Vegar v Aorangi Forests Ltd
[2014] NZHC 2910
•21 November 2014
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY
CIV-2013-404-3163 and 3166 [2014] NZHC 2910
IN THE MATTER of a proposal by Peter Thomas Vegar and a
proposal by Helen Jean Vegar under the
Insolvency Act 2006BETWEEN
PETER THOMAS VEGAR First Insolvent
HELEN JEAN VEGAR Second Insolvent
AND
AORANGI FORESTS LTD & ORS Creditors
CIV-2013-404-3685
IN THE MATTER of an appeal under Regulation 32(1) of the Insolvency (Personal Insolvency) Regulations 2007
BETWEEN ANTHONY JOHN EBERT AND JENNIFER JANE EBERT Appellants
ANDPETER THOMAS VEGAR Respondent
CIV-2013-470-536
IN THE MATTER of an appeal under Regulation 32(1) of the Insolvency (Personal Insolvency) Regulations 2007
BETWEEN HILLERSDEN VINEYARD CONTRACTING LTD (IN LIQUIDATION)
Appellant
ANDPETER THOMAS VEGAR AND HELEN JEAN VEGAR
Respondents
PETER THOMAS VEGAR v AORANGI FORESTS LTD & ORS [2014] NZHC 2910 [21 November 2014]
Hearing: (On the papers) Counsel:
RB Stewart QC for Provisional Trustee
KW Fulton for Mr and Mrs Vegar
SP Bryers for Trustees of Florence Trust
JK Boparoy for Hillersden VineyardJudgment:
21 November 2014
JUDGMENT OF BREWER J [Costs]
This judgment was delivered by me on 21 November 2014 at 12 noon pursuant to Rule 11.5 High Court Rules.
Registrar/Deputy Registrar
Solicitors: Kevin McDonald & Associates (Takapuna) for the Provisional Trustee
Craig Griffin & Lord (Auckland) for Mr and Mrs Vegar
Gaines Law (Blenheim) for Trustees of the Florence Trust
Waterstone Insolvency (North Shore City) for Hillersden Vineyard
Introduction
[1] Hillersden Vineyard Contracting Ltd (in liquidation) (“Hillersden”) and the Florence Trust failed in appeals against the Provisional Trustee’s decision to reject their votes against creditors’ proposals.1 Subsequently, Hillersden and the Florence Trust withdrew their opposition to the proposals, which I then approved.2
[2] The Provisional Trustee, Mr Brown, and the insolvent proposers, Mr and
Mrs Vegar, seek costs.
Issues
[3] Should Mr Brown be awarded costs against Hillersden and the Florence
Trust:
(a) for the withdrawn oppositions to the proposals; and/or
(b) for the failed appeals?
[4] Should Mr and Mrs Vegar be awarded costs against Hillersden and the
Florence Trust:
(a) for the withdrawn oppositions to the proposals; and/or
(b) for the failed appeals?
Discussion
[5] The usual rule is that costs follow the result. If two successful parties are related, such that one counsel could well appear for both, but for some unjustified reason separate counsel are employed, costs may be modified to avoid imposing a
double burden.
1 Vegar v Aorangi Forests Ltd & Ors [2014] NZHC 1109.
2 Vegar v Aorangi Forests Ltd & Ors HC Auckland CIV-2013-404-3163, 3 June 2014 (Minute).
[6] The award of costs where a creditor unsuccessfully opposes a creditors’ proposal can be on a different basis. This Court has held3 consistently that the burden of the costs of a Provisional Trustee falls on the proposing debtor;4 and where a creditor unsuccessfully opposes a creditors’ proposal, costs lie where they fall.5
[7] The reason for the different approach is that a creditor who successfully opposes a creditors’ proposal gets nothing in costs. That is because the debtor, who is insolvent, becomes bankrupt. If there is an award of costs it will have no priority in the bankruptcy. Since a Provisional Trustee has no choice but to present an application to the Court for approval, costs will not usually be awarded against the
trustee. In this case, as is commonplace, the creditors’ proposal6 provides for the
Provisional Trustee’s fees and expenses to be paid by Mr and Mrs Vegar.
