| IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF NEW ZEALAND I TE KŌTI PĪRA O AOTEAROA |
| CA257/2020 [2021] NZCA 123 |
| BETWEEN | RUSSELL WILLIAM TRENT |
| AND | CANTERBURY REGIONAL COUNCIL |
| Hearing: | 17 March 2021 |
Court: | French, Ellis and Muir JJ |
Counsel: | T J Mackenzie and A L Hollingworth for Applicant |
Judgment: | 21 April 2021 at 9 am |
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
The application for leave to bring a second appeal is declined.
____________________________________________________________________
REASONS OF THE COURT
(Given by French J)
Mr Trent and his employer Emergent Cold Ltd[1] both pleaded guilty to a charge of discharging a contaminant onto land in circumstances that might result in the contaminant entering water in breach of s 15(1)(b) of the Resource Management Act 1991. Judge Dwyer imposed a fine of $145,350 on the company and a fine of $97,000 on Mr Trent.[2]
[1]At the time of the offending, the company was known as Polarcold Ltd.
[2]Canterbury Regional Council v Emergent Cold Ltd [2019] NZDC 23930 [Sentencing notes].
Mr Trent appealed his sentence to the High Court. The appeal was dismissed by Nation J.[3]
[3]Trent v Canterbury Regional Council (Christchurch) [2020] NZHC 767 [High Court judgment].
Dissatisfied with that outcome, Mr Trent now wishes to appeal to this Court. Because such an appeal would be a second appeal, leave is required.[4]
[4]Criminal Procedure Act 2011, s 237.
The focus of the proposed appeal is the significance (if any) that should be attributed to the fact that under the Resource Management Act there is a difference between the maximum monetary penalty to which companies and individuals are respectively liable for committing the offence of discharging a contaminant. For companies, the maximum fine is $600,000. For individuals, it is $300,000.[5]
Background
The facts of the offending
[5]Resource Management Act 1991, s 339(1).
The company operates a temperature-controlled warehousing and cold storage business. Mr Trent is employed as its South Island Engineering Manager. He was a long serving and highly regarded employee.
On 3 April 2018, the company instructed Mr Trent to purge some vintage compressors of ammonia vapours to enable their safe removal to a motor museum.
Mr Trent undertook this task using a purging tank that was situated in close proximity to a gutter. The gutter directed water into the Christchurch City Council’s storm water system. The purging process took five hours during which time Mr Trent attempted to control the smell of ammonia by adding more water to the tank to top it up. As a result, there was an overflow from the tank of ammonia or ammonia contaminated water. There was no secondary containment system around the base of the purging tank to contain any spillage. There was also a small leak in the purging line going to the tank which Mr Trent said he fixed.
Section 15(1)(b) of the Resource Management Act relevantly provides that no person may discharge any containment onto land in circumstances which may result in the contaminant entering…
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- Case
- [2021] NZCA 123
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
Background
Background to the litigation
Following the sentencing in the District Court, Trent appealed to the High Court, challenging the fine's appropriateness in relation to the maximum penalties set out in the Resource Management Act. The High Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the District Court's sentencing methodology and concluding that the fine was within the range of sentences reasonably available. Dissatisfied with this outcome, Trent sought leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal, arguing that the difference in maximum penalties between corporate and individual offenders should have been taken into account in setting the starting point for his fine.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Does the difference in maximum monetary penalties between corporate and individual offenders require a sentencing judge to necessarily arrive at a monetary starting point that reflects that difference?
2. Can an appeal be based on the argument that a miscarriage of justice may have occurred or may occur unless the appeal is heard?
Held
1. The Court held that the difference in maximum monetary penalties between corporate and individual offenders does not require a sentencing judge to necessarily arrive at a monetary starting point that reflects that difference.
2. The Court held that the application for leave to bring a second appeal is declined, as there was no tenable basis for an argument that a miscarriage of justice may have occurred or may occur unless the appeal is heard.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Court began by noting that sentencing is an exercise in discretion and not a mathematical exercise. It observed that the argument made by Mr Trent's counsel, that the sentencing Judge was required to take the differing maximum penalties into account by incorporating the lower maximum penalty applying to Mr Trent into his starting point, was flawed. The Court held that there is no obligation on the part of a sentencing judge to take the difference in maximum penalties into account in setting a starting point for individual offenders. The Court explained that the maximum penalty for individual offenders for the offence in question is not a fine of $300,000 but rather a term of imprisonment of two years. The Court further held that the argument overlooks that the reason for the higher monetary penalty for companies is that Parliament regarded the need for the Court to be able to impose meaningful penalties that will carry the necessary punitive and deterrent effect on large commercial organisations. The Court found that the decision in Waslander v Southland Regional Council was strongly supported by the legislative materials which led to the enactment of the Resource Management (Simplifying and Streamlining) Amendment Act 2009. The Court concluded that the difference in the maximum monetary penalties does not require a sentencing Judge to necessarily arrive at a monetary starting point which reflects that difference. The Court also held that there was no tenable basis for an argument that a miscarriage of justice may have occurred or may occur unless the appeal is heard. The Court found that the sentence imposed on Mr Trent was within the range of sentences reasonably available to the sentencing Judge and that there was no error in the District Court’s sentencing methodology.