The Queen v H
[2010] NZHC 17
•4 February 2010
This case has been anonymized
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND
AUCKLAND REGISTRY
CRI-2009-043-001288
THE QUEEN
v
H
Hearing: 24 November and 9 December 2009, and
4 February 2010
Appearances: D A Bell for the Crown
G C Gotlieb and J D Pennick for the Prisoner
Judgment: 4 February 2010
SENTENCE OF DUFFY J
Counsel: G C Gotlieb P O Box 47369 Ponsonby Auckland 1144, and J D Pennick
14 Greenslade Crescent Northcote North Shore 0627, for the Accused
Solicitors: Meredith Connell P O Box 2213 Shortland Street Auckland 1140 for the Crown
R V H HC AK CRI-2009-043-001288 4 February 2010
[1] Ms H , since you have withdrawn the s 106 application for a discharge without conviction, I now have to enter convictions against you on the four charges
to which you pleaded guilty.
[2] Ms H , having pleaded guilty to four charges of possession of methamphetamine for supply under s 6(1)(e) and s 6(2)(c) of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1975, you are hereby convicted on all four charges.
[3] Ms H , the charges to which you have pleaded guilty carry a maximum penalty of life imprisonment, and under s 6(4), there is a presumption of imprisonment for offences of this nature.
[4] The police summary of facts shows that:
a) On 17 December 2008, you purchased five grams of methamphetamine, for $3,500;
b) On 30 December 2008, you purchased four grams for $2,000;
c) On 4 to 5 January 2009, you purchased 10 grams for $6,000; and
d) On 27 January 2009, you purchased 14 grams for $6,000.
All purchases were from a supplier by the name of Pauline Bishop. The total amount
of methamphetamine you obtained from Ms Bishop comes to 33 grams. Of the four purchases of methamphetamine, three of them were of amounts in excess of the presumption in s 6(6), which deems the possession of five grams or more of a class A drug to be for the purposes of supply.
[5] At the time you entered your guilty pleas, the Court which took the pleas refrained from entering convictions against you on the ground that you would be making an application for a discharge without conviction. I consider it is very much to your credit that today you have responsibly recognised that your circumstances do not warrant a discharge without conviction.
[6] Before applying the relevant principles of sentencing to your offending, it is necessary for me to make factual findings on the nature of your offending as it was described in the disputed facts hearing which I heard last year. At that hearing you disputed the Crown’s contention that there was an element of commercial supply in your offending. You accept that you have committed the offence of supplying methamphetamine, but you contend that your supply was limited to giving it to your former husband,Tony H , and that you have never dealt in methamphetamine. Today you will have heard the Crown concede that it accepts there was no commerciality in your offending.
[7] Before dealing with the facts and working my way through the principles of sentencing, I will say now that I do not intend to impose a sentence of imprisonment.
[8] As a result of the evidence I heard at the disputed facts hearing, I have concluded that there is no evidence to suggest you obtained methamphetamine for a commercial purpose. Your evidence, which I accept, was that you obtained the drug
to provide relief to Mr H to mitigate the stupifying side effects of the pain relief medication he was taking, so that before he died he could enjoy better communication with the young teenage son you and he have.
[9] Apart from your own evidence, I have reached the conclusion there was no commercial purpose of your offending because there is no evidence of the usual indicia of drug dealing being found in your possession. For example, you were not found in possession of large sums of money, which you were unable to explain. In your case, there had been a recent matrimonial property settlement, and the police were able to trace the money you used to purchase the methamphetamine. It was clear that the funds you used came from a legitimate source; namely, the sale of matrimonial property. Nor were you found to be in possession of what are known as “tick books” in which drug dealers regularly record the amounts of drugs supplied, and the amounts owed to them. A set of scales and a glass methamphetamine pipe were found when police searched your home, but you have said that this pipe belonged to your partner, Barry. Whether it did or not, it does not provide evidence from which I could have drawn an inference that you were commercially supplying methamphetamine. Possession of a methamphetamine pipe points to use of the drug, rather than to supply to others. Nor do I consider that the set of scales found at your
home can of themselves supply evidence to support an inference of commercial dealing. It is just as probable that someone who was obtaining methamphetamine at the amounts you obtained from a supplier might use scales in order to check the amount received. You have denied doing this, but I note that the transcripts of text messages the police obtained included one where you were recorded as advising your supplier that a previous amount you had bought was short in weight, and you queried whether you should pay less for the next amount, or get an extra amount to make up for the previous shortfall. You could only have known that if the amounts received were being weighed on their receipt.
