| IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF NEW ZEALAND |
| CA15/2012 [2012] NZCA 294 |
| BETWEEN SANTANA DENICE TUTU |
| AND THE QUEEN |
| Hearing: 18 June 2012 |
| Court: Randerson, Lang and Clifford JJ |
| Counsel: A M Simperingham for Appellant |
| Judgment: 5 July 2012 at 10 a.m. |
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
The appeal against conviction is dismissed.
REASONS OF THE COURT
(Given by Clifford J)
Introduction
The appellant, Ms Tutu, was found guilty by a jury in the District Court at Gisborne on one count of burglary (s 231(1)(a) Crimes Act 1961), one count of receiving stolen property the value of which exceeds $1,000 (ss 246 and 247(a) Crimes Act), one count of receiving stolen property the value of which exceeds $500 but not $1,000 (ss 246 and 247(b) Crimes Act) and two counts of receiving stolen property the value of which does not exceed $500 (ss 246 and 247(c) Crimes Act).
Ms Tutu now appeals against her convictions on the two counts of receiving stolen property the value of which does not exceed $500. She does so on the single ground that those two counts, being – she says – purely summary offences, were unlawfully included in the indictment on which she stood trial contrary to s 329(1) of the Crimes Act.
Facts
Ms Tutu originally faced an indictment containing three counts against her. Two further counts, those relating to the receipt of stolen goods the value of which does not exceed $500, were added shortly before the trial commenced. On Ms Tutu’s behalf, Mr Simperingham raised the objection which forms the basis of this appeal. He submitted that under s 329 an indictment may not contain a count for an offence punishable by a term of imprisonment for three months or less because an accused person does not have the right to elect trial by jury under s 66 of the Summary Proceedings Act 1957 for such an offence.
In his ruling Judge Perkins recorded his preliminary view that the two counts in question should not remain in the indictment.[1] But he considered himself bound by two High Court decisions, Young v Police and R v Nichols,[2] which, in line with submissions from the Crown, he found to have held to the contrary. This appeal therefore involves this Court revisiting the question the Judge ruled on.
Mr Simperingham’s concession
[1] R v Tutu DC Gisborne CRI-2010-082-681, 28 September 2011 at [12].
[2]Young v Police (1994) 11 CRNZ 304; R v Nichols HC Auckland T273/96, 19 December 1996.
At the commencement of the hearing of this appeal Mr Simperingham said that he was forced to acknowledge the strength of the Crown submissions opposing the appeal. In doing so he accepted that s 2(2) of the Crimes Act provides that any act which gives rise to liability to punishment under that Act is, subject to the provisions of that Act, a crime. The two counts in question therefore did charge crimes and hence were lawfully included…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read Tutu v The Queen and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2012] NZCA 294
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issue before the court was whether the two counts in question, which involved receiving stolen property of a value not exceeding $500, could be included in an indictment. The court needed to determine if these counts were summary offences that could not be included in an indictment under section 329(1) of the Crimes Act. The appellant's counsel argued that since the maximum punishment for these offences was three months imprisonment, they were summary offences and thus could not be included in an indictment. The Crown, however, contended that these offences were crimes that could be indicted because they fell under the definition of a crime in the Crimes Act.
The Court of Appeal held that the appellant's argument misconstrued the current legal scheme. The court clarified that while the maximum punishment for the offences in question was three months imprisonment, this did not make them summary offences. Instead, they were crimes that could be indicted because they fell under the definition of a crime in the Crimes Act. The court concluded that section 329(1) of the Crimes Act does not preclude a prosecution for such offences from proceeding by way of indictment. Consequently, the appeal against the convictions on the two counts was dismissed.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi