Todd Petroleum Mining Company Limited v Vector Gas Trading Limited

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ORDER PROHIBITING PUBLICATION OF REDACTED TEXT IN THIS JUDGMENT

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND WELLINGTON REGISTRY

CIV-2015-485-1016 [2017] NZHC 2734

BETWEEN

TODD PETROLEUM MINING

COMPANY LIMITED First Applicant

SHELL (PETROLEUM MINING) COMPANY LIMITED

Second Applicant

AND

VECTOR GAS TRADING LIMITED First Respondent

VECTOR GAS LIMITED Second Respondent

Hearing: 1 November 2017

Counsel:

M G Colson and D F McLachlan for Applicants
B A Scott and A Kraack for Respondents

Judgment:

8 November 2017

JUDGMENT OF WILLIAMS J

[1]      I issued a judgment on 31 May this year denying the applicants leave to appeal an adverse arbitral award.1

[2]      Todd now applies to recall that judgment to correct, Todd says, an aspect of it.  In the judgment, I addressed whether Todd and Shell had been accorded natural justice in relation to the way in which the question of the pricing of liquids was

addressed by the Arbitral Panel.  I found that while the natural justice argument did

1      Todd Petroleum Mining Company Limited v Vector Gas Trading Limited [2017] NZHC 1166.

raise a bona fide question of law, it was weak on the facts. At [100] of the judgment, I expressed my conclusion in these terms:

I do not think there is anything in the procedural unfairness question.  It is true that the [redacted] per GJ option was introduced in Vector’s closing, but in  fact Vector’s  stance  in  opening  submissions  was  consistent  with  that proposal.  Vector accepted that an overall net back approach might well be appropriate for raw gas pricing (if the opening gambit of no change in price did not succeed), but did not concede that this inexorably applied to the liquids component.

[3]      And at [105], I took the view that, even if the above conclusion was wrong, Todd and Shell had failed to take the point during the hearing.  I expressed my view in these terms:

In any event, if the KMCs were taken by surprise by the [redacted] option raised in closing, they did not say so.  They could have taken the point at the time, suggesting that this submission was new and demanding a right to call evidence on it.   The Tribunal would then have been required to rule on whether the new element was truly a departure from the way Vector’s case was structured or more in the nature of a refinement of an existing position. I  have  no  doubt  the  Tribunal  would  have  concluded  that  this  was  a refinement, but it is nonetheless significant that the matter does not appear to have been raised and the Tribunal does not appear to have been called upon to resolve the issue.

[4]      Todd argues that I was neither asked nor required to come to the conclusions I have set out.  Indeed, the question of procedural fairness rights was at the time, and remains, the subject of Todd’s separate application pursuant to art 34, sch 1 of the Arbitration Act 1996 to set aside the arbitral award.2   The application for leave, the subject…

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Details
Case
[2017] NZHC 2734
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the High Court of New Zealand, Todd Petroleum Mining Company Limited and Shell (Petroleum Mining) Company Limited sought to recall a previous judgment that had denied their leave to appeal an adverse arbitral award. Vector Gas Trading Limited and Vector Gas Limited opposed the recall. The applicants argued that the judgment should be recalled as it contained an adverse preliminary view on their collateral application for leave to appeal, which risked prejudicing their separate application for leave under the Arbitration Act 1996. The respondents maintained that the issues had been sufficiently canvassed and it was within the court's discretion to address the matter as it saw fit.

The court considered the general principles applicable to recall applications, which include instances where there has been a material intervening law change, counsel have omitted to refer to materially relevant statutory provisions or authorities, or where for some other very special reason, justice requires an aspect of the judgment to be further addressed. The court found that this case fell into the category of very special reasons. The applicants contended that as natural justice was never an issue for the court to resolve, counsel had been denied an opportunity to fully argue the point including by addressing in detail the evidence on it, because they were unaware of the risk of an adverse finding on it. As a result, there was real potential for prejudice. The court accepted that the applicants had made out a very special reason and recalled the judgment accordingly in the interests of justice.

The court now re-issued the judgment having deleted the adverse preliminary view on the applicants' collateral application and replacing it with a statement that it was inappropriate for the court to venture an answer to that question, even in a preliminary way. The court found that it was unnecessary to grant leave in that respect since the merits of that question would be addressed in this Court by another judge in due course. The court also ordered that Todd would be entitled to its costs.

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