The Queen v William Peter Stephens

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF NEW ZEALAND

CA 455/02

THE QUEEN

v

WILLIAM PETER STEPHENS

Hearing:26 February 2003

Coram:Tipping J
McGrath J
Anderson J

Appearances:  B J Horsley for Crown


C J Tennet for Respondent

Judgment:24 March 2003 

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT DELIVERED BY ANDERSON J

Nature of the Appeal

[1]       This is a Crown appeal by way of Case Stated on a question of law reserved, pursuant to s380 of the Crimes Act 1961, during the trial of the respondent in the High Court.

[2]       The respondent was arraigned on an indictment containing four counts of alleged sexual offending against a boy, between June 1997 and August 2001.  On 18 August 1997 certain conduct between the respondent and the boy was brought to the notice of the Henderson Police in response to which a member of the Child Abuse Team, Mr Tamatea, went to the respondent’s address to speak with him.  He administered a short caution and advised the respondent of his rights pursuant to the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act.  There followed a discussion in the course of which the respondent admitted that he had, on three or four occasions, touched the boy’s penis over his trousers.  He denied conduct of a more serious nature, but admitted that in order to get his own way with the child he made what can only be construed as threats relating to the vulnerability of the child and his mother to being removed from New Zealand to the country from which they had emigrated.

[3]       At that stage no complaint had been made by or on behalf of the boy and the respondent’s admissions did not prompt a prosecution.  Instead the Police referred the matter to the Children, Young Persons and Their Family Service.  A complaint was not made until four years later when the boy’s mother, according to her evidence at trial, observed conduct between the respondent and her son. 

[4]       The respondent was arrested and remanded to a depositions hearing on 19 July 2002.  Following committal he was remanded to call-over in the High Court at Auckland on 28 August and further remanded for trial on 18 November.  A pre-trial application was scheduled for 22 October, but the matters in issue were resolved by counsel for the Crown and the respondent.

[5]       In the course of preparing for trial counsel for the respondent decided that the respondent’s intellectual capacity warranted expert assessment.  He referred his client to Dr Susan Shaw, a neuropsychologist.  In a written report dated 1 November 2002 Dr Shaw advised that formal psychometric assessment of the respondent’s intellectual abilities placed him within the “borderline impaired” to “extremely low” range of the scale.  In her opinion the respondent’s intellectual difficulties made him very vulnerable to being taken advantage of and that he also appeared to suffer a mild psychiatric condition exacerbated by psychological stress. 

[6]       Counsel for the respondent decided that the neuropsychologist’s evidence was potentially helpful to the defence theory of the case, aspects…

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Details
Case
[2003] NZCA 57
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Court of Appeal of New Zealand heard an appeal from the Crown in the case of The Queen v William Peter Stephens. Stephens was acquitted on four counts of alleged sexual offences against a boy. The Crown sought to challenge the acquittals on the basis that the trial judge had improperly excluded evidence of admissions made by Stephens to a police officer. The question for the Court was whether the judge's ruling on the admissibility of the evidence was erroneous and if so, whether a new trial should be ordered. The Court found that the judge's ruling was based on an inappropriate consideration of a neuropsychological report that had not been properly admitted into evidence. However, the Court concluded that the exclusion of the evidence did not result in a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice, and therefore declined to set aside the acquittals or order a new trial.

The legal issues in this case centered around the admissibility of evidence and the appropriate circumstances under which a new trial may be ordered after an acquittal. The Court considered the principles of double jeopardy and the discretion of the Court of Appeal under section 382(2) of the Crimes Act to set aside an acquittal and order a new trial. The Court also considered the nature of the excluded evidence, its potential impact on the verdict, and the respondent's intellectual capacity and psychological vulnerability. The Court concluded that the exclusion of the evidence did not necessarily lead to an acquittal and that there was a reasonable possibility that the evidence might be excluded on a new trial on grounds of unfairness.

Background

Background to the litigation

In August 1997, the respondent, William Peter Stephens, admitted to a police officer that he had touched a boy's penis over his trousers on three or four occasions. These admissions were not sufficient to prompt a prosecution at the time. Four years later, the boy's mother observed conduct between the respondent and her son, leading to a complaint and the respondent's arrest. The respondent was indicted on four counts of alleged sexual offending against the boy between June 1997 and August 2001. Prior to the trial, the respondent's intellectual capacity was assessed by a neuropsychologist, who concluded that he fell within the "borderline impaired" to "extremely low" range of intellectual abilities. The respondent's counsel intended to challenge the admissibility of the 1997 admissions on the basis of the respondent's intellectual capacity. However, the judge ruled the evidence inadmissible on different grounds, leading to the Crown appealing the matter on a question of law.

The matter came before the Court of Appeal of New Zealand as a Crown appeal by way of Case Stated on a question of law, pursuant to s380 of the Crimes Act 1961. The appeal was heard on 26 February 2003, before Tipping J, McGrath J, and Anderson J. The Court of Appeal was asked to determine whether the trial judge was correct in finding the respondent's admissions were not voluntary due to his inability to comprehend the caution. The Court of Appeal was also asked if a new trial should be ordered due to the wrongful exclusion of the 1997 admissions.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Was the trial judge correct in finding the respondent's admissions were not voluntary due to his inability to comprehend the caution when no evidence of his intellect or lack of comprehension was presented during the s344A application?
2. Should a new trial be ordered because of the wrongful exclusion of the 1997 admissions?

Held
1. The Court held that the trial judge was not correct in finding the respondent's admissions were not voluntary due to his inability to comprehend the caution when no evidence of his intellect or lack of comprehension was presented during the s344A application.
2. The Court held that a new trial should not be ordered because of the wrongful exclusion of the 1997 admissions.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Court began by acknowledging that the trial judge's ruling on the admissibility of the respondent's admissions was made on an inappropriate basis, as there was no evidence presented to establish the respondent's intellectual capacity or lack of comprehension at the time of the s344A application. The Court emphasized that a court cannot properly take account of factual material not properly before it. However, even if the neuropsychologist's report had been properly in evidence, the Court found the trial judge's reasons for exclusion to be erroneous. The Court noted that the admissions should have been considered with reference to the Court's discretion to exclude on the grounds of unfairness, rather than voluntariness.

Regarding the second issue, the Court noted that the Crown had to persuade it that a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice was occasioned on the trial by the improper rejection of the 1997 admissions. The Court found that it was not satisfied that if the impugned evidence had been placed before the jury, the respondent would necessarily have been convicted on all or some of the counts. The Court also noted that there was a reasonable possibility that if a new trial were ordered, the evidence in question might be excluded on the grounds of unfairness. Considering these factors, the Court decided not to set aside the acquittals and declined to order a new trial. The Court emphasized the importance of the principle of double jeopardy and the need to demonstrate a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice before setting aside an acquittal.