[10] There is also the evidence obtained by the police which records a discussion you had with your supplier about her supplying methamphetamine to your stepson.
At the time these communications were made, you were someone who was obtaining methamphetamine from the supplier. If you were going to supply commercially to others, the opportunity of satisfying your stepson’s desire for methamphetamine was available to you. But rather than do that, you essentially acted as a go-between between him and your supplier. Whilst this in itself can amount to a separate offence of aiding and abetting in the supply of methamphetamine, it is evidence which contradicts a suggestion that you were commercially dealing in methamphetamine.
[11] Furthermore, there is the fact that although this was a police operation that covered a long period of time, your purchases covered a six week period which stopped in February 2009, a time which coincided with the death of Mr H . Having heard your evidence, and weighed that up against the other evidence available to me, I have concluded that there is nothing to show that you were in the business of commercial supply. And today the Crown has reached the same conclusion.
[12] Nonetheless, your offending is relatively severe. You are someone who has procured a total of 33 grams of methamphetamine, and provided it to another person
for his use. The supply of class A drugs is far more serious than the supply of other classes of drugs within the Misuse of Drugs Act. Indeed, Parliament, in s 6(4) of the Act, has indicated that generally possession of methamphetamine for supply should result in a sentence of imprisonment. Your explanation has been that you obtained the methamphetamine to help your terminally ill former husband. It has not,
however, been made clear to me that there were no medically prescribed drugs available that could have a similar effect in alleviating the stupifying side effects of the pain relief he was taking; and I have heard nothing from a qualified medical practitioner to support any basis for saying the methamphetamine was of unique assistance when it came to alleviating those side effects.
[13] In any event, methamphetamine is a class A controlled drug. It is no excuse
for persons to attempt to justify their involvement with this drug on the ground it is
of medicinal benefit. Such explanations carry no weight. In Filo v Police HC Wellington CRI 2007-485-61, 13 September 2007, a case of an application for a discharge under s 106 of the Sentencing Act 2002, where the offender had used cannabis for medicinal purposes, the Court refused a discharge, and did not place any weight on the purpose for which the cannabis was being used.
[14] You have attempted to suggest that your offending was victimless, but I do not accept that. You must realise that by purchasing drugs from Ms Bishop, you provided revenue to the dealer and, further downstream, the importer or manufacturer of the methamphetamine and that, in doing so, you assisted in the illicit operations of those persons. In this admittedly indirect way, you did contribute to the overall harm methamphetamine does to the community.
[15] There is also evidence of your own use of methamphetamine, although it is said to have been in the past and infrequent. But, when searched by police, you were found with a ziplock bag with traces of methamphetamine in your wallet. Such bags are generally known as point bags, because they are used to contain supplies of point one of a gram of methamphetamine. Your explanation was that you had forgotten it was in your wallet. But, nonetheless, this evidence, when taken together with the evidence of your willingness to assist your stepson to obtain his own supply of methamphetamine, reveals you are not a stranger to this drug. It shows that you are someone who was prepared to engage in the illegal use of a class A controlled drug. It is perhaps for that reason today that you have sensibly recognised that this aspect of your character alone would have made it difficult for you to obtain a discharge without conviction.
[16] The pre-sentence report recommended a sentence of home detention, and reported that there was no difficulty in you serving a sentence of home detention from your current address. The report writer has assessed you as having a low risk
of re-offending, and being a good candidate for an electronically monitored sentence. You have acknowledged to the report writer the negative effects of methamphetamine, although you said you believed you were doing the right thing at the time.
[17] You are the mother of two children, a teenage boy and a 10 month old baby. You were once a successful business woman, having established the “Moontide Swimwear” company when you were 18 years old. The business was sold in 2008, and you now receive the domestic purposes benefit. You have a supportive family, and your mother regularly travels to Taranaki to help with child care. The support you enjoy from your family is visible to me today, with your mother’s presence here today, and also that of your teenage son.
