THE SOLICITOR-GENERAL FOR NEW ZEALAND Applicant AND NICHOLAS REX SMITH

[2004] NZHC 1223

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND

WELLINGTON REGISTRY  CIV 2003 485 1811

BETWEEN  THE SOLICITOR-GENERAL FOR NEW

ZEALAND

Applicant

AND  NICHOLAS REX SMITH

First Respondent

AND  TV3 NETWORK SERVICES LIMITED

Second Respondent

AND  RADIO NEW ZEALAND LIMITED

Third Respondent

Hearing:        23-27 February 2004 Coram:   Wild J

MacKenzie J

Counsel:T Arnold, M Laracy and R M Lithgow for the Applicant J O Upton QC and P T Kiely for the First Respondent

J W Tizard and S M Moran for the Second Respondent C Bradley for the Third Respondent

Judgment:     24 March 2004

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

Introduction

[1]    The  Solicitor-General  applies for  orders that  all  three  respondents  be  fined for contempt of Court. The first respondent  is  a  Member  of  Parliament,  Dr  N  R Smith (“Dr  Smith”). The  second respondent  is  a  television  broadcaster,  TV3  Network Services Limited (“TV3”). The third respondent is a radio broadcaster,  Radio New Zealand Limited (“RNZ”).

[2]    The Solicitor’s application of 21 August 2003 sets out a series of events involving   actions   by  each  respondent   relating   to  a  case  in  the Family  Court.  That case involved a dispute over  the  custody  of  a  child  between  the child’s birth parents and  another  family  member  into  whose  care  the  parents  had  put the child.  Although we will need to give  some  detail  about  this  dispute,  we  will  keep  it  to  a  minimum. We will refer to “the case” and to the parties, respectively, as “the  mother”  and “the father” (or, together, as “the parents”) and “the caregiver”. The child we will refer to  simply as “the child”.

[3]    The Solicitor’s allegation against each of the three respondents  is  that  his/its actions constituted a serious contempt of court in that they undermined the proper administration of justice by:

[a]Improperly pressuring a litigant  to  a  proceeding  to  forgo  her  legal rights, or to alter her approach to the proceeding.

[b]Attempting, or  having the appearance of  attempting, improperly to influence the decision of the Family Court, and having the effect of diminishing the validity of the  Court’s  ultimate  decision  in  the  eyes  of  the public.

[c]Prejudicing the ability of the Family Court to perform its function by  tending to dissuade litigants generally from using the Court and by improperly diminishing the standing of the Court  in  the  eyes  of  the public.

[4]These allegations divide into two distinct aspects:

[a]Litigants: Improper pressure on a litigant in  the  case  (the  caregiver), and the potential prejudicial effect of that on prospective litigants in the Family Court.

[b]Court:

[i]Improperly influencing the Family Court and  diminishing  the validity of its decision.

[ii]Undermining  the  authority  and  integrity  of  the  Court.    If  now  a  little  quaint,  this  is  the offence  commonly  called “scandalising the Court”.

[5]    Broadly, the allegations against Dr Smith involve what he allegedly said in  telephone calls he made to the caregiver, comments he  made  in  two  media  releases about the case, and his contributions when interviewed by  RNZ  and  TV3  for programmes about the case.

[6]    The Solicitor’s complaint against TV3 is based on the content of the “20/20” documentary called “Tug of Law” about the case.

[7]    RNZ is charged in relation to the content of three interviews about the case it broadcast on its “Nine to Noon” programme on the National Radio Programme.

[8]    A schedule to the Solicitor’s application provided further particulars of his allegations, as did a subsequent letter dated 2 February 2004.

[9]Section 27A of the Guardianship Act 1968 (“s 27A”) provides, relevantly: “27A            Restriction of publication of reports of proceedings

(1)     No  person  shall  publish  any  report  of  proceedings  under  this Act (other than criminal  proceedings)  except  with  the  leave  of  the  Court which heard the proceedings.

…

(3) Nothing in this section shall limit—

…

(b)         The power of any Court to punish any contempt of Court.”

[10]   Breach of s 27A is relied upon  by the  Solicitor  as a relevant factor in relation to all three respondents, but forms a separate charge against TV3.

[11]   After stating the uncontested facts, and the law, we will determine in turn the charges against each respondent: Dr Smith; TV3 and RNZ.

Uncontested facts

The custody case

[12]   In May 1998 the  parents,  who  were  undergoing  difficulties,  entrusted custody of the child  to  the  caregiver.  The  caregiver  is  the  mother’s  cousin.  The  child  was then 15 months old.

[13]   Six months later, in October  1998,  the  caregiver  refused  the  parents’  request to return the child. The parents made further requests.

[14]   In October 1999, apprehensive that the  parents  might  attempt  physically to take the child, the caregiver applied  to  the  Family  Court  for  interim  custody.  She  made that application ex parte i.e. without giving the parents notice of it.

[15]   That application was granted by  the  Family  Court  on  24  November  1999.  The parents deposed that they were unaware of that  interim  custody  order  until  a  relative mentioned it to them in late 1999 or early 2000.

[16]   In February 2000 the parents made  a  cross-application  for  custody  of  the  child.

[17]   On 10 July 2002, with the parents’ consent, the Family Court discharged the November 1999 interim custody order and made a fresh order, again giving the caregiver interim  custody. At the same  time  the  Court  made  an interim  access  order in the parents’ favour, and directed that a whanau hui was to be arranged to enable discussion to take place regarding  the  child’s  ongoing  and  future  care  and  custody.  The Court adjourned the proceeding for review on 20 January 2003.

[18]   The parents were constituents of Dr Smith in his Nelson  electorate.  On  31 March 2003 the mother saw Dr Smith at his electorate office in Nelson. She was

accompanied by a senior Nelson kaumatua, who is also the Mäori coordinator of Mental Health Services for the  District  Health  Board.  This  kaumatua  and  his  wife,  who also accompanied  the mother, were well known to Dr Smith and had his respect.     In the course of a sometimes tearful interview, the mother outlined to Dr Smith  the  family’s predicament. She  expressed  frustration  with  the  Family  Court  over  the parents’ efforts to obtain  access to the child, and over the delays  in the Court  dealing  with custody. She expressed to Dr Smith particular anger over the family’s non- cooperation  with her  efforts  to  organise  the  whanau  hui  directed  by  the  Family Court, and at what she considered was the ineffectiveness of counsel for the child.

[19]   The mother  recounted to  Dr  Smith  the  parents’ unsuccessful approaches to the Mäori member of Parliament for  Te  Tai  Tonga,  Mahara  Okeroa, the  Prime Minister, the Minister of Mäori affairs, the Minister of  Courts  and  the  Minister  of  Justice,  and provided  Dr Smith  with copies  of their  responses.  She told Dr Smith  of  the substantial  financial  burden the case had imposed on the family, and expressed  to   him strong concerns about the way the child was being cared for, and about the caregiver’s partner.

[20]   The kaumatua and his wife outlined to Dr Smith  their  work over the past few years with the parents and the family. Both  were  complimentary  about  the  parenting skills of both mother and father.

[21]   Dr Smith obtained the mother’s written  consent  to talk  to the  school  attended by the parents’ other  children, to  the  parents’ employers, their  doctor  and  their lawyer. At Dr Smith’s request, later that week the  mother  delivered  to  Dr  Smith’s office the parents’ papers on the case.

[22]   During the following Saturday afternoon, 5 April, Dr Smith  read  those  papers and then called unannounced on the family, and met and talked to the father.

[23]   Over the following  two  weeks,  Dr  Smith  spoke to the other children’s school,  to the parents’ employers and to their lawyer. He said in evidence:

“… I was unsure at that stage what I could do, but had formed a preliminary view that (the parents) had been treated less than fairly by

the State and that there were no  immediate  prospects  of  the  matter being resolved.”

[24]   Dr Smith met the family again on 22  April.  The  child  was  staying  with  the family in Nelson for a 22-27 April period of access. Dr  Smith  thought  the  parents looked extremely distressed, and they told  him  that  they  were  at  the  end  of  their  tether at the prospect of having to return the child at week’s end.   The father also told     Dr Smith that he was considering going “bush”  with  the  child,  and  both  parents  said they were considering keeping  the  child  and  enrolling  him  at  the  local  school.  Dr Smith counselled the father against going “bush”, and  the  parents  agreed  to  tell  Dr  Smith by the end of the week whether they intended keeping the child.

[25]   On Thursday 24 April a message was relayed  to  Dr  Smith  in  Auckland  advising him that the parents did not  intend  returning  the  child  to the  caregiver  at the end of the access period.

[26]   Dr Smith responded  by alerting  RNZ that  same  day to a possible  news  story on the following Monday, 28 April, and was given a contact number  for  Ms  Linda Clarke, the presenter of RNZ’s “Nine to Noon” programme.

[27]   The  following  day  was  Anzac  Day,  Friday  25  April.  Following  Anzac services in the morning, Dr Smith re-read the papers the mother had delivered to him. He decided he needed to telephone  the  caregiver  to  check  the  key  facts  on which the parents’ complaints rested, and he did so.  Because  what  was said  in the course of this telephone call is both important and in dispute, we will need  to  make findings about it. We will do so in paragraphs [49] to [51] below.

[28]   On Saturday 26 April Dr Smith prepared a media release accompanied by a Summary  of Facts  which  he assembled  from  the parents’  papers  on the case.  After   he had got the parents  to check  that  summary  for  accuracy,  he telephoned  Ms Clarke at RNZ and then faxed  her a copy  of his media  release. Ms Clarke expressed interest in interviewing the  mother  and  Dr  Smith  said  he  would  raise  that  with  the  mother  and revert to Ms Clarke. We infer from the fact that Ms Clarke subsequently interviewed the mother on “Nine to Noon” that  Dr Smith  did  revert  to her,  but  there was no evidence about that.