[8] Of course, the award of costs is discretionary and the practice I have outlined is not invariably observed. For example, costs will be awarded against a trustee if the trustee is guilty of misconduct. McGechan on Procedure cites the example of a trustee who abuses the duty to act objectively and even-handedly in creditors’
interests, perhaps by improperly rejecting a creditor’s proof of debt.7 Equally, costs
will be awarded against a creditor who acts unreasonably – for example, through excessive delay in mounting their opposition or by acting vexatiously or maliciously.
[9] In this case, I find neither Hillersden nor the Florence Trust did anything in relation to opposing the creditors’ proposal which would trigger a change to the usual costs situation. I accept that the opposition, particularly by the Florence Trust, required significant work to be done – including the obtaining of expert evidence.
But that is not enough to warrant a departure from the current practice.
3 Re Meltzer, ex parte Parker Street Holdings HC Auckland CIV-2010-404-8293, 28 July 2011 at
[9]-[10]. See also Associate Judge Bell’s discussion in Re Simpkin HC Whangarei CIV-2010-
488-778, 21 March 2011 at [28]-[29] and Wang v Meltzer HC Auckland CIV-2010-404-3177,
5 August 2011; Liddle’s Proposal HC Auckland CIV-2009-404-5377, 25 June 2010; Re Farmer
HC Auckland B812/90, 1 October 1991; Re New Zealand Guardian Trust HC Auckland CIV-2009-404-579, 18 December 2009.
4 Andrew Beck and others McGechan on Procedure (looseleaf ed, Brookers,) at [HRPt 14.14A (b)].
5 At [HRPt 14.14A(d)].
6 At para 16.
7 At [HRPt 14.14A(c)].
Costs on the proposal
[10] I am advised by counsel for Mr and Mrs Vegar and Mr Brown8 that costs regarding the opposition to the proposal are agreed with Hillersden. I am invited to make an order accordingly. In this instance, I take the view that if costs have been agreed then they will be paid in accordance with the agreement. I decline to make an order.
[11] So far as costs claimed against the Florence Trust in relation to the Trust’s
opposition to the proposal are concerned, I order that costs will lie where they fall.
Costs on the appeals
[12] I do not accept that the appeals should be treated in the same way. An appeal by a creditor against a decision by a Provisional Trustee stands to one side of the proposal and approval process. For instance, an appeal can be lodged by a creditor who supports the proposal. In this case, in addition to opposing the approval of the proposal, Hillersden and the Florence Trust attempted to pre-empt the situation by challenging the decisions of the Provisional Trustee which led to the proposal being endorsed by the necessary majorities of creditors in the first place. This was a separate proceeding.
[13] In effect, I held that Hillersden and the Florence Trust did not have standing
to vote at the creditors’ meeting.
[14] Under these circumstances, I see no reason why costs should not follow the event.
[15] I have read the memoranda filed on behalf of the parties, and I note that
Hillersden accepts Mr and Mrs Vegar’s claim.
[16] I am persuaded by the arguments as to calculation of costs on the appeals set
out in Mr Fulton’s memorandum of 25 June 2014. I find that proper allowance has
been made for the overlap between the cases presented on behalf of Mr and
8 In an email to the Court on 17 July 2014, Ms Boparoy for Hillersden confirms that agreement.
Mrs Vegar, on the one hand, and Mr Brown, on the other. I find that Mr Brown has properly recognised that costs for his involvement should be modest.
[17] I note counsel for Florence Trust’s submission as to reduction of quantum claimed on behalf of Mr Brown. But, again, I accept Mr Fulton’s submission as to overall reasonableness. In the exercise of my discretion, I will not further reduce the costs.
[18] I make the following orders in relation to costs on the appeals:
(a) Hillersden is to pay costs to Mr and Mrs Vegar of $10,149 plus disbursements of $261.45;
(b) Hillersden is to pay costs to Mr Brown of $5,671;
(c) Mr and Mrs Ebert, as trustees of the Florence Trust, are to pay costs to
Mr and Mrs Vegar of $10,646 plus disbursements of $261.45;
(d) Mr and Mrs Ebert, as trustees of the Florence Trust, are to pay costs to
Mr Brown of $5,920.
Brewer J