[18] Under the Sentencing Act, to arrive at a final sentence I am required to identify an appropriate starting point. The Crown started off with the submission that a starting point of four and a half years was appropriate and in accordance with the tariff set out in R v Fatu [2006] 2 NZLR 72 (CA). However, this was said on the basis your conduct involved commercial supply. The Crown now accepts it does not and, as I understand the Crown, it has moved away from a starting point of four and a half years.
[19] Nonetheless, the Crown has identified aggravating features of the offending
as being the socially destructive characteristics of methamphetamine, and the amount
of methamphetamine supplied. The Crown identifies relevant mitigating factors as being your guilty plea and lack of previous convictions.
[20] On your behalf, your counsel points to your remorse and your willingness to make a substantial donation to any drug rehabilitation centre. Your counsel has identified the following mitigating facts:
a) Your purchase of the methamphetamine was not for the purpose of your own financial gain;
b) There was nothing to suggest you supplied anyone, other than
Mr H ;
c) Your admitted use of methamphetamine, it is said, is not relevant to your sentencing;
d)The glass methamphetamine pipes and scales found in your home have not been attributed to your ownership;
e) The fact that one of your partners is now in prison for drug use is said
to be irrelevant, and I accept that is so;
f) It is said your actions regarding your stepson and assisting him to obtain methamphetamine are not relevant. I consider that they do have some relevance in that they are a factor to take into account in terms of assessing your overall character; and
g) I do accept the submission that it is in your favour that you did not supply methamphetamine to your stepson, even though it would have been possible for you to do so.
[21] Your counsel submits that in terms of Fatu, your case falls within band 2, which normally attracts a starting point of between three to nine years’ imprisonment. However, Fatu at [42] states that a lack of commerciality and aggravating features allows sentencing judges to sentence beneath the bands.
[22] In R v MacPherson HC Hamilton CRI 2006-019-1950, 11 May 2006, Ellen France J indicated that the method of analysis in Fatu may be of limited applicability to cases involving non-commercial giving of a large quantity of methamphetamine. Thus, your counsel submits that the assistance of Fatu should be considered with caution, if considered at all.
[23] Your counsel submits that the disputed facts hearing has demonstrated that neither of the Crown’s alleged aggravating features are present. The social harm and addictive nature of methamphetamine, it is said, is not a relevant consideration, as
the drug was provided to a terminally ill person for medical reasons only. I do not accept that because, as I have already commented, indirectly by supporting manufacturers and dealers of methamphetamine, you have contributed to the social harm.
[24] It is also submitted that commerciality should not be assumed from the amount of money you spent on methamphetamine. I have already indicated that is correct.
[25] Your counsel has submitted that you should receive a full one-third credit for
a guilty plea in that, insofar as the Crown has suggested that you did not enter a guilty plea promptly in terms of the requirements expressed in the recent Court of Appeal decision in R v Hessell [2009] NCA 450, it is said that you should not be held to those requirements because the judgment was delivered after you had entered a plea. You could not, therefore, have known of the requirements stipulated in Hessell for obtaining a full benefit of a guilty plea. I understand the sense in what you say, it fits with and is analogous to the common law principle against retrospectivity in penal legislation discussed in R v Pora [2001] 2 NZLR 37 (CA). But I am bound by the Court of Appeal’s decision in Hessell as at [74], the Court of Appeal said:
The new guideline should be applied to all sentencing taking place from tomorrow on …
[26] It was only in those cases where sentencing indications had already been given and relied on by defendants that sentencing judges were to adhere to those indications rather than follow the Hessell guideline, unless the guideline yielded a more favourable result than the indication.
[27] Given this statement in Hessell, I consider that I have to treat the entry of your guilty plea in accordance with the guidelines Hessell sets out. I do not consider, therefore, that the entry of a guilty plea at the deposition stage can be said to qualify as the entry of a guilty plea at the first reasonable opportunity, which would entitle you to a full discount.
[28] Your counsel has submitted the appropriate starting point is one of
18 months. It is submitted I should give a 40 per cent discount from the starting point, and there is reliance on R v Flavell HC Auckland CRI-2008-092-7352, 21 November 2008 where a 40 per cent discount was given for a guilty plea at the earliest opportunity.
