Thompson v Police
[2023] NZHC 3229
•15 November 2023
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND CHRISTCHURCH REGISTRY
I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA ŌTAUTAHI ROHE
CRI-2023-409-123 CRI-2023-409-124 CRI-2023-409-125 CRI-2023-409-127
[2023] NZHC 3229
BETWEEN NIGEL TERRENCE WILLIAM THOMPSON
AppellantAND
NEW ZEALAND POLICE
Respondent
Hearing: 14 September 2023 Appearances:
T D A Harré for Appellant
G E Alloway for Respondent
Judgment:
15 November 2023
Reissued:
17 November 2023
JUDGMENT OF HINTON J
This judgment was delivered by me on 15 November 2023 at 4.45 pm, pursuant to Rule 11.5 of the High Court Rules.
Registrar/Deputy Registrar Date: ………………………….
Solicitors:
Crown Solicitor’s Office, Christchurch
THOMPSON v POLICE [2023] NZHC 3229 [15 November 2023]
Introduction
[1] On 6 July 2023 Mr Nigel Thompson was sentenced to three years seven months’ imprisonment by Judge M Callaghan in the District Court at Christchurch for 18 charges of dishonesty related offending:1
(a)theft by person in a special relationship (x 7);2
(b)obtaining by deception (representative);3
(c)obtaining a document;4
(d)using a document for pecuniary advantage (x 4);5
(e)aiding and abetting another person to knowingly apply for a deduction of tax for a purpose other than payment to the Commissioner of Inland Revenue (x 2, representative);6
(f)knowingly provide a false income tax return to obtain a tax refund;7 and
(g)making a false or misleading statement (x 2).8
[2] Mr Thompson appeals his sentence on the basis that it is manifestly excessive. He says that the Judge should not have imposed cumulative sentences or alternatively that there was an insufficient adjustment for totality resulting in too high a starting point. The starting point should have been four years. Mr Thompson also originally contended that the discount for reparation was unduly restrictive given that of the
1 R v Thompson [2023] NZDC 14091.
2 Crimes Act 1961, ss 220(1)(b) and 223(a); maximum penalty seven years’ imprisonment.
3 Sections 240(1)(a) and 241(a); maximum penalty seven years’ imprisonment.
4 Section 228(1)(a); maximum penalty seven years’ imprisonment.
5 Section 228(1)(b); maximum penalty seven years’ imprisonment. Three of these convictions are representative.
6 Tax Administration Act 1994, ss 143A(1)(d) and 148(1); maximum penalty five years’ imprisonment or a fine not exceeding $50,000 or both.
7 Sections 143B(1)(c) and (g); maximum penalty five years’ imprisonment or a fine not exceeding
$50,000 or both.
8 Companies Act 1993, ss 377(1)(a) and 373(4)(c); maximum penalty five years’ imprisonment or a fine not exceeding $200,000.
$427,000 total sum involved in the offending approximately $260,000 had been repaid. At the hearing however, counsel for Mr Thompson, Mr Harré, conceded that the discount afforded for reparation was within range. Such a concession was reasonable. I do not address this point further.
[3] The police oppose the appeal on the grounds that cumulative sentences were appropriate and in any event the starting point was not manifestly excessive.
Facts
[4] The offending relevant to this appeal is categorised by the sentencing Judge as Crown offending, Inland Revenue Department (IRD) offending and Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (MBIE) offending. For simplicity, I adopt the same categorisation.
Crown offending
Nigel Thompson Motor Company
[5] Mr Thompson was a director of Nigel Thompson Motor Co Ltd (NTMC), a business incorporated in 2010. In 2016, after interest from new investors, a new company was incorporated, Nigel Thompson Motor Co (2016) Ltd (NTMC 2016). NTMC 2016 had six shareholders: Mr Thompson, his wife and four new investors.
[6] On 23 March 2017, NTMC was placed into liquidation by the High Court on application of the Commissioner of Inland Revenue due to the company owing over
$400,000 in tax, penalties and interest.
[7] As had NTMC, NTMC 2016 bought and sold vehicles. If a customer required finance to purchase a vehicle, applications were submitted by NTMC 2016 to finance companies, including Dealer Finance Ltd (Dealer Finance). The finance proceeds were paid to NTMC 2016, with the customer responsible for meeting payment obligations.