[29]   On Sunday 27 April the mother rang Dr Smith. She said the caregiver had telephoned her, angry  that  Dr Smith  had become  involved  in the case.  Dr Smith  told  the mother he would telephone the caregiver again and he did.  Although  to a lesser  extent, there is again dispute about what was said in  this second telephone  conversation and we will again make findings about it when dealing with  the  charges against Dr Smith.

[30]   On Monday 28 April RNZ’s “Nine to Noon” programme began with Ms Clarke  interviewing  the  mother.   She  then  interviewed  Dr  Smith.   Tapes  and transcripts of this and the  other  RNZ and TV3 programmes are available, and there is  thus no dispute as to their content.

[31]   That same afternoon, Dr Smith’s office was telephoned by the office of  the Principal Family Court Judge, Judge Mahony,  seeking  the  names  and  file  number  of  the case Dr Smith had  spoken  about  on  RNZ  that  morning.  Dr  Smith’s  office provided that information.

[32]   On Tuesday 29 April Ms Clarke interviewed Judge Mahony on its “Nine to Noon” programme.

[33]   Later in that week Dr Smith, having first obtained the parents’ consent, was interviewed by Ms Amanda Miller for a proposed TV3 “20/20” documentary programme. The parents were also  interviewed, as  was  their  older  son,  and  the family and their home were filmed.

[34]   In the meantime the child, due to have been  returned  to  the  caregiver  on  Sunday  27  April,  was  still  with  the  parents in Nelson.  That led to the caregiver, on 30 April, applying ex parte to the Family Court for a warrant to uplift the child.  The  parents were advised that that application  would  be  heard  in  Wellington  on  8  May. The parents conveyed that to Dr Smith who advised  them  that,  despite  the  expense, they should attend the hearing and take the opportunity  to  outline  their  position,  and press for a firm hearing date for  their  custody  application,  and  for  access  in  the   interim.

[35]   The mother  did  attend  the  Family  Court  hearing  in  Wellington  on  8  May.  She subsequently advised Dr Smith  that  the  Judge  had  ordered  that  the  child  was  to be returned to the caregiver on Sunday 11 May.  The  mother  reported  that  to  Dr  Smith, who subsequently met with both parents. They told him that the Court had confirmed  a  hearing  date  in  July  for  their  custody  application.  He  counselled   them  to comply with the  Family  Court order and  return the  child on  11  May.  He suggested that they focus on putting forward the best case they could in July,  and suggested that non-compliance  with  the  Court’s  order  would  not  assist  to  that  end. Dr Smith deposes that the parents  expressed  to  him  concern  that  they  did  not  have the money to pay for proper representation at the custody hearing. He agreed personally to pay for their legal representation at the custody hearing, provided they returned the boy to the caregiver the following Sunday, 11 May.

[36]   The parents accepted Dr Smith’s counsel, handing the child over at Nelson Airport to counsel for the child, who escorted the child back to Wellington.

[37]   The following day, Monday 12 May, Dr Smith made a second media release, decrying  the  Family  Court  ordering  forcible  removal  of  the  child  from  the  child’s  own family on Mother’s Day, a day which also happened to be the father’s birthday.

[38]   A week later, on Sunday  18  May,  TV3  screened  a documentary  called  “Tug of Law”  on its  20/20  programme.  That  documentary  was  screened  again  on Sunday 25 May.

[39]   The custody hearing took place in the Family Court  at Porirua  on 29-30 July.  The Judge, Judge Mill,  delivered  his  decision  on  19  August.  In  his  decision,  the  Judge made  a  custody order, together with  an  additional  guardianship  order,  in favour of the caregiver. He made access orders in favour of the parents.

[40]   Having ascertained that the parents were not eligible for legal aid, Dr Smith subsequently paid the $5,900  cost  of  legal  representation  for  the  parents  at  the custody hearing.

The law of contempt: general principles

[41]   In Attorney-General v Times Newspapers Limited [1974] AC 273 at 307 Lord Diplock observed:

“ “Contempt of court” is a generic  term  descriptive  of  conduct  in  relation to particular proceedings in a court of law which tends to undermine  that  system  or  to  inhibit   citizens   from  availing  themselves of it for the settlement of their  disputes.  Contempt  of court  may  thus  take many forms.”

[42]   Lord Diplock then (at p 309) identified, as the three requirements of the due administration of justice, that all citizens should:

[a]Have unhindered access  to Courts  for the determination  of disputes  as to their legal rights and liabilities.

[b]Be able to rely on the Courts  as free  from  bias  against  any  party  and for decisions based only on  facts  proved  in   evidence  properly  adduced.

[c]Once the dispute has been submitted to a Court, be able  to rely  upon there being no usurpation by any other person of  the  function  of  the  Court to decide it according to law.

He added:

“Conduct which is calculated to prejudice any of these three requirements or to undermine the public confidence that they will be observed is contempt of court.”

Dr Smith MP

Improper pressure on litigants

The allegations

[43]The Solicitor alleges that Dr Smith’s public campaign:

[a]Created a real risk of improper pressure on the caregiver to alter her position in the case.

[b]Was likely to dissuade other litigants in the  position  of  the  caregiver  from exercising their legal rights.

[44] This part of the case against Dr Smith concerns the first and third of the requirements identified by Lord Diplock which we have set out in paragraph [42] above.

[45]   There are two aspects to improper pressure on litigants. The first concerns litigants  in  the  particular  case.  Here  the  concern  is  with  the  caregiver.  On  this  aspect, two elements of Dr Smith’s conduct need to be considered:

[a]His direct  contact  with  the  caregiver  through  his  two  telephone  calls  to her, and

[b]His public statements in his media releases, and on RNZ and TV3.

On the second element, the public statements, we adopt the test  formulated  by  this  Court in Duff v Communicado Limited [1996] 2 NZLR 89 at 98:

“A public statement about  civil  litigation  currently  before  a  Court  will  be in contempt of Court if:

(a)it goes beyond fair and temperate comment; and

(b)either,

(i)when viewed  objectively,  it can be seen to have  a  real  likelihood  of  inhibiting  a  litigant  of average robustness from availing itself of its constitutional right to have  the  case  determined by the Court; or

(ii)it is actually intended by the maker of the  statement to  have that inhibiting effect  on  a  litigant.

This test is primarily objective,  focusing  on  the probable  tendency of the publication rather than its  actual effect; but  it  encompasses  the  unfair and intemperate comment of someone who has set out to

inhibit a  litigant  regardless  of  whether  the  comment  actually  succeeds in doing so. A weak litigant needs protection against unfair publicity deliberately intended to undermine its position.”

[46]   We discuss later, in paragraphs [52] to [56] the appropriate test for the first element, Dr Smith’s direct contact with the caregiver.

[47]   The second aspect concerns the public as  potential  litigants.  We  draw  again from what Lord Diplock said in Times Newspapers at p 310:

“… If to have recourse  to  civil  litigation  were  to  expose  a  litigant  to the risk of public obloquy  or  to  public  and  pre-judicial  discussion  of  the facts or merits of  the  case  before  they  have  been  determined  by  the  court,  potential  suitors  would  be   inhibited   from   availing themselves of  courts of law for the purpose for which they are established.”

[48]   Pharmaceutical Management Agency v Researched Medicines Industry Association [1996] 1 NZLR 472 (“Pharmac”) in this Court was such a case, the Court commenting at p 476:

“… One must consider tendencies not  only in  relation  to  the particular case, but in relation to resort to the Courts by others.”

In Pharmac the Court held that the offending conduct,  whilst  it  would  not  deter Pharmac (“not an administrative  or  commercial  weakling”),  could  deter  many  defendants  or  prospective  plaintiffs  “from  the  day  in  Court  which   is   their entitlement”.

Findings of fact

[49]   As most of the facts  are uncontested,  findings  are required  only  in relation  to  the telephone  calls.  The  caregiver’s  evidence  was  that,  when  Dr  Smith  telephoned her the first time, he said two things:

[a]“Don’t you feel guilty for stealing (the mother’s) child?”

[b]That he was a Member of Parliament  which  was  the  highest  Court  in the land and that everyone is answerable to Parliament (she noted  Dr Smith as saying “we are all answerable to him”).

[50]   Dr  Smith  denied  saying  either  of  those  things.  Having  heard  the  evidence  and observed those giving it, both of whom were closely questioned, we find that Dr  Smith did, in the course of his first telephone call to the caregiver:

[a]Ask her if she felt guilty for stealing the mother’s child.

[b]In the context of explaining  to  the  caregiver  why  he  was  involved  in  the case, and perhaps his view about it, say words to the effect that he   was a member of  Parliament  and  that  Parliament  is  the  highest  Court in the land and that everyone is answerable to Parliament.

1. We base those findings upon four overlapping considerations:

[a]The fact that Dr Smith rang the caregiver direct. We regard that as an  unusual  if not extraordinary step for Dr Smith to take.   If his purpose   was merely to  check facts, then he   could  have  contacted  the  caregiver’s solicitor. He had the parents’ file which told him who that solicitor was.

[b]The notes both the caregiver and  Dr  Smith  made  during  or  following  the first telephone call. The caregiver said she made her notes  “a little  while after speaking to (Dr Smith) … about half an hour or so (later)

…”  There  is  unchallenged   evidence  from  the  caregiver’s   sister  that, on Sunday 27 April, she saw the handwritten notes the  caregiver  had made of Dr Smith’s telephone call the previous day. Relevantly, the caregiver had recorded:

“(Dr Smith): Don’t you feel guilty for stealing (the mother’s) child?

