      As to the airfare claimed, I order that the defendants are to pay to the plaintiff the sum of NZD 2,500.00. I accept the defendants’ contention that the disbursement should be for a return airfare from Los Angeles to Auckland.38

Conclusion and result

[63]      I find that the principal sum of USD 634,641 was repaid on 20 November 2023, as the defendants contend.

[64]      I further find that interest is not payable on the equitable compensation sum on a compounding basis. Furthermore, use of money interest is not granted.

[65]I make the following orders and directions:

(a)The defendants are to pay equitable compensation to the plaintiff in the sum (i.e. the final figure) of USD 2,359,016.08.

37     See Rodgers v Advanced Creative Technologies Ltd [2013] NZHC 1095 at [44]–[45].

38     High Court Rules 2016, r 14.12(2)(d).

(b)The defendants are to pay judgment interest to the plaintiff on the original judgment sum of USD 634,641 from the date of judgment, namely 18 May 2023, until payment, at the rate of five per cent in accordance with the Judicature Act 1908.

(c)The defendants are to pay judgment interest to the plaintiff on the general damages sum of NZD 50,000 from the date of judgment, namely 17 April 2024, until payment, at the rate of five per cent in accordance with the Judicature Act 1908.

(d)The defendants are to pay judgment interest to the plaintiff on the costs award of NZD 276,775.50 from the date of judgment, namely 17 April 2024, until payment, at the rate of five per cent in accordance with the Judicature Act 1908.

(e)The defendants are to pay judgment interest to the plaintiff on the equitable compensation sum of USD 2,359,016.08 from the date of judgment, namely 17 April 2024, until payment, at the rate determined in accordance with the internet site calculator under the Interest on Money Claims Act 2016 (as discussed above).

(f)The defendants are to pay disbursements for the plaintiff’s airfare in the sum of NZD 2,500. No allowance is made for the plaintiff’s accommodation or taxi travel.

(g)Leave is reserved to apply for further orders and directions. However, this should only be used for significant outstanding issues. It is difficult to conceive that at this late stage there is anything further requiring the Court’s determination. The parties have already been accorded significant hearing and judicial time.

[66]      There is no order for costs in relation to the matters dealt with in this judgment or any steps taken with respect to it.39

Andrew J

39 I note that the plaintiff sought scale costs in relation to her memorandum dated 19 June 2024 if I decided that interest should compound or that use of money interest should be granted. Since I declined both these claims, I accordingly also decline the plaintiff’s claim for scale costs.