Trollope v Police
[2013] NZHC 1676
•3 July 2013
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND HAMILTON REGISTRY
CRI-2013-419-25 [2013] NZHC 1676
BETWEEN ANTHONY SAMUEL TROLLOPE Appellant AND
NEW ZEALAND POLICE Respondent
Hearing: 3 July 2013 Appearances:
Appellant in person
J Tarrant for RespondentJudgment:
3 July 2013
(ORAL) JUDGMENT OF LANG J [on appeal against sentence]
ANTHONY SAMUEL TROLLOPE v NEW ZEALAND POLICE [2013] NZHC 1676 [3 July 2013]
[1] Mr Trollope pleaded guilty in the District Court to a charge of refusing to permit a blood specimen to be taken after having been requested to do so by a law enforcement officer. He also pleaded guilty to a charge of careless driving causing injury, and a charge of failing to supply the police with information regarding the identity of the driver of his vehicle.
[2] On 6 May 2013, Judge Burnett disqualified Mr Trollope from driving for a period of seven months.1 He now appeals to this Court against the period of disqualification on the ground that it is manifestly excessive, or wrong in principle.
The facts
[3] The charges were laid as a result of three separate incidents. The first of these occurred on 21 December 2011. On that date, Mr Trollope was driving his motor vehicle on a rural road. He then became involved in a heated exchange with two cyclists who were travelling along the road. This ended with Mr Trollope driving his vehicle towards one of the cyclists and colliding with the cyclist’s bicycle. He also swerved his vehicle towards the other cyclist. This incident gave rise to the charge of careless driving causing injury. The injury in question was a grazing to the knee of the cyclist whose bicycle was involved in the collision with Mr Trollope’s vehicle.
[4] On the following day, the police served Mr Trollope with a request to provide information regarding the identity of the person who had been driving his vehicle on the previous day. He did not comply with that notice, and this led to the second charge.
[5] The third charge arose as a result of an incident that occurred on 29 May
2012. On that date, the police stopped Mr Trollope whilst he was driving his vehicle. The police initiated breath testing procedures, and Mr Trollope returned a positive result. He was then required to return to the police station for the purposes of providing an evidential sample of his breath, or to provide a specimen of his
blood. Once at the police station, Mr Trollope refused a blood specimen to be taken
1 New Zealand Police v Trollope DC Hamilton CRI-2012-019-000705, 6 May 2013.
after having been required to do so by a police officer. This led to the third charge, namely that of refusing to permit a specimen of his blood to be taken.
The argument on appeal
[6] Mr Trollope’s concern regarding the period of disqualification that the Judge imposed arises as a result of events that occurred between 1 June 2012 and the date upon which he was sentenced.
[7] Mr Trollope appeared for the first time on the charge of refusing to permit a blood specimen to be taken on 1 June 2012. On that date the presiding Judge remanded him without plea, and granted him bail. The grant of bail was subject to several conditions, including a condition prohibiting him from driving a motor vehicle. That bail condition remained in force until Mr Trollope was sentenced on
6 May 2013. As a result, Mr Trollope was subject to a bail condition preventing him from driving his motor vehicle for a period of approximately 11 months. He contends that the Judge ought to have taken into account when fixing the period of disqualification.
Decision
[8] The problem for Mr Trollope is that the charges to which he pleaded guilty carried mandatory periods of six months disqualification under ss 38(b) and 60(2)(b) of the Land Transport Act 1998. Although the Judge had a discretion to order a lesser period of disqualification, she could only do that provided there were special reasons relating to the offending itself, or to Mr Trollope’s personal circumstances.2
Nothing about the offending warranted the imposition of a lesser period of
disqualification than was required by the statute. I do not consider, either, that the bail condition to which Mr Trollope was subject could be regarded as a special reason personal to him so to justify that course of action being taken.
[9] As counsel for the respondent points out, it was open to Mr Trollope at any stage prior to sentencing to ask the District Court to remove or vary the bail
condition preventing him from driving. The condition was obviously imposed
2 Land Transport Act, s 81(1).
because of the risk that the presiding Judge saw of Mr Trollope becoming involved in further incidents if permitted to drive. The sentencing Judge was therefore bound to impose periods of disqualifications of not less six months. The fact that she imposed a period of seven months disqualification reflects the fact that two different incidents were involved.
[10] That being the case, I detect no error of principle in the Judge’s decision. The
appeal against the period of disqualification is accordingly dismissed.
Lang J
Solicitors:
Crown Solicitor, Hamilton
Copy to:
Appellant
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