(Caregiver):   Not  according   to  the  judge.    He  gave me papers to say that I got custody. What have you got to do with it. We

have to do what the judge says. Up to courts and the judge decides  what happens that’s  what  I  understand.  We go to lawyers and psychologists  you’re  not a lawyer you’re a member of Parliament.

(Dr Smith):    Yes member  of Parliament.     Parliament is highest court in land and that’s  a fact and that we are all answerable to him.”

Dr Smith’s notes were prepared before he telephoned, and comprised cryptic prompts as to matters he  wanted  to  discuss.  Save  in  one  respect Dr  Smith’s prompts  are  consistent  with  the  topics  the  caregiver made notes about. The exception is Dr Smith’s note:

“Temporary YES!”

Dr Smith says the caregiver confirmed to him that the child had been entrusted to her care temporarily. The caregiver denies  both  that  Dr Smith asked her that,  and  that  that  was  the  understanding  on  which  the child came to her.

Dr Smith’s notes make no reference to either child stealing or to Parliament (although they are made on  a  sheet  of  paper  bearing  the crest of the New Zealand House of Representatives) but do record:

“Why not returned? !!”

[c]In the media release  Dr  Smith  prepared  the  following  day  (Saturday  26 April), and made on Monday 28 April, he states:

“This case almost amounts to state sanctioned child stealing.”

Dr Smith repeated much the same thing on  the  TV3  20/20 documentary on 18 May when he stated:

“This   can’t   happen   in  New  Zealand.     This is state sanctioned child stealing.”

That is consistent with his asking  the  caregiver  whether  she  felt  guilty  for stealing the child. That term is used in the  note  made  by  the  caregiver, that we have  held  was  made  before  Dr  Smith’s  media release on Monday 28 April.

[d]Dr Smith  accepted  under  cross-examination  that  the  phrase  “Parliament is  the  highest  Court  in  the  land”  is  one  that  he occasionally used, and accepted that he had used it both before (in March) and after (in July) he telephoned the caregiver on  25  April.  Again, that is consistent with his  using  that  phrase  on the  telephone  to the caregiver. By  contrast,  it  was  the  caregiver’s  evidence  that  she  had never heard the expression  before  Dr  Smith used  it  when  speaking to her on the telephone on Anzac Day  2003,  and  at the  time did not even know what it meant.

Decision

[52]   Our findings that Dr Smith  made  the  comments  set  out  in  paragraph  [49] above lead us to the conclusion that he intended to place pressure on the caregiver to surrender custody  of  the  child  to  the  parents.  Asking  her  whether  she  felt  guilty about stealing the child and  telling  her  that  he  was  a  Member  of  Parliament  which  was the highest Court  in  the  land  can  only  have  been  made  with  the  aim  of pressuring  her  to  return  the  child.   They  are  inexplicable  as  fact  gathering  or checking.

[53]   Mr Upton met this  difficulty  by  submitting  that  even  deliberate  attempts privately to  dissuade  a litigant from pursuing a particular course of action will not be a contempt of Court provided it is done in good faith: Times Newspapers per Lord Diplock at p 313. The Solicitor did not contest, and we accept, that Dr Smith acted in good faith and in the pursuit of what he perceived to be his duties as a constituent MP. In the passage in Times  Newspapers relied upon by Mr Upton, Lord Diplock drew a distinction between “private persuasion of a party not to insist on  relying  in  pending  litigation  on  claims  or  defences  to  which  he  is  entitled  under  the  existing  law and public abuse of him for doing so”. His Lordship expressed the view that the

former, provided it is not accompanied by unlawful threats, was not contempt of Court, whilst the latter was at least a technical contempt. The justification Lord Diplock offered  for  that  distinction  was  that  the  public  mischief  in  allowing  a  litigant  to be publicly  abused  “lies  in  the  inhibiting  effect  which  it  might  have  upon  all potential suitors”  if  it  became generally  accepted  that  recourse  to  courts of  law  would make litigants a legitimate target of public abuse.

[54]   Lord Diplock’s view of that distinction was not shared by Lord  Simon  in the  same case. At pp 318-319 he said:

“Private pressure to interfere  with  the  due  course  of  justice  will  only  be acceptable within narrow limits.  If  there  is  a  public  interest recognised by law that disputes should without interference be settled according to law in due process of law  (whether  by  trial or  by  settlement on the basis  of the  law  which  would  be applied at the trial), in my view  it  is  not  only  immaterial  whether  the  interference  is  physical or moral, but  also  whether  the  moral  interference  is,  on the  one hand, by holding the tribunal or litigant or witness up to public detestation or, on the other,  by  bringing private  pressure to  bear (unless such pressure  can  be  justified).  It  is  the  fact  of  interference, not the particular form  that  it  may  take,  that  infringes  the  public interest.

…

The justification for private pressure on a litigant might be such a common interest that fair, reasonable and moderate personal representations would  be  appropriate. Such  common  interest   would not necessarily have to be monetary; a  genuine,  unofficious  and paramount concern for the  real  welfare  of  the  litigant  would,  in  my view,  be sufficient.  In contrast,  merely  by way  of example,  if parents  are in dispute over the custody of a young child, it  is  in  the  public  interest that such a dispute  should  (in  default  of  agreement)  be  settled by impartial adjudication with the child’s welfare as the  first  and paramount consideration:  such  public  interest  would  be  prejudiced  if  an adult child of the family were to say to one parent, “Unless you instruct your solicitor to  withdraw  your  case,  I  shall  never  speak  to  you again” – no less than  by  a  public  campaign  which  holds  such  parent up to odium.”

[55]   We consider  that  Lord  Simon’s  is the  correct  approach.  The  public  mischief  is no doubt the  basis for  treating public comments of  the  type  Lord  Diplock describes as contemptuous. But pressure, privately exerted, can also have  an inhibiting effect on a  particular litigant. We also take the view that, in considering

this aspect, namely pressure on the caregiver as the litigant in this case, all improper pressure, whether applied publicly or privately, is to be taken into account. We are accordingly unable to accept Mr Upton’s submission  that  the  type  of private  pressure Dr Smith exerted  on the caregiver on the telephone cannot  be a contempt  of Court  if it was done in good faith.

[56]   The overall purpose of the law of contempt was succinctly posited by Sir James Wilde in In re Mulock (1864) 3 Sw. & Tr. 599 at 601:

“… she [the petitioner] claims  the  right  to  approach  this  court  free  from all restraint or intimidation.  It  is  a  right  that  belongs  to  all  suitors.”

[57]   For those reasons, we reject Mr Upton’s  submission  that  what  Dr Smith  said  on the telephone to the caregiver could not amount to  contempt, as it was bona fide private persuasion. We hold that what Dr Smith said could be, and is, contemptuous, because its purpose was to persuade the caregiver to give up the case and concede custody  to the  parents.  The  Duff test (see para  [45] above) which we intend adopting  in relation to Dr Smith’s  public  statements  requires  that  comment  be  fair  and  temperate. Insofar as this applies also to  what  is  said  to  a  litigant  in  private,  we  regard Dr Smith’s comments to the caregiver as neither fair nor reasonable nor moderate. It was unfair of Dr Smith to accuse the caregiver  of  criminal  behaviour  (stealing  or  kidnapping  the  child):  the  Family  Court  had  awarded  her  interim   custody. Dr  Smith’s  reference  to  Parliament  being  the  highest  Court  was  coercive  and intemperate.

[58]   Our view is that Dr Smith’s statements in his media releases and on the RNZ programme were contemptuous, in terms of the  Duff test.  First,  we regard  them  as going well beyond the fair and temperate. As the Solicitor pointed  out, the tone and fairness of comment is relevant to its tendency to interfere with the  administration  of justice: Harkianakis v Skalkos (1997) 42 NSWLR 22 (NSWCA) at 38. We have considered Dr Smith’s media releases carefully, and have listened again to the interview with Dr Smith broadcast on RNZ. We substantially agree with the Solicitor’s characterisation of Dr Smith’s public statements as one-sided, emotive

and   extreme     in    terms     of   their     language,     and   inflammatory      and   intimidatory (particularly of the caregiver) in their effect. We instance the following:

[a]Stating “this case  almost  amounts  to  State  sanctioned  child  stealing”  and describing the Court’s (interim)  decision  as  “blatantly  wrong”  so  that enforcing it by returning the child to the caregiver would be  “a  travesty of justice”.

[b]Saying he was “shocked and appalled” after reading the Court papers.

[c]Describing what had occurred as “obscene”, “a fiasco” and “an indefensible situation”.

[d]Referring  to “a warrant (from the Court) for the child to be ripped out of his family’s arms”.

[59]   In  reaching  this  view  we  have not  overlooked  Mr  Upton’s  submission  that the words “fair and temperate  comment”  in  the  Duff test are to be construed broadly  and in liberal  terms  to  ensure  that  the  scope  of  freedom  of  expression  guaranteed by s 14 of the New Zealand Bill  of  Rights  Act  1990  (“the  BORA”)  is  properly  preserved. Mr Upton supported that  submission  with  a  reference  to  the  decision  of the Full High Court in Solicitor-General v  Radio  New  Zealand  Ltd [1994] 1 NZLR 48 at 59. Nor have we overlooked Mr Upton’s submission that, although robust, Dr Smith’s language was that regularly used by Parliamentarians whether inside or outside the House. Mr Upton suggested that politicians seek maximum political impact: they are not expected to use the carefully rehearsed language of Judges or public servants. Our response to that is that Mr Smith can express himself as he thinks appropriate, provided that what he says is not in contempt of Court. The same applies to all New Zealanders.