[8] Between 16 January and 17 July 2017, Mr Thompson on three occasions submitted false applications for finance to Dealer Finance. The total value of the funds obtained was $62,864.
[9] On 4 May 2017, Mr Thompson paid $6,322 from NTMC 2016’s bank account to Gold Band Finance to meet a personal expense, without shareholder or director approval.
[10] Between 27 April and 14 August 2017, Mr Thompson diverted $27,950.25 in payments from Dealer Finance that were to be paid to NTMC 2016 to pay for his personal expenses, without director or shareholder approval.
Gateway Motors
[11] Around September 2017, Mr Thompson assisted Celebration Church in starting a motor trade business, Gateway Motors. He was a volunteer responsible for purchasing, repairing and selling vehicles.
[12] On about 20 November 2017, while working at Gateway Motors, Mr Thompson sold a vehicle worth $8,100. He provided his personal bank account to the client for the purchase price to be paid into, depriving Gateway Motors of these funds.
[13] On 23 April 2018, Mr Thompson requested a cheque from Celebration Church, claiming it was needed to pay for registrations of motor vehicles bought by Gateway Motors. He was provided with a signed cheque, but the value was left blank. Mr Thompson used the cheque to pay an invoice for services not related to Gateway Motors or Celebration Church. When Celebration Church enquired about the cheque, Mr Thompson presented a forged invoice purporting to be from AA to the Gateway Trust for the value of $1,150.01.
Other
[14] On 3 September 2018, a person unknown to Mr Thompson listed their vehicle for sale on Trade Me. Mr Thompson messaged that person and asked whether he could
sell the vehicle for them as a registered vehicle dealer. They agreed. Mr Thompson sold the vehicle for $3,300 and retained the proceeds for himself. The victim contacted the police.
[15] Also in September 2018, Mr Thompson obtained his landlord’s credit card numbers after his landlord mistakenly left his wallet at a property which Mr Thompson rented from him. Mr Thompson used these credit card details on 12 separate occasions to top up his TAB account. He took a total of $6,000.
[16] Mr Thompson volunteered at the Celebration Centre Trust. Between December 2018 and February 2019 Mr Thompson charged $677.42 worth of items from Warehouse Stationery to the Celebration Centre Trust’s business account without authority, using one of the names of their employees as the reference.
[17] In March 2019, Mr Thompson met an elderly resident of a retirement home who had responded to an advertisement placed at her retirement home for a car groomer. She and Mr Thompson developed a friendship. In April 2019, Mr Thompson came into possession of her bank card. He withdrew a total of $20,002.00. Mr Thompson later returned the bank card to the elderly resident.
[18] Throughout April and May 2019, Mr Thompson used the credit card of Mr Edward Bentley 27 times to obtain $1,959.21. Mr Thompson admitted to Mr Bentley that he used his card and agreed to repay him.
IRD offending
PAYE
[19] NTMC and NTMC 2016 (the Companies) were both at the relevant times registered with the Commissioner of Inland Revenue as employers. The Companies were required to account to the Commissioner for deductions made from employees’ wages and for deemed deductions.
[20] The Companies failed to account for a total of $287,908.96 in PAYE and associated deductions by the due dates for 16 non-consecutive tax periods between the
periods ending 31 December 2015 and 31 July 2017. After late payments and late credit transfers, the total amount outstanding across the Companies is $138,905.46.
[21] Mr Thompson was at all relevant times responsible for meeting the Companies' PAYE obligations.
Income tax
[22] In May 2019, Mr Thompson attempted multiple times to claim fraudulent refunds in relation to his 2016 IR3 return, ranging from $232.21 to $35,682.50. Mr Thompson also presented at an IRD office, contacted the contact centre and sent a secure email seeking a fraudulent refund of $10,931.21.
MBIE offending
[23] In 2018 Mr Thompson sought to establish a new company Crusader Motor Co Ltd (Crusader Motors). He completed a consent and certificate of director form and a consent and certificate of shareholder form stating that his legal name was “John William Thompson”. On 22 August 2018, Mr Thompson sent the documents to the Companies Office as part of the registration process. Crusader Motors was incorporated and added to the Companies Register.
[24] On 14 September 2018, the Registrar of Companies made a formal request to Mr Thompson for verification of the information provided on the consent forms. Mr Thompson failed to provide verification and the company was removed from the Companies Register.
