Van Helmond v Accident Compensation Corporation - [2014] NZHC 2750

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND WELLINGTON REGISTRY

CIV-2014-485-7669 [2014] NZHC 2750

BETWEEN
FRANCISCUS VAN HELMOND

Applicant

AND

ACCIDENT COMPENSATION CORPORATION

Respondent

Hearing: 10 September 2014

Counsel:

A Beck for Applicant
I Hunt for Respondent

Judgment:

6 November 2014

JUDGMENT OF WILLIAMS J

[1] The applicant seeks special leave to appeal to this Court, having been refused leave to appeal by His Honour Judge Powell in the District Court.1

[2] The application raises two questions:

(a) whether ACC’s advice to the applicant on 11 July 2005 advising him that his claim for cover was a duplicate claim that had already been rejected amounted to a “decision on the claim” for the purposes of ss 57 and 58 of the Accident Compensation Act 2001; and

(b) whether the review decision of His Honour Judge Beattie of

30 November 2006 finding the July 2005 advice to have been incorrect, reset the clock for the purpose of the statutory timeframes contained in s 57(2) and triggering thereby the deemed decision
consequence in s 58.

1 Van Helmond v ACC [2014] NZACC 143.

Factual and procedural background

[3] This matter has a convoluted history but the relevant facts may be briefly summarised. The applicant, on advice from a doctor, claimed in 1992 to have suffered two injuries: a thoracic strain and a lumbar strain. He was granted cover in respect of the lumbar sprain. The respondent ceased cover in respect of that strain in July 2002 having reached the view that the applicant was now capable of working.

[4] On 7 July 2005, the applicant applied for cover in relation to the thoracic strain. On 11 July 2005, the respondent wrote a letter to the applicant advising him that this was a duplicate claim (i.e. it had been made before) and rejected it. On review, the reviewer held that the respondent had no jurisdiction to further consider the matter as there was no new claim. The applicant appealed.

[5] In a decision dated 30 November 2006, His Honour Judge Beattie found that the respondent’s letter of 11 July 2005 was a decision within the meaning of s 6 of the Act. The reviewer was therefore wrong, he said, to find that there was no jurisdiction to hear the matter. His Honour directed the respondent to reconsider the claim on its merits.

[6] On 13 July 2007, the respondent reached a decision on its reconsideration of the claim. The respondent declined cover for thoracic spine injury.

[7] Meanwhile on 12 February 2007, the applicant had already filed separate applications for review contending that the respondent had failed to process the matter in accordance with the statutory time limit contained in s 57. The argument was that Judge Beattie’s decision of 30 November 2006 reset the clock giving the respondent a maximum of two months within which to reconsider his claim. This meant, the applicant argued, that, whatever the substantive merits, he was entitled to deemed cover under s 58 on the expiry of the…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

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Details

Case: [2014] NZHC 2750
Decision Date: 6 November 2014

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the High Court of New Zealand, Franciscus Van Helmond sought special leave to appeal against a decision of the District Court, which had refused him leave to appeal. Van Helmond argued that the Accident Compensation Corporation (ACC) had failed to make a proper decision on his claim for cover in relation to a thoracic strain injury and that the statutory timeframe for reconsideration had not been reset. The central issues were whether ACC's advice on 11 July 2005 constituted a decision on the claim and if the review decision of 30 November 2006 reset the statutory timeframes for reconsideration. The court assessed the applicant's arguments against the well-established criteria for special leave to appeal, focusing on whether a material error of law was present and capable of serious argument.

The court found that the question of whether ACC's advice on 11 July 2005 was a decision on the claim was not sufficiently arguable. Van Helmond had previously argued the opposite in a different proceeding, and the court held that he could not change his stance mid-litigation. Even if the argument was considered, the court found that ACC's advice, despite being incorrect, was still a decision under the Accident Compensation Act 2001, albeit one that was not properly investigated. Regarding the reset of the statutory timeframe, the court concluded that the statutory provisions referred to the claimant lodging a claim and not to a decision by the Court on appeal. Therefore, the statutory time limits are triggered by the lodging of a claim and not by an appeal decision. Consequently, the statutory clock was not reset, and the applicant could not claim the benefit of a deemed decision. The court found that both issues lacked the necessary arguability to warrant special leave to appeal.

In summary, the application for special leave to appeal was dismissed. The court upheld the District Court's decision, finding that there was no material error of law that met the threshold for special leave to appeal. The statutory time limits for reconsideration were not reset by the review decision, and the applicant's arguments did not present a well-arguable case for appeal.

Orders