[60]   Secondly, we consider that Dr Smith made his media releases and gave the interview on RNZ with the actual intention  of persuading  the caregiver  to give up the case and surrender custody  of  the  child  to  its  parents.  Alternatively,  objectively viewed, we consider there was a real likelihood that Dr Smith’s comments would

inhibit  a  litigant  of  average  robustness  in  the caregiver’s  position  from   availing  herself of her right to have the case determined by the Family Court.

[61]   As Mr Upton pointed out to us several times, the  caregiver  did  not  hear  the RNZ interviews. We think that is beside the point.  Dr  Smith  deliberately  chose  to publish details of the case  and  his  views  about  it to as wide  an audience  as possible:  by making two media releases, participating in  the  RNZ  interviews,  facilitating  the  mother doing the same,  and  also  by taking  part  in the  TV3  documentary.  He hoped and intended that his comments would reach those involved,  and  it  is  as  much  the  likely, as the actual, effect of what  he  said  which  is  relevant.  Although  assessment  based only  on  relatively  brief  (approximately  two  hours)  cross-examination  in  Court  is difficult, we assess the caregiver to be a litigant of above average robustness. It is therefore significant to note her  reaction  to  the  TV3  documentary. We  do  not overlook that Dr  Smith’s  contribution  to  that  documentary  was  relatively  minor.  As will become apparent later in  this  judgment,  we  think  the  aim  of  that  documentary  was the same as that of Dr Smith’s statements, both privately  to  the  caregiver  and  public. The caregiver deposed:

“29. I watched bits and pieces of  the  documentary.   I  couldn’t watch it all and walked out of the room  as I got  upset  when  I saw  (the  child).  I taped  the  documentary  and  watched  it later. I felt that the documentary made me look like I  was  a  bad  person and that I was doing  the  wrong  thing. It made  me feel that I should just give up, and let them  have  (the  child).  I  thought  about  doing  that.    The  documentary  made  it  look  like I had stolen (the child).

…

31.After the  documentary,  the   situation   got   worse   for   me.   I didn’t want to go anywhere. I was  scared  of  bumping  into  people after friends and family told me the things people were saying  about  me. Basically  they  were  saying  that  I  should   give (the child) back  and  that  I  had  stolen  him.  It  was upsetting all over again when  I  learned  that  TV3  re-screened  the documentary a week later  during the  day  on  Sunday 25 May 2003.”

[62]   Mr Upton  made  two  submissions  in  relation  to  s  27A. First, he submitted that Dr Smith did not “publish any report  of  (the)  proceedings”,  as  proscribed  by  s 27A. We do not accept that. Judges have disagreed as to the scope of the words

“report of proceedings”. In TVNZ v DSW [1990] NZFLR  150  Holland  J  confined them to a report of what took place in the courtroom, and as excluding the fact that proceedings had been commenced or the result of the proceedings. Panckhurst J respectfully disagreed in Director-General of Social Welfare  v  Christchurch  Press Co. Ltd 29.5.98, Christchurch CP31/98. He regarded the phrase as covering the  reporting of the initiation  of  a case  and  of  all  stages  of  it.  He  did  not  consider  that the difficulties presented to him, and raised again by Mr Upton in this case, as to the communication of information about a custody case to genuinely interested people, for example  social  workers  and  teachers,  arose,  even  on  that  wider  interpretation  of s 27A. We  respectfully  agree  with  and  adopt  Panckhurst  J’s  approach.  As  he pointed out, s 27A focuses upon the publication of reports, and its wording is not “apt to  capture  the  bare  communication  of  information  to  genuinely  interested  people”.

[63]   The “Summary of Facts” attached to Dr  Smith’s  first  media  release,  of  28  April 2003, at least,  can  only  be  viewed  as  a  report of the case, and it was released  by Dr Smith to all media. It appears that only one newspaper (“The Press” in Christchurch)  picked  up the release.   But that is again  beside  the point,  which  is that   Dr Smith put all that  material  in  the  public  arena. Dr Smith was  also  responsible  for the initial public disclosure of the custody  dispute,  when  he  contacted  RNZ  on  24  April 2003, alerting them to a possible news story the following Monday.

[64]   Mr Upton’s second submission was that, whilst a breach of s 27A(1) could constitute an offence punishable under s 27A(2), it  could not  also  constitute  the common  law  crime  of contempt  of Court.    Mr Upton  went  so far  as to submit  that     s 27A is irrelevant to, and has no effect on, the law of contempt of Court. We do not agree. Contempt of Court can take  many  forms.  Here,  the  Solicitor  points  to  the whole course of conduct  by the respondents  as constituting  the contempt. We agree with the Solicitor that there is an artificiality in  attempting  to  break  that  course  of conduct down into components, extracting those components one by one, and then submitting  that  each,  although  it  might  constitute  an  offence  under  s  27A,   is incapable of constituting a contempt of Court.

[65]   In our view, conduct which is a contempt of Court can also constitute a statutory crime or offence. Examples include perverting the course of  justice  or  threatening a Judge or juror with  violence.  The  fact  that  the  conduct  is criminal  does not prevent it from also constituting a contempt of Court, or being  part   of  a contemptuous course of conduct.

[66]   Consistent with his thesis that s 27A is irrelevant to contempt  of  Court,  Mr  Upton submitted  that s 27A(3)(b)  was to be interpreted  as preserving  the general law    of contempt for any conduct other than breach  of  s  27A(1).  Consequently,  he  submitted that it would be superfluous and illogical to have added to s 27A(3)(b) the additional words contained in s 401(3) of the Crimes  Act  1961  –  “in  any  case  to  which this section does not apply”.

[67]   We regard the wording of s27A(3)(b)  and  s 401(3)  as  deliberately  different, and as having different  consequences.  Whilst  s  401(1)  codifies  the  common  law  power to punish contempt in the face  of  the  Court,  s 401(3)  preserves  the  common law of contempt of Court in all other respects. Section 27A(3)(b), on the other hand, preserves the Court’s power to punish any contempt of Court, including a breach of s 27A(1). As the Solicitor pointed out, each of the two different versions appears in a number of enactments,  and  the  different  consequences  must  be  viewed  as  deliberate or purposive.

[68]   Mr  Upton  submitted that  the  so-called  “public  interest  defence”   is  available to Dr Smith. That defence starts by recognising the “extreme public  interest  that  no conduct should  be  permitted  which  is  likely  to  prevent  a  litigant  in  Court  from  having her  case  tried  free  from  all  matter  of prejudice”.  It then  recognises  that  there is to be  balanced  against  that  the  vital  public  interest  in  the  ventilation  of  questions  of public concern. It does not follow that a contempt has been committed if in the course of ventilating a question of public concern matter is  published  which  might prejudice a party in the conduct of a case. The requirements to establish the public interest defence are:

[a]The publication must be for the purpose of ventilating  a  question  of  public concern.

[b]There must be an absence of an intention to interfere with the  administration of justice, any such interference being incidental.

[69]   If those requirements are met,  Mr  Upton  submitted  that  it  is  then  necessary for the Court to determine whether the statement/conduct  is  or  is  not  contemptuous  upon a balance of the public interest that the case should not  be prejudiced,  and  the public interest in  the  airing  of  matters  of  public  concern.  Mr  Upton  contended  that this “public interest defence” emerges from the Australian cases of Re  Truth  & Sportsman Ltd ex parte Bread Manufacturers Ltd (1937) 37 SR(NSW) 242 and Registrar of Court of Appeal v Willesee  (1985) 3 NSWLR 650. He pointed out that it had been referred to with approval by Lords Reid (at p 296) and Simon (at p 321) in Times Newspapers in 1974, and has also been endorsed in this country  in several cases:  Gisborne Herald v Solicitor-General [1995] 3 NZLR 563; Solicitor-General  v Wellington Newspapers Ltd [1995] 1 NZLR 45 and Solicitor-General v Broadcasting Corporation of New Zealand [1987] 2 NZLR 100, 108-109.

[70]   Mr Upton then argued that a number of factors specific  to this case needed to     be factored in when striking the required balance. Delays in  the  Family  Court,  the private nature of all its proceedings  and the lack  of prominence  given  to the rights  of birth parents in custody cases were  all  matters  of  public  concern. The  role  of  Dr  Smith as  a  constituent  MP  in  publicly  debating  those  matters  and  doing  whatever  was properly required to protect the interests of  his constituents should be recognised. All the  media  releases  by  Dr  Smith,  and  everything  he  said  whether  on the telephone to the caregiver, on RNZ or  on  the  TV3  documentary  were  no  more than a discharge by him of his Parliamentary duties.

[71]   On the other side of the balance, Mr Upton contended that the judicial  system was not off-limits for political  debate  or  criticism,  particularly  by  an  MP  who  genuinely  believed  it  was  flawed  in  relevant  respects.  Further,   the   open administration  of  justice  was one of  the “two  fundamental   pillars   of   our constitutional order”: identified by  Hammond  J  in  Re  Victim  X [2003] 3 NZLR 220 at 225. Another expression of that principle is by Lord Woolf MR in Hodgson  v Imperial Tobacco Ltd [1998] 2 All ER 678 at 685 where he quoted from Sir Jack Jacobs’ Hamlyn lecture “The Fabric of English Justice”:

“… This  was  powerfully  expressed  in  the  great  aphorism  that,  ‘it  is not merely of some importance but is of fundamental importance  that justice  should  not  only  be  done  but  should  manifestly   and undoubtedly be seen to be done’ … Subject to these exceptions, the principle  of  publicity  should  prevail  throughout  the whole  range   of civil proceedings …”

[72]   We accept that this case gave rise to matters of public  interest  and  concern. Those which particularly engaged Dr Smith  were  the  delays  in  the  Family  Court  and the lack of prominence it gave to the rights of  birth  parents  in  custody  cases.  In  addition, the private nature  of  all  proceedings  in  the  Family  Court  has  been  the  subject of much public debate, and in some quarters considerable disquiet. We also accept that it was Dr Smith’s role as a constituent MP to raise and debate matters of public interest which concerned him, and to further as much as he properly could the interests of his constituents.