[29] I am asked to give significant weight to your personal circumstances, due to the unusual facts of the case, and it is submitted that a discount greater than that in Flavell is warranted; here, it is said to be 50 to 60 per cent.
[30] Your counsel says I should give credit to you as a first offender, who has co- operated with the police, and that is correct. You have been willing to give evidence
for the Crown at the trials of the co-accused, if required; and it is submitted that when all relevant discounts are applied, the final imprisonment term is well below one year, and thus, a community-based sentence (either community work or home detention) should be substituted for a term of imprisonment.
[31] It is said on your behalf that your offending was the consequence of an emotionally overwhelming situation, and is deserving of the Court’s leniency.
Principles and purposes of sentencing
[32] In reaching a decision on the appropriate sentence, I am required to take into account the principles and purposes of sentencing. For the purposes of sentencing, I consider the relevant purposes are:
i) to hold you accountable for the harm done by the offending (s 7(1)(a));
ii)to promote a sense of responsibility and acknowledgement of harm (s 7(1)(b));
iii) to denounce the conduct in which you were involved
(s 7(1)(e));
iv)to deter you and other persons from committing a similar offence (s 7(1)(f));
v) to protect the community (s 7(1)(g)); and
vi) to assist in your rehabilitation and reintegration (s 7(1)(h)).
[33] In terms of the principles of sentencing, I consider the relevant principles to take into account are:
i) the gravity of the offending, including the degree of culpability
(s 8(a));
ii)the seriousness of the type of offence in comparison with other offences (s 8(b));
iii) the general desirability of consistency (s 8(e));
iv) I must impose the least restrictive outcome that is appropriate
in the circumstances, in accordance with the hierarchy of sentences and orders set out in the Sentencing Act (s8(g)); and
v)I must take into account any particular circumstances that mean that a sentence or other means of dealing with you that would otherwise be appropriate would, in the particular instance, be disproportionately severe (s 8(h)).
Aggravating and mitigating factors
[34] In terms of the aggravating features of your offending, those that I consider relevant are premeditation: you bought the drugs on at least four occasions, and there was a significant text message correspondence involved in setting up the sales. This is not a significant factor, but it was present.
[35] Methamphetamine is a dangerous and addictive drug. Even though you were not supplying it to the general public, it should still be recognised that this drug has
become a scourge in our society and, by purchasing the drug, you have helped to keep the manufacturers and suppliers of the drug in business.
[36] I accept, in terms of mitigating factors, the lack of commerciality involved in your conduct, and I accept you were supplying to one person, and that that was done
in circumstances that would have been emotionally overwhelming. I accept you did not charge Mr H for the supplies.
[37] There are no aggravating factors in relation to yourself.
[38] In terms of mitigating factors, there is the guilty plea on the day of depositions, and I consider a discount should be given, although not the maximum discount. As I have already said, this is due to the guidelines in Hessell which apply to all sentencing after 2 October 2010.
[39] You are entitled to a discount for your good character in that you have no previous convictions, and I also consider you are entitled to credit in sentencing for the responsible attitude you have demonstrated today in withdrawing the application for a discharge without conviction. That to me indicates you fully realise the seriousness of your offending and are remorseful for it.
Relevant case law
[40] Cases which I consider relevant to a starting point are R v White HC Auckland CRI 2006-019-1754, 30 June 2006 where Asher J, in relation to a total weight of methamphetamine of 25.7 grams, adopted a starting point of four years.
[41] R v Yorston HC Auckland CRI 2005-004-18740, 19 May 2006, where Priestley J, in dealing with 25.88 grams of methamphetamine, adopted a starting point of four years, three months.
[42] R v Reti HC Auckland CRI 2004-044-4049, 16 December 2005, where
Allan J on one charge of possession of methamphetamine for supply, an amount of
30 grams, found the case to be at the lowest end of band 2, calling for a starting point
of three years.
[43] In R v De Serville HC Auckland CRI 2006-004-18441, 29 August 2008, where Lang J, dealing with an amount 30 grams, adopted a starting point of four and a half years.
