Tramroad Limited v Guru NZ Forests Limited

[2025] NZHC 2167

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY

I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TĀMAKI MAKAURAU ROHE

CIV-2025-404-000634

[2025] NZHC 2167

BETWEEN

TRAMROAD LIMITED

Applicant

AND

GURU NZ FORESTS LIMITED

Respondent

Hearing:	27 June 2025
Appearances:	R M N Marsich for the Applicant D G Collecutt for the Respondent
Judgment:	4 August 2025

JUDGMENT OF ASSOCIATE JUDGE COGSWELL

This judgment was delivered by me on 4 August 2025 at 4.00 p.m. pursuant to Rule 11.5 of the High Court Rules.

Registrar/Deputy Registrar Date.......................................

Solicitors:

D M A Burgess, Auckland

D G Collecutt, Auckland R M N Marsich, Auckland

TRAMROAD LTD v GURU NZ FORESTS LTD [2025] NZHC 2167 [4 August 2025]

Introduction

[1]                 Tramroad Ltd (Tramroad) seeks an order sustaining Caveat 13110940.1, registered against Records of Title 526115, 878825, NA26B/798, NA69C/885, SA194/183 and SA54B/251.

[2]                 The issue is whether Tramroad has an equitable interest in the properties sufficient to maintain the caveat or whether it should lapse.

[3]                 Tramroad says it is entitled to maintain its caveat because an agreement it entered into with Guru NZ Limited (Guru NZ) provided a right to lodge caveats over any land owned by Guru NZ Forests Limited (Guru Forests).

[4]                 Guru Forests opposes the application to maintain the caveat. It says that it is not liable for the debt, is not a party to the agreement and that it did not grant a right to lodge a caveat over its land in favour of Tramroad.

Legal principles

[5]                 The right to lodge a caveat is set out in s 138 of the Land Transfer Act 2017 (the Act). The relevant part of s 138 provides that the grounds for lodging a caveat include:

(a)where a person claims an estate or interest in the land, whether capable of registration or not (s 138(1)(a)); and

(b)where a person has a beneficial estate or interest in the land under an express, implied, resulting, or constructive trust (s 138(1)(b)).

[6]                 The Court of Appeal in Botany Land Development Ltd v Auckland Council summarised the principles to be applied when considering an application for an order that a caveat not lapse.1 The application is determined on a summary basis with the Court having regard to the following principles:

1      Botany Land Development Ltd v Auckland Council [2014] NZCA 61 at [23]–[25].

(a)The caveator bears the onus of demonstrating that they have an interest in the land sufficient to support a caveat.2 They need not establish the interest definitively, it is enough if they present a reasonably arguable case.

(b)An order for the removal of a caveat will only be made if it is patently clear that the caveat cannot be maintained—either because there was no valid ground for lodging one in the first place, or, alternatively, that such ground has now ceased to exist.

(c)The summary process by which applications are determined is ill-suited to resolving disputed questions of fact.3 A conflict between affidavits will generally be resolved in the caveator’s favour.4 However, the Court is not bound to accept uncritically statements in an affidavit that are equivocal, lacking in precision, inconsistent with undisputed contemporary documents or other statements by the same deponent, or inherently improbable.5

(d)When the caveator has discharged its burden, the Court retains a residual discretion to remove the caveat. The Court will exercise this discretion cautiously and must be satisfied removal will not prejudice the caveator’s legitimate interest.6

[7]                 To summarise, the Court will maintain a caveat if the caveator presents a reasonably arguable case. Conversely, it will remove a caveat only when it is patently clear that the caveat cannot be maintained.

2      Sims v Lowe [1988] 1 NZLR 656 (CA) at 660.

3      Re Ede (1882) 1 NZLR SC 258; New Zealand Limousin Cattle Breeders Society Inc v Robertson

[1984] 1 NZLR 41 (CA).

4      Bethell v Rickard [2013] NZCA 68 at [22]

5      Barrett v IBC International Ltd [1995] 3 NZLR 170 (CA) at 175, citing Eng Mee Yong v Letchumanan s/o Velayutham [1980] AC 331 (PC) at 341. See also Xie v 126 Waimumu Ltd [2020] NZHC 1109 at [8].