[25] When interviewed by an MBIE investigator, Mr Thompson claimed that he was in the process of legally changing his name to that which he provided on the form. The investigator however found no application by Mr Thompson to the Department of Internal Affairs for a change of name.
[26] Prior to the company being removed, in July 2018, using the name John Thompson, Mr Thompson arranged for Crusader Motors to enter into a lease of commercial premises with Mr Craig Haymes. When Mr Haymes learned of
Mr Thompson’s identity, he cancelled the lease. Mr Thompson owes Mr Haymes
$2,300 in outstanding rent.
[27] Also in September 2018, Mr Stephen Watson listed his vehicle for sale on Trade Me. Using the name John Thompson, Mr Thompson offered to sell the vehicle through Crusader Motors. Mr Watson agreed but upon learning of Mr Thompson’s identity, he cancelled the sale agreement and arranged to collect the vehicle. While in Mr Thompson’s possession the vehicle had suffered considerable damage, travelled 700 kilometres, and most of the petrol was used. This cost Mr Watson $525.00.
District Court decision
[28] The Judge determined the relevant sentencing principles to be “deterrence, denunciation and accountability”. The Judge recognised that these objectives must also be balanced against the need for the Court to impose the least restrictive outcome possible in the circumstances of the case.9
[29] In setting the overall starting point, the Judge set out the starting points for the Crown, IRD and MBIE offending separately before considering totality.10
Crown offending
[30] The Judge considered that the aggravating factors of the NTMC and Gateway Motors offending were the magnitude and sophistication of the offending, that the offending was repetitive and that it involved a “significant breach of trust” given Mr Thompson’s positions as employee (of NTMC) and volunteer (of Celebration Church).11 The losses to the victims were also significant, amounting to $106,386.25.
[31] In setting the starting point for that offending, the Judge considered Hicks v Police,12 McHugh v R13 and Price v Police.14 He considered Mr Thompson’s offending to be worse than that in Hicks and McHugh (where starting points of three
9 R v Thompson, above n 1, at [44].
10 At [45].
11 At [48].
12 Hicks v Police [2022] NZHC 312.
13 McHugh v R [2020] NZCA 456.
14 Price v Police [2017] NZHC 2523.
years were adopted) both in terms of quantum stolen and because Mr Thompson was in a greater position of trust, but less serious than that in Price (where a starting point of three years and six months was adopted).15
[32] The Judge therefore adopted the starting point for the above charges at three years three months’ imprisonment.16 For the other charges the Judge applied an uplift of nine months resulting in a total starting point of four years’ imprisonment for the Crown offending.17
IRD offending
[33] In respect of the IRD offending, the Judge again considered that, as stated by the Court of Appeal in Zaheed v R, primary weight must be given to the principles of deterrence, denunciation and accountability.18
[34] The Judge considered that the IRD offending involved a significant breach of trust, both of the trust placed in Mr Thompson by his employees to account for their PAYE deductions on their behalf, but also by the IRD which relies on individuals to provide it with accurate information.19 Mr Thompson took the money for his own financial benefit when he was in full financial control of the company. The Judge was also of the view that the offending was premeditated and persistent and that there were no mitigating factors.20
[35] The Judge determined that Mr Thompson’s PAYE offending fell somewhat in the middle of that in Inland Revenue Department v Johnstone21 and Inland Revenue Department v Baker.22 In Johnstone, the sentencing Judge adopted a starting point of 30 months’ imprisonment for 33 charges involving $750,000 of unlawfully obtained benefits. In Baker a starting point of two years was adopted for offending that occurred over 28 months resulting in $307,000 of unlawfully obtained benefits. Accordingly,