[44] In all those case, however, there was some element of commerciality, where here there is not, and that to me justifies a lower starting point.
[45] Under normal circumstances where there is an element of commerciality, offending which involved 33 grams of methamphetamine would attract a starting point of between four and five years’ imprisonment. However, as you were only supplying to your former husband, there is the mitigating factor of a lack of commerciality being present. This places your offending at the very bottom of band 2, or indeed, in terms of the principle in MacPherson, it may remove it from band 2 altogether. I consider that however it is formulated. the appropriate starting point here is one of three years’ imprisonment. I find the case of Reti particularly helpful, as that case involved 30 grams of methamphetamine, and there there was a starting point of three years.
[46] It should be emphasised that your case, Ms H , has unique facts, which means that a strict application of the bands in Fatu is not justified and, as I have said in this regard, the approach suggested in MacPherson, where a departure from the bands in Fatu may be warranted is relevant.
[47] I do not consider your motive for your offending to have much weight in the sentence I determine. The fact that you were supplying your terminally ill former husband with drugs to help him is not an excuse for your offending. There is authority in drugs cases that having a good motive does not excuse your illegal conduct. For example, in R v Heremaia HC Whangarei CRI 2008-088-002483, 14 October 2008, Venning J commented that the fact that Heremaia was selling cannabis to obtain funds to enable her family to travel to Auckland to support her mother during her chemotherapy treatment for cancer could not justify her offending.
[48] Similarly, in R v Wong HC Auckland CRI 2008-092-012448, 5 May 2009, Priestley J also touched on this point. He found a drug courier’s motive for bringing
drugs into New Zealand was to earn money to fund his father’s cancer treatment in
Hong Kong, and said (at [21]):
Although that type of motivation can engage the Court’s sympathy it cannot and should not justify this type of offending. Nor can it be given significant mitigating weight.
[49] I consider the only relevance that the unique personal circumstances of this case have is that they remove any notion of commerciality from the supply of the methamphetamine, which is a key factor in the choice of a starting point.
[50] Having adopted a starting point of three years, I consider that when I take into account your guilty plea and, in addition to that, your previous good character, your co-operation with the police, your responsible attitude in acknowledging today that convictions should be entered, and I give some minor weight to the emotional pressure you would have been under when you supplied your former husband with the drugs, I reach the view that a total discount of one-third is appropriate. This would bring the final end sentence down to two years’ imprisonment, which, in turn, qualifies you for home detention.
[51] Everything I have seen in the pre-sentence report informs me that you are a suitable candidate for home detention. The Sentencing Act requires me to impose the least restrictive outcome. I consider that a sentence of home detention is the appropriate sentence to impose on you. Your counsel has suggested that I consider a sentence of community work but, given the nature of the drug, and the amount supplied, I consider that home detention is the least restrictive sentence I can impose on you, and that is why I will not impose any lesser sentence.
[52] In terms of home detention, lest anyone think that this is dealing with someone who is supplying methamphetamine too lightly, I refer to the Court of Appeal’s comments in R v Hill [2008] NZCA 41, [2008] 2 NZLR 381 where it was said of a sentence of home detention at [33]:
The sentence of home detention reflects a perception that society’s interests are better served in some cases by the imposition of restrictions on liberty through home detention rather than through imprisonment.
[53] I consider that someone who is the mother of a young child, and who is at minimal risk of re-offending, and given the unique circumstances of this case, is better suited to serving a sentence of home detention than to serve a sentence of imprisonment. However, given the gravity of the offending, I consider that I should sentence you to the maximum term of 11 months’ home detention. I will also impose the conditions recommended in the report on your suitability for home detention.
[54] Ms H , will you please stand.
[55] On each charge of possession of methamphetamine for supply, you are sentenced to home detention. Those sentences will be served at the same time. You are by no later than 5.00 pm on Saturday, 6 February 2010 to return and to remain at your address at 634 Upper Petone Road, Oakura, and there await the arrival of the probation officer and a representative of the security company. You are to comply with all conditions of the sentence of home detention, and you are not to consume any illicit drugs for the term of home detention. Although there was a suggestion that I should also impose a restriction on the consumption of alcohol, I will not do so.
Duffy J
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