6      Pacific Homes Ltd (in rec) v Consolidated Joineries Ltd [1996] 2 NZLR 652 (CA) at 656.

Issues

[8]                 The issue is whether it is reasonably arguable that Guru NZ granted Tramroad a right to register a caveat over Guru Forests’ land, notwithstanding that Guru Forests was not party to the agreement.

[9]This requires consideration of the following:

(a)What did the parties agree?

(b)Did Guru Forests guarantee Guru NZ’s debt?

(c)Does the agreement require a further agreement between the parties in order to permit Tramroad to lodge a caveat? Or is it complete as it is?

(d)Did Mr Singh sign the agreement in a dual capacity such that he bound Guru Forests to grant the security, and, hence the right to lodge a caveat?

(e)Did Guru Forests ratify the agreement?

Background

[10]Tramroad is in the business of forestry harvesting.

[11]              Mr Singh owns Guru NZ Holdings Limited (Guru Holdings), which owns both Guru Forests and Guru NZ. He is the sole director of all three companies.

[12]              Guru Forests owns a number of properties, including properties the subject of this application.

[13]Guru NZ is in the forestry product export business.

[14]              In mid-2024, Tramroad was engaged to provide forestry harvesting services to Mr Singh’s companies. I use that expression deliberately because the contract under which those services were provided is not before the Court. There is some uncertainty

about the company engaging Tramroad, although as landowner, arguably it could have been Guru Forests. It was its trees being processed. The services provided by Tramroad resulted in invoices totalling $1,247,454.96 being issued to Guru NZ.

[15]Neither Guru NZ nor Guru Forests met those invoices.

[16]              Guru NZ is now in liquidation and receivership. It was placed in liquidation on 13 February 2025 and placed in receivership on 3 March 2025.

[17]              As a result of a growing concern about Guru NZ’s solvency and the outstanding invoices, on 9 September 2024 Tramroad and Guru NZ entered into the agreement. It was prepared by the parties themselves without legal input.

[18]Relevant terms of the agreement included:

(a)The parties to the agreement were Tramroad and Guru NZ. Guru Forests was not a party to the agreement.

(b)Tramroad was described as the “Lender” and Guru NZ was described as the “Borrower” in the Parties section. There was no corresponding definition of those terms in the operative part of the agreement.

(c)The “Debt” was defined “…the sum owed by Guru to Tramroad under this Agreement, and as referenced in the attached email chain marked “C”.”

(d)The Background at “C” provided:

The parties have agreed a payment plan which allows the Borrower to repay the Lender and also for the Lender to secure its position by being able to lodge a Caveat in the event of any default while the debt is still due over any of the properties listed at page 1 of the attached document titled ‘B – Singh Property Portfolio Mortgage Payment Schedule (Subject to clause 3.1)’

(e)The debt was to be repaid in accordance with cl 2 of the agreement which provides for staged payment.

(f)Clauses 3.2 to 3.4 (inclusive) of the agreement provided that Guru NZ would not apply to have any caveats lodged by Tramroad removed at any time whilst the debt remained unpaid. Guru NZ agreed that it would maintain its first mortgages in their “current” state, and not increase any borrowing on any of the caveatable properties or allow them to be used as security for any other debt until such time as the debt is paid.

(g)The properties on which Tramroad was able to register its caveat were set out in a document attached to the agreement and entitled “B – Singh Property Portfolio Mortgage Payment Schedule”.

[19]The key provision in the agreement is cl 3.1. That provision provides:

The Borrower agrees that it will provide security for the Debt by permitting the Lender to register Caveats over the interests of the Borrower’s director in any of the properties owned by Guru NZ Forests Limited as list on page 1 of the attached document titled ‘B – Singh Property Portfolio Mortgage Payment Schedule’ (the Caveatable Properties). The Lender will confirm with borrower before lodging any caveats in an event of default, so it does not interfere with the sale process of any property. Caveat will be registered to the 100% value of outstanding debt.

[20]              The agreement also annexed an exchange of email between the parties as attachment “C”. The parties take different views on the interpretation of that exchange, but I note that the exchange refers to Tramroad organising a caveat over the nominated titles to secure its debt in the event of default.

[21]              The email exchange of 6 September 2024 is entitled, “Guru restructuring finances – Tramroad”. The exchange refers only to “Guru” without differentiating between the three Guru entities that Mr Singh controlled. In that exchange, Tramroad sought and received Mr Singh’s confirmation that the proposed restructuring arrangements were acceptable.