[73]   Above all, we recognise the importance of justice being administered openly wherever and whenever practicable.

[74]   A further submission made by Mr Upton was that the  benefits or  positive impacts of what Dr Smith  said  and  did  significantly  outweighed  the  negative  impact.  Mr Upton gave examples of the benefits e.g.  the  father  did  not  go  “bush”  with  the child; a fixture for a hearing of the opposing custody applications  was  obtained;  the parents were persuaded to return the child to the caregiver. Assuming Mr Upton’s submission is correct, it may go to penalty, but it cannot affect  the  decision  as  to  whether Mr Smith is in  contempt  of  Court.  A  “net  benefit”  analysis  such  as  Mr  Upton suggested is not the test for contempt of Court.

[75]   Notwithstanding all these points, we are  firmly  of  the  view  that  Dr  Smith  has not made out  the  requirements  to  establish  the  public  interest  defence.  He  went  public about the case with the intention of pressuring the caregiver to abandon it and concede custody. His acknowledged intention was  to  assist  his  constituents,  the  parents. Any assistance meaningful to  the  parents  could  only  be  achieved  if  the  custody proceedings  were  resolved  favourably  to  them.  Dr Smith’s  actions  on behalf of  his  constituents  were  intended  to  achieve  a  particular  outcome   from   their litigation. Thus, interference with the administration of justice was Dr Smith’s

primary purpose, and not just an incidental consequence.  Although  ventilation  of  questions of public  concern may  have  been  a  subsidiary  purpose  of  Dr  Smith’s  public  statements,  it  was  not  his  primary  purpose.   Accordingly,  Dr  Smith’s  invocation of the public interest defence fails.

Effect on the Court

The allegations

[76]The Solicitor alleges that Dr Smith’s conduct:

[a]Carried a real risk of placing  pressure  on  the  Court  in  terms  of  its  final decision.

[b]Was likely to lower the standing of  the  Court  generally,  and  to undermine public confidence in its ultimate decision in the case.

[77]   The Solicitor argues that  Dr  Smith’s conduct improperly  impacted  on  the  Court in:

[a]Influencing the particular decision.

[b]Lessening the public  acceptance  of  the  validity  of  the  particular decision.

[c]Lessening the authority of the Court in the eyes of the public.

The law

[78]   The first of these  aspects  is  established  by  proof  of  actual  intent  to  interfere by placing pressure on the Court or attempting to influence its decision:  Solicitor-  General v Radio Avon [1978] 1 NZLR 225 (CA) at 232; Borrie & Lowe The Law of Contempt, 3^rd Edition 1996 pp 79 and 82.

[79]   There is Australian, English and  Irish  authority  holding  that  conduct  which carries a substantial risk of pressuring the Court may also found  a  contempt.  The  rationale here is  that  Judges,  despite  their  training  and  experience,  are  only  human  and are not “entirely aloof from  the  pressures  to  which  other  members  of  the  public are susceptible”. Australian authorities include Victoria v Australian Building Construction Employees’ and Buildings Labourers’ Federation (1982) 152 CLR 25 and Civil Aviation Authority v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1995) 39 NSWLR 540. In England there is Re Lonrho Plc [1990] AC 154, 209 and in Ireland Kelly  v  O’Neill [2000] 1 IR 354, 375 and 377. These cases identify, as relevant to the risk that the conduct may interfere with the Court:

[a]Whether the issues for the Judge are factual or purely legal.

[b]Any element of discretion involved in the Judge’s decision.

[c]The tone of the publication. For example,  in  R v Herald & Weekly Times Ltd [2001] VSCA 152 the Victorian Court of Appeal observed “… this was scarcely and example of journalistic clamour of the worst kind”.

[d]The focus of the publication: was it directed at achieving  a particular result?

[e]Whether the publicity includes information/observation that would be inadmissible in Court.

[80]   The second aspect involves conduct  which  undermines  the  public  confidence  that cases will be determined without  extraneous  influences.  The  conduct  we  are  dealing with obviously focused on the case, but this species of contempt is broader, extending  to  conduct  which  undermines  confidence  for  the  public  as   potential   suitors.

[81]   Attorney-General v Tonks [1939] NZLR 533 involved this type of contempt. So also did Kelly v O’Neill and R v Hanson and Ettridge [2003] QCA 488. In the

latter, the Queensland Court of Appeal was  unsparing  in  its  criticism  of  public comments by the Prime Minister and some senior Members of Parliament about Ms Hanson’s conviction and sentence at a time  when  they  were  under  appeal  to  that  Court. McMurdo P said:

[57]As far as I have been able to ascertain, there has been no retraction   of  any   of these  comments.      If these observations were  accurately reported,          they            are            concerning. They demonstrate, at the very least, a lack of  understanding  of the  Rule of Law,  the  principle  that  every  person  and  organisation  is subject to the same laws and punishment and not to  the  arbitrary wishes of individuals or the passing whim of  the  day. Such  statement  from  legislators  could  reasonably   be  seen  as an attempt to influence the judicial appellate process and to interfere with the independence of the  judiciary  for  cynical political motives.

[58]Fortunately, many legislators asked to comment on the case responded  with  appropriate  restraint.  For   example,  the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr Downer, pointed out that Hanson’s  sentence  “was  a  legal  decision,  not   politically driven” and the Deputy Prime Minister and  the  Federal Treasurer each noted that “the matter was one for the courts”.

[59]A failure  by  legislators  to  act  with  similar  restraint  in  the future, whether out of carelessness or for cynical short-term political gain, will  only  undermine  confidence  in  the  judiciary  and consequentially  the  democratic  government  of  this State  and nation.”

[82]   Proof to the criminal standard of “real risk”  is  required.  However,  as  the  concern is with the perception of the due administration of justice, the focus is on  tendencies to damage public confidence.  The  Court  must  assess  those,  applying  its  own experience:   Solicitor-General v Wellington Newspapers Ltd at 47; Pharmac at   p 476.

[83]   The third aspect concerns  undermining  confidence  in  the  Court  itself.  This  is the type of contempt still commonly referred  to  as  “scandalising  the  Court”,  although that description is also applied to the second aspect  just  discussed. Scandalising the Court was described by the Court of Appeal in Solicitor-General v  Radio  Avon  [1978] 1 NZLR 225 at 231 as “… Something published which was calculated to lower the authority of a Judge and the Court.”

[84]   Scandalising the Court is also well recognised in  Australia.  In  Re Colina; ex parte Torney (1999) 200 CLR 386 Gleeson CJ and Gummow J adopted the following statement (from R v Dunbabin; ex parte Williams (1935) 53 CLR 434 at

442) as capturing the essence of the offence of scandalising:

“…  But  such  interference  may  also  arise   from   publications   which tend to detract from the  authority  and  influence  of  judicial determinations,  publications  calculated  to  impair   the   confidence   of   the people in   the  Court’s  judgments  because  the  matter  published  aims at lowering the authority of the Court as a whole  or  that  of  its Judges and excites misgivings as to  the  integrity,  propriety  and impartiality brought to the exercise of the judicial office.”

[85]   The offence  of  “scandalising”  exists  to  protect  the  Court,  not  the  dignity  of  its  Judges.  It  guards  the  institution,  not  the  individuals.  Nobody   made  that  point more forcefully than Lord Denning MR back in R v Metropolitan  Police  Commissioner, ex parte Blackburn (No. 2) [1968] 2 All ER 319 at 320. The same point was made by Eichelbaum CJ in Solicitor-General  v  Wellington  Newspapers Ltd [1995] 1 NZLR 45 at 47.

Decision

[86]   We are satisfied beyond doubt that Dr Smith intended to influence the Family Court’s decision.  Unmistakably,  he  sought  to  bring  about  the  return  of  custody  of  the child to the parents, his constituents. He did that in  three ways. First, by  propounding that outcome. For example:

“…  I frankly  will be horrified  if the Courts  and the Police  rip this boy  out of the arms of its mother and father, its brothers and sisters when there’s absolutely no evidence that the  child is  under any  threat. That’s where he should be and that’s where he should stay.”

(RNZ interview 28 April 2003)

[87]   Secondly,  by  denigrating  the  other  possible  outcome  -   custody   remaining with the caregiver. Examples:

“This is unfathomable.”

“… That is just so blatantly wrong …”

“… for the child to be ripped out of his  family’s  arms  … that in my view is a tragedy.”

(all in the RNZ interview, 28 April 2003)

[88]   Thirdly, and also in the course of his interview on RNZ on 28 April 2003, by calling for an inquiry:

“… You see, one of the things  I’m  asking  for  is a formal  inquiry.  I  think it is obscene.”

[89]In his media release later that day, he renewed that call:

“Nelson MP Nick Smith is demanding an urgent inquiry into a child  custody  dispute  in  which  the  parents  have  been  legally  fighting  for over three years to get back custody of their 6-year old son.