15 R v Thompson, above n 1, at [51].
16 At [51].
17 At [52]–[53].
18 At [54] citing Zaheed v R [2010] NZCA 573.
19 At [55].
20 At [57].
21 Inland Revenue Department v Johnstone [2017] NZDC 16853.
22 Inland Revenue Department v Baker [2019] NZDC 9739.
the Judge adopted a starting point of 25 months’ imprisonment for the PAYE charges.23 For the income tax charges, he applied an uplift of 11 months to make the starting point on all IRD charges one of three years’ imprisonment.24
MBIE offending
[36] In respect of the MBIE offending, the Judge considered a starting point of 12 months would be justified, but to reflect totality, applied an uplift of five months for these charges.25
Overall starting point
[37] Overall, the Judge adopted starting points of four years’ imprisonment for the Crown offending and three years’ imprisonment for the IRD offending. He applied an uplift of five months’ for the MBIE offending. The Judge considered that cumulative sentencing was appropriate which would lead to a total starting point of seven years five months’ imprisonment.26 However, to reflect totality, the Judge reduced the starting point to six years’ imprisonment.27
[38] As to mitigating factors, the Judge allowed a discount of 10 per cent for Mr Thompson’s gambling addiction,28 15 per cent to reflect Mr Thompson’s guilty plea and a further 15 per cent for reparation made (approximately $260,000 from a total gain of $427,000).29 The Judge noted that Mr Thompson continued to deny that some of the reparation was due.30
[39] With discounts totalling 40 per cent and a starting point of six years’ imprisonment, the Judge imposed an end sentence of three years seven months’ imprisonment.31
23 R v Thompson, above n 1, at [60].
24 R v Thompson, above n 1, at [60].
25 At [62].
26 At [63].
27 At [64].
28 At [67].
29 At [68].
30 At [68].
31 At [69].
Approach on appeal
[40] Under the Criminal Procedure Act 2011, the Court must allow the appeal if satisfied that, for any reason, there is an error in the sentence imposed on conviction and that a different sentence should be imposed.32 For the Court to intervene in a sentence imposed, the sentence must be shown to be wrong in principle or manifestly excessive.33 The focus is on the end result, rather than the process by which the sentence is reached.34
[41] Ordinarily, the Court will not intervene where an end sentence is within a range that can be properly justified by accepted sentencing principles.35
Analysis
[42] As there is only one ground of appeal, namely the starting point, I consider counsels’ submissions in the course of my analysis.
Starting point
[43] Section 84 of the Sentencing Act 2002 provides that cumulative sentences are generally appropriate if the offences for which an offender is being sentenced are different in kind, whether or not they are a connected series of offences. If however offences are similar in kind and are a connected series of offences, concurrent sentences are appropriate.36 In determining whether offences are part of a connected series, the court may consider the time and nature of the offending as well as any other relationship between the offences that the court considers relevant.37
[44] Mr Harré submits that the IRD charges ought to have been concurrent, not cumulative upon the Crown charges. He submits that notwithstanding the fact that there were three discrete prosecuting agencies, the underlying offending was broadly
32 Criminal Procedure Act 2011, s 250(2).
33 Te Aho v R [2013] NZCA 47 at [30]; Tutakangahau v R [2014] NZCA 279, [2014] 3 NZLR 482 at [30]–[35].
34 Tutakangahau v R, above n 33, at [36].
35 At [36].
36 Sentencing Act 2002, s 84(2).
37 Section 84(3).
similar in nature and that it is “artificial” to draw “too fine a distinction” between the sets of offending.
[45] Mr Alloway for the police submits that cumulative sentences were appropriate for the Crown and IRD offending. He relies on Eade v Police where the District Court Judge imposed cumulative sentences for fraud and IRD offending. On appeal, Venning J held that cumulative sentences were appropriate as the frauds arising from a breach of Mr Eade’s position of trust as a property manager between 2007 and 2008 were “quite separate” to IRD offending which occurred primarily between 2004 and 2006 as a consequence of Mr Eade’s trading through companies.38
[46] This case however is materially different to Eade. In Eade Venning J noted that given the different contexts in which the offending occurred, the “only real similarity between the offending is that it was all to the same end”.39 The same is not true here. I note also that Venning J’s decision was on appeal where the primary focus is on the end result. The case is not one where cumulative sentences were first imposed in this Court.
[47] In this case, both the NTMC and IRD offending arose in the context of Mr Thompson abusing his position of trust at the Companies. Both involved Mr Thompson diverting funds derived through or connected to the companies, into his personal accounts. They were also committed at a similar time — the IRD offending between 2015 and 2017 and the NTMC offending also occurring in 2017. It was only because of Mr Thompson’s senior position in the company that he was able to commit both sets of offending. In my view the NTMC and IRD offending is of a similar kind and forms part of a connected series, notwithstanding the fact that they were prosecuted by different prosecutorial agencies. The offending, while different, is connected. Approaching the matter by first setting cumulative sentences was therefore inappropriate.