[22]              The parties agreed what percentage of net equity from the sale of any of the other properties would be applied towards the Tramroad debt. Mr Singh confirmed that up to 50 per cent of net equity upon the sale of any property would be paid in reduction of the debt owed on the day of settlement.

[23]              When lodging the caveat Tramroad initially relied on two events of default by Guru NZ:

(a)failure to pay the sum of $60,000 on 9 September 2024; and

(b)failure to pay 70 per cent of monies due under two letters of credit from the Bank of China.

[24]              It says that this entitled it to lodge caveats as a result of breach. It now accepts that Guru NZ did pay the sum of $60,000 to Tramroad, but notes that it was not paid until 14 September 2024, two days before the caveat was registered and after the agreed date for payment. It was not paid from the amounts due under the letters of credit.

[25]              Mr Singh advised on 20 September 2024 that a property at 3716 Kaipara Coast Highway could be caveated, as that property had the most value. This was in the context of a discussion about Guru NZ’s default in meeting the debt repayment arrangements and specifically referred to “Guru” having guaranteed payment to Tramroad. Mr Singh made no comment in response to the guarantee allegation.

[26]              Ultimately Guru NZ made one payment of $60,000 referred to above and a payment of $200,000 was made by Guru Forests on sale of one of the caveated properties. Tramroad released its caveat to enable the settlement of that sale transaction to occur and received the $200,000 on 30 January 2025.

[27]No other payments have been made to reduce the debt.

[28]              On 6 March 2025, Guru Forests applied to lapse the caveat, which resulted in this application.

What did the parties agree?

[29]              When the Court interprets a contract it must consider the contract’s text, context and objectives, the aim being to ascertain the meaning that the contract would

convey to a “reasonable person” having all the background knowledge that would have been reasonably available to the parties at the time the contract was entered into.7

[30]              In determining the meaning of a contract, primacy is given to the written words of the contract.8 However, an interpretation based on the plain and ordinary meaning of the contract’s language can be displaced in the event that this meaning is inconsistent with the contract’s context, or if that interpretation will lead to an absurdity—that is, where the interpretation is contrary to the “commercial purpose” of the contract.9

[31]              The context in this application was Guru NZ’s failure to meet the invoices issued to it by Tramroad and Tramroad’s (justified, as it turns out) concern about Guru NZ’s solvency.

[32]              The background anticipates Tramroad having the right to caveat properties in the “Singh Property Portfolio Mortgage Payment Schedule”, properties owned by Guru Forests. It does not appear that the parties turned their minds to the correct parties, when purporting to grant a right to caveat to Tramroad when only Guru NZ was a party. That is partially explicable because Mr Singh owns all three Guru companies and is their sole director.

[33]              In support of this point, Tramroad notes that “Guru” is not a defined expression in the agreement, nor is the term “Borrower”. It notes that cl 1.1(b) only refers to “Guru” repaying, which it says is consistent with both Guru NZ and Guru Forests being bound to pay. There is some strength in that argument.

[34]              The key provision is cl 3.1. It records that the debt is secured by permitting Tramroad to register a caveat over Guru Forests’ properties, all of which Mr Singh had an interest in. A handwritten addition notes that Tramroad would confer with Guru NZ before lodging any caveats in the event of default, so that it does not interfere with the sale process of any property.

7      Firm PI 1 Ltd v Zurich Australian Insurance Ltd [2014] NZSC 147, [2015] 1 NZLR 432 at [60].

8      Bathurst Resources Ltd v L&M Cole Holdings Ltd [2021] NZSC 85, [2021] 1 NZLR 696 at [46].

9      Malthouse Ltd v Rangatira Ltd [2018] NZCA 621 at [50].

[35]              It is clear from the surrounding context and circumstances of this case that the parties intended to secure both Guru companies’ futures going forward and they agreed that the debt would be repaid through the sale of property owned by Guru Forests. To do that, both parties intended that Guru Forests’ land would be made available as security. That was notwithstanding the fact that the invoices were outstanding and owed by Guru NZ.

[36]              Bearing in mind that this agreement was drafted by the parties themselves and interpreting the contract with the benefit of the surrounding factual context, it is clear that the parties intended to have Tramroad take the benefit of security over Guru Forests’ land to secure the outstanding debt owed by Guru NZ.