…

I have decided to go public and demand an urgent inquiry …”

We think Dr Smith’s call for an  inquiry  while  the  case  was  sub  judice  points  unerringly to an  intention  to  put  pressure  on  the  Court  by  arousing  public  concern  and emotion about the case. Having accepted in the course of his RNZ interview on “Nine to Noon” that Ministers of the Crown had declined to intervene because of the sound convention that politicians should  not  interfere  when  a  matter  is  before  the  Court, Dr Smith explained:

“… I’m loathe to interfere  in the decisions  of the Court  but when  you  see a case that is just so  blatantly  wrong,  look,  my  parental  instincts take over from my legalistic  mind  and I simply  say that  there  needs  to be an inquiry as to how  it  is  possible  in  this  country  for  someone  to get a custody order without the parents having any say …”

[90]   As we have held that Dr Smith intended to influence  the  Family  Court’s  decision, we need not consider whether his conduct carried  a  real  risk  of  such  influence. Although the Solicitor does  not  suggest  that  the  Judge  who  made  the  custody  decision  on  19  August  2003  was  in  fact  influenced  by  Dr  Smith’s comments, he draws attention to the Judge’s comment that, in  his  five  years  on  the Bench, “I think this may be the  most  difficult  decision  I  have  had  to  make”.  That points up the undesirability of comments such as Dr Smith made upon such a difficult and finely balanced case.

[91]   For much the same reasons, we are also satisfied that Dr Smith intended his comments to lessen public acceptance  of  the  Family  Court’s  decision.  In  the  true  sense of the word, Dr Smith “usurped” the  Court’s  role. In  his  RNZ  interview,  he stated that  he  had  read  the  papers, personally  made  inquiries  including  ‘checking  out’ the family and talking  to  the  school  principal,  the  parents’  employers  and  the  local kaumatua and had established the facts. Indeed,  he  attached  a  “Summary  of Facts” to his first media release. He left the Court and the public  in no doubt  that the  child should be in the parents’ custody:

“… That’s where (the child) should be and that’s where he  should  stay.”

[92]   Comments such as Dr Smith  made  are apt to undermine  public  confidence  in  the Court’s decision, whichever way the Judge decides. If the Judge directed that  the  child remain in the caregiver’s custody, there will be  a  concern  that  the  decision  (to adopt Dr Smith’s  own  words)  is “blatantly  wrong”. If the Judge orders that  custody  of the child revert to the parents, the concern will be that the Judge has succumbed to      the  pressure  of  the  public comments.  These  damaging   consequences   were recognised by both Judges comprising the Full High Court in Attorney-General v Tonks [1939] NZLR 533, 538 and 541. As Reid J observed at 541:

“Nothing would so undermine  the  confidence  which  the  public  repose in our courts of justice than the impression that  their  decisions  were  liable to be affected by extraneous considerations.”

[93]   By making public  comments  and statements  which  undermined  public confidence in the  Family  Court’s  decision,  whatever  it  might  be,  Dr  Smith  at  the same time undermined public confidence in the Court itself.  In  Re  Ouellet  (1976) 72 DLR (3d) 95, the Court of Appeal of Quebec held that a Federal Cabinet Minister had committed contempt of Court for making the following remarks about a Judge who dismissed a prosecution brought by his Ministry:

“I find this judgment completely unacceptable. I think it is a silly decision. I just  cannot  understand  how  a  Judge  who  is  sane  could give such a verdict. It is a complete shock and I find it a complete disgrace.”

[94]   The intemperate, derogatory and unfair remarks Dr Smith made (the worst of which we have set out in paragraphs [87] to  [89]  are  in  the  same  category.  They assault  the  authority  and  integrity  of  the  Family  Court  and  the  fairness   and legitimacy of its decision.

[95]   Again,  the concern  is not to protect the egos or feelings of individual Judges.     It is to prevent  the  undermining  of  public  confidence  in  the  competence  and  integrity of  Family   Court   Judges,   and  thus  the  authority   of the  Court.  Prospective litigants may be discouraged from using the Court’s process, discouragement exacerbated by breach   of   the   parties’   confidentiality.                Prospective litigants with family  problems who saw, heard or   read  the  respondents’  statements  could  be   forgiven  for questioning whether  they  could  safely  entrust  their  dispute  to  the  Family  Court, assured that it would be  dealt  with  competently  and  not  discussed  in  detail  through  the media.

TV3

Improper pressure on litigants

The allegations

[96]   The Solicitor alleges that through its “20/20” documentary “Tug of Law”, TV3 intended to put pressure on the caregiver to forego her claim to custody. The alternative allegation is that the  documentary  had  the  likely  tendency  to  have  that effect.

The law

[97]   We need add only one point to  our  summary  in  paragraphs  [41]  to  [48]  above. The additional point is that television is widely acknowledged to have a more powerful reach than does radio, or the print media. That follows from its ability to

depict people and places  in a way that can manipulate  the emotions  of viewers.  This  was recognised by this Court in Knapp v Roberson (1987) 6 NZAR 493 at 497.

Decision

[98]   The  impression  of  a  television  programme  is  very  much  in  the  viewing,  but we emphasise our following impressions of the programme:

[a]The implicit if not explicit bias in  the  commentary.  It  is  present  right from the outset when the presenter states:

“If you are one  of  the  country’s  two  million  parents  you  might  find  the  following  programme  disturbing.   It is about parents’ rights or lack of rights to  have custody of their own children …”

And it continues right through to the end:

“Time’s  up.   It’s the day they know their  son has to go,   a very special family day captured  on home  video. It’s the day of his father’s birthday and the day the world celebrates  Mothers Day, the very day the system chose   to take the family’s youngest brother and son away …”

[b]The selection of images and scenes. One example is the picture of the whole family with the child’s face  pixillated,  and  then the  removal digitally of the child leaving a gap in the  family  group.  Another  is  the shots of the mother coming out of Court after the hearing  of  the caregiver’s application for a warrant to return the child to her, and tearfully announcing the outcome on the telephone to the father.

[c]The  depiction  of  the  child  relaxing  and  playing   happily   with   the family both inside and  outside  their  home  in  Nelson,  contrasted  with  the somewhat  barren  scenes  of the caregiver  in the porch of her house  in Wellington, and a child entertaining itself  bouncing  a  ball  down  a street. The comparison is deliberately odious.

[d]The depiction of the family as healthy, hard working and closely  knit, versus depiction of the caregiver as a poor parent with quite explicit suggestions that she has seriously neglected the child’s education, development and health and  exposed  him  to  violence  through  living  with a partner who has criminal convictions for violence. There  is  an image of an unidentified document in which the caregiver  conveyed  a threat to shoot the parents if they attempted to take the child.

[e]Representing the arrangement under which  the  child  went  to  live  with  the caregiver as a temporary one,  when  that  is  fundamentally  disputed by the caregiver.

[99]   Our overall assessment of  the  programme,  in  particular  the  impressions  we have mentioned, is that it was one-sided.  We  think TV3  intended that  the  programme place pressure on the caregiver. Indeed, at one point TV3 comes close to admitting this:

“… While we normally don’t reveal  identities  or  details  surrounding  cases like  this,  tonight  we  are  making  an  exception.  We  are  telling  the story in the hope that some urgency, accountability and public scrutiny may be applied … Because this is a case that disturbingly highlights … the fact that there is  no  presumption  in  favour  of  the parents as custodians of their children.”

[100]   We reject TV3’s attempt to excuse the one-sidedness of the programme by  relying  on  the  caregiver’s  refusal  to  participate  in  it.  Quite  apart   from   her obligations under s 27A, the caregiver must not be placed in the  position  of having to make her case on television rather than in Court in an effort to prevent public obloquy.

[101]   Even if there was no  intention  on  TV3’s  part  to  place  improper  pressure on the caregiver, that undoubtedly was the effect  of  the  programme,  and  powerfully  so. The caregiver’s evidence about this is set out in paragraph [61] above.

[102]   We need not repeat that the real risk of the “Tug  of  Law”  programme  improperly pressuring the caregiver  translated  to a risk,  which  we assess  as also  real, of dissuading similarly placed litigants to resort to the Family Court.

Effect on the Court

The allegations

[103]As with Dr Smith, the Solicitor alleged that TV3:

[a]Intended to influence the Family Court  in  its  decision  or,  alternatively  that

[b]The “Tug of Law” documentary created  a  real  risk  of  interfering  with the Court’s decision.

The law

[104] It is as we have set it out in paragraphs [78] to [85] above in relation to Dr Smith.

Decision

[105]   We view the TV3  documentary  as  advancing  the  ‘correct’  solution  to  the  case, and attempting to influence the  Court  to reach  that  result. The  “accountability”  and “public scrutiny” for the case which TV3 stated were its aims in televising the programme (see paragraph [99] above), in our view included pressuring the Court  to return custody of the child to the parents.

[106]   We consider that the impressions conveyed by the programme (we have listed them in paragraph [98] above) were intended  to  influence  the  Judge  in  the  difficult decision he had  to  make,  or  created  a  real  risk  of  such  influence,  albeit  of  the subconscious variety we have referred to.

[107]   Although we are not satisfied to the requisite standard that TV3 intended the documentary to undermine  public  confidence  in  the  Family  Court’s  decision,  we  are  in no doubt that it carried the real risk of doing just that. We have already referred to

the one-sided assessment of the merits of  the  custody  dispute,  and  the  loaded  depiction  of  the  suitability  of  the  respective  parties  to  it.  The  effect  of  the programme would in our view be erosion of public confidence in the decision  of the  Family Court. For the reasons we identified in paragraph  [92]  above,  we think  that would particularly  be so if the Court  awarded  custody  to the caregiver,  but would  be so irrespective of the result.