[48] Section 85 of the Sentencing Act requires that if cumulative sentences are imposed, the end sentence imposed must not be “wholly out of proportion to the
38 Eade v Police (2009) 24 NZTC 23,789 at [15].
39 At [16].
gravity of the overall offending”. The Supreme Court has stated that the effect of s 85 is that “the effective sentence of imprisonment will be the same irrespective of whether the sentences are structured cumulatively or concurrently”.40 Such was also observed by Venning J in Eade.41 While in theory the totality principle means that an end sentence should be the same regardless of whether it is determined on a cumulative or concurrent basis, I suspect the practical reality is more nuanced. When sentencing on a concurrent basis, a sentencing Judge is conscious of the total sentence at all stages of the sentencing process. In cumulative sentencing however, totality is primarily considered at the final stage. Cumulative sentencing therefore carries a greater risk that the starting point adopted will be unduly high — as was the case here. For that reason, I consider it important to adopt the correct approach.
[49] For the purposes of Mr Thompson’s appeal, the focus is on the end sentence rather than the process by which the sentence was reached.42 I therefore do not further address the issue of cumulative or concurrent sentencing. Rather I assess the starting point adopted with reference to the totality of Mr Thompson’s offending and analogous case law.
[50] There is no guideline judgment for sentencing of dishonesty related offending. Rather, in R v Varjan the Court of Appeal set out the principles for assessing culpability in these kinds of cases as:43
[22] Culpability is to be assessed by reference to the circumstances and such factors as the nature of the offending, its magnitude and sophistication; the type, circumstances and number of the victims; the motivation for the offending; the amounts involved; the losses; the period over which the offending occurred; the seriousness of breaches of trust involved; and the impact on victims.
[23] It is in the assessment of culpability that comparison with other cases is to be undertaken. …
40 Booth v R [2016] NZSC 127, [2017] 1 NZLR 223 at footnote 17 and [46].
41 Eade v Police, above n 38, at [16].
42 Tutakangahau v R, above n 33, at [36].
43 R v Varjan CA 97/03, 26 June 2003 at [22]–[23].
[51] In my view the comparable cases illustrate that Mr Thompson’s culpability, in its totality and with reference to the factors identified in Varjan, justified a global starting point of five years’ imprisonment.44 For example:
(a)Mears v R:45 the Court of Appeal held that a starting point of four years six months’ imprisonment was within range for one charge of dishonestly using a document with an intent to obtain a pecuniary advantage. Mrs Mears was also sentenced to concurrent sentences of nine months, six months and two years for three charges of theft by a person in a special relationship. Over a period of six years Mrs Mears stole $380,000 from a small business where she worked as a credit controller. On 490 occasions she changed the payee on cheques payable to her employer to her own name and on 41 occasions she arranged for customers to pay into her bank account rather than her employer’s. As a result of her fraud, Mrs Mears’ employers lost their business and others lost their jobs.
In setting the starting point of four years six months, the sentencing Judge took into account the duration of the offending (six years), the number of transactions, premeditation, extent of loss, abuse of trust and authority, the absence of any explanation by Mrs Mears and the impact of the offending on the victims.46
(b)McGregor v R:47 the Court of Appeal held that a starting point of five years’ imprisonment was appropriate for 10 charges of theft by a person in a special relationship. Ms McGregor was responsible for managing estates, trusts and personal affairs of her clients, the majority of whom were either elderly or mentally incapable of managing their own affairs. Over approximately a four-and-a-half-year period Ms McGregor took
44 The cases highlighted by both counsel involved much lower starting points than in this case and I therefore did not consider them of particular assistance.
45 Mears v R [2014] NZCA 30. Mrs Mears was also convicted for one charge of forgery quite separate to the theft offending for which she received a cumulative sentence of three months’ imprisonment.
46 At [8].
47 McGregor v R [2015] NZCA 565.
without authority approximately $470,000 from a total of 12 different victims through 150 transactions.48 Similarly to Mr Thompson, Ms McGregor used a variety of methods to take the money. On one occasion she purported to buy a car for a client but registered it in her own name.