[37]              Tramroad held off taking enforcement action that it would otherwise have been entitled to take against Guru NZ based on this agreement.

[38]              This interpretation is supported by reference to cls 3.2–3.4 (inclusive) of the agreement, which provided that the borrower would not challenge the caveat, nor would it increase any secured lending over its properties or permit them to be used as security for any other debt.

[39]              Guru NZ could not make that promise, as it was Guru Forests’ land and mortgages in issue. Guru Forests is the only party that could challenge the caveat. It had mortgages over its land that Mr Singh agreed not to extend. He can only have done that on behalf of Guru Forests.

[40]              The intention of the parties was to grant security in favour of Tramroad. They simply failed to specifically include Guru Forests as a party to the agreement. No other interpretation is reasonable, given the factual context.

[41]              Conduct subsequent to the entry into the agreement is relevant. Rather than immediately taking objection to Tramroad registering a caveat over Guru Forests’ land, the parties’ respective directors met on a number of occasions and Mr Singh confirmed his intention to repay the debts through the proceeds of sales of the properties over which the caveat was lodged.

[42]              That was in fact done in relation to the property on 157 Mercer Ferry Road and Tramroad agreed to the release of its caveat to enable that transaction to settle. Guru Forests paid the sum of $200,000 to Tramroad in January 2025. That conduct is consistent with the interpretation set out above.

[43]              The caveator bears the onus of demonstrating that they have a reasonably arguable case to maintain the caveat. It is possible to interpret the agreement as granting an immediate right to Tramroad to lodge the caveat over the identified properties owned by Guru Forests.

[44]              In the substantive proceedings which must follow to establish Tramroad’s entitlement, Tramroad may seek rectification of the agreement to include Guru Forests as a party, or to raise issues of common mistake, entitling relief. That would accord with the intention of the parties as expressed in the agreement.

[45]              In Hanover Group Holdings Ltd v AIG Insurance New Zealand Ltd the Court of Appeal explained that rectification may be ordered where the parties have agreed to a contractual arrangement but the terms in which the arrangement is recorded do not accurately reflect the agreed terms.10 Oral evidence may be given to show that the recorded terms do not reflect the true agreement between the parties. The burden is on the party seeking rectification to show that there was a common intention which was not properly recorded. Evidence of subsequent conduct is admissible to show that the recorded terms do not reflect the agreed terms.

[46]              In this case, I find that it is reasonably arguable that the parties agreed, but failed to properly record, that Guru Forests agreed to give security for Guru NZ’s debt to Tramroad or that it agreed to pay that debt itself and gave security to support that promise.

[47]              Evidence of the parties’ agreement, the overall factual context and the parties’ post-agreement conduct all support a finding that it is arguable that a caveatable interest exists.

10     Hanover Group Holdings Ltd v AIG Insurance New Zealand Ltd [2013] NZCA 442, (2013) 13 TCLR 702 at [30].

Did Guru Forests guarantee Guru NZ’s debt?

[48]              Guru Forests says that the agreement only binds Guru NZ. It says that the debt which was the subject of the agreement is owed by Guru NZ to Tramroad and not by Guru Forests.

[49]              It says that there was no provision in the agreement for Guru Forests to sign the agreement, that it did not guarantee Guru NZ’s debt and that it was not a party to the agreement. That is correct on the face of the agreement.

[50]              It says that it is not possible to imply references to Guru NZ as including reference to Guru Forests. Guru Forests says that because the word “Borrower” is a defined term in the agreement it is not possible to interpret that clause as including Guru Forests.

[51]              It says that there is no guarantee provision in the agreement signed by Guru Forests which in accordance with the Property Law Act 2007 is a requirement for the granting of a guarantee (contracts of a guarantee must be in writing and signed by the party chargeable).11

[52]              In support of its arguments, Guru Forests relies on Brougham v Regan, which is a case where Mr Brougham had signed a loan agreement as a guarantor, but the agreement did not include any provision under which he agreed to answer for the debt, default, or liability of the company.12 Accordingly, there was no agreement to guarantee the debt, notwithstanding the fact that Mr Brougham had signed as guarantor.

[53]              Guru Forests argues that in order for it to be bound to the agreement, there needs to have been an enforceable provision under which it agreed to guarantee Guru NZ’s debts and that is absent from the agreement. It says that Guru Forests never granted a right to caveat its properties, nor did it guarantee Guru NZ’s debt.

