IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF NEW ZEALAND
CA295/03
THE QUEEN
v
THOMAS CLYDE PARRISH
Hearing:26 November 2003
Coram:Gault P
Goddard J
Rodney Hansen JAppearances: P Kaye for Appellant
H D M Lawry for the Crown
Judgment:12 December 2003
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT DELIVERED BY GODDARD J
[1] The appellant was found guilty by a jury of murdering his wife on 12 July 2002. The couple had married in 1985 and separated in 1991, although they had continued to see one another on an intermittent basis. Following their separation the victim had moved into a flat in a large complex in Beachaven, Auckland. The appellant had remained in Kerikeri. By the time of her death the victim had formed an association with another man in the same complex. Early in 2002 the appellant, who had been diagnosed with prostate cancer, came to Auckland for necessary medical treatment. The victim agreed to provide him with accommodation whilst he was in Auckland for treatment. However, the arrangement broke down due to the appellant’s obsessiveness about his former wife and her new relationship. This obsession with the victim and her relationship apparently reached the point where he was, in effect, stalking her and making her life a misery. On sentencing, the trial Judge said he had no doubt that matters had reached a point where the victim had become terrified of the appellant; not least, because of his interest in and use of firearms. The Judge also reached a number of other conclusions about the appellant and his actions and intentions towards the victim in the weeks prior to her death. These findings and others in similar vein were traversed by the Judge in his sentencing remarks.
[2] On 11 July 2003, the Judge sentenced the appellant to life imprisonment with a minimum non-parole period of 13 years. It is against that minimum term of 13 years imprisonment that the appellant now appeals.
The ground of appeal
[3] The appeal was advanced on the ground that the sentencing Judge had erred in giving too much weight to particular aggravating factors, thereby attaching too much culpability to the appellant’s intentions and actions. It was submitted that a correct calculation of the appellant’s culpability, together with the mitigating features, rendered the imposition of a minimum sentence of 13 years imprisonment manifestly unjust.
The facts
[4] The Crown’s case at trial was that the appellant’s actions had amounted to a cold-blooded and premeditated murder. The defence theory at trial was that the victim was shot accidentally whilst she and the appellant were struggling to get possession of his rifle following an argument. The appellant gave evidence at trial, but his version of events was clearly not accepted by the jury.
[5] The facts, as summarised by the Judge in his sentencing remarks, were as follows:
In the weeks not long before the murder you made a number of threats against your wife to other people. Your obsession with her, coupled it seems with a perception…
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- AGLC
- The Queen v Parrish [2003] NZCA 290
- Case
- [2003] NZCA 290
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary issue in this appeal was whether the sentencing Judge had erred in giving too much weight to particular aggravating factors, thereby attaching too much culpability to Parrish's intentions and actions. Parrish argued that a correct calculation of his culpability, together with the mitigating features, rendered the imposition of a minimum sentence of 13 years imprisonment manifestly unjust.
The Court of Appeal found that the sentencing Judge had given careful consideration to the relevant principles of the new Sentencing Act 2002. The Judge identified the aggravating and mitigating factors of the case and found that the sentencing purposes of accountability, denunciation, deterrence, and protection of the community were particularly relevant. The Judge also found that the circumstances of the offending were sufficiently serious to justify a minimum sentence in excess of 10 years. However, the Court found that the Judge had not sufficiently recognised the mandatory nature of s104 of the Act. The Court held that once one or more of the prescribed circumstances in s104 had been identified, it was only in exceptional circumstances that the starting point of 17 years could be departed from. The Court found that Parrish's personal circumstances did not justify a departure from the mandatory minimum term in s104, and a minimum period of 13 years was a merciful sentence, fixed having regard to Parrish's age and state of health.
The appeal was dismissed, and the original sentence of life imprisonment with a minimum non-parole period of 13 years was upheld.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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