In setting the starting point the Judge described Ms McGregor’s offending as a “calculated and deliberate series of thefts” and an abuse of trust and responsibility.49 The Court of Appeal agreed, noting that Ms McGregor’s offending involved a serious breach of trust as she was trusted to look after “the financial affairs of vulnerable people, but instead she used their vulnerability for her own advantage”.50 The Court was of the view that while the persistence and scale of Ms McGregor’s offending was similar to that of Mrs Mears, Ms McGregor’s serious breach of trust and targeting of vulnerable victims placed Ms McGregor’s offending in the more serious category thereby justifying a higher starting point.51
(c)Mount v R:52 the Court of Appeal upheld a starting point of six years’ imprisonment for 76 charges of fraud.53 Mr Mount was a financial consultant and investment advisor. Over a period of ten years he stole approximately $510,000 from his clients by inflating the reported purchase price of investments he purchased and deflating the price of investments he sold on their behalf.54
[52] These cases support a starting point of five years’ imprisonment in this case. Looking at the Varjan factors, particularly the duration of the offending and amount
48 McGregor v R, above n 47, at [4].
49 R v McGregor DC Christchurch CRI 2013-009-1510, 22 October 2014 at [35].
50 McGregor v R, above n 47, at [15].
51 At [19].
52 Mount v R [2015] NZCA 489.
53 At [97]–[98]. The sentencing Judge had uplifted the starting point of six years’ imprisonment by six months to account for Mr Mount’s actions during his trial. That uplift was quashed by the Court of Appeal who held that absent any charge or conviction for that conduct there was no basis for the uplift.
54 At [7].
of loss, Mr Thompson’s offending is more severe than Ms Mears but less so than Mr Mount’s.
[53] I consider that Mr Thompson’s offending is most similar to that of Ms McGregor’s. The quantum, number of victims and period of offending are similar. So too is the relatively simple nature of the offending with both Ms McGregor and Mr Thompson, among other things, directing client funds to themselves and obtaining money from bank cards. While Mr Thompson’s offending was more severe than Ms McGregor’s in that he engaged in a broader range of offending encompassing tax and fraud offending, I consider that in terms of starting point this is balanced by the fact that Ms McGregor’s offending was a more egregious breach of trust. Looking at his offending in its totality, I consider Mr Thompson is similarly culpable to Ms McGregor and that a starting point of five years is justified. This is supported by the fact that in Mount, offending involving a larger quantum over a significantly longer period of time justified a starting point of six years. Mr Thompson is less culpable than Mr Mount and a starting point of five years reflects this.
[54] My conclusion on starting point is consistent with the observation made by Fitzgerald J in R v Borlase that “[w]here the benefits obtained were around $500,000 to $750,000, starting points of around five to seven years’ imprisonment have been adopted”.55 Here, the total benefits obtained by Mr Thompson were approximately
$140,500 from the Crown offending and $287,000 from the IRD offending.56 This amounts to a total benefit of $427,500. While I accept Mr Alloway’s submission that Fitzgerald J’s comments are neither a tariff nor a strict range, I consider the Judge’s comments to be illustrative of the length of sentences that the courts have held are justified for offending of a similar severity to Mr Thompson’s.
[55] That Mr Thompson’s offending encompassed both tax and dishonesty offending and involved significant breaches of trust over a prolonged period of time justifies a starting point of five years’ imprisonment, notwithstanding the fact that the
55 R v Borlase [2017] NZHC 236 at [73].
56 $114,000 of the money derived from the Crown offending and approximately $150,000 of the money derived from the IRD offending was repaid prior to sentencing. Approximately $163,000 remains outstanding.
monetary value of his offending falls below the value Fitzgerald J identified as commonly justifying that starting point.
Manifestly excessive?
[56] I am satisfied that the sentence imposed by the Judge was manifestly excessive. The sentence of three years seven months’ imprisonment is quashed and replaced with a sentence of three years’ imprisonment. That is a starting point of five years’ imprisonment less total discounts of 40 per cent.
Conclusion
[57]The appeal against sentence is allowed.
[58] The sentence imposed in the District Court of three years seven months’ imprisonment is set aside. A sentence of three years’ imprisonment is substituted.
Hinton J
Addendum
[59] For clarification the sentence imposed in the District Court will consequently be amended as follows:
(a)In respect of [70](a) of Judge Callaghan’s sentencing notes Mr Thompson is sentenced to three years’ imprisonment on these charges.
(b)In respect of [70](b) – (e) the sentence remains the same but is concurrent in each instance.
Hinton J
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