11     Property Law Act 2007, ss 24 and 27.

12     Brougham v Regan [2020] NZSC 118, [2020] 1 NZLR 315 at [35].

[54]              It is correct that there is no guarantee clause under which Guru Forests guaranteed Guru NZ’s debt to Tramroad.

[55]              However, I consider that, although awkwardly expressed, there is a reasonably arguable case that the parties agreed that Guru NZ’s debt would be secured to Tramroad by making Guru Forests’ properties available by way of security or that Guru Forests directly agreed to be a party liable for the debt.

[56]              Tramroad says that when the parties referred to “Guru” in the agreement, they meant both Guru NZ and Guru Forests so that a specific guarantee provision was not required, as Guru Forests was also liable for the debt as a principal debtor under the agreement.

[57]              Tramroad says that the Property Law Act 2007 requirements are met if Guru Forests is considered to have signed the agreement as well when Mr Singh signed the agreement noting just Guru NZ as the signatory. That is, he signed for both companies, albeit that Guru Forests is not named. That would mean that ss 24 and 27 are met.

[58]              It is arguable that a right to caveat was intended to be granted. Rectification or a claim for relief for common mistake may remedy the omission Guru Forests seeks to rely on.

[59]              It follows that I am unable to find that it is patently clear that the caveat should be removed on that basis.

Does the agreement require a further agreement between the parties in order to permit Tramroad to lodge a caveat?

[60]              Guru Forests then submits that there was no right to caveat because there was no security granted, and that the agreement anticipated that a further agreement would be entered into between the parties.

[61]              It bases this submission on an argument that the agreement contemplated a subsequent agreement being negotiated and entered into with Guru Forests because the email exchange was attached as attachment “C” to the agreement refers to a right

of first refusal to be granted to Tramroad to buy Guru Forests’ property, which it says would require a further agreement.

[62]              That submission is based on the email of 6 September 2024 where Tramroad refers to “the caveat document that will also cover” a right of first refusal. Guru Forests says that this illustrates that the parties intended further documentation.

[63]              It is possible that the parties intended a further agreement providing Tramroad with a right of first refusal, but I do not consider that this means a present, enforceable, right to caveat the Guru Forests properties did not exist from the date of entry into the agreement.

[64]              Guru Forests points to the handwritten addition to cl 3.1 as support for its argument that the parties intended that a further agreement would be entered into.

[65]              That handwritten addition does not evidence the parties’ agreement that a further agreement would be entered into. It recorded that Tramroad would confirm with Guru NZ before lodging caveats in the event of default. It is arguable that there was such a default. Guru NZ did not have the right to oppose the lodging of a caveat, just a right to be advised. It was advised. That is clear from the subsequent correspondence.

[66]              Clause 3.1 recorded a present agreement to caveat. The addition to cl 3.1 was to facilitate Guru Forests’ sale of the properties from which, via the provisions of cl 2 of the agreement, it had agreed to apply an amount of the net equity towards the debt owed to Tramroad.

[67]              Guru Forests’ position on the reference in annexure “C” to a caveat being registered was to say that this was just part of the negotiations between the parties and that a further agreement was required. The exchange preceded the agreement.

[68]              I do not interpret exhibit C as being anything other than confirmation that Guru Forests agreed to have Tramroad lodge a caveat over its properties; properties in which Mr Singh had an interest. The entire context of the 6 September 2024 email exchange

is Guru NZ encouraging Tramroad to enter into the agreement to ensure the ongoing viability of its and Guru Forests’ businesses. A part of that encouragement was the provision of security in favour of Tramroad by the registration of caveats over Guru Forests’ property. See for example Mr Singh’s comment in that exchange:

Happy to confirm on the below and principals (sic) of the deal.

You will have my full support & transparency all the way so we all get on the other side.

[69]              The same comment can be made in relation to Guru Forests’ interpretation of background recital C to the agreement. Guru Forests argues that background recital C simply records that Guru Forests’ director would permit security to be granted, and it interpolates that permission would be recorded in a further agreement, including Guru Forests. It argues that that was not an immediate grant of a caveatable interest, but rather just an expression between the parties that further documentation was required.

[70]              The standard approach to contract interpretation is to view the background recitals as simply providing background context. The operative clauses commence at cl 1. The key clause is cl 3.1 and I consider that there is a reasonably arguable case that an immediate right to register a caveat was made in favour of Tramroad by Guru Forests’ director on Guru Forests’ behalf. No further agreement was required.