[108]   We have two particular concerns about  the  risk  of   the  programme undermining public confidence in the Family Court. The first is  that  it  included  a  comment by Dr Smith:

“Knowing what I know about this case I’d be dead scared to allow my own children to so in the care of somebody else  knowing  what  the  Court can potentially do and give a custody order and lock you out of those children’s lives for years.”

We view that as a particularly inflammatory and unfair comment.

[109]   We have already mentioned our second concern, but it arises acutely here. Members of the public  viewing  or  hearing  of  this  programme  while  the  matter  was  sub judice, could have no  confidence  that  matters  entrusted  to  the  Family  Court   would be  dealt  with  in  confidence,  and  litigants  protected  from  (as  the  Solicitor termed it) “unlawful, unwanted and unfair public scrutiny.”

[110]   Two aspects of TV3’s defence remain for consideration. The  first  is that  the public interest warranted the televising  of  the  programme.  TV3  identified  the  lack  of any presumption in favour of birth parents in a custody dispute and the adverse effects of delay, in particular in cementing  bonding  of  a  child  to  the  caregiver,  as  public interest issues. The fact that a case gives rise  to  issues  of  public  importance does not legitimise  publication  of  the  details  of  the  case  in  a  way  which  prejudices the hearing of the case.   That is acutely so here, where the case was both sub judice     and subject to s 27A. As Eichelbaum CJ said in the criminal jury trial context in Solicitor-General v Wellington Newspapers Ltd at p 48:

“Generally,  if  there  is  a  genuine  issue  of  public  interest  to  be discussed … it may be aired at once by treating the subject in general

terms or with reference  to  past  examples  where  there  is  no  tendency to prejudice current trials.”

[111]   TV3 sought to bolster its submission that the public interest warranted televising the programme by relying on the fact that RNZ  and  Judge  Mahony  had  already publicly released much of the  detail  of the  case  in the  course  of his  interview  on RNZ. TV3 pointed particularly to  parts  of the interview in which it claimed that Judge Mahony had explained what the Court’s  aim  was,  or  what  its  decision  was  likely to be. It instanced:

“Well, too long in the  life  of  the  child  in  the  sense  that  if  the  child  is to be reunited with the child’s own family and I  understand  that  is theaim, then the child has been away  from  that  family  for  a  long  time but you … but in judging  whether  it is too long or not, regard has to      be had to the actions of the parties on both sides of the family.”

And:

“Well, I think the  issue  here  is,  re-establishing  that  child  with  the  child’s own family in a way which will protect  the  child’s  sense  of identity and security and safety. That’s  the central  issue  in a case  like  this, and that process cannot happen overnight if  you  are  concerned  about the child rather than the  adults.  That  process  takes  time  and  again without getting into the detail of the case, that process has been  going on and progressing.”

[112]   Under cross-examination Mr  Terence Taylor, the  Executive  Producer  of  TV3’s “20/20” programme explained:

“Q.     How did you justify doing that in view of the prohibition?

A. Because we felt this  was  an  exceptional  case,  we  get  a  lot  of people coming to us  with their stories, personal stories, custody battles etc. and we don’t tell those stories because we know there are restrictions on  reporting  the  details  of proceedings, in this case  we thought  it an exception  because  a  lot of the information was already  in  the  public  domain  by  reason of radio broadcasts, in particular  some  of the  details  of the proceeding have been  revealed  by   Chief  Family  Court Judge Mahony, we felt as a result of his participation in those programmes and details  he released  he opened  the door  for us to also reveal details of the proceeding.

Q.You  understood  when  you  made  the  final   decisions   that  you were in breach of s 27A but believed there  were  reasons  why you could treat this as special?

A.We  realised  that  if  you  took  the  letter  of  the  law  of  that  Act then a Court could find us in breach,  but  we felt that given that  the Chief Family Court Judge had released details on the proceeding, on the case, and we felt that in that case the Crown would have to prosecute Judge Mahony and the Court would probably find him  guilty  of  breaching  the  Act,  that seemed to us a farcical situation, we didn’t  think  it  would  happen, it would make no sense to us to think that  the Court could  find  the  Chief  Family  Court  Judge  guilty  of  breaching an Act relating to his own Court, given that was impossible it seemed to us in this exceptional case the letter of  the  law  wouldn’t be upheld strictly and there was an opening to broadcast further details.”

(Notes of Evidence 42/35-43/18)

[113]  We  do  not  find  any  of  this  persuasive.       Neither TV3’s submissions nor Mr Taylor’s evidence accurately describe what Judge  Mahony  said  on  RNZ  is  accurate. We consider         the              Solicitor’s     categorisation        “damage control”   more correctly describes   RNZ’s   interview   with Judge  Mahony.             It is abundantly clear from that interview that the Judge’s  purpose  was  to  explain  in  general  terms  the  approach  of  the Family Court in cases such as this. The Judge was anxious throughout not to be drawn  into  the  detail  of the case.     Despite Ms Clarke’s attempts to have the Judge comment on the case, we do  not  think  he  did  in  a  way that could fairly be criticised. We consider that the position in which Judge Mahony was placed demonstrates the mischief   to  which   this  aspect   of  the  law  of  contempt is  directed.  The judiciary is constrained  in   its       ability          to       respond         to        criticism,     particularly of decisions in individual  cases.  These constraints are heightened,  in  the  case  of  the  Family  Court, by  the   statutory   requirements of  confidentiality.  We consider that Judge Mahony was justified, in the  face  of  the  intemperate  criticisms  of  the  Court,  and  its  handling  of this case, in agreeing to be  interviewed  and  in  endeavouring  to  explain,  so  far  as was possible  without  reference  to the facts  of the case,  the operation  and procedures  of    the  Family   Court.      We  reject Mr  Taylor’s attempt to  justify the  20/20 documentary, on the basis of RNZ’s interview with Judge Mahony.

[114]   Ms Bradley’s second argument  for  TV3  was  that  s 27A  cannot  of itself  found a contempt of Court. We do not agree.  We have  already  outlined  the approach  we  take to the interpretation of s 27A. In In Re F (a minor) Publication of Information [1977] 1 All ER 144 the English Court of Appeal held that a breach of the

confidentiality  of  Court  proceedings  will  amount  to  a  contempt  at   common   law. That case involved a wardship proceeding conducted  in closed  Court.  Lord  Denning  MR held that, to establish a contempt, the applicant had  to  prove  that  the  publisher knew it was publishing information relating to a proceeding conducted in private, or published reckless as to whether or not publication was prohibited.

[115]   We regard the “Tug of Law” documentary as a report of the proceeding. It describes the nature of the dispute, reports on the Court’s decision and identifies the parties by their  first  names.  It  also  identifies  the  locality  of  the  parties.  Even  accepting (which we do not) that the previous publications by Dr Smith and/or RNZ somehow justified TV3 in publishing the same  thing,  the  “Tug  of  Law”  documentary  put in the public arena significant detail that was not already there. For example,  it described the primary proceeding and also the nature and outcome of the warrant application, gave the first names of the child’s parents  and  siblings,  stated  that  the  family lived in Nelson  and  had  enrolled  the  child  at  Stoke  Primary  School,  and  sought to convey the emotions and relationships within the  family.  The  caregiver’s evidence was that children at the child’s school had teased the child following the programme. It is clear that those  children  (or  their  parents)  had  been  able  to identify the parties involved.

[116]   To summarise, we hold that, in televising the  “Tug  of Law” programme, TV3 was in contempt of Court in both the  respects  alleged  by the  Solicitor.  The  first  of  those is in screening a  programme  that  either  intended  to  pressure  the  caregiver,  or  ran the real risk of  dissuading  her  and  prospective  litigants  from  resorting  to  the  Family Court. The second is in attempting to influence the Family Court in its decision, or undermining confidence in the Court.

RNZ

Improper pressure on litigants

The allegation

[117]   The Solicitor alleges RNZ’s broadcasts had  the  likely  tendency  to   place pressure on the caregiver or to dissuade litigants generally from resort  to  the  Family Court.

The law

[118]This is as we have summarised it in paragraphs [41] to [48] above.

Decision

[119]   RNZ accepted responsibility for the statements of those it  interviewed,  in particular the mother and Dr Smith, as well as for the statements  of its presenter Ms Linda Clarke: PSS v JAS per Budd J at p 30; Borrie v Lowe pp 396-397.

[120]   RNZ also accepted that it had prior knowledge of the “angle”  both the mother  and Dr Smith would be taking. Dr Smith had  faxed  his  proposed  media  release  to RNZ on Saturday 26 April.

[121]   Were it not for  the  comments  made  by Dr Smith  on the interview,  we would  not have held the first item, on 28 April, to have exceeded the bounds of appropriate comment. The Courts must not  be  over-sensitive  to  criticism.  The  risk  of  a “chilling” effect on legitimate public debate, to which Mr Tizard referred, must be recognised. The first part of  the  item  on  28  April  consisted  largely  of  an  interview with the mother.   We consider  that the matters  raised  and the comments  did not, for    the purposes of the law of contempt, exceed the legitimate boundaries of public comment on issues  of  public  concern.  To  the  extent  that  aspects  of  the  individual  case were discussed, a possible breach of  s 27A might be  involved, but that circumstances would not, of itself, constitute the programme a contempt.

[122]   Nor do we consider that the item broadcast on 29 April, which essentially consisted of the interview with Judge  Mahony,  was  in  contempt.  That  was,  in  our  view, directed towards legitimate purposes, in seeking to inform the public  of  the  principles applied and the procedures adopted by the Family Court.

