The Queen v Hill
[2009] NZCA 42
•27 February 2009
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF NEW ZEALAND
CA647/2008
[2009] NZCA 42
THE QUEEN
v
LEWIS HILL
Hearing: 18 February 2009
Court: Ellen France, Harrison and Cooper JJ Counsel: M Datt for Appellant
M D Downs for Crown
Judgment: 27 February 2009 at 10.00 am
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
The appeal is allowed and the conviction is set aside.
REASONS OF THE COURT
(Given by Harrison J)
R V HILL CA CA647/2008 [27 February 2009]
Introduction
[1] Mr Lewis Hill was convicted following trial before a Judge alone in the indictable jurisdiction of the District Court at Hamilton on one charge of aggravated burglary.
[2] Mr Hill appeals on a number of grounds. The only arguable issue is whether
or not the Judge’s finding that at the time of entering the premises Mr Hill intended
to commit a crime therein is unreasonable.
Background
[3] Mr Hill and the complainant, Mr Norman Charlton, both lived in Huntly. Motor vehicles driven by each of them collided in the township one evening in early February 2007. Mr Hill’s vehicle then pursued Mr Charlton’s vehicle. Both cars were driven aggressively before a confrontation occurred. The circumstances were plainly acrimonious but neither man was physically injured.
[4] Mr Hill subsequently learned of Mr Charlton’s residential address which he visited on 16 February. He said that he went there to find out why Mr Charlton had tried to run him down. He said that he took with him a baseball bat for the purposes of protecting himself and of damaging Mr Charlton’s car as retribution for the damage caused to his vehicle during the earlier incident. Mr Hill entered the property and walked to the house. Having left the baseball bat outside on the deck, Mr Hill entered into the lounge through a ranch slider door where he encountered Mr Charlton.
[5] The events which immediately followed were in contest at trial. Mr Hill alleged that he and Mr Charlton were involved in a brief scuffle before the latter drew a knife and approached him. Mr Hill said that he then retrieved the bat from the deck and used it in self defence. He struck Mr Charlton on the head causing moderate injuries.
District Court
[6] Mr Hill was charged with two offences: (1) aggravated burglary in that while committing burglary of Mr Charlton’s premises he had a weapon with him, namely a baseball bat; and (2) injuring with intent to cause grievous bodily harm (or alternatively with intent to injure).
[7] Messrs Charlton and Hill gave evidence at trial along with other witnesses. Judge Clark reserved her decision. She made adverse credibility findings against Mr Charlton but not against Mr Hill. She acquitted Mr Hill on the second count of injuring with intent to cause grievous bodily harm on the ground that the Crown had failed to prove that Mr Hill did not act in self defence.
[8] However, Judge Clark found Mr Hill guilty of the first count of aggravated burglary. It was common ground that he entered Mr Charlton’s premises unlawfully. The threshold issue was whether or not he intended to commit a crime at that point. The Judge was satisfied that he did. The grounds for her conclusion are as follows:
[17] [Mr Hill’s] explanation is that he intended to smash the complainant’s car and took the bat with him for that purpose. The car in this case was outside the property, and in this case the crime of burglary in my view is not really alleged in respect of the car outside, although there were references to whether the yard was enclosed or not. That however, the car outside and the intention to damage it, affect the issue as to whether a burglary has been committed, and is relevant more to [Mr Hill’s] state of mind. [Mr Hill] said he wanted to seek an explanation from the complainant and there was no intention of committing a crime inside the James Henry Crescent premises.
[18] That explanation needs to be seen in light of the following matters.
[Mr Hill] was clearly angry. He had stewed on this matter for a number of days. He had already placed the matter in the hands of the police, who
should have been the organisation responsible for seeking any explanation.
He took a baseball bat with him and placed it to the side of the door, making
it readily available. He did not knock on the door and stand back and wait for the occupant to answer with any intended discussion being held at the door.
[19] Immediately upon entry, and confronting [Mr Charlton], there was a scuffle. At no time did [Mr Hill] make it clear that he was simply there to talk, for example by backing off, holding his hands up, indicating that he was not there to fight or scuffle, and having pushed [Mr Charlton] away, [Mr Hill] did not immediately retreat.
[20] As a result of those factual findings I reject [Mr Hill’s] explanation that he was simply there to get an explanation. Having rejected [Mr Hill’s] account, I am satisfied that there was an intention to commit a crime, and accordingly burglary is proved.
Appeal
[9] Mr Hill through his counsel, Ms Meena Datt, submits that Judge Clark had insufficient evidence to support the conclusion that Mr Hill intended to commit a crime when he entered the premises. In legal terms, as Mr Mathew Downs for the Crown submits, the question is whether or not the verdict is unreasonable or cannot
be supported having regard to the evidence: s 385(1)(a) Crimes Act 1961.
[10] We agree with Ms Datt. We can explain our reasons shortly.
[11] Judge Clark did not identify the crime which she says Mr Hill intended to commit on entering Mr Charlton’s house. Like Mr Downs, we assume she was referring to the crime of assault. Her inference of guilty intent was based on findings
of fact that Mr Hill was angry at the relevant time; that he took the bat to the side of the door, making it readily available; that he failed to wait there for an invitation to enter; that immediately upon entry he was involved in a scuffle with Mr Charlton; and that he continued to engage in a physical fight instead of retreating.
[12] We do not regard these facts whether treated individually or in combination
as logically supporting an inference of guilty intent or as justifying rejection of
Mr Hill’s evidence that he entered Mr Charlton’s house ‘to get an explanation’ for
his previous conduct. Mr Hill freely acknowledged that he took the baseball bat to Mr Charlton’s property for the purpose of smashing his car. That unchallenged evidence is consistent with an intent to use the weapon to commit the crime of wilful damage. In this respect it is relevant that Mr Hill was charged with unlawful entry of the premises, not of the property.
[13] Neither was Mr Hill challenged on his evidence that he left the bat outside the door and entered the house unarmed. Judge Clark expressly found that he placed the bat immediately ‘outside the ranch slider door to defend himself’: at [12].
Logically, if Mr Hill intended to use the weapon to assault Mr Charlton, he would have retained physical possession throughout. The Judge’s finding that he acted deliberately in leaving the weapon outside the house, even if it remained within his physical control, is inconsistent with proof of an intention to assault Mr Charlton once inside. So, too, is the Judge’s finding to the effect that Mr Hill only resorted to use of the bat in self defence after he was attacked.
Result
[14] Accordingly we are satisfied that the decision to convict was unreasonable and Mr Hill’s appeal is allowed. His conviction is set aside with the effect that he is acquitted on the charge of aggravated burglary.
Solicitors:
Berman and Burton, Auckland, for Appellant
Crown Law Office, Wellington
8
0
0