Did Mr Singh sign the agreement in a dual capacity?

[71]              The agreement was signed by Mr Singh. He signed as director of Guru NZ. He is the sole director of Guru NZ, Guru Forests and Guru Holdings. He owns all three companies.

[72]              Tramroad says that he had full authority to bind Guru Forests. That is undoubtedly the case.

[73]              Tramroad says that the express terms of the agreement support its argument that Mr Singh bound Guru Forests to the agreement. I consider, given my finding as to the contextual interpretation of the agreement, that it is reasonably arguable that he did that on behalf of Guru Forests as well as Guru NZ. Rectification and/or common mistake will address that omission, or if the extrinsic evidence establishes that a party

has been misdescribed in the document the court may correct the error as a matter of construction.13

[74]              It is acknowledged that Mr Singh is expressly recorded as signing the agreement as “director” “For and on behalf of [Guru NZ]”. It is, however, not possible to read the agreement as a whole as not incorporating obligations on behalf of Guru Forests as well. To ignore Guru Forests’ involvement in the proposed arrangement is to deprive the agreement of any commercial meaning. Guru NZ could not grant security over Guru Forests’ land without it being a party.

[75]              The only source of funds to repay the debt were the proceeds of sale of Guru Forests’ property. For Mr Singh to agree to that, he must have agreed that Guru Forests would meet the obligations owed by Guru NZ to Tramroad. Otherwise, Tramroad had no entitlement to receive the proceeds of sale of Guru Forests’ properties, or to lodge a caveat as agreed.

[76]              Support for this proposition is to be found in Seaglass Holdings Ltd v Giacon.14 There, the Court confirmed that a company need not be specifically named in a document creating liability if there is evidence that the person signing the document intended to bind the company.

[77]              In the present case, there is a reasonably arguable case that Mr Singh intended to bind Guru Forests, as excluding it from the arrangement deprives the arrangement of meaning.

[78]              For present purposes, I do not need to go any further than to determine that in terms of the Seaglass authority, it is reasonably arguable that Mr Singh signed on behalf of both companies when the agreement was formed and/or that Tramroad could seek rectification of the agreement or relief as a result of a common mistake.

[79]              It follows that I consider it arguable, in accordance with the Seaglass approach, that Mr Singh signed the agreement on behalf of Guru Forests as well as Guru NZ.

13     Hamid t/a Hamid Properties v Francis Bradshaw Partnership [2013] EWCA Civ 470 at [57].

14     Seaglass Holdings Ltd v Giacon [2023] NZHC 3552 at [175].

Did Guru Forests ratify the agreement?

[80]              Tramroad also points to various steps which it says are acts under which Guru Forest ratified the agreement. Those acts include:

(a)attending several meetings with Tramroad to discuss and implement the agreement and finalise repayment;

(b)on 20 September 2024, after the caveat was registered, authorising Tramroad to lodge a caveat on Guru Forest’s land at 3716 Kaipara Coast Highway;

(c)liaising with Tramroad to  remove  a  caveat  on  another  property,  80 Cameron Town Road, to enable that property to be sold; and

(d)liaising with Tramroad to release the caveat over 157 Mercer Ferry Road to enable sale of that property, which did result in a partial payment to Tramroad on the settlement of sale of that property.

[81]              Tramroad says that this conduct is consistent with Guru Forests ratifying the agreement. It is arguable that that is the case, as there is no other explanation for that conduct other than that it was ratifying the agreement.

Result

[82]                For the reasons set out above, I consider that it is reasonably arguable that Tramroad has an equitable interest in Guru Forests’ properties.

[83]              There is an order sustaining Caveat 13110940.1, registered against Records of Title 526115, 878825, NA26B/798, NA69C/885, SA194/183 and SA54B/251 pending further order of this Court.

[84]              Tramroad is to file substantive proceedings within 20 working days of the date of this judgment.

[85]              Tramroad is to diligently progress those proceedings, leave being granted to Guru Forests to approach the Court should there be any need for case management to ensure the timely progression of the substantive proceedings to trial.

[86]              Tramroad has been successful in this application. It is entitled to scale costs on a 2B basis, plus disbursements. Those costs are to be fixed by the Registrar.

Associate Judge Cogswell