[123]   We are critical of two aspects of the two “Nine to Noon” programmes. First, although she knew the case was sub  judice,  Ms  Linda  Clarke  made  no  attempt  to steer either the mother or Dr Smith away from the facts of the case, indeed quite the opposite.  The same is true of her  interview  the  following  day  with  Judge  Mahony. We have already expressed the view  that  Judge  Mahony  made  it clear  to Ms Clarke that   he  was  only   prepared   to  speak   in   general  terms. Despite that, Ms Clarke attempted on a number of occasions to draw the Judge into commenting  on the case  itself.        However, if those parts of the programmes are considered on their  own,  we would not be satisfied to the required standard that they constitute a contempt.

[124]   Secondly, we take a particularly  dim  view  of  the  naming  of  the  child  on  RNZ’s interview with the mother. But we do not consider that the more severe sanction of contempt, rather than the sanction provided by s 27A, is justified.

[125]   For the reasons we have already given, we consider that that  part  of  the broadcast on 28 April which consisted of the interview with Dr Smith constitutes a contempt.

Effect on the Court

The allegations

[126]   The  Solicitor  alleges  that  RNZ’s broadcasts,  especially   the  interviews   with  the mother  and  Dr  Smith,  had  the  likely  tendency  of  undermining  public  confidence  in the Family Court’s decision.

The law

[127]We have summarised this in paragraphs [78] to [85] above.

Decision

[128]   Our decision is that that part  of   RNZ’s  broadcasts  which  included  the interview with Dr Smith had the real tendency to influence the Family  Court  in  its decision, and thus to undermine public confidence in that  decision,  whichever  way  it went. We regard Dr Smith’s  broadcast  comment  to  the effect that he would now be  wary of entrusting children to  others  (see  paragraph  [108]  above)  as  particularly erosive of public confidence in the Family Court, coming as it did from a Member of Parliament. Our reasons are  substantially  the same  as  those  we  have   given   in relation to Dr Smith.

[129]   Counsel for RNZ argued that its broadcasts were  not  in  breach  of  s  27A.  They submitted that Parliament cannot have intended to prohibit the dissemination of information which exists independently of a proceeding in the Family Court,  simply  because that information also forms part of  the  evidence in  the  proceeding.  They argued that a large amount of the detail about  the  case  RNZ  broadcast  was  of  that type. The RNZ  case  was  that  it  cannot have been the legislative intention that the s 27A prohibition  be  total,  apart  from  the  exceptions  specified  in  the  section  itself.  That argument was founded on Director-General of Social Welfare v TVNZ (1989) 5 FRNZ 549 and TVNZ v Director-General of Social Welfare [1990] NZFLR 150, counsel contending that Director-General of Social  Welfare  v  Christchurch  Press Co. Ltd (which we have referred  to  in  paragraph  [62]  above)  was wrongly  decided and should not be followed.

[130]   RNZ submitted that s 27A should be construed in such a way as to permit the publication of  information  which  is  neither  private  nor  confidential  where  it  is published bona fide and for a proper purpose.

[131] We have addressed some of these arguments in paragraph [62] above. Upon the interpretation of s 27A which we adopt, we hold that RNZ’s broadcasts did constitute a report of the proceeding in the Family Court. However, with the exception of that part of the broadcast involving Dr Smith, we consider that, for the reasons already given, the broadcasts do not also constitute a contempt. We do not need to reach a firm view on whether there was a breach of s 27A, since no prosecution under that section is before us.

[132]   For RNZ, Mr Tizard submitted forcefully that the common law offence of scandalising the Court cannot survive the enactment in New Zealand in 1990  of  the BORA. He referred to the Court of Appeal’s decision in Lange v Atkinson [1998] 3 NZLR 424 at 431-432, as laying down the correct approach to application of the common law (in that case the common law of defamation) post BORA. He submitted that the correct approach to ss 5, 6 and 14 of the BORA is now that laid down by the Court of Appeal in Ministry of Transport v Noort [1992] 3 NZLR 260, and more recently in Moonen v Film & Literature Board of Review [2000] 2 NZLR

9.    Mr Tizard’s argument then proceeded as follows:

[a]The s 14 right is unlimited except to the extent that  a reasonable  limit  may be imposed by law and  can  be  demonstrably  justified  in  a  free and democratic society.

[b]It is difficult to imagine a more  important  freedom  than  the  s  14  freedom of expression.

[c]The offence of scandalising the Court exists to protect the Courts and through them the administration of justice.

[d]The  Courts in  themselves  do  not  need  defending,  indeed  temperate and constructive criticism strengthens public institutions.

[e]The common assumption that criticism of  the  operation  of  the  Courts will  imperil  public  confidence  in  the  administration  of  justice  is  not well based. For  example,  the  argument  that  criticism  by   one  disaffected litigant of a particular case will create a risk to the administration of justice generally  and  a  disincentive  to  litigants  in  general is an illogical argument proceeding from the particular to the general, and is inherently implausible.

[f]Thus, the argument that the unrestricted right to criticise will lead to a diminution of the role of the Court  or  a  lack  of  general  public acceptance or respect for its decisions has no reliable foundation.

[g]The issue of whether the offence of scandalising the  Court  can  be  justified can be posed very starkly. Taking this case, why should the mother, Dr Smith and RNZ  be  subject  to   criminal  sanction  for  bringing to  public  attention  a  perceived  injustice  where  the  parents  had brought their concerns to the attention of those who ought  to have been able to assist them, but had  received  no  action  and  public  exposure appeared to be the only way to get any action? Would a conviction  really  protect or  enhance  the administration  of  justice   in the eyes of the ordinary citizen?

[133]   We do not accept  that  the  offence  of  scandalising  the  Court  cannot  be justified as a reasonable limitation upon freedom of  expression.  The  freedom  of expression guaranteed by  s  14  is  certainly  a  fundamental  freedom.  But  so  also  are the other freedoms guaranteed  by the  BORA,  for  example,  by ss 21 and  22.  In fact  the s 22 right (not to be arbitrarily arrested or detained) is arguably an even more fundamental one than the  s  14  right.  The  rights  guaranteed  by  the  BORA  depend upon the rule of law, the  upholding  of  which  is  the  function  of  Courts.  Courts  can only effectively discharge that  function  if  they  command  the  authority  and  respect  of  the public. A limit  upon  conduct  which  undermines  that  authority  and  respect  is thus not only commensurate with the rights and freedoms contained in the BORA, but is ultimately necessary to  ensure  that  they  are  upheld.  For  example,  there  is  limited  if any point in  freedom  of  expression  if  it  can  only  be  exercised  within  the  confines  of a prison cell in which  the  expresser  is  has  been  arbitrarily  and  indefinitely  detained.  No right guaranteed by the BORA is wholly unrestricted: each depends upon and is ultimately  limited  by  the need  to  uphold  other  rights.  As  the  Full  High  Court observed in Solicitor-General v Radio New Zealand Ltd [1994] 1 NZLR 48 at 59:

“The rights and freedoms  affirmed  by  the  Act  are  not  absolute  or  to be applied each in isolation, but are to be construed and applied in the context not only of  the Act  and  the  other  rights  and  freedoms  contained in it but of all those other rights and freedoms which are not abrogated or restricted because they are not included in the Act (see s  28). The effect of ss  4,  5  and  6  is  explicit  in  this  regard:  see especially Richardson J in Ministry of Transport v Noort [1992] 3 NZLR 260 at pp 282-283:

‘By specifying how limitations on the rights and freedoms contained in the Bill of Rights are to be justified in particular

cases, s 5 recognises explicitly that there are limits on those rights and freedoms. It reflects  the  reality  that  rights  do  not  exist in a vacuum, that they may be  modified  in  the  public  interest to take account of the rights of  others and  of  the interests of the whole community.’”

[134]   We have already referred (in paragraph [85] above) to the  passage in Solicitor-General v Wellington Newspapers Ltd Eichelbaum CJ emphasised that contempt of Court is concerned, not with the  dignity  of  Judges,  but  with  the  preservation of  the  impartial  and  effective  system  of  justice  which  they  are  charged  to administer. The right to  justice is,  of  course, another right guaranteed  by  the BORA, this time by s 27.

[135]   Mr Tizard submitted that the uncertain nature of the common law offence of scandalising the Court, the unlimited nature of the punishment available for that offence, and the fact that both were administered by a Court which forms part of the system said to be scandalised, all argue against the  continued  recognition  in  New  Zealand of the offence. None  of  these  phenomena  are  new,  and  yet  the  “chilling effect” to which Mr Tizard referred (and which we have already said must be acknowledged) has never been  felt  in  New  Zealand. We  venture to  suggest that there is more freedom of expression today, in particular in relation to what New Zealanders and the New Zealand media are able to say about Courts, Judges and judgments, than there ever has been.

[136]   To  summarise,  we  consider  the  common  law  offence  of  scandalising  the Court is a reasonable limit upon freedom of expression which can demonstrably be justified in the free and democratic society which  exists  in New  Zealand  today. We reject Mr Tizard’s submission that the offence cannot survive the  enactment  of  the  BORA.

Result

[137]We find each of Dr Smith, TV3 and RNZ to be in contempt of Court.

[138]   As agreed, the issues of penalty and costs are for further submission and decision.

“J R Wild J”  “A D MacKenzie J”

Judgment delivered at “12.30 p.m.” on “24^th” March 2004

Solicitors

Crown Law Office, Wellington for the Applicant

Kiely Thompson Caisley, Wellington for the First Respondent

Office Solicitor, TV3 Network Services Ltd, Auckland for the Second Respondent Oakley Moran, Wellington for the Third Respondent