Van Der Veen v Christchurch City Council

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND CHRISTCHURCH REGISTRY

I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA ŌTAUTAHI ROHE

CRI-2020-409-000169

[2021] NZHC 486

BETWEEN

SHANE TONY VAN DER VEEN

Appellant

AND

CHRISTCHURCH CITY COUNCIL

Respondent

Hearing: 11 March 2021

Appearances:

Appellant in person

P N M Brown for Respondent

Judgment:

12 March 2021


JUDGMENT OF DUNNINGHAM J


This judgment was delivered by me on 12 March 2021 at 3.00 pm, pursuant to Rule 11.5 of the High Court Rules.

Registrar/Deputy Registrar

Date……………

Introduction

[1]    Shane van der Veen pleaded guilty and was sentenced by Judge Couch for being the owner of a dog that attacked a domestic animal on 11 May 2020.1 An order was made for the destruction of the dog.2


1      Dog Control Act 1996, s 57(2).

2      As required under s 57(3) of the Dog Control Act.

VAN DER VEEN v CHRISTCHURCH CITY COUNCIL [2021] NZHC 486 [12 March 2021]

[2]    He appeals the conviction. This appeal is advanced in order to save the life of the dog, Kyra.

Background

[3]Kyra was classified a dangerous dog on or around 15 March 2017.

[4]    On 22 August 2019 the complainant was out running with his dog, Oakley. He ran past Mr van der Veen’s home. Kyra was unrestrained within the property and ran along the fence line, barking at the complainant. Kyra did not respond to her owner’s calls to desist. Instead, she pushed through the fence by pushing down the wire mesh and slipping between the mesh and the top wire. Kyra latched onto Oakley’s rear end and began shaking her head. Mr van der Veen jumped the fence and pulled Kyra off Oakley. He knew Kyra could escape through the boundary fence.

[5]    Mr van der Veen was subsequently charged under s 57 Dog Control Act 1996 and appeared in the District Court on 11 May 2020. He was assisted by the duty lawyer. He had already indicated in a letter to the Court that he wanted to plead guilty to the charge. However, the Judge raised the fact that if the charge was admitted or found to be proved, then there was a mandatory provision in the Dog Control Act requiring the Court to make an order for destruction of the dog, unless it is satisfied that the circumstances of the offence were exceptional.

[6]    A discussion ensued about the facts of the offending and the Judge indicated he did not consider they disclosed exceptional circumstances, and he commented on the difficulties of proving exceptional circumstances. The Judge noted that on the basis of the summary of facts it would appear the attack was “readily avoidable if the fence had been properly maintained, which Mr van der Veen accepted”. Following this discussion, the duty lawyer took further instructions from Mr van der Veen and confirmed that a guilty plea could be entered.

[7]    On entry of the guilty plea, Mr van der Veen was convicted. The Judge then made an order for the destruction of  Kyra  as…

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Details
Case
[2021] NZHC 486
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Shane Tony van der Veen, the appellant, appeals his conviction under the Dog Control Act 1996, which led to the destruction order for his dog, Kyra. The Christchurch City Council, the respondent, defends the conviction. The appeal was advanced to prevent the destruction of Kyra. The central issue is whether the conviction and the subsequent destruction order for Kyra are valid despite the appellant's guilty plea.

The court examined whether the appeal could succeed despite the guilty plea, considering the three categories of circumstances leading to a miscarriage of justice. The appellant argued that the offence under the Dog Control Act is not strictly a strict liability offence, contrary to the previous Court of Appeal decision in R v Proctor. The court held that the appellant's appeal must fail because the offence under s 57(2) of the Dog Control Act is indeed a strict liability offence, and the prosecution does not need to establish any lack of care on the part of the owner. The court further held that even if the standard required was to take all reasonable steps, the appellant failed to meet it in that Kyra was allowed to run unrestrained in an inadequately fenced property.

The court concluded that the appeal is dismissed, and the conviction stands, as does the sentence. The court acknowledged the appellant's perseverance and diligence in advancing the appeals but emphasised that the Courts are bound to apply legislation as enacted by Parliament. The court held that the facts accepted show an offence was committed under s 57 of the Dog Control Act, and the conviction was sound.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established